COOK'S LECTURES

BIOLOGY.

TRANSCENDENTALISM.

ORTHODOXY.

Boston Monday Lectures.

LECTURES

ON

BIOLOGY
TRANSCENDENTALISM
ORTHODOXY

WITH THE PRELUDES ON CURRENT EVENTS

AND

ANALYTICAL INDICES.

BY

JOSEPH COOK.

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INTRODUCTION.

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THE object of the Boston Monday Lectures is to present the results of the freshest German, English, and American scholarships on the more important and difficult topics concerning the relation of Religion and Science.

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BIOLOGY.

I.

HUXLEY AND TYNDALL ON EVOLUTION.[1]

"None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are, therefore, unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules, or the identity of their properties, to the operation of any of the causes which we call *natural*. The quality of each molecule gives it the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent."—Professor CLERK MAXWELL, "Lecture delivered before the British Association at Bradford," in *Nature*, vol. viii. p. 441.

"There is a wider teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of evolution. The teleological and the mechanical views of Nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The teleologist can always defy the evolutionist to disprove that the primordial molecular arrangement was not *intended* to evolve the phenomena of the universe."—Professor T. H. HUXLEY in *The Academy* for October 1869, No. 1, p. 13.

IN 1868 Professor Huxley, in an elaborate paper in the "Microscopical Journal," announced his belief that the gelatinous substance found in the ooze of the beds of the deep seas is a sheet of living matter extending around the globe. The stickiness of the deep-sea mud, he maintained, is due to innumerable lumps of a transparent, jelly-like substance, each lump consisting of granules, coccoliths, and foreign bodies, embedded in a transparent, colourless, and structureless matrix. It was his serious claim that these granule-heaps, *and* the transparent gelatinous matter in which they are embedded, represent masses of protoplasm.

1. To this amazingly strategic and haughtily-trumpeted substance found at the lowest bottoms of the oceans Huxley gave the scientific name Bathybius, from two Greek words meaning *deep* and *life*, and assumed that it was in the past, and would be in the future, the progenitor of all the life on the planet. "Bathybius," was his language, "is a vast sheet of living matter enveloping the whole earth beneath the seas."

[1] The forty-sixth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in the Meionaon, Oct. 2, 1876.

2. No less a man than David Friedrich Strauss, who, in 1872, wrote "The Old Faith and New," his last work, used Bathybius as a presumably triumphant keystone of the physiological portion of his argument against the belief in the supernatural.[1] This deep-sea ooze he made the bridge between the inorganic and the organic. "At least two miracles or revelations," wrote Jean Paul Richter, face to face with the French Revolution, "remain for you uncontested in this age, which deadens sound with unreverberating materials. They resemble an Old and a New Testament, and are these,—the birth of finite being and the birth of life within the hard wood of matter. In one inexplicable every other is involved, and one miracle annihilates a whole philosophy."[2] It is very noteworthy, that, according to Strauss's own final admission in 1872, miracle must be confessed to have occurred once at least at the introduction of life, unless some method of filling up the chasm between the dead and the living forms of matter can be found. Bathybius was to occupy this gap. "Huxley," wrote Strauss, "has discovered the Bathybius, a shining heap of jelly on the sea-bottom; Häckel, what he has called the Moneres, structureless clots of an albuminous carbon, which, although inorganic in their constitution, yet are all capable of nutrition and accretion. By these the chasm may be said to be bridged, and the transition effected from the inorganic to the organic. *As long as the contrast between inorganic and organic, lifeless and living nature, was understood as an absolute one, as long as the conception of a special vital force was retained, there was no possibility of spanning the chasm without the aid of a miracle.*"[3] As devout believers in Bathybius, educated men—Strauss affirmed in the name of what he mistook for German culture—could no longer be Christians. Bathybius had expelled miracle. Thus in 1868 and 1873 Bathybius was the watchword of the acutest anti-supernaturalistic discussions, and was adopted as a victorious weapon by Strauss, when, with his dying hand, he was using his last opportunity to equip his philosophy with armour. Men have trembled before Strauss's negation of the supernatural. Bathybius was his chief support of that denial. Huxley called his discovery *Bathybius Häckelii*. Ernst Häckel, well knowing what stupendous issues were at stake, elaborately applauded the discovery.

3. Great microscopists and physiologists, like Professor Lionel Beale and Dr. Carpenter, rejected Huxley's testimony on this matter of fact. Dr. Wallich, in 1869, in the "Monthly Microscopical Journal," presented evidence that the deep-sea ooze has nothing in it to confirm Huxley's views. The ship "Challenger," engaged now in deep-sea soundings, has accumulated evidence of the same sort; and at present Bathybius is a scientific myth and a by-word of derision. "Bathybius," says Professor Lionel Beale in his work on "Protoplasm" (London, 1874, pp. 110, 368, 371), which the "North British Review" well calls one of the most remarkable books of the age,

[1] The Old Faith and New, sect. 48. [2] Levana, sect. 38.
[3] The Old Faith and New, sect. 48.

"instead of being a widely-extending sheet of living protoplasm, which grows at the expense of inorganic elements, is rather to be regarded as a complex mass of slime, with many foreign bodies and the *debris* of living organisms which have passed away. Numerous minute living forms are, however, still found upon it." At the meeting of the German Naturalists' Association at Hamburg, in September 1876, Bathybius was publicly interred. It was my fortune to converse for a while, lately, with Professor Dana of Yale College, when I put to him the question, "Does Bathybius bear the microscope?" He replied, "You know that, in a late number of 'The American Journal of Science and Arts,' Huxley has withdrawn his adhesion to his theory about Bathybius." Thus the ship "Challenger" has challenged the assertion with which Strauss challenged the world; and Huxley himself has left Bathybius to take its place with other ghosts of not blessed memory in the history of hasty speculation.

4. *Nevertheless*, in his New York definition of the doctrine of evolution, Professor Huxley speaks of a "gelatinous mass, which, so far as our present knowledge goes, is the common foundation of all life." As, by his own confession, no such gelatinous mass has ever been observed, his popular assertion that our "knowledge" goes "so far" as to establish that this gelatinous mass not only exists, but is the foundation of all life, is contradictory of his published retraction of his theory before scholars. The observed Bathybius having turned out to be a myth, its place is now occupied by an inferential Bathybius. The chasm between the inorganic and the organic was not bridged by the results of actual observation; but it must yet be bridged, even if only with a guess and a recanted theory. This substitution of the inferential for the observed is unscientific. A primary fault of Professor Huxley's latest definition of the basis of evolution is self-contradiction.

Huxley persists in his forced recantation in spite of all the alleged discoveries in the Bay of Biscay and the Adriatic. But the gelatinous mass, which, according to Huxley's New York Lectures, is the common foundation of all life, he defined. His words permit no doubt that he meant Bathybius and its associated forms of life, as Häckel does in similar language, and not protoplasm in the minute forms in which it exists in the living tissues of to-day. Huxley affirmed in New York, that, "if we traced back the animal and vegetable world, we should find, preceding what now exists, animals and plants not identical with them, but like them, only increasing their differences as we go back in time, and at the same time becoming simpler and simpler, until finally *we should arrive* at the gelatinous mass, which, so far as our present *knowledge* goes, is the common foundation of all life. The tendency of science is to justify the speculation that that also could be traced farther back, perhaps to the general nebulous condition of matter."[1]

Very plainly, by *this* gelatinous mass, at which we should "arrive"

[1] Tribune Pamphlet Report, p. 16.

by a process of investigation carried backward to the first living organisms and to the nebulous condition of matter, Huxley does *not* mean protoplasm in minute forms in the veins of the nettle, and in the other living tissues of to-day, and in them constituting what his famous lecture of a few years ago called "the physical basis of life." But he affirmed that our "knowledge," and not merely our theory, goes "so far" as to show that *this* gelatinous mass is "the foundation of all life."

In view of his recantation as to this sheet of living matter beneath the seas, this assertion is self-contradictory. Since no such gelatinous mass has ever been seen, the substitution of an inferential for an observed sheet of living slime enveloping the world is unscientific. With the argument of Huxley, that of Strauss takes its place among exploded and ludicrous errors.

5. It follows, also, from the facts now stated, that *Professor Huxley's New York Lectures are defective in omitting the most essential part of their subject; that is, in failing to explain how evolution bridges the chasm between the inorganic and the organic, or the lifeless and the living forms of matter.*

6. There have been and are at least three schools of evolutionists, —those who deny the Divine existence, those who ignore it, and those who affirm it; or the atheistic, the agnostic, and the theistic. Carl Vogt, Büchner, and Moleschott belong to the atheistic school of evolutionists; Huxley and Tyndall and Spencer, to the agnostic; Dana, Gray, Owen, Dawson, Carpenter, Sir J. Herschell, Sir W. Thomson, and, in the judgment of Professor Gray, Darwin himself, to the theistic.

7. Of the theistic form of the doctrine of evolution, there are theoretically three varieties: (1) That which limits the supernatural action in the origination of species to the creation of a few primordial cells; (2) That which makes Divine action in the origination of species chiefly indirect, or through the agency of natural causes, and yet sometimes direct, or through special creation; (3) That which makes God immanent in all natural law, and regards every result of cosmic forces as the outcome of present Divine action.

8. In the history of the discussion of evolution, the origin of species among plants and animals has been explained by at least seven distinct hypotheses:—

(1.) Self-elevation by appetency, or use and effort. That is the theory of Monboddo, Lamarck, and Cope.

(2.) Modification by the surrounding condition of the medium. That is Geoffrey St. Hillaire, Quatrefages, Draper, and Spencer.

(3.) Natural selection under the struggle for existence, with spontaneous variability, causing the survival of the fittest. That is Darwin and Häckel.

(4.) Derivation by pre-ordained succession of organic forms under an innate tendency or internal force. That is Owen and Mivart.

(5.) Evolution by unconscious intelligence. That is Morell, Laycock, and Murphy.

(6.) Immanent action and direction of Divine power, working by

the purposive collocation and adjustment of natural forces, acting without breaks ; or the theory of *creative evolution.* That is Asa Gray, Baden Powell, and the Duke of Argyll.

(7.) The same immanent Divine power collocating and adjusting natural forces, but with breaks of special intervention, and this notably in the case of man. That is Dana, and Darwin's great co-discoverer of evolution, Alfred Wallace.[1]

What Huxley calls the Miltonic theory of creation, he did well not to call the biblical ; for it is generally admitted by specialists in exegetical science, that the writings of Moses neither fix the date, nor definitely describe the mode, of creation. Professor Dana, in the closing chapter of his celebrated "Geology," exhibits the first chapter of Genesis as thoroughly harmonious with geology, and as both true and divine. Many theologians combine their distinctive positions with some theistic view of evolution, especially with that held by Professor Dana. Owenism seems at least as sure of a future as unmodified Darwinism. Dana and Häckel represent respectively, I should say, the use and the abuse of the theory of evolution.

9. It is thus evident, from the history of recent speculation alone, that there are, or well may be, at least thirty different views as to the past history of nature ; but Professor Huxley affirms, that, so far as he knows, "there have been, and well can be, only three." That nature has existed from eternity, and that it arose, according to the Miltonic hypothesis, in six natural days, and that it originated by evolution, of which latter he gives a definition,—these are his three theories ; and they are a curiously incomplete statement of facts in the case. It does not follow, that, if the first two be overthrown, only the theory represented by *his definition* is left to be chosen ; but this is the implicit and explicit assumption of the New York Lectures.

10. It is the theistic, and not the agnostic or the atheistic, school of evolution which is increasing in influence among the higher authorities of science.

Some agnostics are proud of exhibiting under almost atheistic phraseology a really theistic philosophical tendency. Spencer's negations in natural theology amount to the assertion that our knowledge of the Divine existence is like our knowledge of the back-side of the moon,—we know that it is, not what it is. But I assuredly know that there is not a ripple on any sedgy shore, or in the open sea of the whole gleaming watery zone, from here to Japan, which is not influenced by that unknown side as much as by the known. So, in the far-flashing spiritual zones of the universe of worlds, there is not a ripple which does not owe glad allegiance to that law of moral gravitation which proceeds from the whole Divine nature, known and unknown. God is knowable, but unfathomable. The agnostics call God unknowable ; but that He is unfathomable is all that they prove, and often all that they mean.

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1 See arts. on "Evolution," by Professor Youmans and President Seelye, in Johnson's Cyclopædia, and Johnson's Natural History.

11. As Professor Huxley does not notice the different schools of evolutionists, his New York definition of the doctrine is defective through vagueness.

12. For the same reason, it is defective by a suppressed statement of hypotheses which are rivals of his own.

13. It is evident, from the nature of the case, that the question of chief interest to religious science is, whether the new philosophy is to be established in its atheistic, its agnostic, or its theistic form. But Professor Huxley regards the order of the appearance of species as a matter to be studied with all zeal: the causes of their appearance, he thinks, are a matter of subordinate importance. At Buffalo he said, "All that now remains to be asked is, How development was effected? and that is a subordinate question." He thus makes the merely initial question, What? more important than the commanding and final question, Why? The clashing looms in Machinery Hall at the World's Exhibition are of supreme moment; the Corliss Engine, which drives them, is of subordinate and inferior interest. Religious science, therefore, finds Professor Huxley curiously wanting in the sense of logical proportion.

14. The New York Lectures insist on resemblances, and not on differences, in related animal forms.

15. They exaggerate resemblances by broadly inaccurate pictorial representation. The Eocene horse of Wyoming, of the genus *Orohippus*, Dana says, is not larger than a fox.[1] The bones of its leg and foot were represented in the New York reported illustrations as quite as large as those of the horse.

16. The New York Lectures prove the existence, not of connected links, but of links with many gaps between them. They prove the existence of steps with many and long and unexplained breaks, and should prove the existence of an inclined plane.

17. They fail to reply to the great, and as yet unanswered objections to Darwinism,—the absence of discovered links between man and the highest apes, the sterility of hybrids, the mental and moral superiority of man, and the existence, in many animals, of organs of no use to the possessors under the laws of either natural or sexual selection.

18. In asserting that this self-contradictory, vague, and historically inexact account of evolution is a demonstration of the truth of his definition, and places evolution, thus defined, on "exactly as secure a foundation" as the Copernican theory, which is verified by all experiment, and has in its favour the unanimity of experts, Professor Huxley's conclusions include more than his premises.

The New York Lectures disagree in their conclusions with those of higher geological authorities, equally well or better acquainted with the American facts, and notably with the conclusions of Dana and Verrill. According to these professors of the university where the relics are preserved, the bones explain, in part, the variations of one style, but do not account for gaps between groups of animals, and least of all do they account for man.[2]

[1] Manual of Geology, ed. of 1875, p. 505.

[2] Dana, Manual of Geology, pp. 590–604.

Professor Gray calls himself, in his latest work, a "convinced theist, and religiously an accepter of the creed commonly called the Nicene."[1] Is there yet any occasion for the disquietude of a free mind holding these views? If the demonstrative evidence in favour of the materialistic form of the theory of evolution is unsatisfactory as presented by Huxley in New York, what shall be said of the subtler procedures of Tyndall's Belfast Address?

Sitting on the Matterhorn on a July day in 1868, Tyndall meditates on the period when the granite was a part of the molten world; thinks then of the nebula from which the molten world originated; and asks next whether the primordial formless fog contained potentially the sadness with which he regarded the Matterhorn.[2] In 1874 he answers, Yes, and concludes that we must recast our definitions of matter and force, since life and thought are the flower of both.

Accordingly, Tyndall's effort is to change the definition of matter. Of the many forms of materialism, his coincides nearest with a tendency which has been gathering strength among physicists for the last hundred years,—to deny that there are two substances in the universe, matter and mind, with opposite qualities, and to affirm that there is but one substance, matter, itself possessed of two sets of properties, or of a physical side and a spiritual side, making up a double-faced unity.[3] This is precisely the materialism of Professor Bain of Aberdeen, and of Professor Huxley; and its numerous supporters in England, Scotland, and Germany, are fond of proclaiming that among metaphysicians, as well as among physiologists, it is the growing opinion; and that the arguments to prove the existence of two substances have now entirely lost their validity, and are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking.

Tyndall's speculations as to matter are simply an extension of the hypothesis of evolution, according to the scientific doctrine of uniformity, from the known to the unknown. Back to a primordial germ Darwin is supposed by Tyndall to have traced all organisation: back to the properties of unorganised matter in a primordial nebula Tyndall now traces that germ. Evolution explains everything since the germ. Evolution must be applied to explain as much as possible before the germ. So far as we can test her processes by observation and experiment, Nature is known to proceed by the method of evolution: where we cannot test her processes, analogy requires that we should suppose that she proceeds by the same method. As all the organisations now or in past time on the earth were potentially in the primordial germ, so that germ was potentially in the unorganised particles of the primordial star-dust: in other words, there was latent in matter from the first the power to evolve organisation, thought, emotion, and will. Where matter obtained this power, or whether matter is self-existent, physical science has no means of determining. In the evolution of the universe from a primor-

[1] Darwiniana, 1876, p. vi.
[2] Musings on the Matterhorn, 27th July 1868. Note at end of Tyndall's Address on Scientific Materialism, 19th August 1868.
[3] Bain (Professor Alexander), Mind and Body, 1873, pp. 130, 140, 191, 196.

dial haze of matter possessing both physical and spiritual properties, there has been no design other than that implied in the original constitution of the molecular particles. Of course, it is utterly futile to oppose these views as self-contradictory in the light of the established definition of matter.

Many of the replies made to Professor Tyndall, however, miss the central point in his scheme of thought, and endeavour to show that it is madness to imagine that matter, as now and for centuries defined by science, can evolve organisation and life. But no one has proclaimed the insanity of such a supposition more vigorously than Tyndall has himself. "These evolution notions," he exclaims, "are absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gibbet, in relation to the ideas concerning matter which were drilled into us when young."[1] Most assuredly Professor Tyndall does not propose "to sweep up music with a broom," or "to produce a poem by the explosion of a type foundry." Audacities of that sort are to be left to the La Mettries and Cabanis and Holbachs: they are not attempted even by the Büchners and Carl Vogts and Moleschotts and Du Bois Reymonds, who, with some whom Tyndall too much resembles, are now obsolete or obsolescent in Germany. "If a man is a materialist," said Professor Tholuck to me once, as we walked up and down a celebrated long arbour in his garden at Halle, "we Germans think he is not educated." In the history of speculation, so many forms of the materialistic theory have perished, that a chance of life for a new form can be found in nothing less fundamental than a change in the definition of matter. Tyndall perceives, as every one must who has any eye for the signs of the times in modern research, that if Waterloos are to be fought between opposing schools of science or between science and theology or philosophy, the majestic line of shock and onset must be this one definition. "Either let us open our doors freely to the conception of creative acts," he says in the sentence which best indicates his point of view in his Belfast Address, "or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions of matter."

Now, it is singular, and yet not singular, that one can find nowhere in Tyndall's writings the changed definition on which everything turns. The following four propositions, all stated in his own language, taken from different parts of his recent discussions, are the best approach to a definition that I have been able to find in examining all he has ever published on materialism:—

1. "Emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena, were once latent in a fiery cloud."[2] "I discern in matter the promise and potency of every form and quality of life."[3] "Who will set limits to the possible play of molecules in a cooling planet? Matter is essentially mystical and transcendental."[4]

2. "Supposing that, in youth, we had been impregnated with the notion of the poet Goethe, instead of the notion of the poet Young, looking at matter not as brute matter, but as the living garment of God, is it not probable that our

1 Address on the Scientific Use of the Imagination, 1870.
2 Tyndall, Fragments of Science, Eng. ed., p. 163.
3 Belfast Address, 1874.
4 Tyndall, Fragments of Science, Eng. ed., p. 163.

repugnance to the idea of primeval union between spirit and matter might be considerably abated?"[1]

3. "Granting the nebula and its potential life, the question, Whence come they? would still remain to baffle and bewilder us. The hypothesis does nothing more than transport the conception of life's origin to an indefinitely distant past."[2]

4. "Philosophical defenders of the doctrine of uniformity . . . have as little fellowship with the atheist, who says that there is no God, as with the theist, who professes to know the mind of God. 'Two things,' said Immanuel Kant, 'fill me with awe: the starry heavens, and the sense of moral responsibility in man.' . . . The scientific investigator finds himself overshadowed by the same awe."[3] "I have noticed during years of self-observation that it is not in hours of clearness and vigour that the doctrine (of materialistic atheism) commends itself to my mind, and that, in the presence of stronger and healthier thought, it ever dissolves and disappears, as offering no solution of the mystery in which we dwell, and of which we form a part."[4]

Of the definition of matter implied in these extracts, it must be affirmed,—not that it is new,—for it is simply what the schools call hylozoism, modified by the recent forms of the atomic theory and of the doctrine of evolution, but that *it reverses the best established position of science.*

1. It denies, and the established definition affirms, that inertia, in the strict sense of the word, is a property of matter.

2. It affirms, and the established definition denies, that matter has power to evolve organisation and vitality.

3. It affirms, and the established definition denies, that matter has power to evolve thought, emotion, conscience, and will.

In the conflict between the established definition of matter and Tyndall's definition, I, for one, prefer the established, for the following reasons:

1. If inertia is a property of matter, the power to evolve organisation, life, and thought, cannot be; but that inertia is a property of matter is a proposition susceptible of overwhelming proof from the necessary beliefs of the mind, from common consent, from the agreement of philosophers in all ages, and from all the results of experiment and observation.

Of course, the logical existence of the alternatives implied in this argument is denied by those who attribute both inertia and spiritual properties to matter as a mystic, transcendental, double-faced unity; but, while they used the word "inertia," their definition of it is not the established one, as is that here employed. By force, I mean that which is expended in producing or resisting motion. By inertia, I mean the incapacity to originate force or motion, or that quality which causes matter, if set in motion without other resistance than itself can supply, to keep on moving for ever; or, if left at rest without other force than its own, to remain at rest for ever. Materialism, hylozoism, and Tyndall's definition of matter, cannot justify themselves, unless it be proved that inertia is not a property of matter. Every student of this theme knows, and in this presence it is

[1] Fragments of Science, p. 165. [2] Ibid., p. 166. [3] Ibid., p. 167.
[4] Additions to the Belfast Address, in Tyndall's authorised edition.

unnecessary for me to state, what the proofs are that matter cannot move itself. They are far more superabundant and crucial than even those which support the belief in the existence of gravitation. Newton himself did not regard attraction as an essential property of matter; and it was long a debate whether his great generalisation should be named the theory of attraction, or the theory of propulsion. If the established definition of matter, and the consequent proof of the spiritual origin of all force, or of the Divine immanence in natural law, are not to be disestablished until that late day when the proof that inertia is not a property of matter, that is, that matter can move itself, can be put into the form of a syllogism, then the yoke of Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato,—of which Tyndall complains, that, after twenty centuries, it is yet unbroken,—is likely to continue to be what it now is, one of the best examples in history of the survival of the fittest.

2. The established definition of matter rests on facts verifiable by experience; Tyndall's, confessedly, is demanded and supported only by the tendencies of an improved theory of evolution.

"Those who hold the doctrine of evolution," says Tyndall himself, "are by no means ignorant of the uncertainty of their data, and they yield no more to it than a provisional assent. They regard the nebular hypothesis as probable; and, in the utter absence of any evidence to prove the act illegal, they extend the method of nature from the present into the past, and accept as probable the unbroken sequence of development from the nebula to the present time."[1]

In his Belfast Adress, Tyndall says, "The strength of the doctrine of evolution consists not in an experimental demonstration, but in its general harmony with the method of Nature as hitherto known." But *his definition of matter rests only on this theory*, which, as he admits, is not verified by experiment; while the accepted definition of matter is so verified. It is notoriously to experiment, and to ages of experiment, and to necessary belief itself, that the accepted definition appeals; it is to the exigencies of an unverified, and experimentally unverifiable theory, that Tyndall appeals.

3. According to the doctrines of analogy and uniformity, on which Tyndall relies, matter must be supposed to be inert where we cannot experiment on it, since it is where we can.

4. Tyndall admits that the manner of the connection between matter and mind is unthinkable, and that, "if we try to comprehend that connection, we sail in a vacuum." His own definition, therefore, involves propositions which are unthinkable. They must have been reached by sailing through a vacuum, and can be proved only by a similarly adventurous voyage.

Pertinent exceedingly to the criticism of his definition of matter are Tyndall's famous admissions that "molecular groupings and molecular motions explain nothing;" that "the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable;" and that, "if love were known to be associated with a right-

[1] Fragments of Science, p. 166.

handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and hate with a left-handed, we should remain as ignorant as before as to the cause of the motion."[1] If the connection between matter and thought in the brain is so obscure, that neither Tyndall, nor Spencer, nor Bain, calls it the connection of cause and effect, but only that of antecedent and consequent, how can the connection between matter and thought in the nebula be so clear, that Tyndall can discern in it, at that distance, "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life"? How is it that the relations of matter and mind are unthinkable as they exist in the brain, and thinkable as they exist in the nebula? How is it that the nervous vibrations and the corresponding events of consciousness are, as Tyndall believes them to be, simply consecutive, or correlative,—a case of "parallelism without contact,"—while the matter of the universe, and the life and thought existing in the universe, are so far from being a case of parallelism without contact, that the "potency" of the latter is all in the former?

5. The established definition of matter will, and Tyndall's will not, bear Tyndall's own test of clear mental presentation.

Bishop Butler shows this well enough, even when Tyndall himself, in the Belfast Address, composes the Bishop's argument. Undoubtedly Tyndall has not laid too much emphasis on the famous German saying, "The true is the clear." But his definition, contemplated with all patience and candour, is clear in neither its affirmations nor its negations; while the established is capable of a coherent presentation in both these respects. So far, indeed, is the Belfast Address from knowing its own opinion, that in one place it says the very existence of matter as a reality outside of the mind is "not a fact, but an inference," thus implying that Tyndall is not sure but that Fichte's idealism may be the truth.

6. The established definition is justified, and Tyndall's is not, by the irresistible testimony of consciousness that the will has efficiency as a cause.

Dr. W. B. Carpenter, a far better physiologist than Tyndall, and whose work on "Mental Physiology," just issued, is, always excepting Lotze's "Mikrokosmus," the best discussion produced in modern times of the connection between body and mind, analyses elaborately all the latest facts, including Professor Ferrier's proof of the localisation of functions in the brain; but he saves himself, as Lotze does, from fatalism, materialism, hylozoism, and from that definition of matter which Tyndall adopts. He affirms a very broad and sometimes startling doctrine of unconscious cerebration, but finds in the properties of the nervous mechanism no explanation whatever of our consciousness, that, by acts of will, we can originate physical movements, and control the direction of courses of thought. *The central part of Tyndall's errors is to be found in his shy treatment of this necessary belief.* There results from this shyness his insufficiently clear idea of what he means by causation. Almost while Tyndall was speaking before the British Association at Belfast on atoms, M.

[1] Fragments of Science, pp. 120, 121.

Wurtz, president of the French Association, was discussing before that body the same theme, and closing an opening address with no unscientific indistinctness as to what cause signifies. "It is in vain," he said, "that science has revealed to it the structure of the world and the order of all the phenomena : it wishes to mount higher ; and in the conviction that things have not in themselves their own *raison d'être*, their support and their origin, it is led to subject them to a first cause,—unique and universal God."[1]

So much does Tyndall's Address lean on Professor Draper's book, on "The Intellectual Development of Europe," that it is a witticism of the London press, that the discourse is rather vapoury when stripped of its drapery ; but Draper himself, in an elaborate chapter of his "Human Physiology" (pp. 283–290), undertakes, by an argument on the absolute inertness of nerve arcs and cells in themselves considered, to demonstrate physiologically the existence, independence, immateriality, and immortality, of the soul.

7. The established definition is supported, and Tyndall's is not, by the intuitive belief of the mind as to personal identity.

All the particles of the body are changed within seven years, as science used to teach, or within one year, as it now teaches ; and, trite as the power of this objection to materialism has made the objection itself, the inquiry is now more pertinent than ever, How is it thinkable, if matter evolves the personality, that this remains the same, while the physical man does not retain its identity during any two circuits of the seasons ?

Mysterious, indeed, is the phenomena of the persistence of physical scars in living flesh that is constantly changing its composition. But grant that the physical basis of memory is an infinite number of infinitesimally small brain-scars, constantly reproduced, although the particles of the brain are all changed, still it is as unthinkable that these scars should rebuild themselves as that the original cuts should cut themselves. It is the generally-accepted theory of metaphysical science, that the soul builds the body, and not the body the soul. But if it be assumed that matter does evolve spirit, then, in the case of the physical basis of memory, it must be supposed to be hand, chisel, inscription, and marble all at once, and not only so, but the reader of the inscription ; and all this while every particle of the marble is known to crumble away, and to be replaced by entirely new particles, every twelve months. Flatter contradiction to that principle of the inductive method which asserts that every change must have an adequate cause does not exist anywhere than inheres in all attempts hitherto made to evolve from matter the soul's ineradicable conviction of personal identity.

According to Tyndall's proposed definition, there is in man, as in the universe, but one substance : in the microcosmus, as in the macrocosmus, all is double-faced matter,—spiritual on the one side, and physical on the other. There is nowhere any immaterial agent separate from a material substance. The particles of man's

[1] Address republished in "Nature," Aug. 27, 1874.

body are endowed with physical and spiritual properties, and are so peculiarly grouped, that their interaction produces not only his organisation, but his inmost spiritual nature. To say, however, that although the body in its living state loses all its particles, and although these are replaced by new, the old *form* is yet retained, and that this similar grouping of the particles explains the continuity of the consciousness implied in the sense of personal identity, is to introduce design without a designer. *Collocation of parts in an organism is precisely what materialism has never yet explained.* Undoubtedly oxygen and hydrogen have such properties, that, if four atoms of the former and eight of the latter come into proper collocation with each other, they will unite, and form water; but they have no properties tending to bring them together in precisely these proportions. Collocation has ever been a word of evil omen to the materialistic theory.

The particles that go out of the system do not transmit their spiritual any more than their physical qualities to the new particles that come in; for the spiritual qualities, as the changed definition of matter states, inhere in the very substance of each particle; *and inherent properties are not transferable.* When, therefore, we exhale and perspire wasted particles, there is plainly no room left by this definition for denying that we perspire latent soul, and exhale latent personality. In a complete renewal of the particles of the organisation, therefore, there ought to be a renewal of the personality. Such is the theory; but right athwart the only course it can sail in juts up the gnarled rock of man's necessary belief that he does not change his personality: a reef, this, with its roots in the core of the world; a huge, hungry sea-crag, strewn already with the wrecks of multitudes of materialistic fleets, and where the new materialistic Armada is itself destined to beach on chaos.

8. The established definition is justified; and Tyndall's is not by the notorious failure of science to produce a single instance of spontaneous generation.

9. Admissions of the opponents of the established definition exist in abundance to prove, that, if taken in connection with the hypothesis of a creative personal First Cause, it explains all the facts which physical science presents; but these same opponents admit that their definition, even when the doctrine of evolution is accepted, brings the physical inquirer at the end of every possible path of investigation always face to face with insoluble mystery.

10. Finally, the mystic and transcendental definition, by making matter a double somewhat, possessed on its physical side of the qualities claimed for it by established science, but on its spiritual side of the properties necessary to evolve organisation and life, attributes to matter self-contradictory qualities, and is itself inherently self-contradictory.

Matter has extension, impenetrability, figure, divisibility, inertia, colour. Mind has neither. Not one of these terms has any conceivable meaning in application to thought or emotion. What is the shape of love? How many inches long is fear? What is the colour of

memory? Since Aristotle and St. Augustine, the antithesis between mind and matter has been held to be so broad, that Sir William Hamilton's common measure for it was the phrase, "the whole diameter of being." *But it is proposed now*—and this is the chief thing I have to say—*to adopt a definition of matter which shall make extension and its absence, inertia and its absence, impenetrability and its absence, divisibility and its absence, form and its absence, colour and its absence, co-inhere in the same substratum.* To this monstrous self-contradiction the mystic hylozoism of Bain, Huxley, and Tyndall, inevitably leads when it defines matter as a double-faced unity, physical on the one side, and spiritual on the other. The reply to this transcendentalism of the evolution school is simply the first law of the syllogistic process, *A* is not *Not-A*.

1. Matter and mind have two sets of qualities, each the reverse of the other, and absolutely incapable of co-existence in the same substance.

2. We know that the two sets of qualities exist.

3. We know, therefore, that there are two substances in which the qualities inhere.

4. There is, therefore, a separate immaterial substance.

As to practical inferences from this discussion, it is worth while to note that—

1. The new philosophy as to matter is consistent with a belief in the Divine existence, but not with that of the immortality of the soul. Alexander Bain thinks it absurd to talk of the freedom of the will. Häckel teaches that the will is never free.[1]

2. Teachers of the inductive sciences must not be allowed to play fast and loose with the axioms which lie at the basis of the inductive method. Physics scorning metaphysics is the stream scorning its source. Science, of course, is not science, unless it is inductive. But behind the inductive sciences is an inductive method; and behind the inductive method are the laws of thought. Inductive science implies inductive method; inductive method implies syllogism; syllogism implies axioms; axioms imply intuitive beliefs. Of necessity resting on metaphysics, science has nothing surer than its axioms of intuitive truth; but on precisely those axioms rest the inferences of free-will, responsibility, and the existence of a personal First Cause. Plaintively wrote Aristotle, after mentioning self-evidence, necessity, and universality as the traits of intuitive truth, that they who reject the testimony of the intuitions will find nothing surer on which to build.

3. A distinct definition of the word *natural* ought to put, and ultimately will put, all science on its knees before a personal God.

Charles Darwin and Bishop Butler define this fundamental term in the same way; and that not the obscure, heedless, misleading, outworn, and fathomlessly vexatious way common in our brilliant periodical literature. It is a fact in which much solace for timid Christians, and much taming anodyne for audacious small philo-

[1] History of Creation, vol. i. p. 237.

sophers, lie capsulate, that the foremost naturalist of our times, and the greatest modern Christian apologist, explicitly agree in affirming—

(1.) That "the only distinct meaning of the word natural" is *stated, fixed, or settled;*" and,

(2.) That "what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so—that is, to effect it continually or at stated times—as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once."

These far-reaching propositions consist wholly of celebrated words from Butler's "Analogy" (part i. chap. 1), the book which Edmund Burke used to recommend to the acutest of his friends as a cure for scepticism. Barry, the artist, for whose varied and inveterate spiritual sickness Burke prescribed only the study of this volume, was so much benefited by it, that, when he made a painting of Elysium, he placed Butler in the foreground. In our haughty day this renowned passage has become in a new degree famous by being adopted through many editions as the postulate motto on the title-page of Darwin's "Origin of Species." It stands there as a head-light. The agreement of Darwin and Butler as to the meaning of the word *natural* is a beacon which ought to be kept steadily in view by any who grow dizzy as they float, perhaps anchorless, in the surges of modern speculation. Butler's and Darwin's definition is Aristotle's and Kant's and Hamilton's, and Newton's and Cuvier's and Humboldt's, and Faraday's and Dana's and Agassiz's. Just this definition has for ages been the established one in religious science. Of late, as if it were a new discovery, it has appeared as the inspiration of the loftiest portions of modern literature. The vision of what lies behind natural law constitutes the hushed "open secret," which throws the Goethes and Richters, and Carlyles and Brownings, and Tennysons and Emersons, and ought to throw the whole world, into a trance.

4. A miracle is unusual, natural law is habitual, Divine action. The natural is a prolonged and so unnoticed supernatural.

Professor Asa Gray maintains that Charles Darwin is guiltless of all atheistic intent; that he never denied the possibility of creative intervention in the origin of species; that he never depended exclusively on natural selection for the explanation of variations in animal forms; and that he never sneered at the argument from design, to which John Stuart Mill advises philosophers to adhere in their proof of the Divine Existence.

If religion and science are once agreed in adopting Darwin's and Butler's meaning of the word *natural*, all that either of them has to do is to become, in Coleridge's phrase, intoxicated with God.

5. It follows, however, as a minor result of this definition, that it cannot be dangerous to religion to inquire whether the origin of species is attributable wholly to natural causes; that is, to habitual Divine action. Is it a terrifying thing to ask whether life itself and all its modifications originated in unusual Divine action, or in habi-

tual Divine action, or partly in one, and partly in the other? It is difficult, and to me impossible, to see what ground for disquietude religious science has in the prospect that either of these propositions may obtain proof. What harm, we may say with Charles Kingsley, can come to religion, even if it be demonstrated, not only that God is so wise that He can make all things, but that He is so much wiser than even that, that He can make all things make themselves?

The distinction between mind and matter stands like a reef in the tumbling seas of philosophy; and its roots take hold on the core of the world. In matter there are definite qualities, such as weight, colour, extension. In mind there are none of these: it is absurd to speak of the length of an idea, the colour of a choice, the weight of an emotion. When Tyndall and Bain, and other revivers of the Lucretian materialism, attempt to make the qualities of matter and mind, which differ as diametrical opposites, and by the whole diameter of existence,—extension and the absence of extension, colour and the absence of colour, weight and the absence of weight, inertia and the absence of inertia,—co-inhere in one substratum, and talk of a double-faced somewhat, "physical on the one side, and spiritual on the other," they are self-contradictory. It is upon the hungry tusks of self-contradiction that whole Armadas of materialistic fleets have been wrecked age after age; and here Tyndall's barge of the gods, which, like Cleopatra's,

> "Burned on the water: the poop was beaten gold,
> Purple the sails, and so perfumed, that
> The winds were love-sick with them,"

only yesterday sank among the mists. But until this reef is exploded, until the distinction between matter and mind is given up, there will very evidently be adequate proof of Design in creation.

Daniel Webster, when once asked if his political opinions on an important topic had changed, wrote to his questioner to look toward Bunker Hill in the morning, and notice whether, in the night, the monument had walked into the sea. If any do not care to puzzle themselves with either the shrill and shallow, or with the more quiet and profound voices of modern speculation, and yet wish freedom from mental unrest, let them not take alarm as to the argument from design until the Aristotelian and age-long monumental distinction between matter and mind has moved from its base; for, until that shaft walks into the sea, Theism is logically safe. "If," says Kingsley, "there has been an evolution, there must have been an Evolver." "Faith in an order, which is the basis of science," says Asa Gray, "cannot reasonably be separated from faith in an Ordainer, which is the basis of religion." The law of development explains much, but not itself.

6. As science progresses, it draws nearer, in all its forms, to the proof of the Spiritual Origin of Force; that is, of the Divine Immanence in natural law; that is, of the Omnipresence of a personal First Cause;

and the religious value of this proof is transcendently great. Wherever science finds heat, light, electricity, it infers the motion of the ultimate particles of matter as the cause ; wherever it finds motion of the ultimate particles of matter, it infers force as the cause ; and, wherever it finds force, it infers, or will yet infer, SPIRIT.

> "God is law, say the wise, O soul, and let us rejoice ;
> For, if He thunder by law, the thunder is yet His voice.
> Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit may meet :
> Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."
>
> TENNYSON.

II.

THE CONCESSIONS OF EVOLUTIONISTS.[1]

"If everything is governed by law, and if all the power is in the physical universe that ever was there, where is God? In the intention."—Professor BENJAMIN PIERCE, *Unitarian Review*, June 1877, p. 665.

"In regard to the physical universe, it might be better to substitute for the phrase 'government *by* laws' 'government *according to* laws,' meaning thereby the direct exertion of the Divine Will, or operation of the First Cause in the Forces of Nature, according to certain constant uniformities which are simply unchangeable, because, having been originally the expression of Infinite Wisdom, any change would be for the worse."—Dr. W. B. CARPENTER, *Mental Physiology*, chap. XX.

ARISTOTLE said of Socrates that he invented the arts of definition and induction. But Socrates, we know, was not a teacher of logic; he was the investigator of ethical truth; and it was in the endeavour to satisfy a distinctively theological thirst that he smote the rocks at the foot of the Acropolis, and caused to gush forth there these crystalline headsprings of the scientific method. Unless we think boldly, north, south, east, and west, and syllogistically, and on our knees, we do not think at all. A Greek teacher of morals first taught us to think in this manner, and, as instruments of ethical research, invented definition and induction. The scientific method thus had a theological origin. Plato first elaborated it; but he drew all the quenching power of the stream of his philosophy from those pristine springs of definition and induction which Socrates opened. Aristotle, no doubt, was the earliest to give a scientific form to logic as a system; but his river of philosophy was only the continuation of the stream beginning under the Acropolis, where the terrific force of the blow of Socrates had caused these healing waters to burst out. It was in theology that the scientific method first found full application. However much we may criticise the Greek and Latin schoolmen and early theologians, it remains true that they elaborated Aristotle's logic, and drew out of it a system of induction and deduction, which was only turned a little aside to new objects by Bacon. I am not one of those who think Macaulay's essay on Bacon faultless. Gladstone has lately shown that the contrast between the system of

[1] The forty-seventh lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in the Meionaon

Aristotle and that of Bacon was not as great as the brilliant historian, who loved antithetical contrasts so well, would make it out to be. The scientific method existed before Bacon's time, and it had received its elaboration chiefly in the schools of theology. But now, since Bacon's time, we hear the scientific method spoken of as if it never had a mother. We are told that religious science must borrow from physical science the scientific method. Religious science will not borrow what is her own. Aristotle affirms that it was in the search after moral truth that Socrates discovered definition and induction. Theology demands in this age, what she has demanded in every age, that we should be loyal to the scientific method. We must have definition; we must have induction; clear ideas and spiritual purposes conjoined are the only deadly intellectual weapons. When a haughty attitude is assumed by physical science in the name of the scientific method, all that religious science has to do is to show that she was the mother of that method, to adhere to it herself, and to hold to it, a little mercilessly, physical science also.

Among the concessions of evolutionists, these are notorious :—

1. That spontaneous generation must have occurred, or the doctrine of evolution as held by Huxley and his school cannot be true.

2. That spontaneous generation has never been known to occur.

3. That it is against all the ascertained analogy of nature to suppose that it ever has occurred.

4. That, if spontaneous generation has not occurred, it must be admitted that a supernatural act originated life in the primordial cell or cells.

5. That the doctrine of evolution as held by Huxley cannot be true, unless some bridge can be found to span the chasm between the living and the not-living.

6. That the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no such bridge.

Who makes all these far-reaching concessions? Professor Huxley. Where? In a most suggestive article on "Biology," published in "The Encyclopædia Britannica," the ninth edition of which, as you are aware, is now issuing from the press.

It is not asserted by this Lectureship that a doctrine of natural selection cannot be proved unless spontaneous generation can be shown to be a possibility. I assert, however, that the doctrine of evolution, "as held by Huxley and his school," cannot stand, unless spontaneous generation can be shown to have been a fact. This is Huxley's own concession. He says, "*If the hypothesis of evolution is true, living matter must have arisen from not-living matter;* for by the hypothesis the condition of the globe was at one time such, that living matter could not have existed in it, life being entirely incompatible with the gaseous state." [1]

"The properties of living matter distinguish it absolutely from all other kinds of things; and *the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the living and the not-living.*" [2]

[1] Professor T. H. Huxley, Encyc. Brit., ed. of 1876, art. Biology, p. 689. [2] Ibid., p. 679.

"At the present moment there is not a shadow of trustworthy direct evidence that abiogenesis [or spontaneous generation] does take place, or has taken place, within the period during which the existence of the globe is recorded." [1]

Will you put these strategic propositions into contact with each other? Huxley's form of the doctrine of evolution stands or falls with the fate of the doctrine concerning spontaneous generation. Darwin's form of it does not; Dana's not; and Gray's not.

Huxley, you notice, expressly concedes that all the evidence we now have is against the theory that spontaneous generation is possible, and that the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the not-living and the living.

Häckel concedes, and it is very evident from the nature of the case, that if the primordial cells did not originate spontaneously, or by usual Divine action, they must have been originated supernaturally, or by unusual Divine action. The theory of natural selection as held by Darwin does not attempt to bridge the chasm between the living and the not-living.

To show how incisive the assertion is, "that life is incompatible with the gaseous state," Professor Huxley says, in a note following the sentence I have read, that it makes no difference, if we adopt Sir William Thomson's theory, that life may have been inducted into this planet from life in some exterior physical source. The nebular hypothesis, which is a part of the great evolution theory, asserts that all the worlds were once in a gaseous state; and so in that exterior physical source, which was once a gas, how could life have arisen? Even Tyndall's famous matter, so richly endowed as to have in it "the potency and promise of all life," must itself once have been in a gaseous state.

When Professor Huxley and Professor Tyndall sit together at the top of the Alps, and Tyndall begins his definition of matter, if Professor Huxley will whisper to him these words, "that life is entirely incompatible with the gaseous state," it will not be logically competent to Professor Tyndall to go on speculating, as he once did on the Matterhorn, whether or not his pensiveness and his thoughtfulness, as well as the gnarled granite peaks, were all potentially existent in the earliest nebula. Let Professor Huxley and Professor Tyndall correct each other, and perhaps there may arise, in that way, contagious life by collision.

"But," continues Professor Huxley, "living matter once originated, there is no necessity for another origination, since the hypothesis postulates the unlimited, though perhaps not indefinite, modifiability of such matter. Of the causes which have led to the origination of living matter, it may be said that we know absolutely nothing."

Here is determined agnosticism. Of course, if physicists will not look outside of matter, they can have no knowledge of a first cause. "Give me matter," said Kant, "and I will explain the formation of

[1] Professor T. H. Huxley, Encyc. Brit., ed. of 1876, art. Biology, p. 689.

a world ; but give me matter only, and I cannot explain the formation of a caterpillar." Professor Huxley likes to quote the first half of that celebrated saying, without the last.

To test the value of these concessions by Huxley as to spontaneous generation, take another theme, and one on which our opinions are not divided—the philosopher's stone. We do not now find ourselves able to make a philosopher's stone. We have no reason to believe that Nature ever made a stone that will transmute the baser metals into gold. There is nothing in science to show that such a stone can be found or made. But, unless such a stone has been made at some time in the past, we must give up a pet theory in philosophy. Therefore let us assert, that, in the complex conditions of a cooling planet, perhaps the philosopher's stone may have come into existence by fortuitous concourse of atoms. You smile, gentlemen, because you are true to the scientific method, and I mean you shall be. But Strauss, in his "Old Faith and New," asks, "Who can tell what may have occurred in a cooling planet?" Virchow says that things were mixed in those early ages, and that it must be that somehow life originated spontaneously ; at least Strauss would be very glad to have us prove a negative.

Now, gentlemen, there is a famous theory in geology called the Uniformitarian Hypothesis. It assumes that the geological formation of the globe was due to precisely the same physical forces that now exist. We have given up the idea of great catastrophes in geology. But when we reason concerning spontaneous generation, if we take our stand on the further side of the fact—if it ever was a fact,—we are in the field of simple physical forces. Here are just the influences that brought into existence our mountains and seas, and determined events in the inorganic world. According to all established science, these forces have been uniform. The Uniformitarian Hypothesis turns upon the idea that uniformity exists in the forces of the inorganic world. We must, therefore, insist, that, if spontaneous generation does not occur now, it never occurred. We must do this in the name of the uniformity of nature.

The chasm between the not-living and the living forms of matter is the fathomless abyss at the ragged edge of which every traveller on atheistic or agnostic roads at last lifts his foot over thin air.

It is notorious that evolutionists admit,—

7. That natural selection cannot have originated species, if the sterility of hybrids is a fact.

8. That, in the present state of knowledge, the sterility of hybrids must be accepted as a fact.

9. That it is fair to ask, as a proof of evolution, that there be formed by selective breeding two species so different that their intercourse will produce sterile hybrids.

10. That no such species have as yet been formed by selective breeding, and that, until two such have been formed, the strongest proof of the doctrine of evolution is wanting.

Who admits all this? Professor Huxley. Where? In his famous "Lay Sermons and Reviews," where he cites (p. 308, American

edition) Professor Kölliker, than whom there is no greater authority in embryology. This German says, "Great weight must be attached to the objection brought forward by Huxley, otherwise a warm supporter of Darwin's hypothesis, that we know of no varieties which are sterile with one another, as is the rule among sharply distinguished animal forms. If Darwin is right, it must be demonstrated that forms may be produced by selection, which, like the present sharply distinguished animal forms, are infertile when coupled with one another; and this has not been done."

What, now, does Professor Huxley himself say, speaking before scholars, and in reply to this passage? "The weight of this objection is obvious," is his answer; "but our ignorance of the conditions of fertility and sterility,"—which have been witnessed by man six thousand years, at least,—"the want of careful experiments extending over a long series of years, and the strange anomalies presented by the cross fertilisation of many plants, should all, as Mr. Darwin has urged, be *taken into account* in considering it." This is all he says, or that can be said, in reply to this objection.

Häckel asserts that sometimes hybrids are not, and five hundred other authorities, and all the proverbs of breeders, affirm that true hybrids are, sterile.

It is safe to say that evolutionists concede,—

11. That natural selection cannot take leaps, and that therefore a multitude of links must have existed between man and the higher apes.

12. That after a diligent search, for nearly forty years, for traces of these missing links, none have been found.

13. That, in spite of all imperfections of the geological record, the destruction of these relics, without traces, is amazing, and that their absence leaves the argument for evolution weakest where it should be strongest.

14. That the oldest human fossils exhibit in essential characteristics no approach to the ape type.

"No remains of fossil man," says Professor Dana, in a most significant passage of his "Geology" (edition of 1875, p. 603), "bear evidence to less perfect erectness of structure than in civilised man, or to any nearer approach to the man-ape in essential characteristics. The existing man-apes belong to lines that reached up to them as their ultimatum; but, of that line which is supposed to have reached upward to man, not the first link below the lowest level of existing man has yet been found. This is the more extraordinary, in view of the fact, that, from the lowest limits in existing man, there are all possible gradations up to the highest; while below that limit there is an abrupt fall to the ape-level, in which the cubic capacity of the brain is one half less. *If the links ever existed, their annihilation without trace is so extremely improbable, that it may be pronounced impossible. Until some are found, science cannot assert that they ever existed.*"

In regard to these missing links, Darwin himself says that their absence is amazing. Even Huxley says of what is unquestionably

one of the oldest fossil skeletons of man, that it has "a fair, average human skull." The lengths of the bones of the arm and thigh of the man of Mentone, one of the oldest human fossils yet discovered, have the proportions ordinarily found in man, and the skull is of excellent Caucasian type.[1] The poorest fossil human brain is twice the cubic capacity of the best ape brain.[2]

It must be noticed that evolutionists admit,—

15. That, if any animal can be shown to possess organs or peculiarities of no use to it in the struggle for existence, the theory of natural selection breaks down.

16. That the hairlessness of man was not only of no use, but was a disadvantage, to him in the struggle for existence, and cannot be accounted for by natural selection, and must be accounted for by sexual selection.

17. That many animals possess peculiarities which, so far as we can see, can be of no use to them in the struggle for existence, and cannot be accounted for by any form of selection, natural or sexual.

In his "Descent of Man," published in 1871, Mr. Darwin himself makes these great concessions. "Natural selection," said Mr. Darwin in his "Origin of Species," published in 1859, "can act only by taking advantage of slight successive variations; it can never take a leap, but must advance by short and slow stages. If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous successive slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down."

Compare that extract with this: "I now admit, after reading the essay of Nägeli on plants, and the remarks by various authors with respect to animals, that, in the earlier editions of my 'Origin of Species,' *I probably attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest. I had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious;* and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my works."[3]

It may be safely asserted that evolutionists concede,—

18. That whether the cause of variation is a force exterior or one interior to the modified organism, or a combination of these forces, is not known.

19. That it is probable that variation is due much more to some innate force in the modified organism than to anything outside of it.

20. That the influence of natural selection has been exaggerated; that it explains much, but not everything; that it deserves only a co-ordinate rank with sexual selection as the explanation of the origin of man; and that very possibly it should have a subordinate rank in contrast with yet unknown causes of variation.

"*No doubt man, as well as every other animal,*" says the Charles Darwin of to-day, "*presents structures which, as far as we can judge with our little knowledge, are not now of any service to him, nor have*

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[1] See Dana's Geology, frontispiece, and pp. 575, 577, and 603.
[2] Ibid., 603.
[3] Descent of Man, English edition, vol. i. p. 152.

been so during any former period of his existence, either in relation to his general conditions of life, or of one sex to the other. Such structures cannot be accounted for by any form of selection, or by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts."[1] "In the greater number of cases we can only say that *the cause of each slight variation and of each monstrosity lies much more in the nature or constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions,* though new and changed conditions certainly play an important part in exciting organic changes of all kinds."[2]

These astonishing modifications of his own theory by Darwin induce Professor St. George Mivart to assert in his "Lessons from Nature," a work which has but just crossed the Atlantic, that "the hypothesis of natural selection originally put forward as the origin of species has been really abandoned by Mr. Darwin himself, and is untenable. It is a misleading positive term, denoting negative effects, and, as made use of by those who would attribute to it the origin of man, is an irrational conception,"—"a puerile hypothesis."[3] Any who remember Professor Huxley's article on Darwin's Critics, in "The Contemporary Review," for November 1871, will recall the strong terms in which he speaks of Mivart's scientific and philosophical competence. But Mivart holds nearly Professor Theophilus Parson's and Owen's creed, that species have originated by a force interior, and not exterior, to the modified organism. *To that position Darwin draws nearer and nearer.* Among Darwinians there seems to be a conspiracy of silence as to this fact. Darwinism is becoming Owenism. Darwin himself is not a good Darwinian.

God be thanked that this age takes nothing for granted! No: it does take one thing for granted,—its own superiority to all other ages; and yet one other thing,—that there are *not* more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in its philosophy. But, my friends, the scientific method requires, that, when we run up our list of causes,—chemical, electrical, physical, mental, spiritual,—we should put at the top, to reach on into the infinite, another class,—the unknown. Even in the nineteenth century, there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy.

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[1] Descent of Man, vol. ii. p. 387. [2] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 388.
[3] Professor St. George Mivart, Lessons from Nature, London, 1876, pp. 280–331.

III.

THE CONCESSIONS OF EVOLUTIONISTS.[1]

"The convertibility of the physical forces, the correlation of these with the vital, and the intimacy of that *nexus* between mental and bodily activity, which, explain it as we may, cannot be denied, all lead upward towards one and the same conclusion,—the source of all Power in mind; and that philosophical conclusion is the apex of a pyramid, which has its foundation in the primitive instincts of humanity."—Dr. W. B. CARPENTER, *Mental Physiology*, chap. xx.

"Causation is the Will, Creation the Act, of God. —W. R. GROVE, *Essay on the Correlation of Physical Forces.*

THE small philosopher is a great character in New England. His fundamental rule of logical procedure is to guess at the half, and multiply by two. God be thanked for the diffusion of knowledge! God save us from the attendant temporary evils of arrogant sciolism in democratic ages! These are a necessary transitory stage in the progress of popular enlightenment which has just begun to dawn in this yet dim Western world. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing; and it is our boast that, in America, every man has a little knowledge. We must drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring; but every breathlessly hurried free citizen now is endeavouring, to his honour, to have a taste at least; and yet we know how mercilessly commerce and greed, and the toil for daily bread, wrench parched lips away from the deep draught. Full popular enlightenment is popular sanity; penumbral popular enlightenment is often popular insanity; and yet the penumbral must precede the full radiance. The small philosopher is always a great character under representative institutions. He seems destined to reign long on the earth, and often disastrously, and yet not for ever. We are an atrociously independent and as yet only a half-educated people. De Tocqueville said that individualism is the natural, and must often be a most mischievous, basis of democratic philosophy. To her great credit and to her great temporary mental distress, Massachusetts, in which popular enlightenment is more widely diffused than elsewhere, has probably just now more small philosophers than any other population of equal size on the globe. Emerson wrote of average Massa-

[1] The forty-eighth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in the Meionaon

chusetts as she was thirty years ago, "It is a whole population of ladies and gentlemen out in search of a religion." No doubt it is to our credit that we study the newspapers; but it is not to our credit that we do not better maintain the best ones, and that we do not sift newspaper information a little more warily, and that some of us think a man can be competently educated on the most trustworthy part of the daily press. "We must destroy the faith of the people in the penny newspaper," I once heard Carlyle say in his study at Chelsea. I fathomlessly respect able and conscientious newspapers; I revere their majestic mission in history. I used to be told in Europe that Americans are governed by newspapers; and I was accustomed to answer, "No, gentlemen, not by newspapers, but by news—a very different thing." But, whether the shrewdest readers get at the news that is the most strategic in science, in politics, in art, in theology, by a hasty scramble through the midnight scribble of our cheaper dailies, is rather doubtful, or, rather, not doubtful at all. The most appropriate prayer, when one takes up the penny newspaper, is an invocation of the spirit of unbelief. But the best-used book of your small philosopher is the newspaper. He is unchurched in art, in science, in theology. He hears great names; he obtains glimpses of great truths; he puts half-truths in the place of systems that will bear the microscope; and when religious science occasionally gets his haughty hearing, it cannot on the Sabbath-day go into secular discussion with him, and you cannot hold his attention at first, except by secular discussion. You say that I am using this Lectureship very maladroitly, and that it is not wise to discuss here evolution and materialism. I do not speak to or for ministers or scholars, although they crowd this hall; I am talking to small philosophers.

Lord Bacon said that "truth emerges sooner from error than from confusion;" and, in the spirit of that remark, you will allow me to be analytical, and to number my propositions, in order that I may save time, and yet be distinct in a crowded discussion. Twenty concessions having been mentioned in a previous lecture, it is next to be noticed that it is notorious that evolutionists admit,—

21. That life is incompatible with the gaseous state, or the state of fused metals.

22. That our present knowledge justifies the conclusion, that probably two hundred millions, and certainly five hundred millions, of years ago, the earth and the sun were in a fused state.

23. That neither two hundred nor five hundred millions of years are enough to account for the formation of plants and animals from primordial cells on the theory of the Darwinian transmutation.

These, gentlemen, are the outlines of what many men of science regard as the most serious of all objections to the hypothesis of evolution. This is the only difficulty to which Professor Huxley in his New York lectures condescended to reply, it is the most prominent of the objections which Häckel endeavours to refute in his recent daring work on "The History of Creation." I now hold in my hand this book, of which Darwin himself says, that its author

has much more information than he has on many points, and that, if it had appeared before "The Descent of Man," the latter work would probably never have been written. Professor Häckel teaches at present in the University of Jena, in Germany; and he is one of the most extreme of evolutionists. He denies the freedom of the will, and is a thorough-going defender of the theory of the possibility of spontaneous generation.[1] He affirms, as Huxley does, that we have no direct evidence that spontaneous generation has ever occurred, and that it is against all the analogy of current nature to suppose that it has occurred. But he knows the exigencies of the radical form of the theory of evolution; and so he assumes, with Strauss, that possibly in a cooling planet a living cell may have been originated by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. A cell once originated, we can account for all life. But he is painfully aware that the Darwinian transmutation requires almost immeasurable time. "In the same way," he says, "as the distances between the different planetary systems are not calculated by miles, but by *Sirius-distances*, *each of which* comprises millions of miles, so the organic history of the earth must not be calculated by thousands of years, but by paleontological or geological periods, *each of which* comprises many thousands of years, and perhaps millions, or even milliards of thousands of years."[2] To the same effect speak Lyell and Dana, and even Darwin.[3]

Now, Professor Huxley very strangely said, in his lectures in New York, that, if the astronomer and geologist will settle between themselves the question as to the length of geological time, he will "agree with *any* conclusion."

Not so speaks the candid Darwin; not so the audacious Häckel; not so Lyell; not so Dana; not so any cautious evolutionist; not so even Huxley himself, when he talks before scholars.

"Thousands of millions of years," says Dana,[4] "have been claimed by some geologists for time since life began. Sir William Thomson has reduced the estimate, on physical grounds, to one hundred millions of years as a maximum." "Any" conclusion! Let us take the best estimate there is, that of one hundred million years; and Häckel implicitly affirms that this is not enough for the process of the Darwinian transmutation.

What is the evidence, gentlemen, that our earth and the sun were in a molten condition, say, five hundred millions of years ago? We tolerably well know of what materials the sun is composed. We bring down by the spectroscope its talkative rays, and we can tell what metals are in it. We know the nature of these metals on our globe. Heat is the same thing here and there; gravitation, the same here and there; light, the same here and there. *The immense argument of analogy makes us sure of our footing just so far as the unity of nature prevails.* We can estimate approximately what the

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1 Häckel, History of Creation, chap. xiii.
2 Ibid., chap. xxiv.
3 Lyell, Geology, vol. i. pp. 234, 235; Dana, Geology, ed. of 1875, p. 591; Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 286.
4 Geology, pp. 59, 591.

heat must have been that would fuse the globe and the sun. Sir William Thomson, whose scientific eminence no man will deny, went into a very laboured calculation, not long ago, to determine how many years since it was that the sun was a molten mass, and how many years since it was that the globe was in a fused state ; and it is very significant that he came to the same conclusion in both cases. The two conclusions tallied. The sun, he said, must have been in a molten state four hundred millions of years ago at the most ; and it probably was in that state two hundred millions of years ago at the least. The same may be said of the earth, which, however, was not cool enough to admit life until about one hundred millions of years ago, as Dana says.

When we look at the reasons why Professor Huxley sneers at this argument, we are the more amazed. "The biologist," he says, "knows *nothing whatever* of the amount of time which may be required for the processes of evolution." Does not he know that there is an immense extent of time required for it ? "Nothing whatever" known about the period needed ! Why, all Darwinians are agreed, all evolutionists are agreed, that we must take Sirius-distances to measure the time required by evolution. "I have not *the slightest* means of guessing," said Professor Huxley at New York, "whether it took a million of years, or ten millions, or an hundred millions of years, or a thousand millions of years, to give rise to that series of changes." On Darwin's, Lyell's, Dana's, and Häckel's authority, this must be called careless talk. It leaves a colossal objection unshattered.[1]

It is admitted by evolutionists,—

24. That variability in species is a lessening quantity as descendants are farther and farther removed in form from their progenitors.

25. That, as every lessening must be a finite quantity, species are known to vary only within comparatively narrow limits.

26. That selective breeding has thus far found variability a limited quantity.

27. That the observed differences caused by variability are infinitely small as compared with the range of variability required by the Darwinian theory.

It has been well said that the savage, looking upon a projectile of modern artillery, might carelessly think it would reach the stars. He does not make allowance for the circumstance that the speed of the ball is a lessening quantity. We find it to be a fact, that, the farther a derived animal form is removed from its progenitor, the less and less rapidly variations proceed. It follows, therefore, that these lessening variations may be fitly represented by a sphere, the original progenitor being the centre, from which there may be variations in all directions, and to which there may be reversions in any direction.[2] The variations are like the throwing-up of a cannon ball from the earth ; the motion away from the central point is

[1] See North British Review, 1867, vol. xlvi. p. 304.
[2] Ibid., art. on "The Origin of Species."

slower and slower as the distance between the ball and the central point is greater and greater. *We assuredly know that it is a truth of science that variability is a lessening quantity; and we therefore do know mathematically that there are limits to variability; for every lessening number is a finite quantity.* Thus, gentlemen, there are broad distinctions to be made between so-called species of a variable and real species of an unvarying kind. If we are to be abreast of our modern science, we shall be shy of saying that there is nothing which has been *called* a species which may be transmuted into another species.

I would confine the definition of species to the limits of ascertained variability. Here is the sphere of variation; and we know that the more any descendant varies from its progenitor, the more likely it is to revert. It may go back in a single generation. The law of science is, that variability, being a lessening, is a finite quantity. If you will draw a circle around the outermost sphere of variability, you will have what Häckel calls a "good species" in distinction from a merely nominal species. The thing we need most in the discussion of evolution is a new definition of species. *A real species will be conterminous with the outermost limits of the sphere of ascertained variability. Grant me this definition, and I will stand with established science on the fact that we have no direct evidence that any real species, thus defined, has ever been transmuted into another species.*

It is notorious that evolutionists concede,—

28. That the cubic capacity of the brain of the highest apes is thirty-four inches, and of the lowest men sixty-eight.

29. That the brain of man is by much larger than he needed in the struggle for existence.

30. That the struggle for existence, or natural selection, does not account for the brain of man.

31. That the eye of the trilobite, one of the oldest of fossil forms, is fully developed and perfect.

32. That the trilobites appear suddenly in the geological record; that there are no premonitions of their approach; and that there is as yet no direct evidence that they had any ancestry.

33. *That the use of an organ may account for its modification, but not for its formation, since it cannot be used until it is formed.*

34. That in many cases, like those of the eye of the trilobite and the brain of man, not only the theory of natural selection, but that of sexual selection, breaks down completely.

35. That in some cases it is impossible to imagine what has produced useful variations in animal forms.

36. That, in certain instances, the adaptation of means to ends cannot be accidental, but must be referred, not to natural, but to supernatural law; that is, not to the habitual, but to unusual divine action.

These, gentlemen, are startling concessions; and the most startling of them all is the last, that there are instances in which the adaptation of means to ends "cannot be accidental." But those are Darwin's words. You will remember that in his delicious book on the "Ferti-

lization of Orchids," at the end of its first chapter he speaks of a marvellous arrangement by which, in one species of these flowers, the sipping-moths are "purposely delayed in obtaining nectar." He says, "If this is accidental, it is a fortunate accident for the plant. If this be not accidental, *and I cannot believe it to be accidental*, what a singular case of adaptation!" Professor Mivart[1] quotes several similar admissions from Darwin's later writings; and he regards them as a virtual, though not explicit, retraction of the theory of natural selection. You say these are all careless expressions on the part of Darwin? I beg pardon: they are not so understood by men of scientific competence, some of whom watch him more closely than the tiger watches its prey.

I am not one of those who lie in wait to find fallacies in Darwin; for it matters little to me, as a student of religious science, which one of the three or four theistic systems of evolution is proven to be the best. If there is a change, I know that every change must have an adequate cause. If there is order in the universe, I know there must have been an Ordainer; for every change must have had an adequate cause. Based upon incontrovertible axiomatic truth, any man may stand in the yeasting seas of speculation, and feel that victorious reef tremorless beneath him; ay, and fall asleep on it, while the rock, in muffled stern thunders, speaks to the waste, howling midnight surge, "Aha! thus far ye come, but no farther." Men can never give up belief in causation. If we know there has been evolution in the universe, we know that there has been an Evolver; and, if design, a Designer; for every change must have a sufficient cause. It will not be to-morrow, nor the day after, that men will give up self-evident, axiomatic truths.

Owen, Parsons, Mivart, Dana, and Darwin himself, all admit that useless characteristics and organs cannot be explained by natural selection; and Darwin has made lately many admissions of his oversights on this point.

Dana, to the latest date, disagrees completely with Huxley and Häckel as to the origin of man, and agrees with Owen, Gray, Mivart, Parsons, and the whole long, stately, and growing list of the theistic school.

It is not denied anywhere, that a certain extent of variation may be experimentally produced by external conditions, as in the brine shrimp and the axiolott. What is denied is, that external conditions can account for the difference between the not-living and the living.

It seems to be the policy of atheistic and agnostic evolutionists to obscure the distinction between *a* theory and *the* theory of evolution. The tendency of science is in favour of the former, and against the latter; that is, for Dana and Hermann Lotze, and against Herbert Spencer and Häckel. The different schools of evolutionists must be distinguished, or there can be no clearness of discussion on this theme.

You will allow me to read one passage from Professor Dana on

[1] Lessons from Nature, 1876, chaps. ix. and x.

the great contrast between the brain of man and that of apes. Professor Dana, with respect be it said, is not a Darwinian; it is hardly fair to call him, without qualification, an evolutionist. He believes that evolution explains much; he does not believe that it explains everything. He does not account for man by evolution. He agrees with Wallace, Darwin's great coadjutor, with regard to the origin of the human will and conscience. Professor Dana, in justifying his significant concessions, says,[1] "In the case of man, the abruptness of transition 'from preceding forms' is still more extraordinary, and especially because it occurs so near to the present time. In the highest man-ape, the nearest allied of living species has the capacity of the cranium but thirty-four cubic inches; while the skeleton throughout is not fitted for an erect position, and the fore-limbs are essential to locomotion: but, in the lowest of existing men, the capacity of the cranium is sixty-eight cubic inches; every bone is made and adjusted for the erect position; and the fore-limbs, instead of being required in locomotion, are wholly taken from the ground, and have other and higher uses."

You will be told that Professor Huxley has said that man differs less from the apes than the upper apes do from the lower apes, or than the uppermost men from the lowermost. You will be assured that there is this and that and yet another point of resemblance between the skeletons of man and of the apes. But bring the contrast to the real test. What of the brain? That is the central portion of the system: increased cephalisation is the law of the progress of animal forms; and, the moment you compare man and the ape on that strategic point, the difference is half.

Thirty-four cubic inches of cranial capacity on the animal side, sixty-eight on the human, and no link between the two! Forty years given to the search! All the agony of the defence of the Darwinian hypothesis engaged in all quarters of the globe in filling up this tremendous gap, and the colossal absence yet remaining!

Professor Agassiz lies in Mount Auburn yonder; and on his breast there is a boulder from his native Alps. Whenever I look on it, I think what a boulder that man may have carried on his breast into his grave, because he was not able to develop the proposition which he laid down as a gauntlet before Darwinism in the last article he ever printed. You remember that in our brilliant Atlantic Monthly, face to face with the world, Professor Agassiz, a few days before he passed into that Unseen Holy where all puzzles are solved, affirmed that it can be proved that the geological record is not so imperfect but that we know what existed between the highest apes and the lowest men, and that, however broken it may be, "there is a complete sequence in many parts of it, from which the character of the succession may be *determined*."[2] He promised to prove that. He bent that colossal bow, and it dropped out of his dying hand. On the English-speaking globe, now that Lyell has gone hence, there is no man but Dana that can take up that bow, and bend it. But what does Dana say? Go

[1] Geology, p. 603.

[2] Atlantic Monthly, vol. xxxiii. p. 101.

to Agassiz's grave ; take with you those yet moist sheets of the last number of the American Journal of Science and Arts ; read over Agassiz's tomb the latest utterance of the highest and gravest authority in American geological science, and you may bring solace to a hovering, mighty spirit for an unfinished task. You will read Dana's latest words :[1] "*For the development of man, gifted with high reason and will, and thus made a power above Nature, there was required, as Wallace has urged, a special act of a Being above Nature, whose supreme Will is not only the source of natural law, but the working-force of Nature herself. This I still hold.*" You say that Agassiz was unduly theistic, and assumed that there is nothing in evolution. Dana is more cautious. The present state of knowledge, he says,[2] favours the theory that "the evolution of the system of life went forward through the derivation of species from species, according to natural methods not clearly understood, and with few occasions for supernatural intervention. The method of evolution admitted of abrupt transitions between species ; but for the development of man there was required the special act of a being above Nature, whose supreme will is the source of natural law." Huxley has come ; Huxley has spoken ; Huxley has gone ; and Dana, over Agassiz's grave, joins hands with Agassiz in the Unseen Holy, to affirm that man is the breath of God.

It is notorious that evolutionists concede,—

37. That "molecular law is the profoundest expression of the Divine Will." This is Dana's language.[3]

38. That, therefore, even if the nebular hypothesis be accepted, design in creation yet stands proved.

39. That, even if spontaneous generation under molecular law were demonstrated, the fact of design in creation would yet stand proved.

If you will elaborately master Professor Stanley Jevon's famous work on the "Principles of Science," you probably will come to his theistic conclusions, *even if you believe in the possibility of spontaneous generation under molecular law.* We have had important works on the logical method and order, from Aristotle to Kant and Hamilton ; and yet, Professor Pierce of Harvard being judge, there have been few more important productions on that theme than the "Principles of Science," by Stanley Jevons, professor of logic and political economy at Owens's College, Manchester. He is an evolutionist ; but he is also a logician.

"*I cannot,*" *he says,* "*for a moment admit that the theory of evolution will alter our theological ideas.* . . . The precise reason why we have a backbone, two hands with opposable thumbs, an erect stature, a complex brain, about two hundred and twenty-three bones, and many other peculiarities, is only to be found in the original act of creation. *I do not, any less than Paley, believe that the eye of man manifests design.* I believe that the eye was gradually developed ;

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[1] American Journal of Science and Arts, October 1876, p. 251.
[2] Geology, pp. 603, 604. [3] Amer. Jour., October 1876, p. 250.

but the *ultimate result must have been contained in the aggregate of causes; and these so far as we can see, were subject to the arbitrary choice of the Creator.*" [1]

It is notorious that even Tyndall concedes,—

40. That if a right-hand spiral movement of the particles of the brain could be shown to occur in love, and a left-hand spiral movement in hate, we should be as far off as ever from understanding the connection of this physical motion with the spiritual manifestations.[2]

It is conceded by Dana,—

41. That the possession by man of free-will and conscience shows that he must have been brought into existence by a being at least as perfect as himself; that is, by an agency possessing free-will and conscience.

42. That evolutionists are of two schools,—the extravagant and the moderate, or the wholesale and the discriminating; and that the former do, and the latter do not, account for man by the theory of evolution.

Häckel concedes,—

43. That the theory of man's descent from apes is, according to the admission of the wholesale evolutionists, deductive, and not inductive,—a result of speculation, and not of observation.

44. That it probably can never be established by the inductive, that is, by the most strictly scientific method.

Do you suppose that I think that this audience can be cheated? I do not know where in America there is another weekly audience with as many brains in it; at least I do not know where in New England I should be so likely to be tripped up if I were to make an incorrect statement, as here. "The process of deduction," says Häckel, "is not based upon any direct experience. Induction is a logical system of forming conclusions from the special to the general, by which we advance from many individual experiences to a general law. Deduction, on the other hand, draws conclusion from the general to the special, from a general law of nature to an individual case. Thus *the theory of descent is, without doubt*, a great inductive law, empirically based upon all biological experience. *The theory, on the other hand, which asserts that man has developed out of lower, and, in the first place, out of ape-like mammals, is a deductive law inseparably connected with the general inductive law.*" [3]

The theory of man's origin from apes is not based upon direct experience. Merely deductive conclusions from circumstantial evidence are sometimes lawful. We do not know all about the worlds beyond the sweep of the telescope; but so firmly is the theory of gravitation established that we believe that, if a new world should be discovered, it would be found to be under the law of gravitation. *If you will prove by induction the system of evolution as thoroughly as the Copernican system has been proved by induction, you may then fill gaps by deduction.* Astronomers predict sometimes that eclipses will occur, and they do occur according to prediction; and we think,

[1] Professor W. Stanley Jevons, Principles of Science, vol. ii. pp. 461, 462.
[2] Fragments of Science, pp. 120, 121. [3] Häckel's History of Creation, vol. ii. p. 357.

therefore, that we have ascertained something conclusive as to the mechanism of the heavens. *If evolutionists can by selective breeding produce from the same stock two varieties so widely differing that their crossing will produce sterile hybrids, then I will say that they have a scientific right to fill up by deduction the gaps in the direct evidences of evolution, and not till then.*

Professor Häckel further concedes, —

45. *That "most naturalists, even at the present day, are inclined to give up the attempt at natural explanation" of the origin of life, "and take refuge in the miracle of inconceivable creation."* [1]

The trouble with your small philosopher in Massachusetts and England is, that he out-Darwins Darwin and out-Häckels Häckel. It is important, at times, that the pulpit should show that it is not afraid of these topics ; and you will notice, that, in this Lectureship, the theme of evolution is not skipped.

You will pardon me one further word on Bathybius, which Professor St. George Mivart calls a sea-mare's nest.

"No more of that, Hal, an thou lovest me."

Häckel has minutely figured Bathybius in the plates of his most elaborate works. Huxley named it from Häckel, *Bathybius Hackelii.* Strauss rested on Bathybius the central arch of his argument against the supernatural.

It was the haughty claim of Huxley and Strauss and Häckel,—

46. That Bathybius is an organism without organs.

47. That it performs the acts of nutrition and propagation.

48. That, with other organisms like itself, it stands at the head of the terrestrial history of the development of life.

49. That it spans the chasm between the living and the not-living.

50. That it renders belief in miracle impossible.

Häckel makes Bathybius a stem from which all terrestrial life divides, and comes to its present state.[2] It would not be worth much for me here to cut down this or that bough in the great tree ; but if, with the latest scientific intelligence, I may strike at its bottom stem, Bathybius, I shall have done something. You must not think that students of religious science have no right to be interested in this classical organism. We have heard of it in theological works. We had it thrust in our faces as proof that a miracle is impossible. We therefore are interested, when, walking past our bookstores, we can pick up the yet fresh sheets of the American Journal of Science and Arts, and turn to a passage on Bathybius in an article on the voyage of the ship "Challenger." Will gentlemen here do themselves the justice, and this topic the justice, to read this authoritative intelligence (October Number, pp. 267, 268)? You will find there this closing concession :—

51. That Bathybius has been discovered in 1875 by the ship "Challenger" to be—Hear, O heavens! and give ear, O earth!—sulphate of lime ; and that, when dissolved, it crystallises as gypsum.

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[1] Häckel's History of Creation, vol. i. p. 327.
[2] Ibid., vol. i. pp. 184, 344 and vol. ii. p. 53.

IV.

THE MICROSCOPE AND MATERIALISM.[1]

ὀλιγοδρανέες, πλάσματα πηλοῦ, σκιοειδέα φῦλ' ἀμενηνά.
ARISTOPHANES: *Aves*, 686.

Blut ist ein ganz besonderer Saft.'

. . . . . .

Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen;
Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist todt!
Auf! bade, Schüler, unverdrossen
Die ird'sche Brust im Morgenroth.
GOETHE: *Faust.*

PLATO in his Phædon represents Socrates as saying in the last hour of his life to his inconsolable followers, "You may bury me if you can catch me." He then added with a smile, and an intonation of unfathomable thought and tenderness, "Do not call this poor body Socrates. When I have drunk the poison, I shall leave you, and go to the joys of the blessed. I would not have you sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the interment, 'Thus we lay out Socrates;' or, 'Thus we follow him to the grave, and bury him.' *Be of good cheer: say that you are burying my body only.*"[2]

Materialism teaches that there is nothing in the universe but matter and its laws; that there is no spiritual substance; and that what is called mind or soul in a man is but a mode of force and motion in matter, and cannot exist in separation from the body.

If materialism is the truth, you and I cannot die as well as Socrates did. If that part of us which thinks and loves and chooses is not separable from our present material frames, our souls are like the electrical charges in the glands of the poor torpedo-fishes, certain to cease to exist as soon as the cells which originate them have been dissolved. On the Peruvian coasts of South America, men drive horses down to the edge of the great deep, in order that they may receive shocks from electric-eels; and sometimes the hoof of a horse will smite the life out of one of his tormentors; and then the wrecked

1 The forty-ninth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in the Meionaon.
2 Plato, Phædon, 115; Jowett's Plato, vol. i. pp. 465, 466; Grote's Plato, vol. ii. p. 193.

swimming creature ceases for ever to be an electric battery, because the cells in which the electricity originated are destroyed once for all. Now, materialism is the doctrine that the soul is in some sense secreted by the brain, as electricity is by the cells of the torpedo-fish or electric-eel, and that, when the brain is dissolved, the soul is no more. I do not call this an impious inference, if it be, indeed, an inference fairly deducible from facts; truth is truth, even if it sears our eyeballs; I call it, however, a withering inference. I am not prejudiced against any conclusion reached through clear ideas; but the momentous issues involved in the affirmations of materialism make me anxious to look into these cells, which Häckel and Büchner and Moleschott say originate the soul. Cabanis, as Carlyle narrates with grimmest humour, thought the brain secreted soul as the liver does bile. This philosophy, and the gospel according to Jean-Jacques, were, we know, two of the broadest and blackest of the far-flapping Gehenna wings that fanned the furnaces of the French Revolution.

It is not commonly known, except among specialists in microscopical physiology, that the latest science has something to say to us of immense import as to the relations of matter and life. That theme comes home to the business and bosoms of all men; and, whatever be the verdict of full investigation, all will be eager to face it, who seek, as we do here, whatever is new and true and strategic in religious thought. On the doctrine of organic cells and living tissues, there is surely no book over fifteen years old that is not largely worthless. A text-book on geology, it is often said, is out of date as soon as it is printed. So swift has been the advance of microscopic investigation, that our cell-theory, which began to be elaborated in 1838, has made its supreme advances since 1860. "All life from a cell:" we have heard that doctrine since 1840. "All life from bioplasm," which is the core of the organic cell, we have heard as a scientific truth since about 1860. The first physiological microscopist in the English-speaking world is now Professor Lionel Beale of King's College, London; and his work on "Protoplasm, or Matter and Life," published with elaborate original plates, some of which are of as late a date as 1874, is one of the most important contributions made to knowledge recently by any original investigator of this central question of questions,—whether, when the cells of the brain are dissolved, the soul, like so much electricity developed through them, is dissipated for ever.

You remember, gentlemen, that in Dresden the great picture of the Madonna di San Sisto has an interior which everywhere suggests an ineffable exterior. Many look upon that painting, and study the hushed, shoreless awe and self-surrender of the eyes of the cherubs in the lower part of the transfigured canvas, and do not ask on what the cherubs are looking. But to cause the observer to ask that, is the chief object of this inspired part of the painting. The Madonna di San Sisto was made for an altar-piece. It was intended to stand before burning incense. In a great cathedral its place would be behind the altar, on which incense is burned to ascend to an unseen

but near Holy of Holies. It is on the central Ineffable Presence before the picture, and to which the incense rises, that these supernaturally intense eyes of the cherubs are looking. Santa Barbara, as you will observe, divides her adoration between the Son in the arms of the mother and the Unspeakable Unseen before him. Another kneeling figure looks toward what is within, but points to what is without. Even the eyes of the Son and the mother gather mysterious, measureless strength from the Unseen Ineffable to which the incense rises. To me, for one, that which is exterior in this most celebrated painting of all time is more impressive than that which is interior. If you look on the interior, there in the background, and not noticeable at first, but filling all the ambient air behind the mother and the Son, is a cloud made up of innumerable blissful faces of supernatural beings in eternal youth. But when at Dresden, day after day for a month, I studied the painting, I always forgot these in the Central Presence to which the incense ascends; and I went away always in a kind of trance. I know nothing in art that moves me as much as the Unseen Holy suggested before that picture.

Will you follow me long enough to-day, my friends, to find out that this Madonna di San Sisto of Raphael, whose interior suggests an ineffable exterior, is a true analogue of the cell,—God and the soul without, inert matter within,—every movement of the latter pointing to the former as its only adequate cause. Come near enough to this Madonna painting of Almighty God, and you will be convinced that it was the purpose of the Artist to make the interior suggest the ineffable exterior.

When we study living matter with the highest powers of the microscope, and under the lead of the best original investigators, what does the latest science see?

1. That nothing that lives is alive in every part.

2. That the substance of every living organism consists of three parts,

(1.) Nutrient matter, or pabulum.

(2.) Germinal matter, or bioplasm.

(3.) Formed matter, or tissue, secretion and deposit.

As you stand on some murmurous shore of a tropical sea, and pick up a beautifully coloured shell, with its occupant yet in it, you easily perceive a difference between the living and the not-living part of that organism. No doubt the shell grows; and yet, even while the animal bears it about upon his back, parts of the shell are as truly inanimate as they are when afterward the painted wonder lies on the shelf of your cabinet. The shell grows, but not in every part, if it be of mature size. It increases its bulk chiefly by additions of matter at its edges and on its interior; and these increments are made by a process of growth in the softer parts of the organism. We ourselves do not carry very large shells about upon our persons; but the finger-tips are incased in delicate shells, of which by no means every particle is living. It once has been living; but when you pare matter away from the back of a shell, or from the edge of the finger-nail, you find a very great distinction between it and the quick flesh

that is touched in a nerve. Four-fifths of the bulk of most organisms, animal and vegetable, is made up of formed matter. Only one-fifth is really alive.

Into the centre of every organic cell there flows a current of nutrient matter, or pabulum; and this may be wholly inorganic. It may be gas; it may be a mineral compound; it may be formed material from meats and fruits. In a cell [referring to a figure the speaker drew upon the blackboard] this nutrient matter is first transformed into living matter, and next the living matter is thrown off as formed material, to make the cell-wall. There are two currents in an organic cell,—one flowing inward, and conveying nutrient matter with it; the other outward, and bearing with it formed material.

In the centre of the cell, by a process that cannot be explained by chemistry or any physical science, the nutrient matter is changed into living matter.

At the outer edge of the cell, formed material accumulates, and is in some cases tissue, in some secretion, in some an osseous deposit.

You have now, I hope, gentlemen, a distinct idea of the three kinds of matter which are to be found in all living organisms,—pabulum or nutrient matter, bioplasm or germinal matter, tissue or formed matter. There are no living organisms, vegetable or animal, that are not made up wholly of these three kinds of matter.

It is only within a comparatively few years that we have been able to demonstrate under the microscope the existence of this distinction between the inner portions of the cell and the cell-wall. Why, Professor Huxley himself, down to 1853, considered the core of the cell as of little importance, and as having no peculiar office.[1] He has changed his opinion now on that point, as on several others concerning the cell-theory; and this fact is not to his discredit at all, because the microscopical study of living matter is advancing so rapidly, that theories of 1850 and 1860 must often be abandoned.

Professor Lionel Beale, who is an accepted authority as to this class of facts, however much his inferences, which I do not now present to you, may be objectionable to materialists, has made large use of a most important process of staining living tissue by a solution of carmine in ammonia. That particular solution makes red whatever is living in a tissue, and does not colour formed material. When you drench a tissue in that solution of carmine in ammonia, you take it out with all the bioplasts stained red. This discovery has been a source of great advances in our knowledge of living tissues, so many of the ultimate parts of which are colourless, and as difficult as water to dissect optically. Fastening the highest magnifying power upon tissue prepared by this carmine process, what do we see?

3. That germinal points, or bioplasts, are scattered so pervadingly through all organic structures that in no organism is there a space one five-hundredth of an inch square without a germinal point, or bioplast.

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1 "The Cell-Theory," Medico-Chirurgical Review, October 1853.

We are sure to find, in any piece of living matter of that size, a bioplast that will colour red in a solution of carmine in ammonia.

4. That the germinal points, or bioplasts, are the only living matter.

5. That all formed matter has once been living matter, and so differs totally from inorganic matter.

Every particle of your oyster-shell has once been living, growing matter, although it now is dead; and yet, although inanimate, it is not inorganic. The shaggiest back of an oyster is matter of a totally different kind from that of the sand and clay and pebbles of which it makes a couch. Every particle of your muscle, nerve, or bone, has once been a bioplast.

I use the word "bioplasm" instead of "protoplasm," because it is a more definite term. It means always that germinal substance which has the power of transmuting not-living into living matter, and of movement, of self-multiplication, and of producing formed material. "Protoplasm" is a word that has been applied to so many different styles of matter, that its indefiniteness in present usage is a frequent source of confusion of thought in biological discussions. "Bioplasm" and "bioplasts" are words which agree well with "biology," the accepted name of one of the greatest of the sciences.

6. That in the cell of an organic tissue the central portion is always a bioplast.

7. That nutrient matter for the bioplasts may consist of inorganic matter, or of formed matter.

8. That the bioplasts convert the nutrient into living matter, and the living into formed matter.

9. That the transmutation of the not-living into the living occurs in the bioplasts instantaneously.

You will read in the older physiologies that all tissues are made up of cells; and that is, of course, true; but you must not suppose that it is the latest doctrine that the cell is the object of supreme interest in living tissue. The cell-wall is formed matter. The bioplast is the unit of growth. Bioplasm may exist without an enveloping wall. It may be a bioplast, and not a cell. You may have expected me to say much about cells and the cellular theory; and I am talking about bioplasts and the bioplasmic theory. The theory of bioplasts has superseded the theory of cells, or rather has given to the latter more definiteness; so that now we speak of cells with meanings derived from bioplasts.

10. That the cell-wall is formed matter, and not alive, and not necessary to the work of transmutation affected by the bioplast.

11. That bioplasts always arise from previous bioplasts.

12. That they have the power of self-movement in any direction.

13. That they are capable of self-subdivision.

14. That each portion of a self-divided bioplast has the same powers as its parent bioplast.

15. That, when dead, bioplasts cannot be resuscitated.

Let us pause here for a moment to notice leisurely the confusion of thought of those who compare this transmutation of the not-living

into the living, with the formation of a crystal. I can form a crystal and dissolve it, and form a crystal again out of the solution. I can take two gases, and mix them, and produce water; and then, by an easy chemical process, I can change the water into these two gases; and I can do this, back and forth, any number of times. But, gentlemen, if a bioplast is once dead, it cannot be resuscitated. Materialists talk about the process of life being a kind of "vital crystallisation," whatever that may mean. Be sure that you hold to clear ideas. Revere the orthodoxy of straightforwardness. I want no philosophy, no platform, no pulpit, no dying pillow, that does not rest on rendered reasons. Owen, who fifteen years ago wrote his great work on the "Anatomy of the Vertebrates," opposed in it Darwinism. He called that system as a whole a "guess endeavour." As others were guessing, he himself ventured to guess how the chasm between the not-living and the living might be bridged. Fifteen years ago, Dr. Lionel Beale did not stand as a lion in the way of such guessing. Owen put forward as a possible hypothesis that we shall find out some day that there is "molecular machinery" that accounts for the phenomena of life. He thinks life in its simplest forms may perhaps be compared to the power a magnet exerts when it attracts certain particles to itself, and rejects others. It seems to have the power of selection. You might say that the magnet is feeding itself to see how it draws up to itself metallic dust. But the reply to all that is, You may magnetise and demagnetise your poor iron any number of times; but kill once the smallest living organism, and there is no remagnetising that. You may change your magnet from state to state, as you may change water to gases, and gases to water. *You may braid and unbraid the threads of any inorganic whip-lash again and again, but once unbraid any living strands, and there is no braiding them together again for ever.*

16. That what the bioplasts effect in the transmutation of nutrient into living matter, and of the latter into formed material, chemistry can neither imitate nor explain.

You must not allow yourself to fall into doubt as to the attitude of materialistic philosophers on this proposition. Who is Häckel? He is a materialist. What is a materialist? One who denies that there is any spiritual substance in the universe, and affirms that matter is the only thing that exists. Can Häckel believe in the immortality of the soul? It is a mild statement to say that he must be in grave doubt about it. Can Häckel believe in God? He says in so many words that "there is no God but necessity." What does Häckel affirm concerning the ability of chemistry to bridge the colossal chasm between the living and the not-living? That it is powerless to do so. That it is impotent to explain how inorganic is transmuted into organic matter. There is nothing in chemistry that can produce life. I asked a friend who lately took his degree in chemistry at Gottingen what was thought there about the possibility of producing in the laboratory any parallels to the action of the bioplasts. "We have given up," said he, "the idea that we can make things grow." "Most naturalists of our time," says Häckel, "are inclined to give up

the attempt to account for the origin of life by natural causes."[1] Du Bois Reymond says, "It is futile to attempt by chemistry to bridge the chasm between the living and the not-living."

In the bioplast occurs a change which is a sealed volume to the deepest physical science. Here is the not-living, and there is the living; and instantaneously the change of the former into the latter is effected. You look with your microscope upon the centre of the bioplast, and what do you see? Little germinal points arising in the centre, and enlarging. The bioplast seems to boil bioplasts from its centre. It moves. It divides itself here before our eyes [illustrating on the blackboard]. It throbs. You watch it under your microscope. The viscid mass is throwing out a promontory here and a promontory there, against gravitation, and contrary to all we know of chemical force. Suddenly there come great inlets here and there; and soon your one bioplast has made of itself two bioplasts. Each of the new bioplasts continues to receive nutriment; and in its interior the mysterious transmutation of the not-living into the living, and the preparation of formed material, go on again. Each will divide again; and thus, little by little, we find formed matter woven at the edge of these creeping bioplasts into—what? Nerve, bone, muscle, artery. We find the not-living changed into the living, and formed material thrown off—how? *So* as to produce all the tissues of the body.

Your microscope demonstrates that the little bioplast has not only the throbbing movement, and power of self-multiplication, but of rectilinear movement also. Once this bioplast was here. It threw off formed material; and that formed material flows away behind it as your thread flows from your spindle. It flows away here—as what? As an incipient nerve. But here another group of bioplasts spin, and a thread flows away—as what? As muscular fibre. There you weave your nerve, there your muscle, there your bone, and there your artery. The bioplasts move on; they convert constantly the nutrient material into living matter, and throw off formed material; and when at last this thread is wound, it has a contractile quality. When that is wound, it has the power of transmitting what we call the nervous force; or, when the other is wound, it is the beginning of a bone: when this other, that is the commencement of an artery; or when this other, that is an incipient vein.

We stand in awe before this action of the bioplasts as incontrovertibly indicating intelligence somewhere. If you please, when the egg begins to quicken, must not the whole plan of your eagle, or of your lion, be kept in view from the first stroke of the shuttles? It is something to weave a nerve, is it not? It is enough to keep us on our knees to know that this little mass of colourless, viscid, and, under the microscope, apparently structureless matter, can weave osseous, muscular, and nervous fibres. But what if they cannot only spin these different threads, but also weave them into warp and woof? I am putting before you facts that are not controverted at all. Dr. Carpenter adopts these views in the latest edition of his

[1] History of Creation, vol. i. p. 327.

famous "Physiology." They are wholly authoritative statements of what goes on in every living tissue. Among materialists, and anti-materialists, as they walk over this high table-land of science, there is, I assure you, my friends, unanimity as to essential facts at present; and by and by, perhaps, there will be unanimity as to inferences from facts. My belief is, that these facts should be put before all scholars, and not kept from the masses. The members of the legal, clerical, and literary professions, are trained in the logical method as thoroughly as physicists are, and have a right to test reasoning, even where they cannot for themselves verify facts. When I stand here before lawyers, and before learned ministers, and before scholars better informed than I have had opportunity to be on these great themes, I feel, that, although not men of science, you have the right to test the reasoning of science. I am bringing to you here only what are conceded to be facts.; and you are competent to test the logic of the facts. It is the right of every mind to look into the logic of whatever touches immortality, the soul, and all that is highest in human endeavour.

It is beyond contradiction that we know that these little points of structureless matter spin the threads, and weave the warp and woof, of organisms. But the bioplasts are of apparently just the same matter in the eagle and in the lion. You look into the centre of the egg of the eagle, and you will see a little mass of colourless, viscid substance, wholly structureless, so far as the highest power of the microscope can reveal its nature. But, when the egg begins to quicken, there is a different segmentation for each of the four great classes of animal forms. All eggs of the class of vertebrates, for instance, begin their development in the same way, and run on in the same way for a while; but your radiates begin another way, and your articulates another. Examined by all the physical tests known to science, bioplasm is the same, however, in your radiate and articulate, and vertebrate.

Take the twittering swallows under the brown eaves, or your eagle on the cliff, or your lion in his lair: the egg, in each case, is the source of life; and, when the quickening begins, there is nothing to be seen at the centre of the egg but this structureless, colourless, viscid bioplasm. Nevertheless, it divides and subdivides, and weaves, in the one case a lion, and in the other a swallow, and in the other an eagle; and I affirm, in the name of all reason, that, from the very first, the plan of the whole organism must be in view somewhere. You know that when a temple is built, the plan of it is in the corner-stone. You know that when the weaver strikes his shuttle for the first time in the finest product of his art, the whole plan of the figures of the web is before him. We see here the bioplasts weaving their threads; we then see them co-ordinating threads and co-ordinating them *so* as, in the one case, to make your swallow, in another case to make your eagle, in another case to make your lion, and in another case to make your man; and why shall we not say, following the law, that every change must have an adequate cause, that somewhere and somehow there is here what all this mechanism needs,—FORECAST?

What are men talking about when they attribute all this to merely "molecular machinery"? Gentlemen, it is out of date to say that "molecular arrangement" accounts for nerve and bone and tissue and artery and vein. It is getting too late to say that merely molecular arrangement accounts for the weaving of organic threads and the interweaving of thread with thread. Will you consider what a complicated process is required to produce that hand of yours, or this eye, or this ear? No doubt strange powers come into existence with the bioplast. Every bioplast is derived from a bioplast: there is your structureless machine, there a little glue-like, colourless matter; and that is all there is. All life begins in the bioplast; and every bioplast known to man has been derived from a preceding bioplast. *Out of what, then, came the first one?*

Professor Huxley writes for "The Encyclopædia Britannica" an elaborate article on biology; and in the opening page of it he says, "The chasm between the not-living and the living the present state of knowledge cannot bridge." Bring materialism to the edge of that chasm. Häckel calls the bioplasts plastids, but confesses that they are mysteries. You find in them complicated processes going forward in apparently structureless matter. You see chemical law apparently set at defiance. The action of material forces appears to be reversed. Häckel, over and over, admits that we cannot produce life, and that we know of nothing but bioplasm that ever has produced it; but somewhere and somehow in the turmoil of a cooling planet, he thinks, forsooth, that there must have been a cell originated by fortuitous concourse of atoms, or spontaneous generation.

Precisely there is the rock, gentlemen, on which both materialism and the radical form of the evolution theory wreck themselves. There is, I willingly admit, a use, as well as an abuse, of the theory of evolution. Perhaps Häckel and Huxley illustrate its abuse: Dana illustrates its use. But when I stand at the side of the chasm between the not-living and the living, I, for one,—face to face with facts, and all theory put aside,—feel as I felt at Dresden before that Ineffable Holy. I am in the presence of Almighty God. Every change must have an adequate cause; and the organic living cell must have outside of it a God, and inside of it an immaterial principle, to be accounted for under the law of causation.

Huxley, more cautious than Häckel, says that life is the cause of organisation, and not organisation the cause of life. He has printed that opinion over and over,[1] and never taken it back. Well, if life is the cause of organisation, probably it is safe to say the cause must exist before the effect. At least, that is Nature's logic. *But, if life may exist before organisation, why not after it? I affirm that the microscope begins to have visions of man's immortality.*

Some force forms the parts of an embryo.

That which forms the parts is the cause of the form of the parts.

The cause must exist before the effect.

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[1] Huxley, Introduction to the Classification of Animals.

The force which forms the parts of an embryo, or of any living organism, exists, therefore, before the parts.

Life is thus the cause of organisation, and not organisation the cause of life.

Life, therefore, exists before organisation.

If it exists before, it may after.

Summarising, then, the latest science analytically, we see in living matter,—

17. That the bioplasts are a colourless, viscid, and apparently structureless substance, and the same in all animals.

18. That they throw off the formed material, *so* that it constitutes nerve, brain, muscle, artery, vein, bone, and all the mechanism of the organism.

19. That, although of the same chemical composition in the eggs of the different animals, they weave tissues such as to produce the different plans of these animals.

20. That their action involves, therefore, both the formation of tissues and their growth according to the needs of the animal.

21. That it involves the production of all those structures, which, in animal and vegetable organisms, exhibit an adaptation of means to ends.

22. That it involves the co-ordination of tissues, secretions, and deposits in the organism.

23. That the plan of the whole organism is necessarily taken into view from the first stroke of the shuttles of the bioplasts that weave it.

Tennyson sings with an emphasis of far-reaching thought :—

> "Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies;
> Hold you here in my hand,
> Little flower, root and all.
> And if I could understand
> What you are, roots and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is."

So we may say in the light of established science :—

> Cells in the crannied flesh,
> I pluck you out of your crannies;
> Hold you here in my hand,
> Little cells, throbs and all.
> And if I could understand
> What you are, throbs and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.

V.

LOTZE, BEALE, AND HUXLEY ON LIVING TISSUES.[1]

"This seems to me to be as sure a teaching of science as the law of gravitation, that life proceeds from life, and nothing but life."—SIR WILLIAM THOMSON, "Inaugural Address before the British Association," "Nature," vol. iv. p. 269.

The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequences in nature. The further question obtrudes itself with resistless might, Whence came the sequences?" —Professor TYNDALL "Fragments of Science," p. 64.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

OUR people are about entering on a presidential election in presence of all the other nations who are our guests. *If a man's head, character, and career are such a truncated cone, lacking all the upper zones, he is no fit centennial candidate.* This autumn's choice may be a rudder of the cause of Civil Service reform in many a century to come. Both political parties assert that a great evil exists in the management of our party political patronage; and both call loudly for reform. Is it not the duty of thoughtful men in all the professions, to see to it that gilded demagogism does not teach the people a lie in the smooth name of democracy? We are told that we must beware of an aristocracy of office-holders. We are assured that Civil Service reform, such as both parties demand, may end in the creation of an office-holding class. Which is the worse, to have the great mass of the minor offices in politics the gift of the higher offices, the upper and lower playing into each other's hands, like gift-enterprises and their patrons, or to have the rule established which Washington and Jefferson and Adams and Madison endorsed, that men shall neither be appointed nor removed on the principle that to political victors belong all political spoils, but shall be put into office for ability and availability, and kept there for good behaviour? *Let us take patronage from party, and give it to the people. Vast gift-enterprises in politics are the subtlest threat in the American future.* They call for attention from all scholars, although, perhaps, not for much discussion in the pulpit as yet. Ministers know much of which they do not speak in public. But, in our circles of influence, it is assuredly in our power to turn public thought upon this enormous mischief in the current political life of a yet young nation. Our Woolseys, our Danas, our Tildens, and our Hayeses are united; and shall educated men of all classes not unite the parlour, the platform, and the pulpit on this now strategic theme? On Civil

[1] The fiftieth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Park Street Church.

Service reform, or any other great cause, give me a union of the parlour, the pulpit, and the platform, and I will insure a right attitude of the press; and give me a union of the parlour, the pulpit, the platform, and the press, and a right attitude of politics and of the police will follow.

THE LECTURE.

At certain seasons, it was the custom of the Doges of Venice to symbolise the marriage of their city to the sea by casting a ring into the waves. Transfigured marble, Venice stood at the head of the Adriatic, and made the howling, waste, immeasurable brine her servant. But her conquest was one of love, and of the natural superiority of the loftiest spiritual purposes. The sea murmured through her streets: she made it float her traffic. The Mediterranean flashed far and wide; and far and wide Venice made it carry her thought, her enterprise, her beneficence. The modern Venice is religious science: the modern Mediterranean is physical science. Transfigured marble, the loftiest spiritual purposes on earth—wherever they exist—are the city. Far-flashing, immeasurable sea, a waste plain unless ridden by fleets of holy wills and beneficent enterprises—this is physical science. That city purposes to cover that sea with such fleets. The sea and the city rejoice equally in their nuptials. On this occasion I wish, after the manner of the Doges of Venice, to cast into that sea as a marriage-symbol the ring of the living cell.

You will allow me to be elementary; for we cannot approach the mysteries of the microscope with clearness of thought, without attention to some very humble details. Let me ask every gentleman here to look to-morrow morning at the unsharpened edge of his razor in order to form a distinct idea of what the one-thousandth part of an inch is. I suppose a thousand dull razor-edges put side by side might make an inch. Now, under our better present microscopes, how much breadth may such a razor's edge be made to appear to have? We can magnify the one-thousandth part of an inch to the breadth of three fingers, or, exactly speaking, to the length of that line [referring to coloured diagrams exhibited on the platform]. The one-thousandth part of an inch, or the dull edge of your razor magnified twenty-eight hundred times linear, is as thick as your three fingers.[1] When you have a dot only the one four-thousandth part of an inch in diameter, that is, a dot so small that four like it could lie abreast of each other on your razor's edge, and when you magnify that dot four thousand times, it is of precisely the size of this dot, or as large as an English shilling. We are going into a labyrinth, my friends; and I wish you to know what opportunities for exact observation the latest science furnishes. You will hear the assertion, that, under the highest powers of the microscope, protoplasm or bioplasm is apparently structureless. I beg you to look at your razor's edge in order that when you examine bioplasm with a power that magni-

[1] Beale's Microscope.

fies twenty-eight hundred times in a linear direction, and know that a line the thousandth part of an inch thick, under that power would be three fingers broad, you may be tolerably certain, that, if there is any structure in the bioplasm that carmine can stain, you will see it. If you are told that this transparent, colourless, and apparently structureless substance is molecular machinery, and that it has purely physical arrangements, which not only weave bone, muscle, artery, vein, and nerve, but can co-ordinate tissue with tissue, and produce wholly by machinery a plant or animal, you must remember that under your microscope, which gives your razor's edge the breadth of your three fingers, all bioplasm appears to be absolutely structureless.

Ariadne, you know, had a clew, a little thread, which she received from Vulcan, and which she gave to Theseus, by the aid of which he safely penetrated the famous labyrinth of Minotaurus. Cultivated men are now thoughtfully walking into a labyrinth far more complicated than that. Philosophy, not for the first time, but with better weapons than ever before, is entering the border-land between the physical and the spiritual, a labyrinth on the border-ground of the two kingdoms of mind and matter; a border on which will be fought the Waterloos of philosophy for a hundred years to come; a border which will be contested as the Rhine never was; a border where soul and matter, God and man, meet; a border where the questions of immortality, of freedom of the will, of moral responsibility, and even of the Divine Existence itself, will be discussed by the iron lips of the best intellectual artillery on the globe. Now we have in this labyrinth an Ariadne clew, and what is it? Why, simply the axiomatic truth, *that every change must have a sufficient cause.* Until the Seven Stars set in the East, men will not give up their belief, that, whenever a change occurs, there must be an adequate cause for it. We are to behold changes occurring in matter, that, under the best microscope, is apparently structureless. We are to behold harmoniously concurrent changes occurring, that when taken together amount to the building up of your hand and nerves and veins, and heart and ear and eye and brain; and not only to that, but to the co-ordinating and adjusting the wants of each one of these to the wants of each of the others. Εκαστω συμμακοι παντες, as the Greeks used to say (all the allies of each): this is the most wonderful fact in the arrangements of the parts of any living organism. Not only the formation of each part, but the co-ordination of part with part in organic structures, is to be explained, without violence to self-evident truth. *We stand before structureless bioplasm, and see it weaving organisms; and we are to adhere, in spite of all theories, to the Ariadne clew, that every cause is to be interpreted by its effects, and that all changes must have adequate causes.*

Before I come to the discussion of the process of carmine staining of living tissues, it is important that I should sketch briefly the history of the cell-theory in physiology.

What right have I to know anything about physiological and microscopical research? How should a minister, who, if born to his

calling, is, as many think, neither man nor woman, but something between the one and the other, dare to know anything about the microscope? I notice that the "New York Nation"—a journal which I respect for its culture, but which occasionally takes a merely library view of human affairs—says that it looked over the catalogues of our theological seminaries lately, and did not find, forsooth, that anything important is known in these professional schools about the recent progress of philosophy or physiology. It found by an attentive examination of printed documents,—about as good evidence concerning the theological instruction in our seminaries as tombstones in cemeteries are concerning the characters of those who lie beneath them,—it discovered, after an exhaustive and astute examination of catalogues, that ministers have no acquaintance whatever with philosophy in its latest forms. It did not ascertain that at Princeton Theological Seminary—that mossy, mediæval school—there is a professorship of the relations between religious and other science. At Andover—a little less mossy, possibly, as you think, but yet sufficiently mediæval—there is a lectureship on that subject; and at some near date there may be established there too, God willing, a professorship on that very theme. Unless a man is equipped in what little of logic and metaphysics a Sir William Hamilton and a John Stuart Mill can teach him, he is not adequately prepared for the Aristotelian lecture-room of Professor Park. What shall we say of the thousand sides of the culture of such a man as Schleiermacher, or Julius Müller?

Go to Germany; and what name at this instant leads the philosophy of the most learned land on the globe? What philosopher is read with the most enthusiasm by students of religious and philosophical science in Germany and England and Scotland? Hermann Lotze. Who is he? I am acutely sorry that you have heard of Herbert Spencer, whose star touches the Western pines, and know nothing of Hermann Lotze, whose star is in the ascendant. The most renowned of the modern German philosophers, he is a great physiologist, as well as a great metaphysician.[1] He is the one that is teaching all Germany—he taught me, among others—to look at this border-land with all the reverence with which we bow down before Almighty God. Who is Hermann Lotze? A man recognised everywhere as thoroughly acquainted with physiology, as Herbert Spencer is not, especially with the latest research. A scholar enriched by the massive spoils of all the German metaphysical systems, and made opulent by all physiological knowledge, and building up with these two sides the colossal arch of a new system, with many a Christian truth at its summit. Although Hermann Lotze, as professor in the philosophical faculty at Göttingen, and one of the higher advisers of the court of Hanover, does not put himself forward as an apologist for any one particular school of religious opinion, he is everywhere regarded as a supporter of that form of Christian philosophy which is now absorbing all established science.

[1] See art. on "Hermann Lotze" in Mind, July Number, 1876.

He is a theist of the most pronounced kind. As to evolution, his positions are nearly those of Dana. He is full of scorn for the idea that the Power that put into us personality does not itself possess personality. Carlyle, toward the end of his famous history of Frederic the Great, says there was one form of scepticism which the all-doubting Frederic could not endure. "Atheism, truly, he never could abide: to him, as to all of us," says Carlyle, "it was flatly inconceivable that intellect, moral emotion, could have been put into *him* by an Entity that had none of its own."[1] This inconceivability is the central proposition of Hermann Lotze's philosophy, the most brilliant, the most audacious, the most abreast of the time, of all the philosophies of the globe. You say I am a reactionary evangelical, and that I stand here endeavouring to hold back the wheels of progress. I find that I have been publicly compared in grave print to one of the persecutors of Galileo; not in so many words, but in thought. The truth is, that, instead of being reactionary, this Boston Lectureship is abreast of the latest German investigation. I am proud to say that I have some acquaintance with Hermann Lotze, and that I regard him, as the rising, as Germany regards Herbert Spencer, as the setting, star in philosophy.

Now, gentlemen, to be brief, the cell-theory and its history may be summarised in twelve propositions:

1. In 1838 the microscope was sufficiently perfected to furnish a solid basis for the observation of facts.

2. Schleiden founded the cell-theory, but restricted it to plants. With him the cell consisted of a vesicle and semi-fluid contents.

3. Schwann added to Schleiden's two elements a third,—the nucleus.

Why am I running over this history? Sir William Hamilton never would discuss any great theme without looking back across the record of its discussion in order to obtain the trend of opinion through a long range. Without historical retrospect, we are easily deceived by temporary swirls of opinion. We have yet another clew besides the one of cause and effect: it is the unanimity of experts. A fair statement of the history of the cell-theory will show that the points that are central in the modern form of that theory were established thirty-five years ago, and that there has been unanimity of conclusion as to all the more essential facts.

(1) "This semi-fluid substance," says Schwann, "possesses a capacity to occasion the production of cells."

(2) "When this takes place, the nucleus usually appears to be formed first, and then the cells around it."

You will not fail to remember the distinction between living matter and formed matter, and that nutrient matter is transmuted by the bioplast into living matter, and then thrown off as formed material. But in the cell are nuclei and nucleoli; and the question of questions in the central part of the cell-theory is, whether the bioplasm existed before the nucleus, or the nucleus before the bioplasm.

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[1] Carlyle, Frederic the Great, book 23, chap. xiv.

Schwann gave as his opinion on that point thirty years ago, that the nucleus appears to be formed by the semi-fluid substance in the cell.

(3.) "*The cell, when once formed, continues to grow by its own individual powers, but is at the same time directed by the influence of the entire organism in such a manner as the design of the whole requires. This is the fundamental phenomenon of all animal and vegetable life.*"

These words of Schwann are more than thirty-five years old, and express the central truth of the bioplasmic theory of to-day.

(4.) "The generation of the cells takes place in a fluid, or structureless substance, which we may call cell-germinating material.[1]

So much for the cellular theory up to 1840.

4. In 1841 Dr. Henle adopted the cell-theory of Schleiden and Schwann, but pointed out the multiplication of cells by division and budding.

5. In the same year Dr. Martin Barry showed the reproduction of cells by division of the parent nucleus.

6. In 1842 and 1846 J. Goodsir confirmed Barry's proposition, and maintained that "the secretion within a primitive cell is always situated between the nucleus and the cell-wall, and would appear to be a product of the nucleus."[2]

7. In 1845 Nägeli showed the comparative unimportance of the cell-wall.

8. In 1851 Alexander Brown proved that the cell-wall is non-essential.

9. In 1857 Leydig first decidedly declared as established science that the cell-wall is non-essential.

10. In 1861 Max Schultze observed that many of the most important kind of cells are destitute of a cell-membrane. He defined the cell as "a little mass of protoplasm inside of which lies a nucleus. The nucleus as well as the protoplasm are products by partition of similar components of another cell." In 1854 Max Schultze had described certain non-nucleated cells, and doubts were thrown on the universality of the nucleus.

11. In 1856 Lord S. G. Osborne discovered the process of the carmine staining of vegetable and animal tissues.

12. By aid of this process Professor Lionel Beale, between 1856 and 1866, so far advanced the knowledge of living tissues, that now his bioplasmic theory at once supplements and supersedes the cellular theory.[3]

Are you shy of accepting the assertion that the cellular theory, of which you have heard so much, has been superseded by the protoplasmic or bioplasmic theory? Here is Häckel himself, who says, "The protoplasm or sarcode theory—that is, that this albuminous material is the original active substratum of all vital

1 Zellenkeimstoff, Schwann, Reports of the Sydenham Society, 1847, p. 39.
2 Anatom. Memoirs, vol. ii., Trans. of the Royal Soc. of Edinburgh, 1845, p. 417.
3 James Tyson, The Cell Doctrine; Dr. John Drysdale, Protoplasmic Theory of Life: London, 1874, pp. 12–108.

phenomena—may perhaps be considered one of the greatest achievements of modern biology, and one of the richest in results."[1]

While we abandon to-day the cell-theory in its old form, we retain it in the new form, if we please to put into the doctrine of the cell the idea that the cell-wall is not essential, but that what is essential is the central viscid, transparent bioplasm, or living, germinal matter.

Gentlemen, I am not a bold man, and therefore I have adopted as an inflexible rule, not to trust any man's authority as to facts in science without advice to do so from his determined opponents. It would have been enough for me to have had, as I did have, the authority of James Dana for trust in Professor Lionel Beale's statements of facts concerning living tissues. One of the most distinguished theological scholars in this country, whom, out of reverence, I will not name, was afflicted nervously, and threatened with loss of sight. Physicians in this learned city, and in Paris, again and again prescribed for him, but fruitlessly. Dr. Lionel Beale in London was recommended to him; and one hour of examination of the case was followed by a single prescription, which was effectual, and has been so year after year through a quarter of a century. In one of my groves near Lake George there is a beech which I call "The Bioplast Beech," so delicious were the hours I spent there this summer with Hermann Lotze and Beale and Dr. Carpenter and Dana and Darwin, and a score of other books of science. Beale's celebrated lectures before the Royal College of Physicians in 1861, on living tissues, and his discoveries concerning bioplasm, were preceded by a work on "The Microscope," which you had better not buy yet, simply because it is going into a fifth edition. It is a bulky, elaborate book, full of plates; and I have seen it worn ragged in my library, as I call the Athenæum yonder, with its one hundred thousand volumes, its one hundred magazines, and one hundred newspapers and excellent professional collections. It is a significant sign when a book of science is worn ragged in a library used by the Sumners and Wilsons and Emersons, and other men who are not likely to waste time on rubbish.

Beale's volumes I find worn eloquently black, and Bastian's hardly stained. Some small philosopher may tell you that Beale is no authority, and that many of his propositions are in dispute. One of them is; but it is a proposition that I am not using at all, namely, that the nerves end in loops. Even on that obscure point, opinion is turning more and more to Beale's side. But when a costly work on the miscroscope, with elaborate plates filled with the results of original research upon living tissues, goes in a few years into a fifth edition, and its author is commonly pronounced to be the first microscopist of the English-speaking world, and when its facts agree with those of Frey, the greatest authority on the same subject in the German-speaking world, even a timid man may read such a book without any great tremor. In examining authorities in science, I seek first to ascertain on what points there is an agreement of the

1 Häckel, Quar. Mic. Jour., 1869, p. 223.

best English and the best German publications; but that is not enough. We must have the authority of his rivals for trusting any man as an expert.

What do the opponents of Beale's conclusions say of his facts?

1. Dr. John Drysdale of Edinburgh is the author of a work on "The Protoplasmic Theory of Life;" and in 1874 was president of the Liverpool Microscopical Society. He has given head and heart to the doctrine that bioplasm is a form of matter *sui generis;* and that its activity is an outcome of transmuted physical force, or the result of "irritability under stimulation."

He opposes vehemently Beale's conclusion that the actions of bioplasm require to account for them a higher than physical force. But of Beale he says, "A master-mind appeared in 1860, we are glad to say, in the person of our countryman, Dr. Lionel Beale of London. He had for years devoted himself with unwearied zeal to microscopical research on the animal tissues, using the highest magnifying powers as soon as available, and had attained to an almost unrivalled skill, and had discovered various new methods of the preparing objects, which enabled him to analyse the structures of the textures to a point not hitherto reached by anatomists. In 1860 he wrote those 'Lectures on the Structure of the Simple Tissues of the Human Body,' which were delivered before the Royal College of Physicians in 1861, and which are destined, I believe, to make an epoch in the progress of physiological science. Since then, Dr. Beale has gone on completing and expanding his system, and filling up the details, and has carried it out in pathology to an extent of completeness and consistency marvellous for the short time as yet given, and as being the work of one man; a fact which in itself shows he has seized on one great and central principle, which enables him to bring into practical harmony a vast number of scattered observations both of his own and of others. Beale's protoplasmic theory now takes the place of the cell-theory. *General opinion is now in accord as respects the facts with Dr. Beale's statements on the nucleus in* 1860."[1]

2. Professor Alexander Bain makes Beale's facts the basis of the central chapter in his work on "Mind and Body,"—one of those tempting but disappointing royal roads to knowledge called "The International Scientific Series." Bain, as you know, teaches that only matter exists in the universe, but that matter rightly defined is "a double-faced somewhat, having a spiritual and a physical side." That is the nearest approach to a definition that either he or Tyndall has given. In this marvellous compound unit there coinhere in one substratum extension and the absence of extension, form and the absence of form, activity and the absence of activity,—all the perfectly contradictory attributes of matter and mind. I suppose that it may be asserted that mind is coextensive with matter; but never, until we can believe that a thing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, will men who love clear ideas adopt Tyndall's and Bain's self-contradictory definition of matter.

[1] Dr. John Drysdale, Prot. Theor. of Life: London, 1874. Pp. 41, 68, 103.

But even Bain leans confidently on Beale whenever he speaks of microscopical physiology.

In arguments before juries, Webster often asked his opponents, "Why do you not meet the case?" Remember that famous phrase of his, if you hear the materialistic theory of evolution defended. What is the case against that theory? It consists of the irreconcilable opposition of the attributes of matter and mind, of the unfathomed gulf between the not-living and the living, of the fact that spontaneous generation has never been shown to be a possibility, and of the missing links between men and apes. Let these points be met fairly, and the case is met. Not until the chasm between the not-living and the living is filled up by observation, not until that distant time when you shall have found some merely physical link between the inorganic and organic, can you say that *the* theory of evolution has been proven by induction. A theory of evolution has been proved, but not *the* theory. The public mind is immensely confused by this one word of many meanings. A theory of evolution Dana holds, but not *the* theory. The position of this Lectureship is, that there is a use and an abuse of the theory of evolution, and that Häckel illustrates the abuse, and Dana the use. I hold *a* theory of evolution, but not *the* theory. What do I mean by *the* theory of evolution? Precisely what Huxley means when he says in so many words[1] that "if the theory of evolution is true, the living must have arisen from the not-living."

3. You want Huxley himself in support of Beale, and you shall have him. The most important propositions that I shall present to you on this occasion I hold here in my hands; and they are all in the language, though not in the order of statement, which Professor Huxley uses. I do not know any late leading work in Germany on microscopical physiology that does not mention Beale again and again. When I was in Jena, I bought Ranke's great work on physiology, in spite of the fact that I was a minister who had no right to know anything on this subject. I brought it with me across the Atlantic; and, on opening it the other day, I found Beale cited, and his propositions put into the foreground of the latest German statements of the cell-theory. You know that, Schleiden and Schwann being Germans, the German physiologists, from patriotic and various other motives, cling to the nomenclature of these great men; but they honour Beale. When I turn to Huxley, however, in his article on biology, in the latest edition of the twenty-one volumes of "The Encyclopædia Britannica," I am able to select from various parts of his discussion these seventeen propositions, every one of which was first made sure by the microscopic research of Lionel Beale; but Beale is not once mentioned in this article by Huxley.

1. "It is certain that in the animal, as in the plant, neither cell-wall nor nucleus are essential elements of the cell."

That conclusion is the result of a Waterloo battle, if you please. Although the proposition is so quietly stated, Huxley knows what

[1] Encyc. Brit., ninth ed., art. Biology

proof there is behind it, and lays it down before the world in this, his most scholarly production on biology, and his latest, as established science.

2. "Bodies which are unquestionably the equivalents of cells—true morphological units—are sometimes mere masses of protoplasm, devoid alike of cell, wall, and nucleus."

3. "For the whole living world, then, it results that the morphological unit, the primary and fundamental form of life, is merely an individual mass of protoplasm."

4. "In this no further structure is discernible."

I beg you to notice the accord of all these propositions with those which, in the last lecture, I put before you as the result of Lionel Beale's investigation.

5. "The nucleus, the primordial utricle, the central fluid, and the cell-wall, are no essential constituents of the morphological unit, but represent results of its metamorphosis."

We saw how bioplasm throws off formed material, and how the nucleus is the result of the action of the bioplasm, and not bioplasm the result of the nucleus; and here you find Professor Huxley asserting that the nucleus is a result of the metamorphosis of bioplasm.

6. "Though the nucleus is very constant among animal cells, it is not universally present."

7. "The nucleus rarely undergoes any considerable modification."

8. "The structures characteristic of the tissues are formed at the expense of the more superficial protoplasm of the cells."

The structures characteristic of the tissues! What a smooth phrase that is, for the infinity of design in the human constitution, bone, nerve, artery, muscle, and all that makes a plant a plant, or an animal an animal!

9. "When nucleated cells divide, the division of the nucleus, as a rule, precedes that of the whole cell."

10. "Independent living forms may present but little advance from an individual mass of protoplasm."

11. "All the higher forms of life are aggregates of such morphological units or cells, variously modified."[1]

12. "The protoplasm of the germ may not undergo division and conversion into a cell aggregate, but various parts of its outer and inner substance may be metamorphosed directly into those physically and chemically different materials which constitute the body of the adult."

13. "The germ may undergo division, and be converted into an aggregate of cells, which give rise to the tissues by undergoing a metamorphosis of the same kind as that to which the whole body is subjected in the preceding case."[2]

14. "Sustentative, generative, and correlative functions in the lower forms of life are exerted indifferently, or nearly so, by all parts of the protoplasmic body."

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[1] Prof. T. H. Huxley, Encyc. Brit., ninth edit., Biology, pp. 681, 682. [2] Ibid., p. 682.

15. "The like is true of the functions of the body of even the highest organisms, so long as they are in the condition of the nucleated cell." [1]

16. "Generation by fission and gemmation are not confined to the simplest forms of life. Both modes are common, not only among plants, but among animals of considerable complexity."

"*Throughout almost the whole series of living beings, we find agamo genesis, or not-sexual generation.*" "Eggs, in the case of drones among bees, develop without impregnation." [2]

[After a pause, Mr. Cook proceeded in a lower voice],—

When the topic of the origin of the life of our Lord on the earth is approached from the point of view of the microscope, some men, who know not what the Holy of Holies in physical and religious science is, say that we have no example of the origin of life without two parents. There are numberless such examples. "When Castellet," says Alfred Russel Wallace, Darwin's coadjutor, "informed Reaumur that he had reared perfect silk-worms from the eggs laid by a virgin moth, the answer was, '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*,' and the fact was disbelieved. It was contrary to one of the widest and best-established laws of Nature; yet it is now universally admitted to be true, and the supposed law ceases to be universal." [3]

"Among our common honey-bees," says Häckel,[4] "a male individual, a drone, arises out of the eggs of the queen, if the egg has not been fructified; a female, a queen, or working-bee, if the egg has been fructified."

Take up your Mivart, your Lyell, your Owen, and you will read this same important fact which Huxley here asserts, when he says that the law that perfect individuals may be virginally born extends to the higher forms of life. I am in the presence of Almighty God; and yet—when a great soul like the tender spirit of our sainted Lincoln, in his early days, with little knowledge, but with great thoughtfulness, was troubled by this difficulty, and almost thrown into infidelity by not knowing that the law that there must be two parents is not universal—I am willing to allude, even in such a presence as this, to the latest science concerning miraculous conception.

17. "The phenomena which living things present have no parallel in the mineral world." [5]

What now, gentlemen, is the conclusion of Huxley from all these propositions that seem to point one way? You notice that his facts are Beale's. You find an explicit agreement here of Beale, of Huxley, of Bain, of Drysdale, of Ranke, and I might say of Carpenter, of Dalton, and of scores of recent specialists. The facts being established, the supreme question as to their interpretation is,—Life or mechanism, *which?*

Beale says life: Beale says a principle that cannot be explained

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1 Professor T. H. Huxley, Encyc. Brit., ninth edition, Biology, p. 685.
2 Ibid., pp. 686, 687.
3 Alfred Russel Wallace, Miracles and Modern Spiritualism, p. 38: London 1875.
4 History of Creation, vol. i. p. 197. 5 Ibid., p. 68

by any form of merely physical force. But Huxley says, and be amazed all men who hold the Ariadne clew, "A mass of living protoplasm is simply a molecular machine of great complexity, the total results of the working of which, or its vital phenomena, depend, on the one hand, on its construction, and, on the other, upon the energy supplied to it: and to speak of 'vitality' as anything but the name of a series of operations is as if one should talk of the horologity of a clock." You are shocked at this proposition, and therefore I have not spoken in vain. We will consider next week this astounding *non sequitur*. If Hermann Lotze, the first philosopher of Germany, were on this platform to-day, he, in the name of the axiom that every change must have a sufficient cause, would tear into shreds the materialistic or mechanical theory of the origin of living tissues and of the soul.

VI.

LIFE, OR MECHANISM—WHICH?[1]

"Tu cuncta superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique imagine formans."
BOETHIUS, *De Consol.*, 9

"What time this world's great workmaister did cast
To make all things such as we now behold,
It seems that He before His eyes had plast
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould
He fashioned them as comely as He could,
That now so fair and seemly they appear;
As naught may be amended anywhere.
That wondrous patterne, wheresoe'er it be,
Whether in Earth, laid up in secret store,
Or else in Heaven, that no man may it see
With sinful eyes, for fear it to deflore,
Is perfect beauty."—SPENSER.

ONE day the poet Goethe, when in his advanced age, was riding home to Weimar with his friend Eckermann, and conversing on the immortality of the soul. They turned by Tiefurt into the Weimar road, and stopped at a spot, where, like other travellers, I have often meditated on Goethe's career; and they had from that outlook a majestic view of the setting sun. The great poet and philosopher remained for many minutes in perfect silence, and at last said with mystic but tremorless emphasis, "*Untergehend sogar ist's immer dieselbige Sonne.* Setting, nevertheless the sun is always the same sun. I am fully convinced that our spirit is a being of a nature quite indestructible, and that its activity continues from eternity to eternity." This man knew all philosophies and all art—materialism, realism, pantheism, the wildest scepticism, and, I fear, not a little of the most infamous sensualism; but his was at least a free mind and a modern one. Here, however, was his conclusion concerning the possibility of the existence of the soul in separation from the body: *Setting, nevertheless the soul is always the same soul.*[2] Will you enter to-day, my friends, into Goethe's brain at that instant, and remain

[1] The fifty-first lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in the Park Street Church.

[2] Goethe, Conversations with Eckermann. Trans. by J. Oxenford, Bohn's ed., p. 84.

there during this discussion, lynx-eyed, I care not how thoroughly so, but earnest? It is incontrovertible that we, too, a little while ago, were not in the world, and that we, too, a little while hence, shall be here no longer. The sun hastes to the west as fast at noon as in the last moment before sunset.

New lands in our age can be discovered only in old lands. Schliemann, on the Plain of Troy, has shown us a city of great antiquity; and he has done so by studying an old land beneath its soil. We are reaching the bottom of the Roman forum; we understand, as never before, the environment of the Acropolis, because we are looking with the spade for new lands in the old lands. If a new continent has been discovered anywhere in the last twenty-five years, it has been in the ancient continent of *living tissues*. We are to enter on that strange country; we draw near to it across turbulent seas; and I think, that, as the Santa Maria ploughs tossing across the waves toward the west, we already begin to see carved wood occasionally, symbol of life behind the watery horizon. Already, as we approach this new continent, do we not find now and then a poor floating spray of red berries? Are these little birds not of a kind always cradled on the land? Are not the shapes of the very clouds, as the sun goes down, some indication that we shall at last reach the firm, happy shore? Is there not breathed upon us out of the undescried but nearing coast an odour as of spices and balm, and frankincense and myrrh, and dates and palms—a fragrant atmosphere that comes in the twilight wind off the continent of an unseen Holy? We have not landed on the new coast yet; but they who walk late on the deck of the Santa Maria have seen a light rise and fall ahead of us. We are to look to-day at the thickening signs of the approach of a whole new continent in philosophy that lies hardly out of sight. It will be a land assuredly of firm hope of immortality, and therefore a land of inspiration such as no spiced breath of the tropics ever breathed into the physical nostrils. Our souls are sick from lack of the more heavily fragrant airs out of the blessed isles of certainties as to what is behind the veil. It is already certain that we are to discover a new land, and that the inhabitant of it is life, not mechanism.

Two positions of much importance have been proved, I hope, in lectures preceding this: first, the explicit and entire agreement of Beale and Huxley as to all the central facts concerning living tissues, and this in spite of the disagreement of these authorities on other points; and, secondly, the crescent unanimity of experts for thirty-five years as to those same facts. The two initial propositions which I think I have established are, that rival experts agree, and that they have agreed for more than a quarter of a century, on the facts fundamental in our discussions here. Let us, now, summarise our knowledge of bioplasm, remembering, as we do so, that we have the authority of Huxley, of Carpenter, of Frey, of Dalton, of Beale, of Drysdale, of Bain, of Ranke, and of Kölliker. You will permit me, for the sake of clearness of thought, to number the points of our positive knowledge in biological science.

Bioplasm, otherwise called protoplasm, or germinal matter,—

1. Is transparent;
2. Colourless;
3. Viscid, or glue-like;
4. Under the highest microscopical powers is apparently structureless;
5. Exhibits these characters at every period of its existence;
6. Shows itself, under all the tests known to physical science, to be the same in the animal and in the plant, in the sponge and in the brain;
7. Is capable of throbbing movements, or of advancing one portion of itself beyond another portion;
8. Is capable of rectilinear movements;
9. Executes so many movements, that the same mass probably never twice in its life assumes the same form;
10. May exist in masses less than one one-hundred-thousandth of an inch, or as large as one two-hundredth of an inch in diameter, but, as constituting the nuclei of fully-formed cells, is usually found in masses from one six-thousandth to one three-thousandth of an inch in diameter;
11. Absorbs nutrient matter, which may be either inorganic or formed material;
12. Instantaneously changes this dead matter into living matter;
13. Does so by a process which no human science can imitate or explain;
14. Throws off formed material to constitute a cell-wall;
15. Develops within itself a nucleus, and within that a nucleolus;
16. May exist and move, however, without cell-wall or nucleus;
17. Spins the threads of nerves, arteries, veins, bones, and all the mechanism of the system, by throwing off formed material;
18. Weaves these threads into the infinity of co-ordinated designs in the plant and animal;
19. Can by no possible outer environment be made to produce nerve if it should produce muscle, or muscle if it should produce nerve, and so of every other tissue, secretion, and deposit;
20. Is so thickly scattered through the tissues, that there is scarcely a space one-five-hundredth of an inch in size without its portion of it;
21. Is capable of self-subdivision;
22. In its self-subdivided parts has all its original powers;
23. Always arises from preceding bioplasm;
24. Constitutes about one-fifth of the bulk of living bodies;
25. Is the sole agency by which every kind of living thing is made, or, so far as known, has been made or ever will be made;
26. When it divides itself, is preceded sometimes in that act by the division of its nucleus, and sometimes not;
27. May throw off a portion of itself without a nucleus, and develop a nucleus in the detached portion.
28. Forms nuclei and nucleoli, which appear to differ sexually, as it is only after the intermingling of these in certain cases that multiplication takes place;

29. Does not transform the nucleus, or nucleolus, directly into formed material;

30. Transforms it into ordinary bioplasm, and thus into formed material;

31. When recently dead, will take a carmine stain from the solution of carmine in ammonia, as formed material will not;

32. At its death is resolved into fibrine, albumen, fatty matter, and salts;

33. Forms thus the spontaneously coagulable substance on the diffusion of which through the body the rigidity of the frame after death depends;

34. Is in direct continuity with formed material while the latter is in process of formation.

Such is the most interesting, by far, of all the objects known to physical science.

Carmine staining, the great discovery of 1856 and 1860, must take place immediately after the death of the bioplasm, or it cannot be successfully executed. Many unskilful manipulators in the laboratory, and amateurs without number, have endeavoured to stain the tissue of plants and animals, and have waited too long after its death, and have failed. Sometimes, too, they have not rightly compounded the materials for their carmine solution, a distinct receipt for which you will find in Beale's work on the microscope. When the process of staining is performed soon after the death of a tissue, all germinal points or bioplasts in it come out with a red colour; but the formed material is not stained at all.

[From this point on, Mr. Cook referred to large coloured diagrams hung on the wall back of the platform.]

These eloquent representations of stained tissues are exact reproductions of Dr. Beale's famous illustrations, and were made by Mr. Stone, an artist of the Studio building, who spoke admiringly of Beale's illustrations the instant he saw them. Here is the whole cell with its wall, bioplast, and nucleus (see plate I. fig. 1). Two currents exist in every cell,—one flowing inward in the direction of this arrow, and the other passing out from the centre of the bioplast in the direction of this arrow. Every particle of matter that can be found in a living being is of one of three kinds,—nutrient matter, living matter, or formed matter. Nutrient matter comes through the wall of the cell, and, entering into the bioplasm, is there transformed into living matter.

You had better not take a cell, however, as the type of the elementary part in the living tissue. If you are to be abreast of the very latest investigations concerning the cell-theory, you will take a naked mass of bioplasm like this as the elementary part (see plate I. fig. 2). As I showed you in my last lecture on both Huxley's and Beale's authority, it is not essential at all that there be a wall of formed material around the naked mass of bioplasm. It is not essential at all that there be a nucleus within it. That is the advance we have made since 1838. Nevertheless, if you are to understand the action of these currents, it is well to keep in mind the cell-wall. Nutrient

material may pass through the cell-wall in animal tissues just as sap passes through the intercellular substance in vegetable tissues. When once in the bioplast, the nutrient matter is seized on by this living matter, which you see coloured with carmine in all these illustrations, and nuclei are developed in the bioplast, and nucleoli within the nuclei. The bioplast produces the nucleus, and not the nucleus the bioplast. It throws off formed material around its quivering edges, and thus forms a cell-wall. In that wall the oldest formed material is on the outside, and the next oldest just within, and so on to the inner part of the wall, which is in physical continuity with the bioplasm.

Movement is going on all the while in any naked mass of bioplasm. Here is a bioplast, naked, colourless, structureless matter; and it moves so that it takes these many shapes in five seconds, and these many other shapes in one minute (see plate I. figs. 2 and 3). Here we must hold fast to the Ariadne clew, that every change must have an adequate cause. We come here to fathomless design; but let us enter by slow stages on these sublimities of research.

Here is a young tendon, and here is an old tendon. The living matter is red, as you notice, and runs in lines through the tendon; and yet the tendon is narrow. But in the old tendon the formed material is more abundant than in the new; and yet all the formed material which makes an increased thickness in the old has been thrown off by these bioplasts. They have here thrown off formed material *so* as to make a tendon, which is, as you know, a structure very different from muscular fibre and from nervous fibre.

Here is one set of bioplasts that is intended to weave a tendon, here one that is to weave a muscular fibre, and here one that is to weave a nervous fibre. There is no possible external influence that can make them exchange offices with each other. You have here a tendon, there a muscle, there a nerve, all woven by these bioplasts. We know that they are thus woven, and that every change must have an adequate cause. Adhere, gentlemen, to that axiomatic truth, though the heavens fall. From your bioplast spindles flows off formed matter—here a miracle of muscle, there a miracle of tendon, there a miracle of nerve.

The cellular integument is not unworthy of notice; for that shows us the career of its bioplasts from the first to the last. You have here the skin that covers one of the papilla on the tongue of a frog (see plate II. fig. 1). That infinitely delicate membrane that covers the little sensitive points on the tongue is here magnified. You notice that the bioplasts on the lower or inner side are young, and that there is not much formed material around them. There are no distinct cells in the younger part of a tissue. This intercellular substance is not formed into the ring-shapes which you see further on, where the tissue is older. As the bioplasts grow, the formed material about them increases in thickness, until it becomes so thick that the nutrient matter will not go through the cell-walls. Then the bioplasts languish; they grow smaller and smaller, and at last the cells in which the bioplasts are dead scale off. When dead—never

before except by violence—they drop away; but their places are supplied by soldiers that take position in the gap of the lines, and build according to the pattern of the design of the whole organization. You have here (see plate II. fig. 2) coloured illustrations of several stages of the growth of a cell—its youth, its adolescence, its middle life, its advancing age, its extreme old age.

Remember that a mass of bioplasm has a tendency to assume a more or less spheroidal form. But it changes itself in the course of a minute into all the protean shapes indicated here, first by the black, then by the unbroken line, then by the broken red line, and divides and subdivides its edges, until at last it throws off this portion of itself, which has the same powers with its parent (see plate I. fig. 3). We find under our astounded gaze nothing but colourless, glue-like, transparent matter; and yet we see it performing all these miracles of as many different sorts as there are different sorts of tissues to be woven.

In a single nerve there is an unspeakable complexity; but come to something a little more complex. Let us stand with open eyes before this revelation of Almighty God. Here is a nerve wound spirally around another fibre (see plate II. fig. 5). How is it made to twine about its trellis-work? Why, when that nerve begins to be formed in a living organism, these bioplasts in it are near each other. They begin to throw off formed material. The object is to weave so as to produce this delicate nerve that is coiled spirally around the other fibre. The bioplasts were shoulder to shoulder, and they begin to separate. They weave, and they carry a spiral nerve around that other fibre with perfect precision.

Adhere to your clear ideas. Materialists say that all this is done by molecular machinery. Do they know what they are talking about when they use that phrase? They say that here are "infinitely complicated chemical properties." They say that all these things occur merely by "a transmutation of physical forces." Do they know what they are saying when they utter propositions of that sort? The tendency of the latest science begins to throw into derision all materialism of this kind. The Germans have a proverb which says, "The clear is the true;" and ascertained truth can be made clear. Will you make it clear that "molecular machinery," however complicated, can achieve these results? There a tendon, there a muscle, and there a nerve, are woven, and all by the same machinery? The same causes ought to produce the same results. There is an almost measureless difference in your results; but in all ascertainable physical qualities this bioplasm is the same thing in every tissue.

Marvels, however, have but just begun. We might pause long on these earlier stages in the formation of tissues; but there is one word or fact we ought to bow down before, if we have eyes (see plate III.). It is *co-ordination*, the adjustment of part to part in a living organism. A vast number of tissues are woven side by side; and their *co-ordination* is the supreme miracle. It is more than much, my friends, to weave a nerve, a muscle, a vein. But here we have a mass of thin

tissues from a tree-frog, and you have here muscles and veins and nerves interlacing with each other intricately. Not only do the mystic bioplasts know enough to coil one fibre around another fibre spirally, but they weave the whole complexity of the tissues together. How? *So* that there is no clashing among the multitudinous wheels of the living organism. In the naked bioplast we see changes going on; and the question is, What is an adequate cause of these changes? Life, or mechanism—which? In the different threads that are woven by the bioplasts we must ask: Life, or mechanism—which? But here, before this transfigured representation of the co-ordination of tissue with tissue, the question answers itself: Life, or mechanism—which?

Here is the last white and mottled bird that flew to us out of the tall Tribune tower; and softly folded under its wing are these words concerning Darwin from Thomas Carlyle at his own fireside in London: "So-called literary and scientific classes in England now proudly give themselves to protoplasm, origin of species, and the like, to prove that God did not build the universe. I have known three generations of the Darwins,—grandfather, father, and son, atheists all." [I do not call Darwin an atheist; but this testimony is very significant.] "The brother of the present famous naturalist, a quiet man, who lives not far from here, told me that among his grandfather's effects he found a seal engraven with this legend, '*Omnia ex conchis*' ('everything from a clam-shell'). I saw the naturalist not many months ago; told him that I had read his 'Origin of the Species,' and other books; that he had by no means satisfied me that men were descended from monkeys, but had gone far toward persuading me that he and his so-called scientific brethren had brought the present generation of Englishmen very near to monkeys. A good sort of man is this Darwin, and well meaning, but with very little intellect. Ah! it is a sad and terrible thing to see nigh a whole generation of men and women professing to be cultivated, looking around in a purblind fashion, and finding no God in this universe. I suppose it is a reaction from the reign of cant and hollow pretence, professing to believe what in fact they do not believe. And this is what we have got: all things from frog-spawn; the gospel of dirt the order of the day. The older I grow,—and I now stand upon the brink of eternity,—the more comes back to me the sentence in the Catechism, which I learned when a child, and the fuller and deeper its meaning becomes,—'What is the great end of man? To glorify God, and enjoy Him for ever.' No gospel of dirt, teaching that men have descended from frogs through monkeys, can ever set that aside."[1]

Will haughty Boston, will the colleges of New England, will tender and thoughtful souls everywhere, listen to Thomas Carlyle as he stands upon the brink of eternity?

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1 Daily Tribune, Nov. 4, 1876. Extract from a letter from Carlyle published in Scotland, and quoted in the London Times.

VII.

DOES DEATH END ALL? INVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION.[1]

"Die Nothwendigkeit für zwei unvergleichbare Kreise von Erscheinungen zunächst zwei gesonderte Erklärungsgründe zu verlangen, verbot uns jeden Versuch, aus Wirkungen materieller Stoffe, so fern sie materiel sind, das innere Leben als einen selbstverständlichen Erfolg ableiten zu wollen."—HERMANN LOTZE, *Mikrokosmus, I.*, 186.

"Attention to those philosophical questions which underlie all Science, is as rare as it is needful."—Professor T. H. HUXLEY, *Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1871, p. 443.

IF the Greeks had possessed the microscope, they would in all probability never have been thrown into debate over the famous question of their philosophy, whether the relation of the soul to the body is that of harmony to a harp, or of a rower to a boat.[2] According to the former of these two theories, the music must cease when the harp is broken: according to the latter, the rower may survive, although his boat is destroyed. He may be completely safe, even when his frail vessel, splintered by all the surges and lightnings, rots on the tusks of the reefs, or sinks in the fathomless waste, or dissolves to be blown about the world by the howling seas. In the one case, death does, in the other it does not, end all. Dim as was to the Greeks of Pericles' day the whole field which science has entered with the microscope for the first time in the last fifty years, all their greatest poets and philosophers held that the relation of the soul to the body is that of the rower to a boat. This was the common metaphor as men conversed on this theme under the Acropolis two thousand years ago. Without Christian prejudices, Greek tragedy is full of the dying faith of Socrates. Æschylus, with his eyes of dew and lightning fixed on the fact of immortality, strikes the central chord of his harp; and one terrific thrum of it I often in still days hear across twenty centuries:

> "Blood for blood, and blow for blow:
> Thou shalt reap as thou didst sow."

[1] The fifty-second lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

[2] Plato, Phædon.

What if Aristotle and Plato and Æschylus had had Beale's and Helmholtz's and Dana's eyes in the study of living tissues?

When modern investigation asserts that life directs the movements of bioplasm, it does not deny at all that currents of physical and chemical forces are floating around the bioplast boat. It asserts simply that the oars are in the hands of life. You will not understand me to deny that the rower in the boat is aided by the currents beneath him, by the winds around him, and by his own weight and the inertia of his vessel. Nevertheless, between the rower and the boat on the one hand, and the inert log that may be floating beside him on the other, there is plainly all the difference that exists between the living and the not-living. Your rower takes advantage of all the forces around him; he can give them new directions; he presides over them. He can sail against the wind; he can row against the current; he governs the forces that wheel in mysterious complex cycles above and around and beneath him; he makes them his own, and so is a living thing on the water. Just so, life uses the physical and chemical forces at work in living organisms.

There ought to stand before every discussion definitions, just as before one of Shakspeare's dramas there stand the names of the *dramatis personæ*. I know into what an intricate tropical forest of thought I am entering; and I am fully aware that the chief personage here is one whose character never has been successfully described in a definition. What is life? Thousands and thousands of definitions have been attempted of that term; and we have as yet in words no satisfactory statement of what life means; but we all understand very well what the thing is.

Herbert Spencer defines life as "The definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences." This definition has been very much admired; and I suppose you all understand what it means. The latest science finds this definition *defective*, because it does not limit the changes of which it speaks to one specifically constituted substance now known as bioplasm.[1]

I know what I venture; but, as my definition of life, I must give these words: *The power which directs the movements of bioplasm.* I beg you to notice that I do not say that life is *the force which moves bioplasm*, although, as a loose definition, the latter phrase would do. Bioplasm is moved in part by physical and chemical forces, though not chiefly. Chemical and physical forces, however, are not called living in the best philosophy. To say that life is the force that moves bioplasm is to say that all the power there is in the river on which the boat and rower float originates in the rower. I say nothing of that sort. The force of the river belongs to the river; that of the oars, to the rower. The power which causes your skiff to move against the current, or which catches the wind in the sail, is that of its living occupant, who directs other forces, *and puts forth force of his own.* Nevertheless, in the motion of your little boat, there is a

1 Drysdale, Protoplasmic Theory of Life: London, 1874. P. 176.

combination of the power of the rower and the power of the currents. So, in the motion of your bioplast, there is the agency of purely physical and chemical forces, together with the co-ordinating agency or directing power which weaves the tissues, and interweaves tissue with tissue into designs marvellous beyond comment, and which cannot be accounted for at all by anything simply chemical or physical. I affirm, therefore, that life may be defined provisionally as the rower in the boat, or the power which directs the movements of germinal matter. To give a fuller definition, I may say that *life is the invisible, individual, co-ordinating cause directing the forces involved in the production and activity of any organism possessing individuality.* Of course the vitality of a cell differs from the life of the whole organism of which it forms a part; for many cells may die and the life of the organism to which they belong not be affected. Important distinctions exist between vitality, life, and soul. A single cell may have vitality; the individual organism to which the cell belongs has life; and that organism, if possessed of self-consciousness, and of the power of self-direction, has soul. To assert Lotze's doctrine of an immaterial principle as the cause of form in organisms is not to assert the theory of vital force.

When I woke after my first night in Venice, which I had entered by the full moon, my earliest act was to ascend the tower of St. Mark's, and obtain a general view of the city by the rising sun. Before we discuss our central question, "Does death end all?" let us take a large view of this theme, as if from St. Mark's tower. Our rising sun here is the refulgent certainty that every change must have an adequate cause. When our national historian wrote the first volume of his history of the United States, it was not known that the Mound-builders had left elaborate traces of themselves in the spacious West. George Bancroft, therefore, asserted that the Mississippi valley was without any remains of human works. But since he wrote that first volume of his, we have discovered the most intricate kinds of mounds in the prairies; and it is now universally conceded that there was a race of Mound-builders, and that the Mississippi valley is full of their works. On the prairie near Adrian, Michigan, for example, there is a night-hawk traced by mounds on the earth; and the spread of its wings is two or three hundred feet. Over against him on the verdant, ancient acres, the mounds present the figure of a warrior with a balanced spear. Bancroft knew something of these mounds at the time he wrote his book; but he said they were produced by geological action. In the Drift period these peculiar formations had been made by the complex swirls of the water and icebergs. If a man should undertake to hold to that theory now, and affirm that the Drift period formed these mounds, what would you say to him? There is your night-hawk. Is it not possible for a complexity of geological forces—gravitation, chemical action, and the turmoil of a cooling planet, of which Strauss, Virchow, Häckel, and Huxley make so much—to trace on the prairie a night-hawk? Is it not, at least, possible that your night-hawk might have been traced there by the movements of matter having in it the power

and potency of all life? May it not be that thus were produced your savage and his balanced spear? You would say that a man holding such views ought to be sent to the lunatic wards. No *may be* is good for anything in science, unless it may be an *is*. But how about your actually living night-hawk, flying there above the prairie in the edge of the evening? How about your savage there miraculously alive, and poising his spear? Although you believe this rude earth-work tracery of the night-hawk and the savage cannot possibly have originated in any complexity of merely physical forces in a cooling planet, you will allow a man, if he is full enough of scientific authority, to come before you, and seriously puzzle you, as Strauss, Huxley, Virchow, and Häckel attempt to do, with the assertion that the bioplast—which stands at the head of the development of your living night-hawk, and which had in it all that has followed of life on this globe—came into existence in some Drift period by a fortuitous concourse of atoms. You ought for this to be sent to the lunatic wards. The reply to all reasoning of that sort is simply this, that *merely physical forces do not act so.* As Agassiz used to say, "The products of merely physical forces are the same in all quarters of the globe, and during all time known to man; but the products of the forces that produce life are varied under the same circumstances. Between two such sets of forces there can be no causal or genetic connection."[1] The results of the forces that produce organisms differ in different periods, and therefore we cannot account for them by these invisible, blind, mechanical laws. If, on the prairie, the figure of your night-hawk was not traced by a complication of these forces, assuredly, in the name of all clear ideas, the first bioplast that came into existence, and the bioplasts that weave the night-hawk and savage, were not constructed by any such complication of physical forces, acting without design or choice.

Does death end all? The answer to that question depends on the reply to another: Is life the cause of organisation, or organisation the cause of life? Is the relation of the soul to the body that of harmony to the harp, or that of the harper to the harp?

What are the strategic points in the discussion of the origin of life?

1. Tyndall, Huxley, Bain, Drysdale, and Spencer himself, all admit that the actions of bioplasts cannot be explained by merely chemical properties or forces.

If I succeed in showing you that this concession is made by the materialistic school, you will be relieved from much distress cast on you by popular irresponsible scribblers and declaimers. In November 1875, Professor Tyndall quoted and adopted these words of Du-Bois Reymond, "It is absolutely and for ever inconceivable that a number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen atoms should be otherwise than indifferent as to their own position and motion, past, present, or future."[2] Tyndall adds in his own words, that "the con-

[1] Agassiz, Essay on Classification.

[2] See Preface to Tyndall's Fragments of Science. Also his article in the Fortnightly Review, November, 1875, p. 585. Also Dr. Charles Elam's art. on "Automatism and Evolution," Contemporary Review, September 1876, p. 539.

tinuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness is the rock upon which materialism must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of the human mind." That is Tyndall, if you please, in 1875, writing a preface to the Belfast address, which needed much explanation after its errors had been searchingly pointed out by general public discussion.

There is inertia everywhere in all that we call matter. What is inertia? The incapacity to originate force or motion. Inertia is a property of the matter in bioplasm as surely as of that in any other part of the universe. This is the substance of DuBois Reymond's famous concession, that it is for ever inconceivable that a mass of physical atoms—past, present, or to come—should be outside the range of the law of inertia. "There is," says Faraday,[1] "one wonderful condition of matter, perhaps its only true indication, namely, inertia."

Even Herbert Spencer, who would be very glad to prove the opposite, says in his "Biology" (vol. i. p. 182), "The proximate chemical principles, or chemical units,—albumen, fibrine, gelatine, or the hypothetical proteine substance,—*cannot possess the property of forming the endlessly varied structures of animal forms.*" This is Herbert Spencer in 1864. "Nor," continues he, "can any such power be given to the cell as a morphological unit, even if it had a right to that title." It is the bioplast that is the morphological unit, and not the cell. "Therefore," concludes Spencer, "there is no alternative but to suppose that the chemical units combine into units immensely more complex than themselves, and that, in each organism, the physiological units produced by this further compounding of highly compound atoms have a more or less distinctive character. We must conclude, that, in each case, some slight difference of composition in these units, leading to some slight difference in their natural play of forces, produces a difference in the form which the aggregate of them assumes." Spencer's "Biology" is now an outgrown book, so rapid has been the progress of biological knowledge since its publication.

But the reply to this precious theory is, that *involution and evolution are a fixed equation.* If these multiplex molecules and their merely mechanical actions, which Spencer says build the body, have no life behind them, you will get no life out of them. If the smaller units out of which he makes up his larger units have no life in them, you will obtain from the latter only what was in the former.

Let us be for ever sure that the law of the persistence of force requires that evolution and involution should be equal to each other. You will get out of your molecular units what you put into them, and nothing more. But, according to Spencer himself, the chemical and physical forces and properties of atoms cannot build an organism. Larger molecular masses made up of these units, he says, may do so. Not unless there can be more evolved from, than is involved in, these units. If involution and evolution are *not* an eternal equation, there

[1] Correlation and Conservation of Forces, p 24.

may be an effect without a cause. You cannot evolve anything which you have not first involved. Huxley, Spencer, Bain, and Drysdale, all admit that, if you make up your compounds from all the ascertained molecular activities, you involve nothing that will account for the weaving of these complex tissues. That admission is fatal to their further pretence, that a combination can be made which will evolve what has not been involved.

But Dr. Drysdale, who is a candid Scotch writer, makes a most distinct admission, that, even after we have built up these complicated molecular units, the matter in them must be *inert*. Hear the authority of a man who opposes Beale's opinion, that the action of the bioplasts cannot be accounted for except by a higher than physical cause, and who seriously undertakes, while admitting Beale's facts, to persuade the world that this matter in the bioplasts is of an infinitely peculiar sort, and that all it needs is "stimulus" to set it at work in all this miraculous weaving and inweaving and co-ordination of tissues. Dr. Drysdale says in so many words,[1] "*No matter how complex the protoplasmic molecule may be, its atoms are still nothing but matter, and must share its properties for good or evil, and among the rest inertia. Hence it cannot change its state of motion nor rest without the influence of some force from without. True spontaneity of movement is, therefore, just as impossible to it as to what we call dead matter. . . . So we are compelled to admit the existence of an exciting cause in the form of some force from without to give the initial impulse in all vital actions. This is the*—What? The soul? We expect him to say that; but what he says is, "This is the *stimulus*," whatever that may mean.

It is very surprising, in view of the school of thought to which Professor Alexander Bain of Aberdeen belongs, that, in his work on "The Senses and the Intellect" (p. 64), he should go so far as to uphold the doctrine of the spontaneity of vital actions, and to maintain that a spontaneous energy resides in the nerve-centres which gives them the power of initiating molecular movements *without any antecedent sensation from without*, or emotion from within, or any antecedent state of feeling whatever, or any stimulus extraneous to the moving apparatus itself. This fact of spontaneous energy he regards as the essential prelude to voluntary power.

So much, gentlemen, for the latest concessions of materialists; but I hold in my hand here the best, or certainly the freshest, book in the world on the "Cellular Theory;" and what are its opening words? All medical students in this audience will know that Professor Heinrich Frey of Zurich is a great authority on the cell-theory, and that this book of his has had an enormous sale between the Alps and the Baltic. Frey's work on "Microscopic Technology" is placed side by side with Stricker's "Histology" in the reading recommended to the two hundred young men in the Harvard Medical School yonder; but fresher than either of these books is this new volume published by Frey in 1875.

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[1] Protoplasmic Theory of Life, p. 199.

Rufus Choate, as you remember, used sometimes to lay out a course of study in the classics perfectly parallel with that of the young men in Harvard University, and, in his breathless profession, would keep pace with them year after year. What if a student of religious science, who has no right to know anything about physiology, should look at the text-books in use in Harvard Medical School on physiology and other topics, and by this means, and by considerable conversation with men of science, assuring himself that he is not reading rubbish, and with a professional medical library at his command, should follow side by side the investigations those highly privileged young men are pursuing yonder, and occasionally stand with them in their dissecting-rooms? I know at least one student of religious science who does precisely that, and is fascinated with his work. Biology is now quite as interesting as the classics. In your Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, studies are elective; and about ninety out of one hundred of the students there elect biology as one of their subjects.

Professor Frey of Zurich, in this work, which is hardly dry from the press, prints, face to face with the world, these as his very first sentences: "A deep abyss separates the inorganic from the organic, the inanimate from the animate. The rock-crystal on the one side, vegetable and animal on the other: how infinitely different the image! Is it, then, possible to bridge over this gulf? We answer, Not at the present time." We turn on in this volume, and find that reference is made to the theory that vital transformations are much like crystallisation, and that then these remarks are made, with a very apparent and not undeserved sly smile:

"Schwann, the founder of modern histology, taught, What the crystal is in regard to the inorganic, that the cell is in the sphere of life. As the former shoots from the mother lye, so, also, in a suitable animal fluid, are developed the constituents of the cell, nucleolus, nucleus, covering, and cell contents. *This view was embraced during many years, it explained everything so conveniently. This was, however, over-hasty.* The cell arises from the cell. *A spontaneous origin does not occur.*"[1] All this is in accord with what Huxley says in his article in "The Encyclopædia Britannica," "There is no parallel between the actions of matter in the mineral world and in living tissues."

2. After the unanimity of experts, there is no higher authority on any scientific doctrine than to find it taught in standard text-books in schools of the first rank; but you may easily ascertain that the very latest standard text-books oppose the mechanical or materialistic theory of life.

Dr. Tyson's book on "The Cell Doctrine" is in use side by side with Frey in your Harvard Medical School; but Tyson opens with diagrams from Beale, and closes with Beale; and where is there anything in him that is regarded as invulnerable, that he did not

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[1] Professor Heinrich Frey, Compendium of Histology, Twenty-four lectures. Translated by Dr. G. R. Cutter. New York: Putnam's Sons, 1876. Pp. 1, 14.

obtain from Beale? Over and over, in the latter half of the book, as he closes the history of the thirty-nine years since the cell-theory was promulgated, he cites Beale; and, in spite of all the sneers from Huxley and others about "aquosity and horology," he sums up established science thus, "*We believe that the proper shaping, arrangement, and function of these elementary parts, is not a process identical or analogous to crystallisation, taking place through merely physical laws, but that there is a presiding agency which controls such arrangement to a definite end.*"[1] This is a statement out of a text-book mentioned officially in the catalogue of Harvard University as in use in the best medical school of your nation; and here is the best German book; and I have just read to you out of the best Scotch book; and Beale's is the best English Book; and they are all explicitly agreed in the assertion, that it is life, not mechanism, which weaves us and all things that live.

3. I affirm that we have under the microscope ocular demonstration that it is life which causes organisation, and not organisation which causes life. What is the first thing that appears in the formation of an organisation? A mass of germinal matter that has life but *no organisation.* You know what a naked bioplast is,—a little speck of glue-like matter, transparent, colourless, and, under the highest powers of the microscope and every other test known to man, showing no organisation, but yet capable of multiplex movements,—all these in a minute [referring to coloured diagrams on the platform]. "*We fail,*" Huxley says, "*to detect any organisation in the bioplasmic mass;*" *but there are movements in it and life.* We see the movements: they must have a cause. The cause of the movements must exist before the movements. *The life is there before organisation.* But, if life may exist before organisation, it may do so after it, or outside it.

If, according to custom in some rude games of sailors, we were to put a man in a canvas bag, and throw him in the bag upon this platform; and if that bag were to begin to cast out a promontory here, and a promontory there, and assume scores of shapes, and move to and fro, and pick up, now this object, and now that,—we should have no unfit representation of a portion of the movements of a naked bioplasmic mass. Your astonishing bag here picks up this chair, which cannot move of itself; and to make the parallel complete, it must have the power of absorbing this inanimate object, and of changing it into something just like itself, or alive. Suddenly this man in the bag may, if the parallel is to be made perfect, throw off a small sack from the bag, and that instantly begins to move on this platform: it forthwith commences to pick up lifeless matter, and to transform it into living matter like itself. It, too, throws off other little sacks, which go through the same motions again. We should say that sacks of that sort had very complicated machinery in them. But this is by no means the chief marvel.

You know, gentlemen, that in India it is a play of the children

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1 Dr. James Tyson, The Cell Doctrine, pp. 112 and 113. Lindsay & Blakiston, 1870.

and of grown men to make up the form of an elephant by stacking themselves together, two men making a leg of the elephant, six or eight his body, three or four his head, one or two his proboscis. You see in the pictures from India representations of elephants, made up, as you notice when you look at them sharply, wholly of human forms. Now, to carry out this parallel, we must have our first canvas bag transform itself into many canvas bags, and then all of them build themselves up, after this Indian fashion, into the elephant, the lion, the giraffe, or the palm-tree, the date, or the pomegranate; and these must live. They must *grow*. Some of the miraculous sacks will drop away from day to day; but new ones must take their places, and fill out the design had in view at the first. Of course, the part assigned to the man in the proboscis of an elephant thus built must be very different from that assigned to a man in the leg. If an elephant is to be made up in that way, the men who form his back must have a very different position from the men who form the tusks. There must be very peculiar activities put forth by each man in each part of your elephant. So, although our bioplasm is, to all appearance, the same thing when it weaves a tendon, and when it weaves a muscle, and when it weaves a nerve, its activities are very different. Surely the invisible molecular machinery must be very complicated indeed; for it makes a tendon here, a muscle here, or a nerve here. According to Spencer and this astute materialistic school, the bioplasts are nothing but molecular machinery, started off by "stimulus" into all this weaving, as the spark starts off the gunpowder into explosion. We say, that, if that is so, the molecular machinery must be more than exceedingly complex; for not only must it really be very different when it weaves a nerve from what it is when it weaves a muscle; but,—and this is the point on which to fasten supreme attention,—when we run back the examination of all our co-ordinated tissues, we find that assuredly all this molecular machinery must in some way have existed, or have been provided for, in the first little transparent, colourless, and apparently structureless bioplast which began to weave your elephant or your man, your pomegranate or your palm. A rather complicated kind of molecular machinery to be crowded into a space so small!

The acorn which hangs above the nest of your eagle has in it bioplasts that differ under the microscope in no particular from the little mass of bioplasm in the eagle's egg. Your bioplasm that weaves your oak is, to all human investigation, the same thing with the speck of bioplasm which weaves your eagle. Gentlemen, there is no inductive evidence of the existence of this mechanism. We may say, therefore, that, in the present state of knowledge, we cannot prove that molecular mechanism, acted upon by physical and chemical forces, is the sole source of organisation.

4. Matter in living tissues is directed, controlled, arranged, so as to subserve the most varied and complex purposes.

Only matter and mind exist in the universe.

Matter in living tissues must therefore be arranged either by matter or by mind.

No material properties or forces are known to be capable of producing the arrangements which exist in living tissue.

In the present state of knowledge, these arrangements must be referred to mind or life as their source.

5. Bioplasm exhibits peculiar actions found nowhere in not-living matter.

It exhibits different actions in every different animal and vegetable tissue.

For each class of these peculiar actions, there must be a peculiar cause.

That cause must be either matter or mind.

But the cause has qualities which cannot, without self-contradiction, be attributed to inert matter.

It must therefore exist in the life, or an immaterial element of the organisation.

6. It is plain that, before the matter which forms the tissues has entered the organisation, the plan of the tissues is involved in the earliest bioplasts.

There is forecast involved, therefore, in the action of the bioplasts. "Bioplasm prepares for far-off events," says Professor Lionel Beale over and over.

Forecast is not an attribute of matter, but of mind. An immaterial element exists, therefore, in living organisms.

7. There is a great fact known to us more certainly than the existence of matter: it is the unity of consciousness. I know that I exist, and that I am one. Hermann Lotze's supreme argument against materialism is the unity of consciousness. I know that I am *I*, and not *you;* and I know *this* to my very finger-tips. That finger is a part of my organism, not of yours. To the last extremity of every nerve, I know that I am one. The unity of consciousness is a fact known to us by much better evidence than the existence of matter. I am a natural realist in philosophy, if I may use a technical term: I believe in the existence of both matter and mind. There are two things in the universe; but I know the existence of mind better than I know the existence of matter. Sometimes in dreams we fall down precipices, and awake, and find that the gnarled savage rocks had no existence. But we touched them; we felt them; we were bruised by them. Who knows but that some day we may wake, and find that all matter is merely a dream? Even if we do that, it will yet remain true that I am I. There is more support for idealism than for materialism; but there is no sufficient support for either. If we are to reverence all, and not merely a fraction, of the list of axiomatic or self-evident truths, if we are not to play fast and loose with the intuitions which are the eternal tests of verity, we shall believe in the existence of both matter and mind. Hermann Lotze holds that the unity of consciousness is a fact absolutely incontrovertible and absolutely inexplicable on the theory that our bodies are woven by a complex of physical arrangements and physical forces, having no co-ordinating presiding power over them all. *I know that there is a co-ordinating presiding power somewhere in me. I am I. I am one.*

Whence the sense of a unity of consciousness, if we are made up, according to Spencer's idea, or Huxley's, of infinitely multiplex molecular mechanisms? We have the idea of a presiding power that makes each man one individuality from top to toe. How do we get it? It must have a sufficient cause. To this hour, no man has explained the unity of consciousness in consistency with the mechanical theory of life.[1]

There is not in Germany to-day, except Häckel, a single professor of real eminence who teaches philosophical materialism.[2] The eloquent Michelet, the life-long friend and disciple of Hegel, lectured at Berlin University in the spring of 1874 in defence of the Hegelian philosophy *as a system*. Out of nearly three thousand students he obtained only nine hearers. Helmholtz, the renowned physicist of Berlin, has come out through physiology and mathematical physics into metaphysics; and his views in the latter science are pretty nearly those of Immanuel Kant. Wundt, the greatest of the physiologists of Heidelberg University, which leads Germany in medical science, has made for years a profound study of the inter-relation of matter and mind; and he rejects materialism as in conflict with self-evident, axiomatic truth. Hermann Lotze, now commonly regarded as the greatest philosopher of the most intellectual of the nations, and who has left his mark on every scholar in Germany under forty years of age, is everywhere renowned for his physiological as well as for his metaphysical knowledge, and as an opponent of the mechanical theory of life.

I look up to the highest summits of science, and I reverence properly, I hope, all that is established by the scientific method; but when I lift my gaze to the very uppermost pinnacles of the mount of established truth, I find standing there, not Häckel, nor Spencer, but Helmholtz of Berlin, and Wundt of Heidelberg, and Hermann Lotze of Göttingen, physiologists as well as metaphysicians all; and they, as free investigators of the relations between matter and mind, are all on their knees before a living God. Am I to stand here in Boston, and be told that there is no authority in philosophy beyond the Thames? Is the outlook of this cultured audience, in heaven's name, to be limited by the North Sea? The English we revere; but Professor Gray says that there is something in their temperament that leads to materialism. England, green England! Sour, sad, stout *skies*, with azure tender as heaven, omnipresent, but not often visible behind the clouds; sour, sad, stout *people*, with azure tender as heaven, and omnipresent, but not often visible behind the vapours. Such is England, such the English. We are to extend our field of vision to the Rhine, to the Elbe, to the Oder, to the Ural Mountains; and, when we look around the whole horizon of culture, the truth is, that philosophical materialism to-day is a waning cause. It is a crescent of the old moon; and, in the same sky where it lingers as a ghost, the sun is rising, with God behind it.

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[1] See Lotze's greatest work, Mikrokosmus, Leipzig, 1869. Vol. i. book 3, chap. 1.

[2] See art. on "Philosophy and Science in Germany," Princeton Review, October 1876, pp. 752–755.

VIII.

DOES DEATH END ALL? THE NERVES AND THE SOUL.[1]

"It needs not that I swear by the sunset redness,
And by the night and its gatherings,
And by the moon when at her full,
That from state to state ye shall be surely carried onward."

KORAN.

"Die Kraft, die in mir denkt und wirkt, ist ihrer Natur nach eine so ewige Kraft, als jene, die Sonnen und Sterne zuzammenhält. Ihre Natur ist ewig, wie der Verstand Gottes, und die Stützen meines Daseins—nicht meiner körperlichen Ercheinung—sind fest, als die Pfeiler des Weltalls."—HERDER, *Philosophy of History*.

PRELUDE OF CURRENT EVENTS.

SAFE popular freedom consists of four things, and cannot be compounded out of any three of the four—the diffusion of liberty, the diffusion of intelligence, the diffusion of property, and the diffusion of conscientiousness. In the latter work, the Church is the chief agent; and her most important instrumentality we call the Sabbath. Goldwin Smith very subtly says that it is free religion and hallowed Sundays which explain the average moral prosperity of America. We have had in the last week, in Boston, a somewhat obscure and erratic convention, advising America to do better than she has thus far done in following the New-England ideas concerning Sunday. Give America, from sea to sea, the Parisian Sunday, and in two hundred years all our greatest cities will be politically under the heels of the featherheads, the roughs, the sneaks, and the money-gripes. Abolish Sunday, and the social sanity it fosters, and, in less than a century, the conflict between labour and capital would issue here in petroleum fire-bottles. Capital in our great muncipalities is fleeced now to the skin. Does it wish such social insanity to spring up as shall cut it through the cellular integument to the quick? If it does, let capital abolish Sunday. Working-men desire to build co-operation up into a palace for themselves and their little ones; and God speed their effort to protect their own! But how can co-operation succeed without the large confidence of man in man? and how can that come without the moral culture given by the right use of Sundays? Co-operation fails because men are not honest. How are men to be made honest without a time set apart for religious culture? That population which habitually neglects the pulpit, or its equivalent, one day in seven, can ultimately be led by charlatans, and will be.

[1] The fifty-third lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

I am no fanatic, I hope, as to Sunday; but I look abroad over the map of popular freedom in the world, and it does not seem to me accidental that Switzerland, Scotland, England, and the United States, the countries which best observe Sunday, constitute almost the entire map of safe popular government.

Sabbath is a day of religious culture and cheerful rest. Its biblical warrant is found in the re-affirmation by the Sermon on the Mount of the whole moral spirit of the Decalogue. I affirm, without fear of successful contradiction by any cultured thought, that the Sermon on the Mount re-affirms the moral spirit of the Decalogue, and in that re-affirmation perpetuates the direction to hallow one-seventh portion of our time: it matters very little which seventh. "Forsake not the assembling of yourselves together," is apostolic precept, as it was apostolic example. No doubt small critics may show that the apostles and our Lord did works of necessity and mercy on the Sabbath; and so do we, and so will we to the end of time. But the Sermon on the Mount re-affirms your first, your second, your third, your fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth commandments. How are you to show that it does not re-affirm the fourth in spirit? "Not one jot or tittle shall ever pass from the law till all be fulfilled."

It is fifteen hundred years now since Constantine put into execution the law bringing one day in seven an unwonted hush on all industry in the Roman dominion. Here we are ten centuries off from the time when Christianity closed her chief political struggles. Here is a republic built chiefly by Christianity, and perfectly free, and governing more square miles than ever Cæsar ruled over. This nation calls peace to her industries one day in seven. She sends nine millions of her population, one in five, to a World's Fair, and shuts the door every Sunday. I know what report says about the evasions and hypocrisy of the Centennial Commission in admitting persons surreptitiously into the buildings on the Sabbath against the vote to close the grounds on that day. If the report is correct, the Centennial Commission ought to have public rebuke, unless it can make adequate explanation.

I am glad to see that even this erratic convention, dazzled out of sight by the sound ideas and majestic words of the Episcopal congress, was wise enough to proclaim that it did not wish to introduce into America the European Sunday.

Hallam says that European despotic rulers have cultivated, as Charles II. did in the day of the "Book of Sports," a love of pastime on Sabbaths, in order that their people might be more quiet under political distresses. "A holiday Sabbath is the ally of despotism." Wherever the Romish or Parisian Sunday has prevailed for generations, it has made the whole lives of peasant populations a prolonged childhood.

America, I venture to say, is satisfied with the record of the Sabbaths in her World's Exhibition. This convention seemed to think, however, that the burden of a great reform was laid upon its shoulders. It apparently thought its thin meetings the representation of a large constituency. Men are strangely full of company sometimes, when before the mirrors of high self-appreciation. Sidney Smith, calling on a nobleman, passed through a room full of mirrors, which showed him several images of his own form approaching from many directions. He was wholly alone; but he was overheard to say, "A meeting of the clergy, I see."

THE LECTURE.

Suppose that the musician at your organ yonder has on his finger Gyges' ring, which according to the Greek mythology, as you remember, made the wearer invisible. It is entirely clear, is it not, that if we were to approach and study that instrument while it is in action under the fingers of this invisible musician, we should find in it no authority for attributing the anthem proceeding from the organ to the inert matter composing the organ? We should have, on the contrary,

incontrovertible evidence in the very structure of the instrument that it was made to be operated upon from without. If it is to give forth melody, it must be moved by something not itself. It is composed of wood and metal and ivory, all of which, with all their complicated mechanical arrangements, are inert, and, if taken alone, are wholly valueless in the production of music.

In one portion of the organ we have a keyboard; and, in the case supposed, we look on the very intricate combinations and motions in the keys, and see no cause for the movements. But we know, if we are sane, that every change must have an adequate cause. We find a perfect correspondence between the motions of the keys and the pulsations of the melody rising and falling in this temple. But this parallelism is not identity. The keys in motion are not the music. Motions and forces are not the same.

Let, now, some inquirer of narrow mental horizon, and confusing —as so much current discussion does—motions with forces, assert that these intelligent movements of the keys—which, of course, must have behind them forces containing intelligence—are the sole cause of the anthem. *Let him insist on a new definition of ivory.* Let him affirm that the matter composing these keys has in it the power and potency of all music, from the simplest air up to Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Let him go behind the organ, and elaborately study the very powerful and purely physical forces at work in the interior of the instrument. Let him show, learnedly and laboriously, that currents of air thrown into the pipes produce, according to merely mechanical principles, the wholly physical concussions in the molecular particles of the atmosphere which are concerned in the music. As no merely physical science, by any test known to man, can detect the presence of the musician, let this observer assert that there is no musician independent of the instrument, and that the anthem proceeds wholly from the mechanism of the organ, acted upon by exclusively physical stimulation from without. Let him assert that the hypothesis of an invisible musician is as absurd as the attribution of aquosity to water, or of horology to a clock. According to this supposed materialistic observer of the organ, there is nothing in the anthem which is not wholly the result of the mechanism of the organ on the one hand, and of the merely physical forces supplied to it by the organ-bellows on the other. Let this naturalistic observer have a great name—among men of his own opinions.

Should we be puzzled by these confident assertions? Not if we held fast to the Ariadne clew of the self-evident, axiomatic truth, that every change must have an adequate cause. We should say that this instrument, being made wholly of matter, is inert. We should assert, in the name of established science, the incontrovertible inertness of all parts of the organ taken alone. We should say that the motion of rough currents of air through it does not and cannot account for the intricate and ravishing melody which captivates our souls by its intelligence, and must have behind it a soul. Mere wood, metal, and ivory cannot utter Beethoven's spirit. Perhaps the air, by the slight pressure of intelligence on the keys, can be ruled into

melody, and made to give all its majestic force to the intelligent weaving of the anthem. But in your organ, as elsewhere, involution and evolution are a fixed equation. You bring out of it only what you put in. Your musical instruments will throw no Beethoven into the air, unless there is a Beethoven at the keys.

Such, my friends, is the stern outline of the ineffaceable contrast between the body and the soul. The distinction between matter and mind is a gulf as vast and impassable in physics as in metaphysics. The soul wears Gyges' ring. It is, indeed, invisible to the microscope, and intangible to the scalpel. But there are mysterious molecular motions in the nervous substance of the brain. Neural tremors fill the keyboard of the body. Undoubtedly there is a perfect correspondence between these tremors and the anthems of thought and emotion, in your Homer, your Demosthenes, your Cæsar, your Milton, your Shakspeare. But the parallelism is not identity. Motions and forces are not the same. The keys in motion are not the music. Physical forces play through the brain; but they do not sing, unless modulated by the ineffable touches of the keys. Just as surely as you, from the structure of an organ, may infer the necessity of a wholly exterior agent to move it, so, from the structure of the nervous system, we must infer the necessity of a wholly external agent to set it in action.

In what I am about to put before you I have the authority of Frey, of Stricker, of Ranke, of Kölliker, of Carpenter, of Beale, of Dalton, and of Draper.

1. In the nervous mechanism there are two kinds of fibres, called by physiologists the automatic arcs, and the influential arcs.

We have here a representation of the simplest kind of nervous fibre [illustrating by a figure upon the blackboard],—the pendent curve of a nervous thread, one end in contact with the external surface of the body, and the other connected with this muscular tissue. If you please, the bioplasts weave all that. Perfectly simple as the structure looks, it is a miracle. Can you make anything like it? Here is your muscular fibre, which has the peculiar quality of contracting under nervous stimulus. Here is your nervous cord, which transmits strange influences that cause contraction when they are received upon this muscular tissue. One test by which true is to be distinguished from false science is, that the former does, and that the latter does not, concern itself carefully with beginnings. Remember, that, even in this automatic nerve, motions and forces are not the same. Muscular contraction is an effect of physical forces only as these act on mechanism arranged before the forces themselves came into play. Your miraculous brain is first woven by your bioplasts. You say mind is the result of the mechanism of the brain; but the mechanism of the brain is the direct product of bioplasmic action.

Of course, I am ready to admit, that, if you touch a portion of this automatic nervous arc with a galvanic current, you will produce contraction there in the attached muscle. Electrical stimulation of such a nerve may produce a contraction of the muscle even after the man

is dead. But what wove that nerve? What wove that contractile tissue?

Beyond this simplest structure, the next higher in the development of the nervous system is what is called the cellated nervous arc. We see it here, a pendent curve as before; but now with a very large bead, or mass of nervous matter with bioplasts in the middle of it, is hanging at this point. It is yet true that irritation here produces contraction there. What influence, then, has this nervous centre upon the transmission of this nervous force? The books say that there is no proof that the nervous influence is changed in quality by its passage through one of these simplest ganglia. You may single out a nerve arc of that primitive style, and irritate it by an electric current on one side of this large bead or ganglion, and you will produce contraction in the muscle just as before. You irritate this side beyond the great bead, and you produce contraction.

But a third step in the development of the nervous system does introduce a change. Many of these nerve-centres are tied up to other nerve-centres [illustrating by a figure in which the ganglion of the nerve-arc was connected with another ganglion]; and in a nerve with its ganglion connected in that style with another ganglion, a portion of the influence transmitted through this complex nervous mass is thrown off into this other complex nervous mass. Your physiological authorities call the latter a registering ganglion. This transmission of nervous influence into the registering complex of nervous matter may be very inadequately illustrated, Professor Draper says, by a faucet with three stops,[1] or by a mirror with a portion of the isinglass taken off the back. The light is in part reflected and in part transmitted. Thus this registering mass of nervous matter retains a portion of the force sent through this nervous arc; and, in an animal possessing this nervous mechanism, there will be memory, or something equivalent to it.

Thus far we have seen only what is called the automatic nervous mechanism. Please fix in your minds, gentlemen, the simplicity of this structure, and, when a more complicated mechanism is outlined in connection with this, keep vividly before your minds the contrast between the two.

All established science is agreed that there are automatic and also influential arcs in the nervous system, and that the contrast between the two things is as marked as that between their accepted scientific names.

In the higher animals there is added to the simpler automatic part of the nervous system a far more intricate structure, called the influential nervous mechanism. Professor Draper represents the contrast between the automatic and the influential part of the nervous system by this ideal figure,[2] which I here reproduce line for line. It is substantially a lower curve and an upper curve—the one automatic, the other influential, and the two bound together by nervous threads. In all physiology, outside the supreme topic of

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1 Professor J. W. Draper, Human Physiology, p. 380.

2 Ibid., p. 282.

bioplasm, I know nothing which is so suggestive as this contrast between the automatic and the influential nerve-arcs. Here, assuredly, is a majestic mount of vision upon which the philosophy of the relations between body and soul, matter and mind, must often pace to and fro.

2. Plants and many animals possess only the automatic arcs.

3. Such organisations as possess only the automatic arcs are automata; and, although they have life, they cannot, in the strict sense of the word, be said to possess souls including free-will and conscience.

The contrast between the influential and the automatic is that between freedom and necessity. It is that between man, with the power of choice, and your poor honey-bee, who is supposed to work as an automaton. The bee has not the influential arc: it has only the automatic nerves. Accordingly, by instinct it has built its cell in the same way age after age. Two bees under precisely the same circumstances will do precisely the same things.

But this upper arc, which is possessed by man, is called influential, and not automatic, because it is the seat of activities of a free sort. This is the keyboard of your invisible musician: this is the white ivory shaped by no mortal fingers, and on which life plays.

Gentlemen, I have been accused of being rhetorical; but a man who wishes to dazzle by rhetoric does not talk in twenty-eighthlies and forty-ninthlies, as I have sometimes done. Any one, however, who wishes to convince by cool precision, very naturally employs numerals. You will allow me, therefore, to number the points of a discussion, which must be crowded, and which would nevertheless be clear.

Just here expose themselves in more than glimpses the fascinating questions as to the difference between instinct and reason, and as to the immortality of instinct. Animals that possess only the automatic nerve-arcs have only instinct for their guidance: they have life, but not free wills and consciences. Later in this course of lectures, I shall discuss the question, whether, after death, there is a survival of the immaterial principle in animals that are mere automata. Here and now I emphasise only this broad distinction between the influential and automatic nerve-arcs, a physical fact, without any haze either in its margin or its contents. God materialises. In the universe of forms, as well as in that of forces, the Divine language has no empty syllable. Perhaps this invisible musician, with Gyges' ring on his finger, has not been left without a witness of himself in the whitish-gray keyboard of the human organ. Perhaps the contrast between the automatic and influential nerve-arcs is just as important a fact in the instrument God has made as the distinction between your musician and the man who moves the bellows behind the organ is in the instrument man has made. Among the automatic and influential nerve-arcs, all philosophy ought to stand listening with hushed breath.

4. Man possesses in abundance both the automatic and influential arcs.

5. Whatever animal possesses the influential arcs has a depository, magazine, or reservoir of force not dependent on external impressions.

Aristotle noticed with great keenness of interest the fact that men awake before they open their eyes. Professor Bain regards that circumstance, with which we are all familiar, as one out of thousands of proofs that external irritation is not necessary always to internal activity.

By the way, Aristotle was accustomed to assert that the most interesting portion of human knowledge is that which refers to what he called the animating principle of physical organisms. We are beginning to think, I hope, that what is called bioplasm is the most interesting by far of all the objects known to physical science. That, in substance, is an opinion two thousand years old. Aristotle defined the animating principle as the *cause of form in organisms.*[1] This to him was the most alluring of all the topics open to Greek philosophy. He said often, that, if we ought to be interested in a theme in proportion to its dignity, certainly nothing could be more entrancing than the study of the animating principle.

6. In man the influential arc is the seat of intellect, free-will, and conscience.

7. But, as man possesses the automatic arc also, many of his actions are automatic.

We must expect to find in some animals which have a much more perfect automatic nervous mechanism than man, instincts, and, apparently, spontaneous movements, of the most marvellous kinds. I am not asserting that man is not in some respects an automaton; but he is by no means as good a one as might be chosen if the power of automatic nervous action is to be shown. Professor Huxley went before a great audience at the Belfast meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and took a headless frog, and put it on the back of his hand, and then turned his hand slowly over; and the frog kept his place till the hand had been reversed, and the frog stood in the palm.[2] Now, said Professor Huxley, is there any will concerned in that? Is not this the result of purely physical stimulation of the frog's nerves? Have we not here an automaton? He meant to puzzle the world about the freedom of the human soul. But the bioplasts wove that frog too. After the automatic mechanism is woven, such results are very well known to follow the action of the merely automatic part of the nervous system. A frog with its head cut off you may put on the back of your hand, and you may turn the hand over, and the frog will keep its place meanwhile without assistance, and stand on your palm. Of course, there is no action of the cerebral hemispheres there. The irritation of the feet has such an effect as to cause the muscles to enable them to cling to their support; just as, while the perching bird sleeps, the perch itself stimulates to action the muscles that cause it to be clasped by the

[1] Aristotle de Anima, *passim*.
[2] Huxley's Address on the Question, Are Animals Automata?

bird's feet. Will you please notice that you have no right to be puzzled by any number of facts like these, and that all there is in Huxley's famous experiment is admitted truth concerning the automatic part of the nervous system, and that the puzzle consists in putting that fragment for the whole?

8. As in man, the automatic and the influential nervous arcs are blended together by innumerable commissures, and are yet perfectly distinguishable by study, so the automatic and the free activities of man are, in experience, most intricately blended together, and yet are perfectly distinguishable by careful attention.

9. Sometimes the former may become so powerful as to overcome the latter; and sometimes the latter may overcome the former.

10. The power of habit, and, to a great extent, that of emotion, depends on the action of the automatic arcs.

Your classical orator of Boston stands upon some transfigured platform, and the warp and woof of his unpremeditated language fall from the loom of his mind, every figure perfect. You hold up in print the next morning his speech between your eyes and the merciless sunlight, and there is no flaw in the weaving. Your Phillips, your Everett, your Sumner, your Webster, have scarred into their nervous systems good literary habits. You know very well that a scar will not wash out, or grow out. Absolutely there is no doubt about this. But how vast and fathomlessly practical are the applications of the simple truth that scars are ineraseable! A two-edged sword this, and of keener than Damascus steel. Your dull inebriate, who scars his brain by the habit of intemperance, thinks, that, after his reformation, his nervous system will slowly recover all the soundness it once had. But in your finger a scar will not grow out; and on your brain a scar will not grow out. Here are scars which were made when my fingers were too young to be trusted with edged tools; but, although the particles of my body have been changed many times since then, the scars are here, reproduced with the reproduction of the particles of the body. Once in seven years we have a new body, the books used to say: once in twelve months, as they say now, the particles of our physical system are changed. Scars, however, are absolutely unchangeable in the changing flesh. We carry into our graves the marks of boyhood's sports; and this is as true, if you please, of the sports that scar the brain as of those that gash the fingers. The most searching blessing on good habits, the most penetrating curse on bad, is found in the one fact, that the automatic nervous mechanism is such, that when a habit, good or bad, is scarred into the nerves and brain, the soul pours forth the result of the habit almost spontaneously.

The influential nerve-arcs can, indeed, hold back the activity of the automatic arcs. "The will counts for something as a cause," says Huxley himself. Dr. Carpenter explicitly teaches, that the influential nerve-arcs may resist, "keep in check and modify" the action of the automatic nervous mechanism.[1]

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1 Carpenter, Physiology, eighth edition, 1875, p. 730. See, also, his Mental Physiology, *passim*.

The power of volition resides in the influential arcs. But even a man is so far an automaton that, if he is an orator, he will scar himself with the complete oratorical habit, and may speak, as the bird sings, without effort. You wonder at the precision, fluency, and force of the language of your Burke or your Chatham. But the automatic nerve-scars representing good literary habits may have been in the mother, or in both parents, or in five generations. Certainly the habit of good extemporaneous speech has been cultivated through more than a quarter of a century by your Chatham and your Burke. It is now scarred deeply into the nerves; and scars do not grow out. And when, before any audience, the warp and woof of eloquent speech are needed, the automatic action of good habit sets its power behind the will of the orator; and nearly all that is required is, that some great thought and passion should throw the shuttles once, and then the figured, firm web flows spontaneously from the perfect loom. But just so, my friends, your tendency or mine to slovenly speech, our fearfully unæsthetic ways, and even the inebriate's thirst, or the sensualist's leprous thoughts, scar the nervous system in its automatic arc. When you, thus scarred by habit, and it may be, alas! by inheritance, pass the place of temptation, you are seized, you know not with what power: you feel that there is necessity upon you; and that mystery is simply the fact that scars are ineraseable. You have scarred your nervous system with an evil habit; and now this terrific power of the automatic mechanism stands behind your will. Your musician yonder, under the same automatic law, derives power from the very source from which you derive weakness. He calls forth melody, spray after spray of the fountain of the anthem ascending and falling, with raptures all in rhythm; and we are lifted by it to the azure; we are ennobled by it mysteriously: but your musician is making no effort. So has habit ingrained his nervous mechanism, that he plays as the bird sings. Professor Huxley states, that once an old soldier, who had been accustomed all his life to come to a perfectly erect attitude at the word "attention," was carrying home his dinner on a London street, when a comrade who desired sport called out to him from the other side of the way, "Attention!" Instantly the inattentive soldier came into the upright attitude, and dropped his dinner in the street. Now, Professor Huxley says, that although the details of that anecdote may not be all correct, they might be, and that they might be because of the power of the automatic action of the nervous system. So you, holding your families' or your own pure character in your arms; you, citizens of Boston, holding your honour in this city in your bosoms, are some day tempted sorcerously by intemperance or passion, by the greed and fraud of crooked trade or politics, or by any of the bad impulses that habit or inheritance has woven into your nerves; and suddenly, under automatic trance, which might yet have been escaped by force of will, the things dearest to you are dropped by you in the draggled street of your private or public life at the sudden word "Attention" from the black angel.

11. The action of the influential arcs is not to be regarded as a

creation of force, but rather as the optional opening of a reservoir of force, given with the gift of life to each organisation that possesses free-will.

I touch here upon a great mystery, and am quite aware of the nature of the ground over which I pass; but you will notice that this proposition does not go as far as Sir John Herschel does, when he asserts that the soul is, to a small extent, a real creative force. Let us call it, rather, a power delegated for optional use. All the power we have is certainly delegated power. We have received it all from Almighty God. His force is all the force there is in the universe, intellectual or physical.

12. This fact, that free-will is exercised through the influential arcs of the nervous system, does not, therefore, necessarily contradict the law of the persistence of force.

13. In both the automatic and the influential arc there is a perfect adaptation of the structure to the agent that is to set it in activity.

Sometimes, at the end of the automatic arc, you have an eye, with its marvellous lenses, or an ear, which Professor Tyndall calls "a harp of three thousand strings."

14. The eye is the outer portion of the automatic arc concerned in vision; and all parts of the eye are adapted in their structure to a wholly external agent,—light.

15. The ear is the outer portion of the automatic arc concerned in hearing; and it is adapted perfectly to an external agent,—sound.

16. The nerves of smell are connected with a structure adapted to a wholly external agent,—odour.

17. The tongue is adapted in the same way to a wholly external agent,—flavour.

18. Many problems in biology are susceptible of an inverse solution: as, for example, given the nature of light to determine what must be the structure of the organ of vision; or, given the structure of the eye to determine what is the nature of light.

19. So, in relation to the agent which moves the influential arcs, we have the problem: Given the structure of the brain to determine the nature of the agent which sets it in action.

20. There is an absolute analogy in construction between the elementary arrangement of the fibres of the brain and those of any other nervous arc.

21. The influential, as well as the automatic part of the nervous system, has its centripetal and centrifugal fibres, which converge to sensory ganglia, or nervous centres.

22. Just as the automatic arcs in man's nervous system have vesicular material at their external extremities in the organs of the senses, so the influential have vesicular material at their external extremities in the convolutions of the brain.

23. But we know beyond question that the automatic nerve-arcs can display no phenomena of themselves: they all require an external agent to set them in motion.

24. The optical apparatus is inert without the influences of light; the auditory inert without sound. The organs of taste and smell, and

the nerves connected with them, are inert and without value, except under the influences of wholly external agents.

25. Established science asserts the absolute inertness of the cerebral structure in itself; or the entire incapacity of the influential as well as of the automatic nerve-arcs to initiate their own activities.

26. As, therefore, from the structure of the eye, we may infer the existence of a wholly external agent, light, or from that of the ear, the existence of a wholly external agent, sound, so, because of the absolute inertness of the cerebral structure in itself, we must attribute its activities to an agent as external to it as sound is to the ear, or light to the eye.

27. That agent is invisible to the external vision, and intangible to external touch.

28. It is positively known to consciousness, or the internal vision and touch.

29. That agent is the soul.

30. As the dissolution of the eye does not destroy the light, the external agent which acts upon it; and as the dissolution of the ear does not destroy the pulsations of air, the external agent which acts upon it; so the dissolution of the brain does not destroy the soul, the external agent which sets it in motion.

Gentlemen, there is more than one soul here besides mine sad with unspeakable bereavement. There are eyes here besides mine which weary the heavens with beseeching glances for one vision of faces snatched from us in fiery chariots of pain. Is death the breaking of a flask in the sea? Is there for me no more personal immortality than for a consumed candle? Cool precision, gentlemen, not rhetoric; even at the edge of the tomb, cool precision!

I open Professor Draper, and read, "If the optical apparatus be inert, and without value save under the influence of light; if the auditory apparatus yields no result save under the impressions of sound,—since there is between these structures and the elementary structure of the cerebrum a perfect analogy, we are entitled to come to the same conclusion in this instance as in those, and, asserting the absolute inertness of the cerebral structure in itself, to impute the phenomena it displays to an agent as perfectly external to the body, and as independent of it, as are light and sound; and that agent is the soul."[1] That is a very sacred kind of Scripture, for it is the record of God's work fairly interpreted.

I might quote twenty other authorities; but I cite this book because it has a great fame in Germany, and is accessible to all, and because Professor Draper, in a most painfully unfair volume on "The Conflict between Science and Religion," has set himself somewhat outside the pale of what I call just sympathies in this great discussion. He, at least, has proved his freedom from all traditional opinions. The objection to the latter book is, that he confuses Romanism and Christianity, and shows that conflict has existed between some forms of the Church and science, and then infers that Christianity itself is

[1] Draper, Physiology, p. 285.

in conflict with clear ideas. This man, with more than one compeer of his in the latest physiological research seconding his words, affirms, in the face of the world, that "It is for the physiologist to assert and uphold the doctrine of the oneness, the accountability and the immortality of the soul, and the great truth that, as there is but one God in the universe, so there is but one spirit in man."[1] "We have established the existence of the intellectual principle as external to the body."[2] That is Beale, and that is Hermann Lotze, too.

There is a school of rather small philosophy in Cambridge yonder, among a few young men, who, very unjustly to Harvard, are supposed by large portions of the public to represent the University. I happen to be a Harvard man, if you please, and ought to know something of my *Alma Mater*. There is not a paving-stone or an elm-tree in Cambridge that is not a treasure to me. Who does represent Harvard? Hermann Lotze and Frey and Beale, rather than Herbert Spencer and Häckel, are the authorities which the strongest men at Cambridge revere. The North American Review, the Harvard chair of metaphysics, the Harvard pulpit, the Cambridge poets and men of letters, who are tall enough to be seen across the Atlantic and half a score of centuries, are not converts to materialism.

Must I infer that the New York *Nation* is possessed of a philosophy of materialistic tendency? I have not criticised, I have even defended, the theistic doctrine of evolution. I have endeavoured only to show that the atheistic and agnostic forms of that doctrine are violently unscientific. There is a use and an abuse of the theory; and Dana represents the one, and Häckel the other. I have treated atheism and materialism without much reverence; for I revere the scientific method. But three weeks in succession I am assailed with ridicule without argument in a critical journal that claims to be courteous and fair. As this cultured, and, I may say, distinguished Boston audience knows, the New York journal has stated my positions with the most broad and painful inaccuracy. Am I to stand here before an audience that has as much culture in it as any weekly gathering in the United States, and be lashed before the world by this New York weekly, which is, indeed, well informed in politics, but in philosophy is so far behind our times as to be now predominantly Spencerian? Its editor, as you know, resides in Cambridge; and the small, disowned school in philosophy there seems to have taken possession of this periodical of very unequal merit. In philosophy, the *Nation* has no outlook beyond the Straits of Dover. I do not remember that I ever saw in it a single reference to Hermann Lotze, or any proof of large knowledge of so much as the outlines of the freshest German thought of the first rank on the physiological side of metaphysical research. As to present culture in the wide and rich theological field, I may say, that, so far as a specialist's judgment is worth anything, mine is, that the *Nation* cannot be trusted on this theme, it is so benighted by its insular philosophy, and by a very frequent arrogance toward all theology not Spencerian.

[1] Draper, Physiology, p. 24. [2] Ibid., p. 286.

This paper needs a rival. I dislike to criticise it; for, after all, it is our poor best in the way of a critical weekly. At a hotel table in Munich once, a haughty English lord asked me what was the best paper in America of the order of the Saturday Review of London. "The Nation," I said. "Yes," he replied; "but you have forty millions of people, and Great Britain has only thirty millions, and you have but one paper of this class."

There used to be a proverb that, when Philadelphia wanted to know what to think, she looked to New York; and when New York wanted to know what to think, she looked to Boston; and when Boston wanted to know what to think, she looked to Concord. No doubt this proverb originated in Concord. But I walked the other day with a Concord author whose words have been read with delight by two generations, and will be remembered, I hope, by twenty; and he said to me under those historic elms on your Boston mall, after having been twice in the audience of this Lectureship, "You may tell Boston that I, for one, regard Lionel Beale and Hermann Lotze as the rising men in philosophy." That is Bronson Alcott, who lives not far from the spot where Nathaniel Hawthorne lies at rest till the heavens be no more. If you listen to the inner voice of Emerson's latest publications, and to that of Carlyle's, you will find that these men whom you have called pantheists, are no deniers of the personal immortality of the soul.

Am I out of my field in endeavouring to prove that man has a soul? *Ne sutor ultra crepidam.* Let no shoemaker go beyond his last, Horace said ages ago. But what if, in the progress of the ages, there be made a new last? Significant signs of the times are the professorships and lectureships starting up in renowned theological schools on the relations between the religious and other sciences. In New York City, in Union Seminary, there is a lectureship, with ten thousand dollars endowment on "The Relations of the Bible to the Sciences." It is called the Morse Lectureship, because founded by Samuel F. B. Morse, in memory of his father, who was only a doctor of divinity. In the same school there is a lectureship on "Hygiene," founded by Willard Parker. We have the Vedder Lectureship at the New Brunswick School of the Reformed Church in America. Princeton has a chair, established in 1871, designed to discuss elaborately "The Relation of Christianity to Natural and Speculative Science." Andover has a lectureship, and I hope may soon have a professorship on this theme. Out of place! I maintain that all these foundations are timely, and deserve the cordial support of all scholars. They are a new last, indeed; but the occupants of these chairs will make specialists of themselves in their new fields, which will by no means be outside the range of theological research. All these facts were overlooked by the *Nation* when it made its astute examination of catalogues to see whether ministers know anything of the latest philosophy. Catalogues are a sufficiently sorry authority; but their less slovenly perusal might have taught this journal that a new last has been created by a new time, and that, in the name of Horace's maxim no student of religious science can be warned off the field

which Hermann Lotze and Beale have entered. No student of religious science is adequately equipped for his work, unless, with open eyes, he has worshipped in that temple of physiological research where Lotze and Helmholtz and Frey and Wundt and Beale and Carpenter and Dana, and all men of science who think not to twenty only, but to thirty-two points of the compass, now kneel, hushed, dead, in the presence of a Living God, but ready to rise up alive and fill civilisation with their own enthusiasm.

IX.

DOES DEATH END ALL? IS INSTINCT IMMORTAL?[1]

"Des Todes rührendes Bild
Steht Nichts als Schrecken dem
Weisen, und nicht als Ende dem Frommen."
GOETHE, *Hermann und Dorothea.*

"Die Schöpfung hängt als Schleier, der aus Sonnen und Geistern gewebt ist, über dem Unendlichen, und die Ewigkeiten gehen vor dem Schleier vorbei, und ziehen ihn nicht weg von dem Glanze, den er verhüllet. . . . Ich und du, und alle Menschen und alle Engel und alle Würmchen ruhen an seiner Brust, und das brausende, schlagende Welten- und Sonnenmeer ist ein einziges Kind in seinem Arm."—JEAN PAUL RICHTER, *Hesperus.*

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

ON the morning of Saturday, Oct. 23, 1852, Daniel Webster, whose statue was unveiled last Saturday in Central Park, said to his physician, "I shall die to-night." Dr. Jeffries, much moved, replied, after a pause, "You are right, sir." The gorgeous and jewelled October day rolled on at the edge of the sea; and when evening came, the last will and testament of your greatest statesman and orator was brought to him for his signature, which he affixed, and then said, "Thank God for strength to do a sensible act! O God, I thank Thee for all Thy mercies." His family was brought to his bedside; and his biographer, Curtis, noticing that Mr. Webster was about to say something which should be recorded, took his seat at a table, and caught these last words. Curtis says they were uttered slowly in a tone which might have been heard through half the house: "My general wish on earth has been to do my Master's will. That there is a God, all must acknowledge. I see Him in all these wondrous works. Himself how wondrous! What would be the condition of any of us, if we had not the hope of immortality? What ground is there to rest upon but the gospel? There were scattered hopes of the immortality of the soul, especially among the Jews. The Jews believed in a spiritual origin of creation. The Romans never reached it; the Greeks never reached it. It is a tradition that communication was made to the Jews by God Himself through Moses. There were intimations, crepuscular, twilight. But, but, but, thank God! the Gospel of Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to light, rescued it, brought it to light." Then the greatest reasoner this country has produced caused a sacred hush to fall upon his dying chamber; and in a loud, firm voice, he repeated the whole of the Lord's Prayer, closing with these words, "Peace on earth, and good-will to men: that is the happiness, the essence,—good-will to men." Another authority, that

[1] The fifty-fourth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

of his own secretary, says, that, in the last week of his life, this man, whose career you know, often repeated the whole hymn, of which the first stanza is,—

> "Show pity, Lord; O Lord, forgive!
> Let a repenting rebel live.
> Are not Thy mercies large and free?
> May not a sinner trust in Thee."

Webster knew his own need of these petitions. I am not here to say that he lived a Christian life. I raise this morning, when Webster is before the nation, the question, whether there is any evidence that he died repentant. I hope there is. Not many years ago I sat, on a howling winter night, at the fireside of John Taylor in gnarled New Hampshire; and he said to me, "Webster always attended the communion-service when he was at Elms Farm. Till his death he was a member in good standing with the Salisbury church, with which he united when a young man."—"But," said I, "was that church strong enough to discipline a statesman?"—"If Webster had shown," John Taylor replied, "anything of intemperance, or other evil ways, in New Hampshire, he would have been disciplined by that church. What he did in Washington, I know not. Here, among those who knew him best, he was always ready to kneel at the family altar. There was one hymn that we always used to like to sing together," said John Taylor, with his immense bass voice, and wholly unconscious of the expression he was making of his own massiveness. "We liked to sing together 'Old Hundred:' it seemed to fit us." The venerable Judge Nesmith, whose guest I have sometimes been at Franklin, has told me things almost too sacred to be repeated here, concerning Webster's religious thoughtfulness in his last years. "Were they the last words I have to utter," said John Taylor to me, "I should say Webster died a Christian;" and just this testimony has been given me by the profound judge, Nesmith, who stands highest among all authorities concerning Webster's life in his native haunts. Your Robert C. Winthrop, at New York on Saturday, said he had knelt with Webster at the table of our Lord, and witnessed the fervour and tenderness of his devotions.

But, gentlemen, a death-bed repentance is never to be encouraged before the time, or discouraged at the time. What I wish to insist upon, face to face with all the small philosophies of our time on both sides of the Atlantic, is the record of Webster's last speech, revised by himself. These sentences which Curtis caught are the last unrevised speech. But on Sabbath evening, Oct. 10th, the last formal speech was written, and on Oct. 15th, was revised and signed by Webster's own hand. These, his last revised words, stand upon the marble of the tombstone at Marshfield. Plymouth Rock looks on them; and they look on Plymouth Rock. This is the record Webster left as his last word to men in all ages; and ought it not to be copied in marble in some spot more conspicuous than that brown Marshfield shore?

"Philosophical argument, especially that drawn from the vastness of the universe as compared with the apparent insignificance of this globe, has often shaken my reason for the faith that is in me; but my heart has assured and re-assured me that the Gospel of Jesus Christ must be a divine reality. The Sermon on the Mount cannot be a merely human production. This belief enters into the very depth of my conscience. The whole history of man proves it."[1]

At twenty-three minutes of three o'clock on the Sunday morning following that Saturday which was illumined by the serious words on immortality, Webster passed into the Unseen Holy into which all men haste. Boston, since 1852, has been wringing her hands in secret, and saying not unfrequently, as the plain man said at the tomb in Marshfield, "Daniel Webster, without you the world seems lonesome." Are we sure that we are without him? When Rufus Choate took ship for that port where he died, some friend said, "You will be here a year hence."—"Sir," said your great lawyer, "I shall be here a hundred years hence, and a thousand years hence."

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[1] Curtis's Life of Webster, vol. ii. p. 684.

THE LECTURE.

If death does not end all, what does or can? If we can demonstrate by a purely physiological argument, as Draper, Lionel Beale, and Hermann Lotze, say we can, that the soul is an agent as external to the cerebral mechanism as light is to the eye, or sound to the ear, we have taken the Malakoff and Redan of materialism; and then the question is, whether we can get on in Russia. A small critic may ask how the immortality of the soul is proved by showing its externality and its independence in its relations to the physical organism. The immortality is not directly proved by the proof of the externality and the independence; but it is indirectly made probable. If you take Island No. 10 and New Orleans, you can sail from St. Louis to the Gulf, and thence to any coast you please. If, as the highest philosophy of Germany, Scotland, England, and America asserts, our nervous mechanism is wholly inert in itself, and as plainly requires an external agent to set it in motion as any musical instrument does, then the dissolution of the brain is no more proof of the dissolution of the soul than the dissolution of your organ is proof of the dissolution of the musician who plays it, but who has Gyges' ring on his finger, and is invisible. It has, in all ages, been the pretence of materialists, that the relation of the soul to the body is that of harmony to the harp, and not of the harper to the harp, or of the rower to a boat. But show me by physiological argument that the soul is an agent external to the nervous mechanism, and you have proved that the relation of the soul to the body is that of a harper to a harp, or of a rower to a boat; and, in showing that, you have removed, I affirm, not only a great, but the greatest obstacle to the belief in immortality. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, as there is not, we must believe in the persistency of that spiritual force which we call the soul; and this we must do in the name of the scientific principle of the persistence of force, itself the most vaunted of all modern points in science.

Allow me, gentlemen, to untwist a little the famous Ariadne clew, which we follow here in all our investigation; namely, that every change must have an adequate cause. In that one principle lie capsulate a great number of axioms which are at the base of all kinds of research, theological, physiological, political, or historical.

Lest you should suspect me of theological bias in untwisting the strands of this clew, take that interpretation of it which the great physiologist, Wundt, whom I have often quoted, adopts in his work on "The Physical Axioms in Relation to the Principle of Causality," a book published at Erlangen in 1866. Professor Wundt says that the principle that every change must have an adequate cause, contains in it these six axioms:—

1. All causes in Nature are causes of motion.
2. Every cause of motion is external to the object moved.
3. All causes of motion work in the direction of the straight line

uniting the point from which the force departs with the point upon which its operation is directed.

4. The effect of every cause persists.
5. Every effect is accompanied by an equal counter-effect
6. Every effect is equivalent to its cause.[1]

Will you remember, my friends, that the definition of force is this, *That which is expended in producing or resisting motion?* That is Meyer's definition; and Meyer, if he had never given any other proof of genius than this one phrase, would deserve to be called a man of great powers. But go behind even this definition, and, for the sake of clear ideas, ask what is expended in producing or resisting motion. Surely the only thing we can think of as being expended thus is *pressure.* What produces pressure? Your Carpenters, your Agassizes, and your Herschels, your Newtons, your Sir William Hamiltons, your Danas, as well as your Richters and Carlyles and Lotzes, all hold that behind the pressures which produce the motions of the universe is—WILL! MOTIONS, PRESSURES, WILL—is the universe transfigured? This is not declamation, however, but established philosophy of the latest date. Whoever will look into the last chapters of Dr. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology," or at the last sentence of Mr. Grove's famous "Essay on Correlation of Forces," or into Professor Agassiz' "Essay on Classification," or into Sir John Herschel's "Astronomy," or Dana's "Geology," or Professor Pierce's great work on "The Mathematics of Astronomy," will find the doctrine unhesitatingly maintained, that *force is always and everywhere of spiritual origin.* When I was in Harvard University, I went one day into a bookstore, and turned over a great quarto on "The Mathematics of Astronomy" by Professor Pierce; and I came upon a chapter entitled "The Spiritual Origin of Force." I looked into it; and, welling up out of that stern granite of mathematics, I found the Castalian spring of crystalline water, where the Goethes, and Herschels, and Carpenters, and Agassizes, and Lotzes, and Danas, and Richters, and Carlyles have drunk so long. In the transfiguring scientific certainty that all force originates in Will, I found that better than Delphic spring, one deep draught of which gives a new vision to the eyes, and makes the whole universe a burning bush, of which Orion and the Seven Stars are only a lowermost leaf, but every fibre of which, near and far, burns with a fire that cannot be touched, and every dustiest path before which is ground so holy, that on it we must take off our shoes, however proud of intellect we may be. Take now, the doctrine, that wherever we find heat, light, electricity, we infer motions of the ultimate particles of matter as the cause; and that, wherever we find motions, we infer pressures as the cause; and that, wherever we find pressures, we infer WILL as the cause,—and you have the point of view of these six axioms, which, by the way, are not the words of any small philosopher, nor of a theologian, nor even of an ethical teacher, but of a man simply of the microscope and scalpel, adhering

[1] Professor Wilhelm Wundt, On the Physical Axioms in Relation to the Principle of Causality. See, also, Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, passages on Wundt.

in all the labyrinth of modern physiological investigation, only to the idea of sanity, that every change must have an adequate cause. You say that this is poetry, and so it is; but it is also cold, exact science. You say this is not Harvard University. Are you sure? Yonder on the banks of the Charles sits the most philosophical poet of our generation, yes, the most philosophical on either side of the Atlantic; and, in the name of Harvard University, James Russell Lowell might rise and sing what he sang in his own name only yesterday :—

> "God of our fathers, Thou who wast,
> Art, and shalt be, *when the eye-wise who flout*
> *Thy secret presence* shall be lost
> In the great light that dazzles them to doubt,
> *We who believe Life's bases rest*
> *Beyond the probe of chemic test,*
> Still, like our fathers, feel Thee near."
>
> LOWELL, *Atlantic Monthly, December* 1876.

I hold in my hand an important and enticing book, eagerly waited for by me for one, and off which the spray of the gray sea has hardly yet been shaken. It is a volume on "The Functions of the Brain," issued only last month by Dr. David Ferrier, fellow of the Royal Society, and professor of forensic medicine in King's College, London; and it will need no recommendation to gentlemen of the medical profession, who are permitted to know something of living tissues, and to form and express opinions after study as to the great controverted theories in biology, as no layman in science is—except the editor of the *Nation*. Professor Ferrier is a follower of two great German investigators, Fritsch and Hitzig; and his work and theirs undoubtedly constitute not only the freshest, but the most important of all recent contributions to the knowledge of the nervous system.

Let me now, in the name of the latest research, put before you, step by step, an argument exclusively physiological, and leading up, as that of last Monday did, along this line of Wundt's wholly tremorless axioms to the conclusion that the soul is external to the nervous mechanism, which it sets in motion.

1. Fritsch and Hitzig and Dr. Ferrier have proved that certain of the convolutions of the brain of a living animal may be electrically stimulated so as to produce in the animal various physical actions.

2. The stimulation of different parts of the brain produces different results, which can be foretold by the experimenter.

3. The doctrine of the localisation of functions in the brain is now, therefore, practically beyond dispute.

I am aware that two great physiological parties,—the localisers and the anti-localisers—occupy the field of recent investigation concerning the brain. But, if we have Brown-Sequard, Hermann, Foster, and Dupuis among the anti-localisers, we have among the localisers the now preponderating names of Charcot, Fritsch, Hitzig, Ranke, Carpenter, Ferrier, Draper, and Dalton.

When you give a rabbit chloroform, and then remove a portion of its skull, the animal suffers no pain, and consequently does not fall into such contortions as to cause the act of taking away parts of the

skull to injure the delicate texture of the brain. We have succeeded at last in uncovering the living, palpitating, cerebal tissues, without disturbing their delicate machinery; and we have done this by the use of chloroform, not known in the world as an anæsthetic until a few years ago. Using electrical currents that are just distinguishable by the tip of the human tongue, and employing blunted electrodes that will not scarify the nervous webs we touch, we may stimulate the exposed brain of a living animal, and ascertain that the stimulus on different parts produces different motions. We may accurately foretell these motions, after having had a sufficient experience in such kinds of experiments. One particular part of the brain, for instance, will, if stimulated, produce the attitude of resistance in the animal; and another part, if stimulated, will cause the attitude of fear. In short, a large portion of the brain has now been investigated in this way so thoroughly, that we may affirm that it is a keyboard on which electricity may play. This effect of galvanic currents on the automatic nervous mechanism is peculiarly evident on the lower or automatic nerve-arcs. You stimulate a centrifugal automatic nerve [referring to the blackboard], and you will produce motion in the muscle attached to the correlated centrifugal fibre.

Is there any proof at all that the whole brain is a keyboard that can thus be played upon by electrical stimulation?

A portion of it more closely connected with the spinal cord than the rest is a keyboard; but does the law of the automatic portion extend to the whole mass of the brain? The nervous mechanism is divided into the influential and automatic arcs. Does this fundamental distinction hold good under the searching test of electrical stimulation?

4. It is agreed that the frontal lobes are the seat of intellect.

5. *But electrical stimulation of these highest parts of the influential nervous mechanism produces no motion.*

If there are produced in this portion of the influential arcs by electricity such tremors as cause muscular motion when produced by electricity in the automatic arcs, no motion follows in the muscles. This is a fact of vast significance; but there is another of even higher import.

6. If one hemisphere of the brain be removed, paralysis of the powers of motion and sensation follows in one-half the body.

7. *But, even when one hemisphere of the brain is removed, all the mental operations may yet be fully performed.*[1]

8. These results of electrical stimulation and of cerebral injury, being opposite in the two cases, prove that physiological causes such as are concerned in the *automatic* nervous mechanism are not to be found in operation in the *influential* nervous mechanism as it is represented by the anterior lobes of the brain.

9. The distinction between automatic and influential *is* made broader, therefore, by the latest scientific research.

Let us examine a little leisurely the bearing of these propositions

[1] Ferrier, Functions of the Brain, p. 257.

upon the great biological distinction between the automatic and the influential portions in the nervous system. The important point to be noticed [illustrating by diagrams] is, that you may stimulate with electricity an influential arc here, and not produce any motion yonder. On the contrary, touch the corresponding portion of an automatic arc, and you move this muscular fibre. Although this mechanism is called automatic, remember that it was made so by the bioplasts that wove it, and that a contractile quality was given to this muscular fibre by the bioplast that wove both it and this nerve, and tied the two together. Apply your electrode to the automatic arc, and you produce contraction; but apply your electrode to the influential arc, and you produce no contraction. There is, therefore, a difference between the structure of an influential arc and that of an automatic arc. We prove this tangibly when we try point after point of the brain and of the great nervous centres connecting it with the spinal cord, and find that the lower powers of the nervous mechanism are reflex and automatic, but that these higher frontal lobes are ocularly demonstrable not to be of that sort. When we apply to them the electrical test which produces motion elsewhere, no motion whatever is produced.

If you take away one hemisphere of the brain, what is the effect? One-half the body is paralysed. The sensation and the motion which belong to the side of the body opposite to the removed hemisphere are gone. But your mental powers continue, and exhibit in completeness all their activities. Dr. Ferrier himself is authority for the astounding fact that the action of the mind is not so bound up even with these influential arcs, that it cannot show the whole army of its powers when you take away one whole hemisphere of the brain. If that can be proved, gentlemen, it has been proved tolerably well. I should say, that there is a difference between the influential and the automatic arcs, or that between the two things there is as broad a contrast as between the two scientific names. Just that has been proved beyond dispute. It is admitted by the latest science that you can take away one hemisphere of the brain, and have complete mental action yet remaining, although you cannot take away one hemisphere without paralysing one-half of the body. If I show this, I prove that there is a distinction of great breadth and significance between the influential and the automatic arcs.

"The physiological activity of the brain," says Professor Ferrier in a most suggestive passage, "is not altogether co-extensive with its psychological functions. The brain as an organ of motion and sensation, or presentative consciousness, is a single organ composed of two halves: the brain as an organ of ideation, or re-presentative consciousness, is a dual organ, each hemisphere complete in itself. *When one hemisphere is removed or destroyed by disease, motion and sensation are abolished unilaterally*,"—that is upon the opposite side,—"*but mental operations are still capable of being carried on in their completeness through the agency of the one hemisphere.* The individual who is paralysed as to sensation and motion by disease of the opposite side of the brain (say the right) is not paralysed mentally; for he can still feel and will and think, and intelligently comprehend with the one hemisphere. If these functions are not carried on with

the same vigour as before, *they at least do not appear to suffer in respect of completeness.*"[1]

A great fact this, even when standing alone; but add to it the test of your subtle electrical stimulus, and you find that all that is implied in the distinction between influential and automatic is borne out by these two colossal circumstances,—that stimulus on the influential arcs will produce no motion, but that it does produce complex motion if applied to the automatic arcs; and that half of the brain may be taken away, paralysing the half of your body, while the mind continues all its operations.

10. Physiological causes do not act where they do not exist.

11. The action of the influential nervous mechanism is not, therefore, *originated* by the physical causes operating in the automatic nervous mechanism.

12. But the inertness of the mechanism in itself demonstrates that it must be set in motion by an external agent.

13. That agent must be either matter or mind.

14. It is demonstrated that the action of the bioplasts in weaving the brain, and that of the frontal lobes after they are woven, cannot originate in matter.

15. It originates, therefore, in an external immaterial agent.

16. This, which is, in part, immediately known to consciousness, is life and the soul.

17. Modern microscopical research, therefore, proves that the soul is an agent external to the nervous mechanism which it sets in motion.

18. This being proved, it is demonstrated that the relation of the soul to the body is that of the rower to a boat, or of an invisible musician to a musical instrument.

19. But it has been admitted for ages by materialists themselves, that, if this is proved, then death does not end all.

Therefore, in the present state of knowledge, the case stands thus:

20. If death does not end all, what does or can?

"Electrical irritation of the antero-frontal lobes," says Dr. Ferrier, "causes no motor manifestations,—a fact, which, though a negative one, is consistent with the view, that, though not actually motor, they are inhibitory motor, and expend their energy in inducing internal changes in the centres of actual motor execution. . . . The development of the frontal lobes is greatest in men with the highest intellectual powers; and, taking one man with another, the greatest intellectual power is characteristic of the one with the greatest frontal development. The phrenologists have, I think, good grounds for localising the reflective faculties in the frontal regions of the brain; and there is nothing inherently improbable in the view that frontal development in special regions may be indicative of power of concentration of thought and intellectual capacity in special directions."[2]

In this assertion, that a four-banked organ has more musical power than one with a single bank, Ferrier is not falling into materialism; nor is he adopting the whole phrenological map, of most portions of

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[1] Ferrier's Functions of the Brain, p. 257, § 89. [2] Ibid., pp. 287, 288.

which he speaks with no respect. His belief is, that a new and better map will be made some day by infinite painstaking. He asserts simply that the keys on which the anthems of intellect are played are in the frontal portion of the brain, and that this anthem is at its best when the rows of keys are the most numerous, on which our invisible musician with Gyges' ring plays.

What of the immortality of instinct? A great distinction exists between those organisms that are mere automata, or have life, but no free-wills or consciences, and the higher animals, which have both the automatic and the influential nervous mechanism. The plant and the automaton have life, but not souls in the full sense of the word. But do not facts require us to hold that the immaterial part in animals having higher than automatic endowments is external to the nervous mechanism in them as well as in man? What are we to say if we find that straightforwardness may lead us to the conclusion that Agassiz was not unjustifiable when he affirmed, in the name of science, that instinct may be immortal, and when he expressed, in his own name, the ardent hope that it might be?

Go to Agassiz' grave in mount Auburn yonder, and, at the side of the Swiss boulder which marks the spot, stand alone and read these words of his, and meanwhile send your thoughts onward into the eternities and immensities, whither, no doubt, he sent his, when he wrote in the face of the world this majestic inquiry. These are the closing sentences of one of the most remarkable passages in perhaps the most remarkable of his works,—his "Essay on Classification:" "Most of the arguments of philosophy in favour of the immortality of man apply equally to the permanency of the immaterial principle in other living beings. May I not add that a future life in which man should be deprived of that great source of enjoyment, and intellectual and moral improvement, which result from the contemplation of the harmonies of an organic world, would involve a lamentable loss? and may we not look to a spiritual concert of the combined worlds and all their inhabitants in presence of their Creator, as the highest conception of paradise?"[1]

"It was *seventy* years ago,
In the pleasant month of May
In the beautiful Pays de Vaud,
A child in his cradle lay;
And Nature, the old nurse, took
The child upon her knee.
'Come, wander with me,' she said,
'Into regions yet untrod,
And read what is still unread'
In the manuscripts of God.'
And whenever the way seemed long
Or his heart began to fail,
She would sing a more wonderful song,
Or tell a more marvellous tale."

LONGFELLOW, *On the Fiftieth Birthday of Agassiz.*

[1] Louis Agassiz, Contributions to the Nat. Hist. of the U. S., vol. i. p. 66; Essay on Classification, close of part i. chap. i, sect. xvii.

What sings she now to this great soul which has passed into that paradise of which his worthiest conception was, that it should be a concert of the combined worlds? One cannot but recollect in the sublimity of this passage that this man was born in sight of the Alps. Of French descent, of Swiss birth, of German education, of American activity, Agassiz is now of the house not made with hands; and so large was he that, even when in the flesh, he appeared by forecast to be a citizen, not of America, or of Europe, but of the supreme theocracy, in whose presence he hoped to see a concert of the combined worlds and all their inhabitants.

Richter used to say that the interstellar spaces are the homes of souls.

Tennyson sings most subtly his trust:—

> "That nothing walks with aimless feet;
> That not one life shall be destroyed,
> Or cast as rubbish to the void,
> When God hath made the pile complete.
>
> That not a worm is cloven in vain;
> That not a moth with vain desire
> Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire."
>
> In Memoriam, liii.

Is it not worth while for us, standing here at Agassiz' tomb, with Richter on our right, and Tennyson on our left, to pause a moment, and on their wings, so much stronger than ours, to look abroad a little into this highest conception of paradise? A concert of combined worlds! The Seven Stars have their planets; Orion in this infinite azure is attended by his retinue of worlds; the lightest feather of the Swan which flies through the Milky Way represents uncounted galaxies; in the north, Ursa Major guards realms of life so broad, that thought faints in passing across but one of the eyelashes of the eternal constellation as it paces about the pole unwearied; Aquarius, Boötes, Sagittarius, Hercules, each holds in his far-spread palm of sidereal fire innumerable inhabitants. What if Agassiz and Richter and Cuvier and Milton and Shakspeare, and that host which no man can number, are studying at this moment a concert of all the life of Orion and the Seven Stars, Ursa Major, and the rest, and of that forgotten speck which we, on this lonely shore of existence, call earth? The loftiest exhibition of organic life of all kinds from all worlds, and in the presence of their Creator! Would it not be an immeasurable loss to be without this concert of combined worlds? Would it not be a diminution of supreme bliss not to have union with God through these, the most majestic of His works below ourselves? Shall we, too, not hope that this highest conception of paradise may be the true one? Richter would say, if he stood here, that he hopes it may be. Tennyson says, as he stands here, that he wishes it may be. Must not we, remembering the long line of acute souls who have believed in the possibility that instinct is immortal, say, that, if it be so, it is best that it should be so? Whether it is so or not, I care not to assert: what I do affirm is,

that the argument for immortality, by striking against the possibility that instinct may be immortal, is not wrecked, but glorified.

When we close our short careers, some questions that we debate as matters of high philosophy will be personal to you and to me. As we lie where Webster lay, face to face with eternity, and its breath on our cheeks, there will come to us, as it cannot come now, the query whether the relation of our souls to our bodies is that of harmony to a harp, or of the harper to the harp. The time is not distant when it will be worth something to us to remember that they who walk late on the deck of the Santa Maria have seen a light rise and fall ahead of us. The externality and independence of the soul in relation to the body are known now under the microscope and scalpel better than ever before in the history of our race. Exact science, in the name of the law of causation, breathes already through her iron lips a whisper, to which, as it grows louder, the blood of the ages will leap with new inspiration. Before that iron whisper, all objections to immortality are shattered. If, in the name of physiology, we remove all objections, you will hear your Webster, when he comes to you, and says that a Teacher attested by the ages as sent with a supreme Divine mission brought life and immortality to light. There is no darkness that can quench the illumination which now rises on the world. No ascending fog from the shallows of materialism can put out the sun of axiomatic truth. Ay, my friends, in the oozy depths of the pools where the reptiles lie among the reeds in the marshes of materialism, there arises a vapour which, as it ascends higher, that sun will irradiate, will stream through with his slant javelins of scientific clearness, until this very matter which we have dreaded to investigate shall take on all the glories of the morning, and become, by reflected light, the bridal couch of a new Day, in a future civilisation.

X.

DOES DEATH END ALL? BAIN'S MATERIALISM.[1]

"Wem die heiligen Todten gleichgültig sind, dem werden es die Lebendigen auch."—JEAN PAUL RICHTER, *Titan*, cycle 47.

"Five hundred doors
And forty more
Methinks are in Valhalla.
Eight hundred heroes through each door
Shall issue forth.

. . .

All men of worth
Shall there abide.

. . .

The ash Igdrasil
Is the first of trees."

THE PROSE EDDA.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

CHARLES DICKENS, toward the close of his "American Notes," says, that, when in the United States on his first visit, he was often forced by sheer amazement to ask why dishonesty, conjoined with high intellectual capacity, received so much reverence from Americans. "Is it not a very disgraceful circumstance," Dickens would inquire, "that such a man as So-and-so should be acquiring a large property by the most infamous and odious means, and, notwithstanding all the crimes of which he has been guilty, should be tolerated and sheltered by your citizens? He is a public nuisance, is he not?"—"Yes, sir."—"A convicted liar?"—"Yes, sir."—"He has been kicked and cuffed and caned?"—"Yes, sir."—"And he is utterly dishonourable, debased, and profligate?"—"Yes, sir."—"In the name of wonder, then, what is his merit?"—"Well, sir, he is a smart man." Dickens says he held this dialogue a hundred times.[2] In Dickens' name I once told this anecdote to a learned German, who replied in the spirit of the renowned German candour, and in his own name, bringing his hand down upon the table with an emphasis that made the glasses ring, "That word 'smart' will break America's neck yet, unless you break the word's neck."

Every gentleman's political sympathies I wish to treat always with as much respect as I treat my own; but as to my own I say, Perish my political party, if it succeeds by fraud!

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[1] The fifty-fifth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

[2] American Notes, chap. xviii.

We are suddenly entering, in our hundredth year, upon an as yet almost unnoticed, but subtly suggestive exhibition of one great weakness in our political system, namely, that, in close elections, gigantic political spoils tempt to gigantic political frauds. In presence of Centennial guests we are now in the midst of a war of affidavits; and it appears that the combatants are about equally able. It is no empty sign of our times that contestants for political primacy, in a territory greater than Cæsar ever ruled over cannot satisfy each other that each means to be fair. The far-seeing, fateful Muse of history, holding her pen in readiness to record what is yet to be in America, and looking on the present and coming size and fatness of party political spoils in the United States, whispers to our people anxiously the words of Shakspeare's Coriolanus :—

> "My soul aches
> To know, when two authorities are up,
> Neither supreme, how soon confusion
> May enter 'twixt the gap of both, and take
> The one by the other."

There are now eighty thousand minor offices filled by party patronage in the United States. While the principle, that to political victors belong political spoils, governs our politics, eighty thousand men will be turned out of office, and eighty thousand put in, with every change of the national administration. You know that Washington turned out but eight men, Adams only four, Jefferson thirty-nine, but not one of them for political reasons, Madison nine, Munroe five, and the younger Adams only two, but Jackson six hundred and ninety. Our population, as a whole, is doubling every thirty years. Soon we shall have two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand to be turned out or put in whenever a President is elected. *Will the republic bear that strain?* You will not, you say, vote for Washington's and Jefferson's rule,—to appoint the able, promote the worthy, and never remove the worthy for merely partisan reasons. You fear that there might grow up, under such a practice, an aristocracy of office-holders. It does not seem to occur to the astute opponents of civil-service reform that such an aristocracy, as it would not be turned out or put in by party patronage, and not be changed with the administrations, would serve both political parties, and so be no aristocracy at all.

Let the nation adhere for a century longer to Jackson's accursed principle, that to political victors belong all political spoils, and what must be the effect? What if closely contested national elections occur? The spoils of party patronage are already becoming so great in the United States as to constitute, with large and often controlling portions of both political parties, wholly irresistible temptations to fraud. But the spoils grow vaster and fatter with fearful speed. *Only civil-service reform can remove this enormous coming mischief.* It can do so only by taking patronage from party, and giving it to the people. *Gigantic party political spoils, gigantic party political frauds,—these are cause and effect.* They imperil the peace of the republic. They must do so more and more as our population grows. *Ultimately in America there will be either civil-service reform or civil war.*

THE LECTURE.

Plato represents Socrates as saying that he had looked at many authorities, and, among others, at the nature of things, but dared not look long at the latter for fear his eyes would be dazzled.[1] It is the radiance of the nature of things, or axiomatic, self-evident truth, which must frighten back to Chaos the vampire Doubt. On some sickly veins of our moaning and sceptical age that vampire broods as a nightmare; but no nightmare can bear the noon. Mrs.

1 Phædon.

Browning sang plaintively in the name of poetry, and her antipodes, Ernst Häckel, affirms aggressively in the name of science, that,

"A wider metaphysics would not harm our physics."

Two thousand years ago, Aristotle, with a measureless plaintiveness and gladness, wrote what the history of all discussion has since confirmed, that they who forsake the nature of things, or axiomatic first truths, will not and cannot find anything surer on which to build. Let us bring all those who are halt and lame and blind with doubt, or mental unrest, into the sunlight of axioms. Let us cheer ourselves in the vivifying radiance of the noon of the self-evident truths. The questions which the progress of science raises the progress of science will answer. It will do so, not to the detriment, but to the coronation, of religious science. Twenty centuries before the modern forms of physical science were born, religious science made, as she yet makes, the dateless and eternal noon of axioms her soul.

I find no form of materialism, old or new, that can look into the authority which dazzled Socrates, and retain steadfastness of gaze.

What is the newest form of materialism? That of Professors Bain and Tyndall, and that which is adopted, in a large degree, by Huxley and Spencer, and, almost without qualification, by Häckel. You know that St. George Mivart calls Huxley Häckel's *Alter Ego* "Contemporary Evolution." No man doubts that Häckel, in spite of his protestations, is a materialist, or one who believes that there is but a single substance in the universe, namely, matter. "The will is never free" is Häckel's constant teaching; and to his amazingly narrow philosophy, which Germany discards, "God is necessity" only, and has "no freedom of choice." Huxley quietly holds many of Häckel's philosophical opinions, but expresses them with far less boldness on their offensive side than Häckel does. When it is asserted that Herbert Spencer's positions are not of materialistic tendency, let a competent witness be called, say Thomas Rawson Birks, professor of moral philosophy in Cambridge University, England. This trained and indorsed scholar has just sent to us across the sea a work of beautiful clearness and candour, entitled "*Modern Physical Fatalism*, and the Doctrine of Evolution, including an Examination of Mr. H. Spencer's First Principles." The "Fatalistic Philosophy and Doctrine of Evolution, *as unfolded by Spencer*," he regards as "radically unsound, full of logical inconsistency and contradiction, flatly opposed to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and even to the very existence of moral science."[1] You must not allow yourself to think that the highest philosophical authority in Cambridge in England, and the highest in Cambridge in America, are really of two opinions as to any philosophy that is predominantly Spencerian. Is it maintained that Huxley is not a materialist in any sense, because he has said that he is not in some senses of that word of many meanings? What are his definitions? Who is it that teaches in so

[1] Preface, Sept. 28, 1876.

many words, in his latest and most deliberate utterance,[1] that "a mass of living protoplasm is simply a molecular machine, the *total* results of the working of which, or its vital phenomena, depend, on the one hand, on its construction, and, on the other, upon the energy supplied to it; and *to speak of vitality as anything but the name of a series of operations is as if one should talk of the horologity of a clock*"? If that is not materialism, what is? How much more space does that definition leave for freedom of the will and moral responsibility and immortality than is left by Häckel's more outspoken but not more sweeping phrases? That sentence contains both Huxley's and Spencer's central position. But every redoubt in the camp which defends the mechanical theory in biological science is riddled and ploughed by the artillery of Hermann Lotze and Wundt and Helmholtz, and all the best learning of Germany, to say nothing of Scotland and America. Of course, the English materialistic school must pick its phrases carefully. It often says it is not materialistic; but it is to be tested by its definitions. Many of Huxley's phrases imply not only a fear of arousing the aversion of scholars to materialism, but also a lack of intellectual unity. Tyndall and Huxley are both freely accused in England and Germany of metaphysical incompetence. On the question whether certain schools of thought are materialistic or not, those innocent souls who cannot fasten their eyes fixedly on definitions will find all the beaten paths of modern philosophical discussion full of what politicians call dust for the eyes of the unwary.

In the sea of axiomatic truth, materialism swims with fins of lead.

1. Bain's and Tyndall's materialism, which is the latest and subtlest kind, asserts that matter is "a double-faced unity," having "two sets of properties, or two sides,—the physical and the mental;" but is, nevertheless, "one substance," and the only substance which exists in the universe.[2]

2. If this definition is correct, it follows, that, in matter, physical and spiritual qualities must not only inhere, but *co*-inhere, in one and the same substratum. The qualities of matter and mind must be conjoined in one substance.

3. Among the fundamental qualities of matter are extension, inertia, gravity, colour, form.

4. But the qualities of mind are the antipodes of these qualities. It is absurd to speak of the extension, inertia, gravity, colour, or form of a thought, an imagination, a choice, or an emotion.

When Cæsar saw Brutus stab, and muffled up his face at the foot of Pompey's statue, was his grief round, or square, or triangular? When Newton conceived the idea that gravitation is a universal law, was that thought red, or brown, or violet? When Lincoln by a stroke of his pen manumitted four million slaves, was his choice hexagonal, or octagonal? Does the act of imagination in a Shakspeare weigh an ounce, or a pound? These questions show that the terms which we apply to matter are totally inapplicable and meaningless if applied to mind.

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[1] Huxley, Encyc. Brit., art. "Biology," 1875.

[2] Bain, Mind and Body, p. 196.

5. Professor Bain himself admits that the organic and the inorganic are not so widely separated as matter and mind; and that the elements of our experience are in the last resort, not one, but *two*. "Mental and bodily states are utterly contrasted; and our mental experience, our feelings and thoughts, have *no extension*, no place, no form or outline, no mechanical division of parts, and we are incapable of attending to anything mental until we shut off the view of all that."[1]

You must not suppose that Bain is witless enough not to recognise the distinction between mind and matter as the broadest known to man. His work on "Mind and Body" I hold in my hand; and it is one number of those royal and very disappointing roads to knowledge, called "The International Scientific Series." I reverence Professor Bain. He has written some books which are thorough, and will bear, in most parts, the logical microscope. But this volume on "Mind and Body" seems to have been made to order and in haste. Nevertheless, it is the Bible of the latest English materialism; and now, out of this freshest revelation, let me read a text or two.

"EXTENSION," says Professor Bain, "is but the first of a long series of properties *all present in matter, all absent in mind.* INERTIA cannot belong to a pleasure, a pain, an idea, as experienced in the consciousness. Inertia is accompanied with GRAVITY, a peculiarly material quality. So COLOUR is a truly material property: it cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a pain. These three properties are the basis of matter; to them are superadded Form, Motion, Position, and a host of other properties expressed in terms of these, Attractions and Repulsions, Hardness and Elasticity, Cohesion, Crystallisation. Mental states and bodily states cannot be compared."[2]

These sound very much like Sir William Hamilton's phrases, but they are Bain's; and yet, turn on to the last and most emphatic paragraph of this book, and you find a proposition at which Sir William Hamilton or Hermann Lotze would only smile; namely, that there is in the universe but "one substance," which has two "sides,"—whatever that word may mean,—"a physical and a mental," and so is "a double-faced unity." "The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity. The one substance with two sets of properties, two sides,—the physical and the mental,—a double-faced unity, would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case."[3]

Not if the nature of things is yet as dazzling to us as it was to the eyes of Plato and Socrates and Aristotle and Liebnitz and Kant and Hamilton; not if axiomatic truth is as radiant to us as it is to Lotze and Helmholtz and Wundt and Beale and Dana; not if we are to adhere to the first of all logical laws, that, whatever stands or whatever falls, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense.

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[1] Professor Alex. Bain, Mind and Body, pp. 124, 135.
[2] Ibid., pp. 125, 135. [3] Ibid., p. 196.

6. If matter is a double-faced unity, having a spiritual and physical side, there must *co*-inhere in one and the same substratum extension and the absence of extension, inertia and the absence of inertia, colour and the absence of colour, form and the absence of form.

7. To assert that these fundamentally antagonistic qualities of matter and mind not only inhere, but *co*-inhere, in one and the same substratum, is to assert that a thing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense.

8. This limitless self-contradiction wrecks in this age, as it has wrecked in every age, the pretence that there is but one substance in the universe.

9. We know incontrovertibly that there are two sets of attributes, which, as diametrical opposites, cannot *co*-inhere in one substance, since extension and its absence, inertia, form, colour, and their absence, cannot possibly co-exist in one and the same thing at the same time.

10. Every attribute, however, must belong to some substance.

11. *Two irreconcilably antagonistic sets of attributes must belong to two substances.*

This proposition is as venerable as the sword Excalibur of King Arthur. With it materialism of the older forms has been defeated on many a Waterloo of philosophy; with it materialism in its newest form has no battle but that which consists in flight from its deadly edge.

12. The axiomatic knowledge we have of two such sets of attributes necessitates the conclusion that matter and mind are two substances.

13. In that inference from self-evident truth, all forms of materialism are shown to be absurd, as all forms alike assert that there is but one substance.

14. *Professor Bain's fundamental error is the confusion of "close succession" with "union."* He asserts "union" of the qualities of matter and mind in one substance with two sets of properties. He endeavours, but in vain, to show that this is not union in place; and then says,[1] that "*the only mode of union that is not contradictory is the union of close succession in time.*" Such *succession* is not *union* in any sense that can justify the assertion that there is but *one* substance in the universe with two sets of properties.

In the last pages of this weak book, Moleschott, Vogt, and Büchner, whom Germany regards as little men, are mentioned as among the recent bright lights of materialism. Bain admits distinctly, and yet, of course, without emphasis, that "*it is not to be supposed that these writers are in the ascendant in Germany.*" His poor sketch of the history of materialism is intended to show that this system of thought may expect a successful future. That argument, however, with many others, stumbles, and falls flat over his concession that the most intellectual nation, in which philosophy is a passion with scholars, and which has given to this subject more thought than

[1] Professor Alex. Bain, Mind and Body, p. 137.

all other nations combined, repudiates the latest as well as the oldest materialism.

Gentlemen, I know that thus far in this address the argument is metaphysical; but, in the audience of scholars, it is not for that reason useless. Metaphysics is simply *an articulate knowledge of the necessary implications of axiomatic truths*, and is not only a very clear and exact science in itself, but the mother of all the other sciences. We must reject either self-contradiction or sanity. We must adhere to primary, self-evident truths, or fall into that ultimate form of scepticism which knows nothing except that it knows nothing, and does not know even that except upon the evidence of these very axioms or intuitions, with which it plays fast and loose. The man who does not know much is a great character in our inquiring but unphilosophical times. When you trace a mind which rejects axioms up to its last refuge of oleaginousness, or ignorance, or weakness, you can ask, "Are you sure that you know nothing with certainty?"—"Yes," he replies, "I am sure."—"But then there is one thing you know with certainty."—"No; I am sure that I know nothing surely."—"But how are you sure that you are sure?" Only on the authority of the axiomatic, self-evident truths which dazzled the eagle eyes of the Acropolis; are presupposed in all reasoning; and are imbedded not only in the human mind, but in the very nature of things. Every change must have a cause. The whole is greater than a part. Mind exists. Matter exists. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. These are a few of the renowned fundamental principles, first truths, axioms, intuitions, eternal tests of verity, of which metaphysics gives the list; and to conscientious consistency with these, it is the duty of religious science, which first elaborately studied axioms, to hold mercilessly all other sciences and herself.

Curiously, and yet not curiously, physiology, and metaphysics tell the same tale whenever they speak on the same points. To test one science by another is the most important, and, intellectually, the most delicious, of all arts. Let us turn now to physical, concrete facts again, and observe the coincidence of their testimony with that of the primary mental facts or axioms. In the field of modern physiological research, materialism fails through hopeless and practically measureless self-contradiction.

1. If matter is a double-faced unity, having a spiritual and physical side, and is the only substance that exists in the universe, then, in matter, spiritual and physical qualities must not only inhere, but *co*-inhere, in the same substratum.

2. It must be true of every atom of matter that it has a spiritual and a physical side.

3. In every atom, therefore, spiritual and physical qualities must be found so inseparably conjoined, that the one side cannot be conceived to be taken away without carrying the other side with it.

4. If this be the true character of matter, then the physiological activities of the atoms must be at least co-extensive with the psycho-

logical activities displayed in connection with those atoms ; that is, *both the psychical and physical sides of the one substance-matter must go together, and, if the latter be removed from any grouping of atoms, the former must go with them.*

5. According to this newest materialistic definition of matter, the physiological activities of the brain must be *in this sense* co-extensive with its psychological activities.

6. But according to the experiments of Ferrier, Fritsch, and Hitzig, one whole hemisphere of the brain may be taken away, and one-half the body paralysed in consequence, and yet the mental operations remain complete.

7. "The physiological activities of the brain are not co-extensive with its psychological activities."

This is Ferrier's own language, of which he does not seem to see the philosophical importance.

8. Matter, therefore, is physiologically demonstrated not to be a *double-faced unity with inseparably conjoined spiritual and physical properties.*

9. But the psychological changes taking place in the mind must have an adequate cause.

Evolution equals involution. There cannot be in the effect what does not exist in the cause : if there could be, there would be an effect without a cause.

10. The adequate cause of the psychological changes taking place in the mind does not exist in the physiological changes going forward in the brain ; for, *other things being equal, effects must vary when their causes vary ; and the half of the brain may be taken away, and the mind yet perform with completeness all its operations.*

Many writers have taught that the connection of cause and effect may be tested in three ways,—either by taking away the cause, and noticing that the effect ceases ; or by introducing the cause, and noticing that the effect springs up ; or by making the cause vary, and noticing that the effect varies. We cannot take the moon out of the heavens, and we cannot dip the tides out of the sea ; and so, in regard to the tidal motions of the ocean, we cannot apply the first two of these tests. But we can use the third ; for we notice, that, when the sun and moon are in conjunction, the tides are higher than at other seasons. We observe that the tides follow the moon, and always vary according to its position. Now, this is precisely the test that I apply in reading under the law of causation the philosophical import of the latest physiological facts. We cannot take apart the body and soul, and then bring them into conjunction, noticing first the effect of their separation, and then that of their union ; but we can cause the one to vary somewhat, and notice the variation, or absence of variation, in the other. We take away a hemisphere of the brain, and do not produce the variation in the mind which it is perfectly clear ought to follow if materialism is true. Bain's pretence, that the antagonistic qualities of matter and mind inseparably co-inhere in one substance-matter, is inconsistent with such a fact as Ferrier brings before the world, when he says, as all physiologists say, that you may take half

a brain away, paralysing half the body, and yet leave the mental operations—memory, imagination, affection, choice, reason, perception, the whole list of faculties—complete. We vary the supposed cause, and the supposed effect does not vary ; and this is proof that it is not an effect.

It is to be expected that a small diminution of vigour in mental action may follow the taking away a hemisphere of the brain ; but in a large brain this effect is hardly perceptible. Take away half the force of the bellows of your organ yonder, and your anthem proceeding from the organ is less loud ; *but all its notes and rhythms remain. In the brain is your anthem in the bellows, or in the musician's fingers?* Materialism is a stupid peasant that for ever stands behind the organ, and can see only the bellows, and never the musician ; and asserts, when the latter wears Gyges' ring, that he does not exist, and so would blunderingly account for the anthem by the bellows and organ alone.

11. As the adequate cause of physiological changes in the mind cannot be found in matter, it must exist outside of matter.

Hermann Lotze is for ever reiterating as the great maxim of his philosophy, "Exceptionally wide in the universe is the extent, entirely subordinate is the mission, of mechanism." This is the keynote of the deepest philosophy of Germany at this moment, that mechanism is to be found everywhere in the universe, but that it is everywhere the horse, and not the rider. "Exceptionally wide in the brain," Hermann Lotze would say, "is the extent, but wholly subordinate is the mission, of the nervous mechanism."

We must remember that this very mechanism, the known origin of which is left in such mystery by materialists, is woven by the bioplasts with a sufficient cause behind them. We must study that cause by its phenomena, as we study any other object in Nature. As many unprejudiced students as have seen Lionel Beale's preparations and exhibitions of tissues under the microscope, have, he says, hopelessly abandoned materialism.

A fascination not easily described attends the study of living movements under the microscope, as a kind of conviction there comes to you, which no diagrams convey, that life and mechanism are two things. I am properly conscious of the fact that I am no microscopist. Perhaps I had better reveal, however, that it happens that I have the opportunity to use, at any hour of the day or night, what I suppose to be by far the best microscope in Boston. It belongs to a professor, a physician, who has made histology a specialty, and who was so kind as to invite me to use his magnificent instrument. It is what the books call a one-seventy-fifth objective ; and the highest power Beale is using is only a one-fiftieth. This prince among microscopes is in Tremont Temple building now ; and it shows a white blood corpuscle nearly as large as the silver piece called a sixpence ; and even Lionel Beale's best instruments show it hardly larger than a three-cent piece. Dissections of brains are offered to my inspection frequently ; and, although I have no right as a student of religious science to do so, I seize eagerly every opportunity to study the

physiological side of philosophy as one part of religious science. Let me say that only the other evening, in this very Temple, in company with experts who all believed in Lionel Beale, and not in the mechanical theory of Häckel, I saw living bioplasm pass and repass through the field of this exceptionally excellent instrument. I had read all Beale says of bioplasmic movements; I had impressed upon myself the intricacy of the work done by the bioplasts; I had minutely studied the best coloured plates; and I thought I knew something of the difference between the action of life and that of merely physical force: but, when I saw bioplasm itself in movement [such as is represented here], I felt myself in the presence of an entirely new revelation of the inadequacy of materialism, with all its prate about chemical forces, to account for the weaving, I will not say of a brain, an eye, an ear, or a hand, or of nerve within nerve, and of bone beneath muscle, but of the humblest and simplest living fibre that ever a bioplast spun.

Think of the various activities of the one substance bioplasm! The fluid that lubricates the eye is thrown off by the same matter that constructs bone. The muscle and the tendon are woven on one loom. Take that which you drink at your tables, and call milk, and what is it but smooth cell-walls thrown off by the bioplasts, and now, in their absence, sliding over each other as a beautiful fluid? What is this instrument of three thousand strings, which we call the ear, but a mass of cell-walls woven together by bioplasts? How are we to account for the miraculous retina and lenses of the eye? They came from the same loom that weaves the brain. *How is such variety of effects to be accounted for with no variety of mechanism?*

12. Outside of matter is to be found only what is not matter, that is, an immaterial cause.

13. The existence of that cause is demonstrated by the application of the axiomatic truth, that every change must have an adequate cause.

14. This same law demonstrates the externality and independence of this cause in its relations to the cerebral mechanism.

15. The relation of this immaterial agent to the body, therefore, is that of a harper to a harp, or of a rower to a boat, and not that of harmony to a harp.

16. The dissolution of the brain, therefore, no more implies the dissolution of the soul than that of a musical instrument does that of an invisible musician who plays upon it, or that of a boat does that of the rower.

17. Death, therefore, does not end all. Therefore, for the third time, by an independent line of argument purely physiological, we conclude,—

18. If death does not, what does or can?

To outline now a third argument, let me ask you to notice in all their relations to each other this series of propositions:—

1. It is a physiological fact that every human being once breathed by a membrane, then by gills, then by lungs, and once had no

heart, and then a heart with but one cavity, and then a heart of four cavities.[1]

2. The particles of the body are continually changing.

3. In the metamorphoses of insects, not only are the particles of the body changed, but its entire plan is altered.

Will you, my friends, but picture to yourselves the change of plan which must be made when a creeping creature is transformed into a flying one? Your beautiful tropical butterfly was once a repulsive chrysalid. It had only the power of crawling. But the bioplasts wove it. Little points of transparent, structureless matter were moving in it, were throwing off cell-walls in it, and bringing these walls into the shape, now of a tendon, now of a muscle, now of a nerve, and so completing the whole marvellous plan of a crawling creature; disgusting in our first sight, a miracle at the second. But now these same bioplasts, which, according to materialism, have nothing at all behind them but chemical forces, suddenly catch a new and very brilliant idea, namely, that they will weave a flying creature. Whence comes that? Out of matter; for matter has a physical and a spiritual side. They thereupon, without any new environment, with the same sun above them, and the same earth underneath them, and the same food, begin to execute a wholly new plan, or rather to carry out one held in reserve from the first. They weave anew; there appears within, and rising out of, the creeping, odious worm, your gorgeous tropical butterfly; and *he is the same.* There is identity between that flying creature and that creeping creature. Are they two, or one? You breathed by gills once; you breathe by lungs now. Is your identity affected in the change? Your bioplasts wove you, so that once you had a heart of one cavity, and now have one of four. Are you the same? Is your identity affected through all these changes? Every few months, the flux of the particles of the living tissues carries away all the particles in the entire physical system. How do we retain identity? Matter has a physical and a spiritual side, indeed. While all the matter that composed my body has gone in the flux of growth, I am I, however. I have an ineradicable conviction that I am the same person that I was years ago; and yet, years ago, there was not in my body a particle that is now there. I have an ineradicable conviction that the butterfly is identical with the crawling worm; but the characteristics of your worm are left behind when there appears in the worm a resurrection to a new life.

What if your butterfly were in all his parts as invisible as he is in some portions of his wings; and what if, to human ken, through sight or touch, there could be no account given whatever of that creature woven out of the loathsome chrysalid? What if, out of that discarded organism, were to arise something equally glorious with the butterfly, but wholly invisible, would this change be more miraculous than the rising of that visible winged creature out of that body? I think not. *If God can lift the visible out of the chrysalid, may He*

[1] Draper, Physiology, p 550.

not be able to lift the invisible also? Yes; but you say that this is Christian materialism. I beg your pardon: I know what thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls rise for utterance as we face life in death. I do not assert that the soul is material; nor do the Scriptures do so, where they affirm that there is a spiritual body as there is a natural body. What that means, I need not here, in the presence of so much learning greater than mine, discuss; but I do affirm, that if God, instead of lifting a visible, were to lift an invisible, flying creature out of the worm,—insect or man!—He would perform no greater miracle than that He does now. Nothing more inconceivable would it be to lift a wholly invisible new form out of a chrysalis than one partially invisible. The change need not be greater; and He who can do the one miracle, and does it day after day before our eyes, can do the other.

4. In all the flux of the body the soul retains conscious, personal identity.

5. The unity of consciousness, and the sense of continuous personal identity, require adequate explanation.

6. Nothing can exist in an effect which did not previously exist in the cause.

7. Effects must change when causes change.

8. If conscious personal identity were an effect of the matter comprising the physical organism, it ought to exhibit as an effect the same flux which exists in its supposed cause.

9. No such flux is observed in the effect.

10. Therefore, the cause of the sense of personal identity is not to be found in the matter of the organism.

11. As only matter and mind exist in the universe, that cause must be an immaterial agent existing in connection with the physical organism.

12. That agent is known to consciousness, and is called the soul.

13. Its existence is not only known to consciousness, but is demonstrable by the law of causation, which requires that every effect must have an adequate cause.

The unity of consciousness and the permanence of personal identity are supreme German arguments against all forms of materialism.

This is the birthday of Thomas Carlyle. Eighty-four years ago, in the stern year in which Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and Charlotte Corday, went to the scaffold, there came into the world the first prose poet of our time, and the most lofty and vivid imagination, except Richter's, since Milton. Is it not fitting that on this day, at least, we should listen seriously to a man who has thought boldly, and with no narrow mental horizon?

"You have heard," says Carlyle, and in perfect freedom from all bias but that of genius, "St. Chrysostom's celebrated saying in reference to the Shechinah, or ark of testimony, visible revelation of God among the Hebrews: 'The true Shechinah is man.' Yes, it is even so: this is no vain phrase; it is veritably so. The essence of our being is a breath of Heaven. This body, this life of ours, these faculties, are they not all a vesture for that Unnamed? *We touch Heaven*

when we lay our hand on a human body. We are the miracle of miracles. This is scientific fact. God's creation—it is the Almighty God's. Atheistic science babbles poorly of it with scientific nomenclatures, experiments, and whatnot, as if it were a poor dead thing to be bottled up in Leyden jars, and sold over counters; but the natural sense of man in all times, if he will honestly apply his sense, proclaims it to be a living thing. Ah! an unspeakable, God-like thing, toward which the best attitude for us, after never so much science, is awe, devout prostration, and humility of soul; worship, if not in words, then in silence."[1]

Who in Boston has a right to look loftily on Carlyle? Macaulay said, but let me only whisper the fact, that he did not see how Prescott, being what he was, could live in such a place as Boston. Who in any American editor's chair, or in any college in New England, is authorised to look condescendingly upon Carlyle, even on this theme, although, forsooth, he is not a microscopist?

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[1] Carlyle, Hero Worship.

XI.

AUTOMATIC AND INFLUENTIAL NERVES.[1]

"It is certain that matter is somehow directed, controlled, and arranged, while no material forces or properties are known to be capable of discharging such functions. . . . I believe that it will be found, that the institution of the series of preparatory changes which occur previous to the development of the lasting form and structure of tissues can only be accounted for upon the supposition of the existence of a power capable of foreseeing what was about to happen, and of determining beforehand the arrangement that would be most advantageous to the living being, and able to provide beforehand for requirements that it was foreseen would arise at a future time."—LIONEL BEALE, *Protoplasm*, pp. 306, 358.

"The laws of nature do not account for their own origin."—JOHN STUART MILL, *Logic*.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

IT is sometimes sneeringly affirmed that colleges teach little but the art of finding where knowledge is; and yet that is a great and difficult art. In the froth-oceans of weak books, it is a high service to point out to a hurried man, on any interesting theme, the most serviceable volumes. What are the dozen best English, and what the dozen best German books on biology? In response to many inquiries, verbal and written, let me attempt an answer to this rather formidable question. There are few or no good books on biology older than 1860. Remember that the microscope did not attain its power to furnish facts of a scientific character for the basis of research till 1838. So fast has the study of living tissues progressed, that it may be said that all the conclusions reached before 1860 either have been or will be modified. I therefore can recommend to you nothing older than 1860, except an author or two like Schleiden and Schwann, who began the investigations of living tissues, and whose works are to be examined for their interest as historical documents. On this theme, as on so many other philosophical matters, the best books are German; but take first the English in the order of their merit:—

1. Beale, Dr. Lionel S., "Protoplasm; or, Matter and Life." Third edition: London, G. & A. Churchill; Philadelphia, Lindsay & Blackiston, 1875.

The style of this work is attractive for its clearness, grace, and force, and occasionally for a keen, logical humour. It is not always that a physician has literary capacity; but Lionel Beale is a good and almost a brilliant writer. Besides, he has had a liberal training in logic and metaphysics, and seems to have grasped philosophy as a whole very fully. But the charm of his book is in the luminousness, vivacity, and power produced by his stalwart grasp of his theme as an original discoverer. No doubt he has added more to the knowledge of living tissues than any living English author within the last twenty-five

[1] The fifty-sixth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

years. It does not become me to state here what precautions I have taken to know that I have not been misled in seeking authorities on biology; but I have taken precautions of a most merciless sort, and continue to take them, and all my precautions end in giving me more and more confidence in Beale, as a man of candour and sense as well as of science. If you can buy the productions of but two authors on biology, purchase the works of Beale as the best that the English language offers you, and those of Frey as the best that the translated German at present affords.

2. Frey, Professor Heinrich, Zurich, "Manual of Histology," Leipzig, 1867; and "Compendium of Histology," Zurich, 1876. Translated by Dr. George R. Cutter. New York: Putnam Sons, 1876. Frey's two works are by common consent placed now at the head of German works on histology.

3. Drysdale, Dr. John, "The Protoplasmic Theory of Life." London, 1874. This work of an Edinburgh physician, and president of the Liverpool Microscopical Society in 1874, seems to stand third in order of importance. It does not adopt Beale's conclusions as to vital force; but it accepts his facts, and makes a strenuous and futile effort to reconcile them with what is called the theory of stimulus.

4. Ferrier, Dr. David, "The Functions of the Brain." London and New York, 1876. This work is indispensable to any one who does not read German books on biology.

5. Tyson, Dr. James, "History of the Cell Doctrine."

6. Carpenter, Dr. W. B., "Mental Physiology." London and New York, 1874.

7. Beale, Dr. Lionel S., "How to work with the Microscope." New edition. Philadelphia, 1877.

8. Köllicker, "Manual of Human Histology." Translated by George Bush and Professor Huxley for the Sydenham Society, 1853.

9. Huxley, Professor T. H., art. on Biology in ninth edition of "Encyclopædia Britannica."

10. Carpenter, "Human Physiology," ninth edition, 1876.

11. Draper, Professor J. W., "Human Physiology," 1856.

12. Dalton, Professor John C., "Human Physiology," edition of 1875.

Here is a list of twelve German authors :—

1. Lotze, Hermann, "Mikrokosmus," 3 vols., 1873. Lotze was born at Bautzen in 1817. He was graduated at Leipzig in 1834, in both philosophy and medicine. In 1842 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, but since 1844 has been professor of philosophy at the University of Göttingen. His collected works are to be recommended as all bearing on biology.[1]

2. Ulrici, "Gott und die Natur." Halle, 1873. "Gott und der Mensch." Leipzig, 1874.

3. Stricker, "Handbuch der Lehre von der Geweben des Menschen und der Thiere. Leipzig, 1868.

4. Häckel, "Generelle Morphologie der Organismen," 1866.

5. Schultze, Max, "Protoplasma der Rhizopoden," 1863. Read all of Schultze's works.

6. Neumann, "Ueber d. Zusammenhang sog. Molecularen mit dem Leben des Protoplasma;" Du Bois-Reymond and Reichert's "Arch.," 1867.

7. Kölliker, "Neue Untersuchungen," &c., 1861.

8. Kühne, W., "Untersuch. über das Protoplasma," 1864.

9. Helmholtz, "Handbuch der physiol. Optik."

10. Wundt, Physiologie des Menschen.

11. Hitzig, "Untersuchungen über das Gehirn."

12. Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die thierische Electricität.

Omitted books which scholars here may think I ought to have named, would probably appear if I were to give a list of the hundred best volumes.

If you can buy but three books, have Frey's "Histology," and Beale's "Protoplasm," and Lotze's "Mikrokosmus."

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[1] See art. on "Hermann Lotze," in July number of Mind, 1876.

THE LECTURE.

If Aristophanes were here to-day, we perhaps could give him no better entertainment than to cause a frog to utter the famous words of one of this Greek poet's plays: *Brekekekéx, koáx, koáx.*[1] We might take a brainless frog, and, by gently stroking its back, we should produce these Greek words, uttered automatically by the vocal organs of the amphibian; and, as often as we stroked the back, we should insure that result. Goltz, the German physicist, who has lately written an elaborate work on the nerve-centres of frogs,[2] says very genially that the batrachian chorus of our summer evenings is the natural proclamation of the fact that it is well with the inhabitants of the marsh as the sedges and the ooze stroke their backs under the still stars. I am not supposing our frog's brain to be removed as a whole, but so far forth only as the taking-away of what are called the cerebral hemispheres can change the mechanism of the complex nervous mass within the skull. The lower nervous centres in the spinal column and in the neck, and just above, remain in the frog. When I pinch him, thus brainless, he leaps. When I place the miraculous creature in the palm of my hand, and turn the hand, as Huxley did his in a famous public experiment, intended, but not sufficient, to puzzle the world as to the freedom of the will, the frog keeps position, and stands upon the back. I reverse the motion, and he keeps his place, and stands upon the palm. This is not an effect of will on his part, but of the life which stands behind that marvellous automatic mechanism which his bioplasts have woven. I put him in his native pool, and he swims the instant he touches the water. On reaching the shore, however, he at once becomes quiet. He sits there hours and days; and, if he is not again touched by some external force of such a kind as to irritate his automatic nerves, he will seek no food, and will continue quiet until he becomes a mummy. All this looks as if the frog were an automaton; and so, indeed, he is when the hemispheres of the brain are taken away. But, when these hemispheres are present, the frog seeks food; he does not sit in one spot; his automatic croak he represses when a stone is thrown among his watery bowers of grass and reeds; he has multitudinous playful ways; he possesses, in short, the power of self-direction. All this he loses with the removal of the hemispheres. The animal that has lost these, however great its remaining automatic power may be, will not seek food, and, unless artificially fed, always perishes of starvation. There appears to be nothing like choice or volition left in the frog after the cerebral hemispheres are ablated.

Take a fish, and remove its cerebral hemispheres, and you will find that the same great contrast between automatic and influential nervous action appears. The fish swims with perfect equilibration. The stroke of the fins and tail retains its amazing precision. But the mutilated swimming creature does not stop, as other fishes pause,

1 Aristophanes' The Frogs. 2 Functionen der Nervencentren des Frosches, 1869.

to nibble at food here and there. It does not loiter, as its companions do, in shaded aqueous couches. It flashes not up thence, as they do, to catch the unwary insect in the evening or morning dusk. The brainless fish has no capacity to play in spheral rhythm with its mates and with the waves. It keeps on in a straightforward course, unless turned aside by some obstacle; and does not pause until nervous or muscular exhaustion necessitates rest. That fish, too, will perish of starvation unless artificially fed. It has no tendency to seek food; its volitional power is lost. In this case of the fish, a very different law would seem to be exhibited from that which appears in the case of the frog; and yet the two cases are to be explained by precisely the same contrast between the automatic and the influential nervous arcs. The fish has a constant stimulation of the automatic nerves. The water produces reflex movements; and these, so wisely did the bioplasts of the fish weave the creature, constitute the complex act of swimming. Your frog sits still because no stimulus is applied to the automatic nerves; and your fish swims because a prolonged excitation of those nerves is produced by the water. But, to show that the case of the frog and that of the fish are parallel, put the frog into the water, and he will swim in it as long as it floats his body. He is an amphibious animal, and will get out upon the land if he can; and this is the only difference in the case.

Let us remove from a pigeon the central hemispheres, and we shall find that the poor bird, when we wave a fiery brand in a circle before its eyes, will follow the motions of the light with its head. If a fly pauses on its crest, it will shake off the intruder. Placed on its back the bird will regain its feet. If it walks along your table, and comes to the edge, it will lift its wings the moment this action is necessary to balance its form. So mysteriously have its bioplasts woven this flying creature, that, when the pigeon thus brainless is cast out upon the free air, it moves there with its accustomed royalty, as if in its home. But when left at rest it makes no spontaneous movements. This brainless bird, like the brainless frog or fish, unless stimulated by some outward touch, remains for ever quiet, never seeks food, and will become a mummy. It has apparently no power of originating muscular action. It possesses the lower nervous arcs; but you have taken away the upper, and in doing this you have taken away its power of originating movements.

Removal of the hemispheres from a rabbit leaves the animal for a while prostrate; but, after a varying interval, it exhibits power to maintain its equilibrium on its legs in an unsteady manner. A loud sound causes its silken, sensitive ears to twitch, its quivering, aspen-leaf body to start. Its flight, once begun under proper stimulation, is headlong, bungling, and blind. If left to itself, it will seek no food, remain fixed and immovable on the same spot, and, unless artificially fed, die of starvation in the midst of plenty. It has no capacity to originate motion.[1]

[1] See Flourens, Longet, and Vulpian On the Results of the Removal of the Cerebral Hemispheres in Pigeons. See, also, Ferrier, Functions of the Brain, chap. iv., and Carpenter, Human Physiology, edition of 1875, pp. 696, 697.

Gentlemen, it shall not be my fault if you go from this hall without having impressed on you the distinction between the influential and automatic nervous mechanism. Next after the contrasts between the living and the not-living, and between matter and mind, that distinction is the most important and the widest in biology. These three colossal distinctions all not only inhere, but co-inhere, in the very substance of the science of the relations of matter and mind. These are the sublime peaks of biology; and on them, in clear days, whoever would know the landscape of modern philosophy and of religious science must wander with the best telescopes well used, and pace to and fro, and be alone, and sometimes kneel.

Perfectly coincident with metaphysics is physiology, whenever the two speak on the same point. Physiology shows us two kinds of nervous activities,—one automatic, one influential—I might say volitional and responsive, but I anxiously avoid merely technical terms when the use of them is not necessary. I adopt the phraseology of Draper, "influential and automatic," rather than the phraseology of Carpenter, "volitional and responsive," because "influential" is a wider word than "volitional." I suppose that the will does originate muscular action.[1] But the will is not the whole soul. I believe that every part of the soul is "influential" on what is called the influential nervous arc. Every finger of the invisible musician who wears Gyges' ring, and which we call the soul, touches some point of this board of whitish gray keys. I will not name the activity of the whole set of fingers on this board by that of the thumb merely. To call this whole list of activities volitional would be to name but the thumb, when we have reason, imagination, emotion, all acting more mysteriously by far than the swiftest motion of your Ole Bull's Norwegian fingers on the strings of his magical instrument. Keep, then, this distinction between the influential and the automatic before your mind; remember that volitional and responsive are other words for the same things, and you will find that the great contrast between matter and mind, which is so prominent in metaphysics, is equally prominent in physiology.

I hold, that in the divine language in matter, as well as in mind, there is not an empty word, syllable, letter, space or point. By and by the time will come when everything in the universe of forms, as well as in that of forces, will be found to be significant,—doubly, trebly, quadruply, infinitely. It is safe to maintain, that this great distinction in the body between the automatic and the influential, is a thing meant to indicate to us the contrast between necessity and freedom, fate and choice. So are we woven by the bioplasts, that a part of our actions are responsive to physical, and a part responsive to spiritual stimulus. Dr. Carpenter affirms in so many words, that, in the nervous mechanism, "the *vesicular* substance has for its office to *originate* changes which it is the business of the *fibrous* to *conduct*."[2]

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1 Carpenter, Mental Physiology, American edition, pp. 378, 386, 391, 413.
2 Human Physiology, edition of 1875, p. 587: see, also, pp. 694, 713, 752.

"The will," he teaches, "is constantly *initiating* movement. The distinction between *voluntary* and *involuntary* movement is recognised by every physiologist."[1]

It is Carpenter's theory that consciousness is located in the sensory ganglia, which lie immediately between the influential and the automatic arcs, and that just as an outward physical impulse may be transmitted upward through the automatic nerves to this sensory centre, so an impulse originated by pure spirit in the cerebral hemispheres may be transmitted downward to the seat of consciousness. We know what the nerves of the external senses are; but Reil and Carpenter very significantly call the highest influential mechanism *the nerves of the internal senses*. As the automatic nerve touches light, so the influential soul. Mysterious beyond comment is this physical contrast when regarded as a first letter in the alphabet of philosophy. That part of a tree which is below the soil is not more different from that which is above than the automatic is different from the influential nervous mechanism. A ship below the water-line is adapted to the water, and above that line to the air; but the sails and rudder are not more palpably adapted to different agents than the automatic and the influential nervous arcs in man. As well as we know that a sail is inert without wind, we do know that this upper nervous arc is inert without soul. As from the structure of the sail we might infer the nature of wind, so, from that of the inert mechanism of the brain, Draper and Lotze and Beale and Carpenter say we may infer that of the viewless spiritual force which beats on it.

What can prove to us that the upper arc of the nervous system has that behind it which has power to originate motion, unless it be the fact that the removal of that arc takes away all power in the animal to originate motion? There is the effect; and it ceases when the cause ceases. I ask only that you should apply here the stern law of Newton, that, where cause and effect are conjoined, the taking away of the former produces the cessation of the latter. We take away the cerebral hemisphere of the fish, the frog, the pigeon, the rabbit; and the animals invariably become mummies from the loss of all power of originating muscular movements.

To summarise, then, a crowded discussion, let me in the name, not of Draper simply, but of Beale, of Carpenter, of Ferrier, of Lotze, of Frey, of Stricker, of Kölliker, of Wundt, and of Helmholtz, affirm,—

1. In the absence of the cerebral hemispheres, the lower nervous centres, of themselves, are incapable of originating active manifestations of any kind.

2. An animal in possession of the cerebral hemispheres exhibits a varied spontaneity of action.

3. Very palpably this is not conditioned by present impressions on the organs of sense.

4. The lower nervous centres, if they are taken alone, are concerned in automatic or responsive actions only.

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[1] Mental Physiology, pp. 414, 379; see, also, On the Control of Habit by the Will, pp. 366, 367; On its Directing Power, pp. 386–391; and On its Determining Power, pp. 423–428.

5. The power of self-conditioned activity the hemispheres alone possess.

All great physiological facts reach as far into philosophy as they do into physiology. May I state, under appeal for correction, that theology in our times has a physiological side? I am perfectly amazed at the feeling that many have, that a specialist in religious science has no right to look into physiology. Why, every student of religious science must be more or less a specialist in philosophy: and philosophy is now built, not only on the investigation of consciousness, but on physiology. At Andover yonder, in the course, say, of a crowded year given to religious truth as a system, fully three months are devoted to what is called natural theology; and all the six lectures, and often more a week, turn on philosophy largely, and I had almost said exclusively. Till the existence of God and of the soul is demonstrated, religious science does not take up the topic of biblical evidence. She does take it up at last, but with an arm of resistless strength, when at last she comes to the close of natural theology, and enters on revealed. Andover, like New Haven, like Princeton, like Edinburgh, like Oxford and Cambridge, like Heidelberg, Halle, Leipzig, and Berlin, begins with axioms, with self-evident, first truths, asking no man to believe more than what Aristotle laid down as incontrovertible, self-evident, necessary, axiomatic. On the basis of that adamant, having proved the existence of God and of the soul, religious Science finds herself in an attitude to ask, What are the relations between the two? There is a God, and there is a soul; and it must be, in a universe made on a plan, that there are relations between the two; and that these relations do not depend on count of heads, or clack of tongues. The universe must have conditions of salvation in it if it is made on a plan. Religious science springs out of the universality of law. If there is a soul, and the soul is made on a plan, if there is a God who is all order and all holiness, then it is incontrovertible that there are natural conditions of salvation. What is salvation? Let us nave a definition. Salvation is *permanent deliverance from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin.* It must be, that, in a universe in which we can demonstrate the existence of a living God and a living soul, conditions of freedom from the love of sin and from the guilt of it exist, that you and I cannot change by ignoring them, or voting them up or down. The government of the universe is not elective. Therefore, it is fitting for us to begin with demonstrating axiomatically the existence of God and the existence of the soul, in order that we may go forward and learn from the plan of the two what must be the natural conditions of their harmony.

Religion a science? Yes, assuredly; for science is simply *a body of established truth, or systematised knowledge, reached by the application of the scientific method, that is, by definition and induction.* By these processes, which religious science invented, she undertakes to investigate the activity of the highest zones of man's being, to establish right conduct upon the nature of things, to ascertain the contents of both natural and revealed truths, to illustrate, in short, by

all that can be known to man, the relations between the soul and its Author. A science? Yes, certainly; a result of the use of the scientific method; and not only as much a science as any other, but a science as much more than any other as a view from the top of the dome of St. Peter's is a greater outlook than the view from any slit called a window.

You say that only a brick-maker can understand architecture. Well, I cannot make brick; but it has been my speciality for the last ten years to study logical, physiological, metaphysical, theological, and ethical architecture. It is trite beyond measure to say, although some sceptics seem never to have heard, that it is the duty of every theological student to know with uncommon thoroughness logic and metaphysics, and the chief results of the most advanced physiological as well as of the latest exegetical research. I should consider myself unfit to hold up my rushlight before religious truth anywhere, if I had not given myself to these topics for years, not only under the best guidance, but with the freest spirit.

Michael Angelo never learned to make a brick; he was not skilful as a plumber: but he had some knowledge of architecture. I am willing to compare with Michael Angelo's knowledge of material architecture that knowledge of logical and philosophical architecture which belongs in our age to some teachers of religious science in Germany. A man may be an architect, although he is not a carpenter, and cannot fell a tree skilfully, or hew a stone, or unroll lead on a roof. There may be in a man sound judgment as to architecture, although he knows nothing about making brick. I revere specialists, and am not underrating them; but very plainly the relation of all minor specialists to philosophy is that of the contributors of material to the architects of your St. Peter's or your Milan Cathedral. From all sides material comes to the architect. Each specialist guarantees his own material; but the architect, by all the tests known to man, is to find out what are good and what are bad brick, timbers, granite, and marble; and, whenever the sciences agree what materials are good, it is our business to build with them the temple of religious thought. We have a right to do this if we understand architecture.

A specialist is undoubtedly a king of research in his own field; but what if that field embraces only molluscs, or scarabea, or the dative case? A specialist may have a wide field. Who is a specialist? I affirm that your Michael Angelo is a specialist as well as your mere brickmaker and plumber. When the minor specialists assume an arrogant attitude toward the greater, I am always reminded of the stone-cutters I conversed with in Story's studio at Rome. "We made this Cleopatra," said they; "we produced this Sybil;" and so through twenty resplendent works of art. And then the stone-cutters added, as a matter of small moment, "Our modeller, Mr, Story, is upstairs." Even Ernst Häckel insists upon it[1] that the narrowness of outlook of specialists in physical science, and their inadequate philosophical training, is the worst mischief of our

[1] History of Creation, vol. ii. p. 349.

modern scientific discussion. Do not think that I speak from prejudice in the assertion that there is no profession, unless it be the legal, better trained in logic and philosophy than the ministerial. I am aware that I am speaking before an audience containing many scholars, and I am anxious never to violate courtesy here toward learning of any kind; but I do not know where, in a course of medical instruction, any physician gets that merciless drill in logic which is necessary in any adequate theological or legal professional preparation and career. I do not know where any man studying merely with the microscope and scalpel and retort obtains that kind of literary and logical and philosophical training which belongs of necessity to the law and theology. This has been so in all ages, though we undoubtedly have made mistakes. No doubt we have sometimes taken brick that were poorly baked; and I think that is our chief trouble to-day.

In justification of the five propositions thus far discussed, let me ask you to listen to Professor Ferrier, indorsed now by Carpenter and Dalton in standard text-books of science. "One fundamental fact seems to be conclusively demonstrated by these experiments, viz., that in the absence of the cerebral hemisphere, *the lower centres of themselves are incapable of originating active manifestations of any kind.* An animal with brain intact exhibits a varied spontaneity of actions, *not, at least, immediately conditioned by present impressions on its organ of sense.* When the hemispheres are removed, all the actions of the animal become the immediate and necessary response to the form and intensity of the stimulus communicated to its afferent nerves. Without such excitation from without, the animal remains motionless and inert. It is true that some of the phenomena which have been described would seem to be opposed to this view; but they are so in appearance only, and not in reality. . . . Hence *the phenomena manifested by the different classes of animals, after ablation of the hemispheres, admit of generalisation under the law that the lower ganglia are centres of immediate responsive action only, as contradistinguished from the mediate or self-conditioned activity which the hemispheres alone possess.*"[1]

Although, from the course of his education, Ferrier might be expected to lean toward Bain's philosophy, he cannot be accused of crudeness while he maintains that the distinction between matter and mind is as clear in physiology as in metaphysics. He does that in this very significant statement of facts from a physiologist's point of view; and this to-day is the freshest word on our theme: "That the brain is the organ of the mind, and that mental operations are possible only in and through the brain, is now so thoroughly well established and recognised, that we may, without further question, start from this as an ultimate fact. But how it is that molecular changes in the brain-cells coincide with modifications of consciousness, how, for instance, the vibrations of light falling on the retina excite the modification of consciousness termed a visual sensation, is

[1] Ferrier, Functions of the Brain, pp. 40, 41.

a problem which cannot be solved. We may succeed in determining the exact nature of the molecular changes which occur in the brain-cells when a sensation is experienced; but this will not bring us one whit nearer the explanation of the ultimate nature of that which constitutes the sensation. The one is objective and the other subjective: and neither can be expressed in terms of the other. *We cannot say that they are identical, or even that the one passes into the other, but only, as Laycock expresses it, that the two are correlated.*" [1]

Just here I must fulfil my promise to refer to a courteous question asked me in print [2] by a gentleman who thinks that "chemical force and vital force are cognate." That is his language; and by it I understand him to mean that the one is kindred in origin with the other. Certainly he does not hold himself in such an attitude in this article that he can be exonerated from the grave charge that he disagrees with Ferrier, when the latter teaches, as Tyndall affirms also, that these molecular activities "*cannot be made to pass into*" mental activities. Speaking of the effect of "tea and coffee and phosphorated food in oiling the wheels of the mind," this Boston writer says, "Such agents develop chemical force without question: this force, to the best of our knowledge, accelerates the wheels of life, and it is every way proper to suppose that, doing thus, it is analogous to the force which sets the wheels going; or, in short, that chemical force and vital force are cognate." He then goes on to affirm that the "impressions" coming from different quarters "are to the individual the representative of the universe, and that it may be said that in this way the universe is each man's tutor, and *forms* his soul." Gentlemen, that is materialism.

Let us test this typical statement by a parallel case. The reasoning may be summarised in three propositions: (1) Chemical force accelerates the wheels of life; (2) Therefore it is analogous to the force which sets the wheels of life in motion; (3) Therefore chemical and vital forces are cognate. Now let us parallel that reasoning, point for point, for the sake of clearness. The strong current in the Merrimack or Charles River accelerates the motion of the rower in his boat. It is, therefore, every way proper to suppose that the force of the current is analogous to the force which sets the oars in motion.

I beg you to be courteous, gentlemen. This Lectureship has but one motto, "The clear, the true, the new, the strategic." I do not first seek orthodoxy; I seek first clearness. A man who sets before himself even truth as the first object is likely to make truth only the synonyme for his own opinion. Let us seek first clearness, whether the heavens stand or fall.

To proceed, then: the force in the current accelerates the motion of the rower in his boat: therefore it is every way proper to suppose that it is analogous to the force that sets the oars in motion; and therefore the force of the current and the force that moves the oars are cognate.

But this is not all; for, to make the parallel complete, we must

[1] Ferrier, Functions of the Brain, pp. 255, 256. [2] Daily Advertiser, Nov. 29, 1876.

assert that the force that moves the currents and the force that moves the oars are cognate in such a sense, that, when all things are fairly stated, it must be conceded that the force that moves the currents "forms" the force which moves the oars.

Undoubtedly the rower on the river is aided by the currents, and so, undoubtedly, is the rower called life aided by currents of purely physical force moving through the living organism; but to say that from this fact we must conclude that the two forces are cognate, is no more unreasonable in the former case than in the latter.

This gentleman thinks, that, at one point, I make a leap in my proof; but I never leaped across the difference between the current in the river and the force that moves the oars.

I need not mention in detail the reasoning in an earlier paragraph of this criticism; for the concessions made to me there destroy the criticism, and the whole falls when the word "cognate" falls. The gentleman says it is "force" which moves that portion of the brain which will not react under electrical stimulus. I say it is "*force*," but not physical force; for this, as Ferrier says, cannot be shown to pass into mental force. This gentleman's reasoning to prove that it does so pass proves astoundingly too much. The force, too, must be one adequate to account for the effect produced.

When he grave assertion is made that the bellows yonder accelerates the action of the organ, and that, therefore, it is perfectly proper to suppose that its force of rough wind is of the same character with the will of the musician whose fingers touch the keys, and that, therefore, *the musician was blown out of the bellows*, we come to a vivid view of the logic of materialism.

You put me into a bad mood, gentlemen. I have heard that hypotheses are allowable up to a certain point, but that there does come a time in logic when there must be an end of hypotheses. De Morgan, in his logic, tells a story of a servant who was to prepare a stork for dinner for his master. But the servant had a sweetheart; and, to gratify her, he cut off a leg of the stork after it had been cooked, and put the mutilated bird upon the table of the nobleman. When dinner was served, the nobleman called the servant to the door of the feasting-hall, and said, "How does it happen that this stork has but one leg?"—"Why, sir," was the hypothesis used in answer, "a stork never has but one leg." No more was said in the presence of the company; but the next day, before the nobleman dismissed his servant, he thought he would see what further hypothesis the man would offer. So he took his servant into the grounds of the castle, and showed him the storks standing there. "See," the nobleman said, "each stork has two legs."—"But look again," said the servant, "each stork has really now but one;" and surely each was standing, after the manner of this bird, on one. But the nobleman shouted to the birds with a frightening gesture, "Off, away!" and each stork ran away with two legs. "Yes," said the servant, who did not lack hypothesis; "but, yesterday you did not say, 'Off and away' to that stork on the table." There must at some point be an end to hypothesis; but materialism saves itself by saying, "Off and away!"

to the baked stork. Why, the poor grave-digger in Hamlet knew better than that; for he was no materialist. "Who is to be buried here?" said Hamlet; and the fool answered—

> "One that was a woman;
> But, rest her *soul*, she is *dead*."

At our present point of view, we need only name the propositions which flow from the latest physiological research:—

6. Molecular motions in the nervous system are now definitely known to form in all cases a closed circuit.

7. They cannot, therefore, be said to be identical with mental activities.

8. They are only parallel with them.

9. They are demonstrably not transmuted into mental activities, but only correlated with them. Parallelism is not identity: the keys in motion are not the music of your organ.

10. Materialism, therefore, fails under the microscope of physiology, and it fails equally under a strict application of the law of causation.

The externality of the soul to the nervous mechanism is just as well known in relation to the upper keyboard or influential arcs, as the externality of your fingers to the lower keyboard or the automatic arcs, is known in these experiments with the frog and the pigeon, the fish and the rabbit. You know how those motions in the lower keyboard are produced. You know, therefore, how those in the upper are started. Matter did not start them there. Matter does not start them here. Mind starts them here. Mind starts them there. We are conscious in ourselves of power of choice, and that inner witness must be combined with the testimony that comes from the scalpel and the microscope, to show that the power of self-direction does not originate in matter.

How the unextended substance, mind, can act upon the extended substance, matter, is a mystery; but to affirm that it does so involves no self-contradiction. What is a mystery? Something of which we know *that* it is, though we do not know *how* it is. What is a self-contradiction? An inconsistency of a proposition with its own implications. That mind moves matter, we know. How it does it, we know not. Sir William Hamilton,[1] in his efforts to solve this mystery was anxious that even what is called mesmeric force should be investigated; and he and many other acute minds have asked whether it may not be within the power of the human will to influence another human will across the street, across the city, across a continent. In the name of exact science, many seek to-day to know whether by possibility human will may not, in some cases, make matter move by willing to do it. I hold no strange theory on this theme; I am shy to my fingers' tips of even the conclusions of Carpenter concerning it. But will you not allow me, in the name of Sir William Hamilton's curiosity, and in that of President Wayland of Brown University, to use, merely as illustration, this presumed power of the human will to

[1] Professor Veitch, Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, p. 154.

move matter without contact through other matter? If you conceive that as possible, and fairly within natural law, then natural law itself becomes the magnetisation of all matter by the influence of one Omnipresent Will, in which is no variableness nor shadow of turning. As our wills play upon the keyboard of the influential human nerves, so Omniscience and Omnipresence, magnetising all worlds and their inhabitants, play upon all infinities and eternities. The connection of the Divine Will with matter may be thus obscurely revealed to us by that of the human will with matter. Each is a mystery; but, if these two are kindred mysteries, the universe is one, and man's passion for unity in science is satisfied. Matter is an effluence of the Divine Nature, and so is all finite mind, and thus the universe is one in its present ground of existence and in the First Cause. In a better age, Science, lighting her lamp at that Higher Unity, will teach that, although He, whom we dare not name, transcends all natural laws, they are, through His Immanence, literally God, who was, and is, and is to come. Science does this already for all who think clearly.

XII.

EMERSON'S VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY.[1]

"Ψευδηγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται στόμα
τὸ δίον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεῖ."
ÆSCHYLUS, *Prometheus Bound*, 1031.

"Οὐκ ἂν τάδ' ἔστη τῇδε, μὴ θεῶν μέτα."
SOPHOCLES, *Ajax*, 950.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

WHICH city has the greater right to an attitude of intellectual haughtiness, Boston or Edinburgh? In preparation for all inspired work in poetry and art, and, much more, in religion, it is necessary to make the palms of the hands clean and to shake off them the glittering, stout vipers,—intellectual pride, vanity, and self-sufficiency. Has Edinburgh shown a greater decision and skill than Boston in dislodging these wreathing reptiles from her fingers, as Paul shook off the serpent on Melitus, feeling no harm? Is Edinburgh really the equal of Boston in culture? Where is there in this city a better metaphysician than Sir William Hamilton or Dugald Stewart? Who here has advanced exact science more than Black, or Playfair, or Sir David Brewster? Is there a better political economist here than Adam Smith, the author of "The Wealth of Nations"? Have we better historians than Hume and Robertson? Is there any rhetorician here likely to be more influential than Hugh Blair? Have we a painter superior to Sir John Leslie, a more delightful essayist than Thomas De Quincey, a better writer on ethics than Sir James Mackintosh? What literary name have we, on the whole, superior to that of Walter Scott? Can Boston produce the equal of John Knox or Thomas Chalmers? What periodical of the same class have we better than "Blackwood's Magazine," as edited by a Lockhart and a Wilson? What quarterly have we here in Boston more famous than "The Edinburgh Review," with Francis Jeffrey, and Sidney Smith, and Horner, and Macaulay, and Brougham behind it? This Edinburgh, true to the deepest inspirations of conscience in her Scotch heart and intellect, knelt down lately on the shore of the North Sea, and was willing to have her devotions led by an American evangelist; and shall Boston, on this Puritan and Pilgrim shore, stand stupidly stiff when asked to kneel?

Dickens wrote in his last years, that he regarded a Boston audience as next to an Edinburgh audience, but that this was a high compliment to Boston; for he regarded an Edinburgh audience as perfect.

What if Boston in 1877 should receive, as well as Edinburgh did in 1874, evan-

[1] The fifty-seventh lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

gelists thrice more emphatically approved by experience now than they were then? What if we should put ourselves as thoroughly as Edinburgh did herself into the attitude of a telescope focused on the sun of religious truth, and ready, therefore, to cause an image of the sun to spring up in the chambers of the instrument? We are proud of our lenses: are we willing to adjust them? *Once adjusted, even poor human lenses, by fixed natural law, may draw down a star or a sun into the soul; and, although the light is from above, the adjustment is our own.* Are we willing to bring the axis of adjusted, spiritual, telescopic thought in Boston into complete coincidence with the line of the keenest rays of conscience, and of self-surrender to God, and see what the effect will be in the starting-up within us of a light otherwise unattainable, and hot enough to burn up our temptations,—hot enough to purge whatever of politics, or commerce, or social life is held in the focus of the rays,—hot enough to sear the wings of the dolorous and accursed scepticisms which flutter not through the Boston noon, but through the Boston dusk, and endeavour yet to build homes for themselves in last year's birds' nests, like Paine's forgotten books, and Parkerism, and small philosophy, and free religion and materialism?

Edinburgh, when Mr. Moody came to that city, avoided a division of her Christian forces. Half a score of churches could not hold the audiences; but there was no lack of trained minds and hearts ready to converse with the religiously irresolute face to face. To bring those who have not surrendered to God face to face with those who have, and to let the two sets of minds act and react upon each other in personal hushed conversation, religious study, and prayer, is one of the highest blessings to both, and perhaps the most effective human instrumentality known to man for the diffusion of personal religion. I have seen men and women go into such conversation shiveringly as babes into a bath, and come out with foreheads white and eyes like stars. Face-to-face conversation between the converted and the unconverted is everywhere the chief measure to be taken for the religious culture of *both*. The secret of Mr. Moody's great usefulness is in a combination of three things,—his total and immeasurably glad self-surrender to God; his fervid oratory, alive in every part with biblical truth, practical sagacity, and fathomlessly genuine consent to conscience; and his most uncommon good sense in organising religious effort in those forms which bring the converted and the unconverted face to face in conversation, biblical study, and prayer.

A power not of man springs up when the religiously resolute and the religiously irresolute converse and kneel together in the holy of holies of human experience, a Divine aroma breathed upon the two from the open Scriptures between their eager faces. These inquiry-meetings, this organisation of lay religious effort, this putting the unrepentant face to face with the converted, this kneeling together of those who are right with God and those who wish to be, is the secret, I think, of the chief religious power in the long course of the evangelist's work.

Edinburgh was willing, with all her haughtiness, to enter into that style of religious effort. Professor Blaikie says that the sacred songs which filled the meetings are at this day better known in Scotland than Burns' poems. In a call issued to all Scotland from Edinburgh, nearly all the professors of the University of Edinburgh are represented. There were in the list of signatures the names of Professors Calderwood, Balfour, Blaikie, Charteris, MacGregor, and Crawford, side by side with those of Hanna and Duff, Scott Moncrieff, and Horatius Bonar. There is hardly a circle of culture in Edinburgh that was not proud to be represented in the lists of persons engaged in the endeavour to carry the truth to all portions of society. Will Boston do anything like this? Will Harvard University do what Edinburgh University was proud to do to carry men on a vigorous current of calm thought into self-surrender to God? I wish to speak with due reverence of this city; but I am not of the opinion that Boston is entitled to more intellectual renown than Edinburgh; and yet, in Edinburgh, the students came out by thousands to hear religious truth, and to have a personal application made of it to themselves, not altogether by the evangelist, but by the spirit of the time. You remember that on one occasion the students of Edinburgh came together in the Free Assembly Hall, and so filled it, that Mr. Moody was obliged

to speak to an immense gathering in the quadrangle, while Mr. Whyte, successor to Dr. Candlish, and Professor Charteris, conducted the services within. Around the platform were professors from nearly all the departments of the university, and from the Free Church and College, and nearly two thousand students. This was a more significant scene than that when Gladstone sat on the platform in London.[1]

Edinburgh is looking upon Boston; London watches this city; Glasgow, Liverpool, Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, ask what Boston will do to bring herself into an attitude in which God can walk up and down our streets as He has walked up and down the streets of other cities. Who will prepare the way for the triumphal procession, not of any sect, but of all Christian truth? In Chicago, the other day, a young man who had stolen some thousands of dollars confessed his sin to the person with whom he conversed in an inquirer's room, and of his own accord went to the penitentiary. Over and over again it has happened in these meetings that men guilty of unreportable deeds have confessed them, and have begun new lives with that emphasis of sincerity which is given by voluntarily taking witnesses to utterly unspeakable guilt. Is this excitement? It is Almighty God in conscience. Professor Dorner I heard say once in Berlin University, "The truth is, gentlemen, not so much that man has conscience as that conscience has man." Your Emerson says men cannot love Goethe, because he was incapable of surrender to the moral sentiment. Is Boston ready to give herself up to that sentiment in such a manner that she shall not only know that she has conscience, but allow conscience, and God who is behind it, to have her?

THE LECTURE.

As light fills, and yet transcends, the rainbow, so God fills, and yet transcends, all natural law. According to scientific Theism, we are equally sure of the Divine Immanency in all Nature, and of the Divine Transcendency beyond it. Pantheism, however, with immeasurably narrow horizons, asserts that natural law and God are one; and thus, at its best, it teaches but one-half the truth; namely, the Divine Immanency, and not the Divine Transcendency. Christian Theism, in the name of the scientific method, teaches both. While you are ready to admit that every pulsation of the colours seven in the rainbow is light, you yet remember well that all the pulsations taken together do not constitute the whole of light. Solar radiance billows away to all points of the compass. Your bow is bent above only one-quarter of the horizon. So scientific Theism supposes that the whole universe, or finite existence in its widest range, is filled by the infinite Omnipresent Will, as the bow is filled with light; and this in such a sense that we may say that natural law is God, who was, who is, and who is to come. In the incontrovertible scientific certainty of the Divine Immanency, we may feel ourselves transfigured as truly as any poetic pantheist ever felt himself to be when lifted to his highest possible mount of vision. But, beyond all that, Christian Theism affirms that God, knowable but unfathomable, incomprehensible but not inapprehensible, billows away beyond all that we call infinities and eternities, as light beyond the rainbow. While He is in all finite mind and matter, as light is in the colours seven, He is as different from finite mind and matter as is the noon from a narrow band of colour on the

[1] Dr. John Hall and G. H. Stuart, The American Evangelists, p. 51.

azure. Asserting the Divine Transcendency side by side with the Divine Immanency, religious science escapes, on the one hand, the self-contradictions and narrowness of pantheism, and attains, on the other, by the cold precision of exact research, a plane of thought as much higher than that of materialism as the seventh heaven is loftier than the platform of the insect or the worm.

It would be very Emersonian to differ from Emerson. His mission, according to his own statement, is to unsettle all things. It is common to hear the acutest readers assert that his writings have no mental unity. The poet Lowell thinks that sometimes Emerson's paragraphs are arranged by being shuffled in manuscript; and the best British criticism[1] says, "They are tossed out at random like the contents of a conjuror's heart." But is there no point of view from which the Emersonian sky,

> "With cycles and with epicycles
> Scribbled o'er,"

may be seen to have within it a comprehensible law? Before Hegel, Emerson's master, became obsolete or obsolescent in Germany, no doubt Emerson was a pantheist; but I cannot explain by any form of pantheism the later motions of some stars in his pure, soft azure. You may prove that he is more poet than philosopher, more seer than poet, more mystic than seer; and yet the surety in the last analysis is, that he is more Emerson than either. *Individualism held firmly, pantheism held waveringly*, are to me the explanation of the bewildering and yet gorgeous motions of the constellations in his sky. Mr. Frothingham acutely says that Mr. Emerson's place is among poetic, not among philosophic minds.[2] It is not Emersonian to wince under philosophical self-contradiction; but it is Emersonian to writhe under the remotest attempt to cast on individualism so much as the fetter of a shadow.

Loyalty to the Over-Soul is Emerson's supreme mood. Whether it lead to philosophic consistency or not, is to his scheme of thought an empty question. Whatever shooting-star streams at this instant across the inner sky of personal inspiration is to be observed, and its course mapped down, even if it move in a direction opposite to that of the last flaming track of light noted there. What if the map at last show a thousand tracks crossing each other? Are they not all divine paths? Are they not to be all included and explained in a sufficiently wise philosophy? The point of departure of all the shooting-stars in Emerson's sky is the constellation Leo. All his metaphysics he is ready to abandon at any moment, if the loftier movements of the soul as its exists in himself come into conflict with his philosophy. He utters whatever the Over-Soul seems to him to say, whether in harmony with previous deliverances or not. He is a pantheist, but not a consistent pantheist: he is an idealist, but not a consistent idealist: he is a religious mystic, but not a consistent

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1 Encyc. Brit., 1875, art. "On American Literature."
2 Transcendentalism in New England, 1876, p. 236.

mystic: *he is an individualist, mapping his own highest inner self, or as he would say in pantheistic phrase, mapping God.* The Over-Soul comes to consciousness only in man. In the transfigured work of tracing on the page of literature all gleams of light in the Over-Soul in Emerson, he is consistent with himself, and in this only. A maker of maps of the paths of shooting-stars is Emerson; and he is more devout than any astronomer intoxicated with the azure. Sit in the constellation Leo, if you would understand the Emersonian sky.

A brilliant and learned volume by a revered preacher of this city[1] contains the most luminous analytical proof that a pantheistic trend sets through Emerson's writings as the Gulf-current through the Atlantic. But Emerson often proclaims his readiness to abandon pantheism itself, if the Over-Soul seems to command him to do so. In the whole range of his often self-destructive apothegms, I find no single sentence so descriptive of his position as a fixed individualist and a wavering pantheist as this:—

"In your metaphysics you have denied personality to the Deity; yet, when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life, though they should clothe God with shape and colour. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot, and flee."[2]

Whoever would come to the point of view from which all Emerson's self-contradictions are reconciled must take his position upon the summit of individualism, and transfigure that height by the thought that there billows around it what we call God in conscience, and what Emerson calls the Over-Soul. In the loftiest zones of human experience there are influences from a Somewhat and Someone that is in us, but not of us; and Emerson is so far pantheistic as to hold that this highest in man is not only a manifestation of God, but God, and the only God. Therefore he is always in the mount. His supreme tenet is the primacy of mind in the universe, and I had almost said the identity of the human mind with the Divine Mind. As the waves are many, and yet one with the sea, so to pantheism finite minds and the events of the universe are many, and yet one with God. As the green billows that dash at this moment on Boston Harbour bar, and cap themselves with foam, are one with the Atlantic, so you and I, and Shakspeare, and Charlemagne, and Cæsar, and the Seven Stars, and Orion, are but so many waves in the Divine All. The ages, like the soft-hissing spray, may take this shape or that; but they all come from one sea. Every wave is an inlet to the sea, and to all of the sea. "There is," says Emerson, "one Mind common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same, and to all of the same."[3] "*The simplest person, who in his integrity worships God, becomes God.*" Eight generations of clerical descent are behind Emerson's unwavering reverence for the still small voice: one generation of now almost outgrown German thinkers is behind his wavering

1 Rev. Dr. Manning, Half Truths and the Truth, 1872.
2 Emerson, Essays, vol. i. p. 50. 3 Essay on History.

reverence for pantheism. Would he only assert, side by side with the Divine Immanence, the Divine Transcendency, we might call him a Christian mystic, where now we can only call him a teacher of transfigured pantheistic individualism.

Pantheism denies the personal immortality of the soul. To pantheism, death is the sinking of a wave back into the sea. We shall find, however, that Emerson, true to his central tenet of hallowed individualism, has again and again asserted the personal immortality of the soul, and never denied it in reality, though he has often done so in appearance.

When, in 1832, Mr. Emerson bade adieu to his parish in this city, he used, as on every occasion he is accustomed to use, memorable words. "I commend you," the last sentences of his letter to that parish read, "to the Divine Providence. May He multiply to your families and to your persons every genuine blessing; and whatever discipline may be appointed to you in this world, may the blessed hope of the resurrection, which He has planted in the constitution of the human soul, and confirmed and manifested by Jesus Christ, be made good to you beyond the grave! In this faith and hope I bid you farewell."[1] These are wholly unambiguous words.

You say that Emerson never has asserted, since 1832, the personal immortality of the soul; but what do you make of certain almost sacredly private statements of his to Fredrika Bremer? That authoress, whose works Germany gathers up in thirty-four volumes, came out of the snows of Northern Europe, and one day found Mr. Emerson walking down the avenue of pines in front of his house, through the falling snow, to greet her. Day after day they conversed on the highest themes. Months passed while Fredrika Bremer was the guest of Boston; and toward the end of the lofty interchanges of thought between these two elect souls, there occurred what Fredrika Bremer calls a most serious season. One afternoon in Boston, with all the depth of her passionate and poetic temperament, she endeavoured to convince Emerson that God is not only in all natural law, but that He transcends it all; that He demands of us perfection; and that, therefore, as Kant used to say, we must expect personal immortality or opportunity to fulfil the demand; that religion is the marriage of the soul with God; and that the idea that God is objective to us, and that our souls may come into harmony with His, a Person meeting a person, is vastly superior, as an inspiration, to any pantheistic theory that all there is of God is what is revealed to us in the insignificant scope of our faculties. She endeavoured, in the name of lofty thought, to show the narrowness of pantheism at its best. The interview was serious in the last degree; and Fredrika Bremer says that Emerson closed it with these words, "I do not wish that people should pretend to know or believe more than they really do know and believe. The resurrection, the continuance of our being, is granted: we carry the pledge of this in

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1 R. W. Emerson, Letter dated Boston, Dec. 22, 1832, quoted in Frothingham's Transcendentalism in New England, 1876, p. 235.

our own breast. I maintain merely that we cannot say in what form or in what manner our existence will be continued."[1]

Transcendentalism in New England was marked by a bold assertion of the personal continuance of the soul after death. "The Dial" always assumed the fact of immortality. "The transcendentalist was an enthusiast on this article," Mr. Frothingham says; and Mr. Emerson's writings, he adds, were "redolent of the faith." Theodore Parker thought personal immortality is known to us by intuition, or as a self-evident truth, as surely as we know that a whole is greater than a part. It must be admitted that New-England transcendentalism caused in many parts of our nation a revival of interest and of faith in personal immortality.[2] Mr. Emerson was the leader of New-England transcendentalism.

But you say, that since 1850, Emerson has changed his opinion; and yet, if you open the last essay he has given to the world, that on "Immortality," you will read, "Everything is prospective, and man is to live hereafter. That the world is for his education is the only sane solution of the enigma. . . . The implanting of a desire indicates that the gratification of that desire is in the constitution of the creature that feels it. . . . The Creator keeps His word with us. . . . All I have seen teaches me to trust the Creator for all I have not seen. Will you, with vast cost and pains, educate your children to produce a masterpiece, and then shoot them down?" What do these phrases amount to, taken in connection with the two earlier passages which I have cited, and which assuredly assert personal immortality? "All sound minds rest on a certain preliminary conviction, namely, that, if it be best that *conscious personal life* shall continue, it will continue; if not best, then it will not; and we, if we saw the whole, should, of course, see that it was better so. . . . I admit that you shall find a good deal of scepticism in the street and hotels and places of coarse amusement; but that is only to say that the practical faculties are faster developed than the spiritual. Where there is depravity, there is a slaughter-house style of thinking. One argument of future life is the recoil of the mind in such company,—our pain at every sceptical statement."

The "conscious personal" continuance of the soul, Emerson no more than Goethe denies. In this very essay, however, we must expect to find apparent self-contradiction; and accordingly we can read here these sentences, written from the point of view of a wavering pantheism, "Jesus never preaches the personal immortality. . . . I confess that everything connected with our personality fails. The moral and intellectual reality to which we aspire is immortal, and we only through that."

Allow me, on this occasion, to contrast arguments with *ipse dixits*, and to use only the considerations which are implied in Emerson's teachings on immortality. You will be your own judges whether the conclusion that there is a personal existence after death must follow from his

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[1] Emerson, Conversation with Fredrika Bremer, Homes of the New World, vol. i. p. 223.

[2] See Frothingham, Transcendentalism, pp. 195–198.

premises. I shall, of course, unbraid the reasoning, and show its strands; but its braided form is Emerson's axiom, "The Creator keeps His word with us." The argument is old; and for that reason, probably, Emerson values it. It has borne the tooth of time, and the buffetings of acutest controversy age after age. In our century it stands firmer than ever, because we know now through the microscope, better than before, that there is that behind living tissues which blind mechanical laws cannot explain.

1. An organic or constitutional instinct is an impulse or propensity existing prior to experience, and independent of instruction.

This definition is a very fundamental one, and is substantially Paley's.[1]

2. The expectation of existence after death is an organic or constitutional instinct.

3. The existence of this instinct in man is as demonstrable as the existence of the constitutional instincts of admiration for the beautiful, or of curiosity as to the relations of cause and effect.

What automatic action is, you know; and an instinct is based upon the automatic action of the nervous mechanism. Who doubts that certain postures in anger, certain attitudes in fear, certain others in reverence, certain others in surprise, are instinctive? These postures are taken up by us, without reflection on our part: they are organic in origin. It is instinct for us to rest when we are fatigued, and to take the recumbent position; and we do not reason about this. The babe does it. Instinctive actions appear early in the progress of life, and are substantially the same in all men and in all times. An educated impulse does not appear early, and is not the same among all men in all times. Of course, it would avail nothing if I were to prove that the belief in immortality has come to us from education. If that belief result from an organic instinct, however, if it be constitutional, then it means much, and more than much.

4. The dulness of these instincts in a few low races, or in poorly-developed individuals, does not disprove the proposition, that admiration for the beautiful, and curiosity as to the relations of cause and effect, are constitutional in man.

5. So the occasional feebleness of the expectation of existence after death does not show that it is not an organic or constitutional instinct.

6. This instinct appears in the natural operations of conscience, which anticipates personal punishment or reward in an existence beyond death.

You desire incisive proof that we have a constitutional anticipation of something beyond the veil; but can you look into Shakspeare's mirror of the inner man, and not see case after case of the action of that constitutional expectation? Shakspeare's delineations are philosophically as unpartisan and as exact as those of a mirror. Is it not the immemorial proverb of all great poetry, as well as of all profound philosophy, that there is something that makes cowards of us all as

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[1] Natural Theology, chap. 18.

we draw near to death, and that this something is not physical pain but a Somewhat behind the veil? Death would have little terror if its pains were physical and intellectual only. There is an instinctive action of the moral sense by which we anticipate that there are events to come after death, and that these will concern us most closely.

Bishop Butler, in his famous "Sermons on Conscience," has no more incisive passage than that in which he declares that "conscience, unless forcibly stopped, magisterially exerts itself, and always goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and confirm its own." This prophetic action of conscience I call the chief proof that man has an instinctive expectation of existence after death. We are so made, that we touch somewhat behind the veil. As an insect throws out its antennæ, and by their sensitive fibres touches what is near it, so the human soul throws out the vast arms of conscience to touch eternity, and Somewhat, not ourselves, in the spaces beyond this life. All there is in literature, all there is in heathen sacrifice, continued age after age, to propitiate the powers beyond death, all there is in the persistency of human endeavour, grotesque and cruel at times, to secure the peace of the soul behind the veil, are proclamations of this prophetic action of conscience; yet conscience itself is only one thread in the web of the pervasive organic instinct which anticipates existence after death.

7. This instinct appears in a sense of obligation to meet the requirements of an infinitely perfect moral law.

We know that the moral law is perfect, and therefore that the moral Lawgiver is perfect.

But the moral law demands our perfection. "Therefore," said Immanuel Kant, "the moral law contains in it a postulate of immortality." Its requirement is a part of our constitution, and cannot be met in this stage of existence. It is not met here, and therefore the moral law requires us to believe in an existence after death. That is Kant's very celebrated proof; but I am pointing to it only as one thread in this organic web which we call instinctive anticipation of existence after death. Put your Shakspeare on the fear of what is behind the veil, side by side with your Kant on this anticipation of the time when we can approximate to perfection, and you will find these broad-shouldered men, in the name of both poetry and philosophy, affirming, as the postulate of organic instinct in man, that existence after death is a reality.

8. It appears in the universality of the belief in existence after death. All widely-extended beliefs result much more from organic instinct than from tradition.

9. It appears in the human delight in permanence.

10. It appears in the unoccupied capacities of man in his present state of being.

11. It appears in the convictions natural to the highest moods of the soul.

> "There shines through all our earthly dresse
> Bright shootes of everlastingnesse."

12. It appears in the longing for personal immortality characteristic of all high states of complete culture.

13. It appears conspicuously in Paganism itself, in the persistence of all the ages of the world in the efforts to propitiate Supreme Powers, and to secure the peace of the soul beyond the grave.

How is the force of any impulse to be measured, unless by the work it will do? What work has not this desire of man, to be sure that all will be well with him beyond the veil, not done? What force has maintained the bloody sacrifices of the heathen world through all the dolorous ages of the career of Paganism on the planet? What force has given intensity to the inquiries of philosophy as to immortality? What has been the inspiration of the loftiest literature in every nation and in all time, whenever it has spoken of avenging deities that will see that all is made right at last? How are we to explain the persistency of every age in the attempt to propitiate the powers beyond the veil, and to secure the peace of the soul after death, if not by this impulse arising organically, and existing as a part of the human constitution?

14. Nature makes no half-hinges. God does not create a desire to mock it. The universe is not unskilfully made. There are no dissonances in the divine works. Our constitutional instincts raise no false expectations. Conscience tells no Munchausen tales. The structure of the human constitution is not an organised lie. "The Creator keeps His word with us."

15. But, if there is no existence after death, conscience does tell Munchausen tales; man is bunglingly made; his constitution raises false expectations; his structure is an organised lie.

Our age has many in it who wander as lost babes in the woods, not asking whether there is any way out of uncertainties on the highest of all themes, and in suppressed sadness beyond that of tears. Small philosophers are great characters in democratic centuries, when every man thinks for himself; but lost babes are greater. There is a feeling that we can know nothing of what we most desire to know. I hold, first of all, to the truth that man may know, not everything, but enough for practical purposes. If I have a Father in heaven, if I am created by an intelligent and benevolent Being, then it is worth while to ask the way out of these woods. I will not be a questionless lost babe; for I believe there is a way, and that, although we may not know the map of all the forest, we can find the path home.

There are four stages of culture; and they are all represented in Boston to-day, and in every highly civilized quarter of the globe. There is the first stage, in which we usually think we know everything. Then comes the second stage, in which, as our knowledge grows, we are confronted with so many questions which we can ask and cannot answer, that we say in our sophomorical, despairing mood, that we can know nothing. A little above that we say we can know something, but only what is just before our senses. Then, lastly, we come to the stage in which we say, not that we can know everything, not that we can know much, indeed, but in which we are sure we can know enough for practical purposes.

Everything, nothing, something, enough! There are the infantine, adolescent, juvenile, and mature stages of culture.

16. But, so far as human observation extends, we know inductively that there is no exception to the law that every constitutional instinct has its correlate to match it.

17. Wherever we find a wing, we find air to match it; a fin, water to match it; an eye, light to match it; an ear, sound to match it; perception of the beautiful, beauty to match it; reasoning power, cause and effect to match it; and so through all the myriads of known cases.

18. From our possession of a constitutional or organic instinct by which we expect existence after death, we must therefore infer the fact of such existence, as the migrating bird might infer the existence of a South from its instinct of migration.

19. This inference proceeds strictly upon the scientific principle of the universality of law.

20. It everywhere implies, not the absorption of the soul into the mass of general being, but its personal continuance.

Your poet, William Cullen Bryant, once sat in the sweet country-side, and heard the bugle of the wild migrating swan as the bird passed over him southward in the twilight. Looking up into the assenting azure, this seer uttered reposefully the deepest words of his philosophy :—

"Whither, midst falling dew,
While glow the heavens with the last steps of day,
Far through their rosy depths dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way?

There is a Power whose care
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast,
The desert and illimitable air,
Lone wandering, but not lost.

He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone
Will lead my steps aright."

BRYANT, *To a Waterfowl.*

XIII.

ULRICI ON THE SPIRITUAL BODY.[1]

"Der Leib der Menschen ist eine zerbrechliche, immer erneuete Hülle, die endlich sich nicht mehr erneuen kann."—HERDER, *Philosophy of History.*

"The poet in a golden clime was born,
With golden stars above;
Dowered with the hate of hate, the scorn of scorn,
The love of love.
He saw through life and death, through good and ill;
He saw through his own soul;
The marvel of the everlasting will,
An open scroll,
Before him lay." —TENNYSON.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

THIS morning, the bells of Christian churches on the continents, and of Christian vessels on the great deep, are audible to each other around the whole planet. I am not speaking rhetorically, but geographically, when I say that the Christian Church at this moment encircles the world in her arms. We forget too often what a great continent Australia is, and what a pervasive force her English language and laws may become in the lonely southern hemisphere. But Japan has forced herself upon the notice of the world of late, as the undeveloped England of the Pacific. Her great Mikado congratulated our President, only the other day, on the success of our Centennial Exhibition; and there lay behind the cordial words from the far shore just the sentiment which a Japanese high official expressed lately at Hartford, that the Christianisation of Japan is an event to be expected in the near future. The revolution in that crowded island of sensitive, ingenious men, is in the hands of the cultivated upper classes. It does not depend on count of heads or clack of tongues, and is not likely to go backward.

You say Russia and England may come into armed collision in the shadow of the Himalayas, and that the bear and the lion may fill the Cashmere vale with blood. May God avert this! But, even if they do so, it will yet remain sure, in any event, that the days of Buddhism are numbered; and that, so far as Paganism governs Central Asia, it is every year squeezed more and more nearly to its exit from life between the state necessities of Russia and England. Coming farther West, it is significant that the Suez Canal, the key to the great gate of the way to India, belongs now chiefly to Great Britain; and that, even with the Egyptian road to the East in her possession, she cannot afford as yet to take off from Constantinople an eye behind which, for eight hundred years, has rested no inconsiderable portion of authority on this planet, and which now rules a fifth part of the population of the globe.

1 The fifty-eighth lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship, delivered in Tremont Temple.

Only this morning, from under the sea, we have whispered to us by electric lips great promises by the "sick man" of the Bosphorus. The liberty of Ottomans is to be inviolable. The religious privileges of all communities, and the free exercise of public worship by all creeds, are guaranteed. Liberty of the press is granted. Primary education is compulsory. All citizens are eligible to public offices, irrespective of religion. Confiscation, statute labour, torture, and inquisition are prohibited. Ministerial responsibility is established. A chamber of deputies and a senate are instituted. These two houses, in connection with the ministry, have the initiative in framing laws. General and municipal councils are to be formed by election. The prerogatives of the Sultan are to be only those of the constitutional sovereigns of the West.

In 1453 Islam crossed the Bosphorus with a bound, for the leprosies of its social life had not yet had time to unstring its nerves. Its own poisons have made it now little more than unspeakably flaccid flesh, without a soul. Its promises are very empty. But this time, as never before, the demand for reform is emphasised by the great powers of Europe. This new constitution just promulgated in Constantinople contains no guaranties which the rest of Europe will not ultimately be obliged to secure from the populations of European Turkey. But if Islam must make the changes Europe demands, she must violate the Koran. Let adequate political reforms be perfected in Turkey, and Islamism is sure to unloosen her accursed, leprous grasp from the fair throat of the Bosphorus.

One of our most gifted missionaries and statesmen, Dr. Hamlin, has said lately, "Let Turkey stand, that Islam may fall." No doubt this opinion is a wise one from his point of view; and this morning even we, who are so little familiar with the politics of the Bosphorus, can understand, that, if all the reforms the recent conference of the great powers has asked for are carried, the Koran is a dead letter in Turkey. Dr. Hamlin seems to say that certain political changes are going forward in Turkey under the pressure of her own state necessities and of the demands of the great powers; that these changes cannot be carried through without violating in the boldest manner the political and religious provisions of the Koran; and that, therefore, if Turkey will carry these reforms through, she will undermine the authority of her own sacred book.

It seems probable, however, that Providence is to make shorter work with what Carlyle calls the unspeakable Turk than he would in any way make with himself under the pressure of the necessity for political reform. Is it not pretty clear that Gladstone's advice will ultimately be followed, and that Turkey as a Mohammedan empire will at least have no more armed support from Christian powers? If she must take care of herself, how long can she, who, in one of the fairest regions of the globe, is a treacherous bankrupt now, maintain her position in Europe, face to face with the increasingly angry protest of her own population and of Russia on the north, and of Austria, Germany, England, and France toward the setting sun? Constantinople and Cairo are held by Islam to-day only with faint grasp. Without these cities she will be driven back in her fearful sickness to her deserts. Only most slowly can she be healed there of her terribly poisoned blood. The days of the distinctively Mohammedan power in Europe are numbered.

Looking around the globe to-day, we see, therefore, an unbroken line of Christian influences in the near future, stretching from the Yosemite to the Sandwich Islands, to Australia, to Japan, to India, and past the Suez Canal, and thence to the Bosphorus, and thence to Germany, now possessing political and Protestant primacy in Europe, and so on to England, and then across that little brook we call the Atlantic, only two seconds wide now for electricity. There are no foreign lands.

In this year, America may say of her guests what was said of Portia's suitors:—

> "The watery kingdom
> Whose ambitious head threatens the face of heaven
> Is no bar to stop the foreign spirits;
> But they come as o'er a brook."
>
> *Merchant of Venice.*

Christianity at this hour reads her Scriptures, and lifts up her anthems, in two hundred languages. One-half of the missionaries of the globe may be reached from Boston by telegraph in twenty-four hours. God is making commerce His missionary.

It is incontrovertible that it was predicted ages ago, that a chosen man called yonder out of Ur of the Chaldees should become a chosen family, and this a chosen nation, and that in this nation should appear a chosen Supreme Teacher of the race, and that He should found a chosen Church, and that to His chosen people, with zeal for good works, should ultimately be given all nations and the isles of the sea. In precisely this order world-history has unrolled itself, and is now unrolling. No man can deny this. No man can meditate adequately on this without blanched cheeks. What are the signs of the times which I have recounted on this festal morn, but added waves in this fathomlessly mysterious gulf-current? We know it began with the ripple we call Abraham. It is now almost as broad as the Atlantic itself. What Providence does, it from the first intends to do. We see what it has done. We know what it intended. It has caused this gulf-current to flow in one direction two thousand, three thousand, four thousand years. Good tidings, this gulf-current, if we float with it!—good tidings which are to be to all peoples! A Power not ourselves makes for righteousness. It has steadily caused the fittest to survive, and thus has executed a plan of choosing a peculiar people. The survival of the fittest will ultimately give the world to the fit. Are we, in our anxiety for the future, to believe that this law will alter soon? or to fear that He whose will the law expresses, and who never slumbers nor sleeps, will change His plan to-morrow, or the day after?

On this day of jubilee, let us gaze on this gulf-current, and take from it heart and hope, harmonious with the heart of Almighty God, out of which the gulf-current beats only as one pulse.

The difficulties that Christianity has now are chiefly in great cities. They are in the unfaithful members of highly civilised society. They are in that subtle and pernicious inactivity which undermines the nervous force of the world at its centres.

THE LECTURE.

De Wette, the great German theologian, who died in 1849, and who was called the Universal Doubter, said in his last work, published in 1848, that "the fact of the resurrection of Christ, although a darkness which cannot be dissipated rests on the way and manner of it, cannot itself be called into doubt" any more than the historical certainty of the assassination of Cæsar.[1] This is the passage over which Neander, the famous Church historian, shed tears when he read it. De Wette was a leader of the acutest school of rationalism in Germany in his day, and denied utterly that there are passages in the Old Testament Scriptures predicting the coming of our Lord. He was coupled by Strauss himself with Vater, as having placed on a solid foundation the mythical explanation of the Bible. Nevertheless, such is the cumulative force of the evidence of the resurrection as a fact in history, that De Wette, listening only to the latest voices of the most laborious, precise, and cold research, affirmed, face to face with the sneers of the rationalism which he led, that the fact itself, although we do not understand the way and manner of it, is incontrovertible.

1 De Wette, Concluding Essay, appended to Historical Criticism of Evangelical History, p. 229.

I am to speak this morning, not of this fact, but of the way and manner of it. I know that the theme is fit to blanch the cheeks.

Before taking up this mystery of mysteries, however, let us, for a moment, glance at the logical value of De Wette's concession. It is a verdict reached unwillingly by long listening to all the public and secret words of history and philosophy—the guides which scepticism is so eager, and which religious science may well be yet more eager, to force upon the attention of the world.

I am accustomed to recite as a part of my private creed these propositions, based on De Wette's concession as to the fact of the resurrection :—

1. The intuitions of conscience prove the moral excellence of the biblical system.

2. The moral excellence of the biblical system proves that it is not inconsistent with the attributes of an infinitely perfect Being to give to that system a supernatural attestation.

3. If an historical attestation of this kind has been given to the biblical system, the existence of that attestation may be proved by the established scientific rules of historical criticism.

4. The established scientific rules of historical criticism, severely applied, demonstrate the fact of the resurrection.

5. The fact of the resurrection proves, not the Deity, but the Divine authority of our Lord, as a teacher sent into history with a supreme and divinely attested religious mission.

6. The Divine authority of our Lord proves the doctrines He attested.

7. Among these are His Deity, the Inspiration of the Scriptures, the necessity of the New Birth, the Atonement, Immortality, the Eternal Judgment.

It was my fortune once to put these propositions before the acutest intellect I have ever met in the field of theology, and to ask if they would bear the logical microscope. I remember, that, as I repeated them slowly, the majestic eyes of the listener were lifted from the earth to the horizon, and from the horizon to the infinite spaces of the Unseen Holy behind the azure. When at last I asked if De Wette's verdict did not contain in it all these conclusions, the unwavering reply was, "All, incontrovertibly. But De Wette's concession is the result of the conflicts of eighteen centuries of scholarship. Adhere to those propositions, for they have borne the tooth of time in the past, and will bear all the buffeting of acutest controversy in the future." Once in his garden at Halle-on-the-Saale, in an hour I shall long remember, I put those propositions before Professor Tholuck, with the same emphatic result.

It is on the way and the manner of the personal continuance of the soul after death that German philosophy now bends an intense, prolonged, reverent gaze. You will not suppose me to indorse everything which I put before you this morning as a part of the latest German philosophy. Nevertheless, I confess my sympathy with the whole trend of that magnificent body of thought which is represented by the Lotzes, the Helmholtzes, the Wundts, and the

Ulricis. Whoever is in accord with this school, which now leads the most intellectual and learned nation of our times, will find himself in most emphatic antagonism to the English materialistic school. This latter, however, has nothing to say that is new to Germany. Gentlemen here who have been accustomed to form their philosophical opinions from an English outlook, will, perhaps, allow me to ask them this morning for once, as an experiment, to occupy the German point of view. I do not request you to take the opinions of the Germans, though they have a far greater fame than the English for philosophical breadth and acumen; but will you not take their point of view long enough to understand that there are two philosophies in the world? If there is one represented by the Huxleys and Häckels, there is another opposed at all points to materialism, and represented by the Lotzes and Helmholtzes, and Wundts and Ulricis,—names which the future is far more likely to honour than those of any of their critics.

1. Lotze, Ulrici, Wundt, Helmholtz, Draper, Carpenter, and Beale, teach that the nervous mechanism in its influential arc is plainly so constructed that we must suppose it to be set in motion by an agent outside of it.

2. Every change must have an adequate cause.

3. *Only when involution is equal to evolution in the connection between cause and effect is the cause adequate to produce the effect.*

We all agree, and we talk smoothly, as to the authority of the tropically fruitful axiom, that every change must have an adequate cause. But what is an adequate cause? My definition, which I do not ask you to accept, is, *Such a cause as makes involution equal to evolution.* Sir William Thomson, speaking of the shrewd attempt of materialism to explain living tissues by infinitely complex molecular combinations of merely material particles, says it is for ever sure that we cannot get out of the combinations anything that we do not put into them; and that all science is against the idea that evolution can ever exceed, in the force or the design it exhibits, the involution which must go before the evolution. Involution before evolution is the fact on which to fasten attention, if we would be lifted out of materialism. *Let us be involutionists first, and evolutionists afterwards.* The astute attempt of Tyndall is to put into matter what he wishes to draw out of it. His whole effort is to introduce a new definition of matter. He would have us think of matter as a double-faced somewhat, having a material and spiritual side; and although, in attempting to do so, we necessarily fall into immeasurable self-contradiction, he is forced to undertake the support of even that, because he knows that evolution cannot be greater than involution. He would put into his theory, therefore, on the one side, that power and potency of all life which he wishes to take out on the other. It is the supreme law of philosophy that involution and evolution are an eternal equation. Materialism is marked by, perhaps, nothing more superficial than the attempt to avoid the force of that law in the explanation of living tissues. Even Tyndall,[1] after reasoning in favour of the theory which Professor Frey,

[1] Materialism and its Opponents, 1875.

the German histologist, says science has given up, that life is a kind of vital crystallisation, says inadvertently, with curious self-contradiction, that a living organism is "woven by a something not itself." Materialism astounds us by the assertion that physical and chemical forces are enough to explain the formation of living tissues ; but no man has shown that in physical and chemical forces there can be an involution equal to the evolution we call organism and life. The evolution in man is intelligence, imagination, emotion, will, or all that we call the soul ; and the involution, therefore, must have in it the equivalents of these qualities. For ever and for ever it will be true that you can find in living tissue, and take out of it, only what is put into it, visibly or invisibly.

4. The nature of what Aristotle called the animating principle, or the soul, is to be inductively inferred by an inflexible application of the principle that involution must equal evolution. In living tissues, as everywhere else, every change must have an adequate cause.

5. The co-ordination of tissues in a living organism must proceed from a sufficient cause, defined as one in which involution is equal to evolution, and which therefore must possess, not only intelligence, but permanence and unity in all the flux of the atoms of the body.

6. The unity of consciousness requires the same.

7. The persistence of the sense of personal identity requires the same.

The immense facts that each individual feels himself to be one, and that his identity through life is a certainty in spite of the flux of the particles of the body, are to be accounted for. It is enough to the acute German, born a metaphysician, to know that he has an ineradicable sense of personal identity, and that his consciousness is a unit, to cause him to repel the idea that all we call the soul is the result simply of an almost infinitely complex arrangement of atoms. Everywhere there is permanent unity in the plan of each organism that has life. All there is in the oak is woven after the fashion of the oak ; all in the lion, after that of the lion ; all in the man, after that of the man. We do know incontrovertibly that in each individual there is, from first to last, no deviation from the one plan on which the bioplasts weave. Now, that unity must be accounted for. It is a fact ; it is tangible ; it is visible.

If we have always before our speculative thought the ascertained activities of the bioplasts ; if we behold them throwing out here and there their promontories, dividing and subdividing, and yet always weaving on a plan existing in the first stroke of their shuttles, and so carrying nerve around muscle, and forming here a vein and there an artery, here a tendon and there a hand, an ear, an eye, a brain,—we shall feel that all attempts to prove materialism by physiology are attempts to quench the noon under a bat's wing. Ulrici talks freely of much sand thrown in the eyes of our time by materialism ; and so do Lotze and Helmholtz, and Wundt and Beale ; and sometimes, in gusty days, I think there is a little of this dust even in this pellucid New-England air.

8. The nature of the animating principle has of late, in Germany, been very carefully inferred from the effects it produces.

It is the belief of many that science draws near to an explanation of some parts of the mystery in the connection of the soul with the body.

9. The late German philosophy holds the view that the soul must be conceived as a property or occupant of a fluid similar to the ether.

10. This fluid, however, does not, like the ether, consist of atoms.

Elaborate attempts to found the hope of existence after death on the scientific certainty that atoms cannot be destroyed have often been made ; and an effort of this sort has lately appeared in the work of a New York authoress on "The Physical Basis of Immortality." She adopts Bain's philosophy, and talks of a material and a spiritual side in an atom ; and she says that somewhere in the physical organism there is a soul-atom, and that this cannot be destroyed. This theory is German, only it is a little out of date, although Lotze once favoured it.[1] There are two competing theories,—that of the soul-atom and that of the soul-fluid. It is the doctrine of the non-atomic ether, or soul-fluid, which your Ulrici—whose German book, as you see, I read to pieces in a hundred miles in the railway train this morning—advocates. By the way, allow me to say that Ulrici's three volumes, entitled "Gott und der Mensch," published at Leipzig in 1874, are far more incisive than even his "Gott und die Natur" on all topics relating to living tissues and the connection between soul and body. Be sure to read the former work, especially the portion on the nervous system and the soul.[2]

It is Ulrici's view that the soul is the occupant of a non-atomic ether that fills the whole form, and lies behind the mysterious weaving of the tissues.

Who is Ulrici? Not a small philosopher, I assure you. Hermann Ulrici, professor of philosophy in the University of Halle, was born in Germany in 1806. He studied law and afterwards physical science in the stern manner of the German universities, and then gave himself to literature and philosophy. He has written an elaborate work on æsthetics ; and his criticisms on Shakspeare are the best, except those of Gervinus. Everywhere in Germany he is recognised as authorised to speak on the nerves and the soul from the point of view of a specialist ; and his is, perhaps, the highest name in Germany, after that of Lotze, in all philosophy connected with the relations between mind and matter.

11. This non-atomic fluid is absolutely continuous with itself.

12. Its chief centre of force is in the brain.

13. But it extends outward from that centre, and permeates the whole atomic structure of the body.

Have you ever, my friends, floated in thought above the green and steel-grey seas of the globe, and called vividly before your imagination the contrast between the dark depths and the sunny

1 For Lotze's present views, see Mikrokosmus, Drittes Buch, Zweites Kapitel, Von dem Sitze der Seele, Allegegenwart der Seele im Körper.

2 Vol. i. pp. 161–225 ; see, also, Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 303.

surfaces of the oceans? The upper portions of every ocean are permeated by the sunbeams; but, as we descend in the Atlantic or Pacific, we come to obscurity; and, in the lowest search of the sea, there is darkness. Just so in the connection of the soul with the body. There is a sunny sea, an obscure sea, and a dark sea. A portion of the operations of the immaterial principle in us we are vividly cognisant of through consciousness. A few of the activities of our physical organisation we are conscious of obscurely; most of them, however, and all this weaving of tissues, go on wholly below consciousness. There seem to be mental operations that proceed in the darkness of the mental Atlantic. Some go on obscurely in a region of partial illumination. But intellect, will, emotion, belong to those sunlit waves where consciousness fills the billows at the surface of the mental ocean with iridescence. You will readily admit that consciousness does not make us aware of all the activities of the immaterial principle. That unit which we call the soul is not cognisant of all its own operations as it is conscious of memory or of an act of reason. Many things which the immaterial principle in man does, it performs in the dark depths, where no man's consciousness comes, and yet God is there.

14. The soul, as an occupant of this ethereal enswathement, operates in part unconsciously, and in part consciously.

15. It co-operates with the vital force.

16. It is not identical with that force.

In order to explain living tissues, it is not necessary to assume the existence of what is called vital force; but it is necessary to assume the existence of an immaterial principle. Hermann Lotze takes great pains, and Ulrici does, to show that the immaterial principle is not necessarily to be thought of as identical with what has been called the vital force. That which moves these bioplasts, and causes them to build on a plan kept in view from the first, and maintained as a unit to the last, we say must be an adequate cause of these motions; and that is not the vital force simply, although it may be the vital force with this other psychical force behind it; and yet the two are always to be carefully distinguished from each other.

17. The soul has a different type for each different organism.

As it were folded up, it exists, of course, in the embryonic germ of each organism,—oak, lion, eagle, or man.

18. It is the morphological agent which weaves all living tissues. It spins nerves. It weaves the muscles, the tendons, the eye, the brain. It arranges each part in harmony with all the other parts of the organism.

19. When it rises to the state of consciousness, it produces the phenomena known as thought, imagination, emotion, and will.

20. So far forth as the ethereal enswathement of the soul is non-atomic, it is immaterial.

It is the business of the Boston Monday Lectureship to keep before this audience, so many members of which know more than the lecturer, the very latest speculations, if they lead to anything strategic. You will allow me to say that as wise men as Martineau

and Ulrici and Beale and Lotze and Helmholtz do not sneer at the idea that the universe may have in it three things, and not merely two. Matter and mind, we have commonly said, include everything; but some are whispering, "Perhaps there is an invisible middle somewhat, for which we have no name, but which is remotely like the ether." Is it material? It is not atomic; and matter is. Now, Ulrici so far adopts this idea as to affirm explicitly that the ethereal enswathement of the soul must be non-atomic, and so far not like matter. He thinks that the atomic constitution of this enswathement would be absolutely inconsistent with the fact of the unity of consciousness. He holds, that, if the soul-fluid be made up of atoms, there is no proof that it is not in flux with the flux of the particles of the body. But the persistence of our sense of individuality is proof that there is no such flux in the substance in which mental qualities inhere. We know that there are in us certain mental attributes, and that every attribute must have a substratum; and in the substratum in which anything permanent, like the sense of identity, inheres, there must be no flux, but permanence. Therefore, following the clew that every change must have an adequate cause, Ulrici holds that the enswathement of the soul, this ethereal body, is non-atomic, and not in flux.

Just as the summer lightning blazes through the cloud, so the soul blazes through that spiritual body which is finer than nervous tissue, finer than electricity. When the egg begins to quicken, the life is the chief thing in it, and that life belongs to a certain somewhat, an ethereal form of matter that connects it with all this dead world around. The soul inhering in that spiritual body takes to itself clothing, and builds the visible matter upon the invisible. According to the law of the invisible matter, according to its power to take large or small space as its exigencies require, it grows, for a season, larger and larger, until the soul in it has taken clothing to itself out of this visible world. We appear here as ghosts appear in the night. Carlyle says we are all ghosts; we appear, we disappear; we come forth from the invisible, we go into the invisible. These are facts; but Germany begins to speculate as to the adequate causes of our being woven as we are, and says that, behind all the weaving of our tissues, there must be this ethereal body. Why does she say that? Germany commonly has a reason for her positions.

There is Niagara. You see a rainbow drawn across the surface of the cataract. The rainbow does not move. The water moves. What is the cause of the rainbow? The water, you say. No! Germany replies; the rainbow never moves. If the water were the chief cause of the rainbow, the rainbow would move; for you must have in the fountain what you have in the source. The occasion of the rainbow is in the water; the cause is in the sun. That is not in flux. Your rainbow is not in motion, either. Now, the plan of man's organism does not change from the first quickening of the egg until the man drops into the grave. It is one thing, just as that rainbow is one thing. Our sense of identity persists. Nevertheless, all the particles in the body are changing as the drops in Niagara are. The

cause of our sense of personal identity must be something that is not in perpetual change. Your fountain cannot rise higher than your source. The plan of your mechanism does not change, and so the source of that plan does not change. We know that every coarser physical particle does change. There is nothing in my hand that was there seven years ago, I suppose, except the plan of the material. The particles have all been changed; but the plan is just the same. That plan which does not change implies the existence in man of a substance which does not change, and, although that substance is invisible, science thinks it is there because it sees effects which can be explained only upon that supposition.

We know that the rainbow is not in flux, and so we know there is something behind it which causes it to persist in one form. As the plan of your eagle, your lion, your man, your oak, is steadily adhered to from first to last, we say that plan belongs to something that is not in flux, that came in when the plan threw its first shuttle, and goes out unimpaired, even after the shuttle ceases to move. That invisible somewhat some scholars in Germany call a spiritual body.

21. This non-atomic ethereal enswathement of the soul is conceivably separable from the body.

How shall I proceed, gentlemen, when thoughts crowd upon us here and now that soon will seem too sacred even for the hushed chambers from which you and I must pass hence, each alone? Who has treated death inductively? What do the dying see? What do they hear? What do they fear, and what do they hope? I am asking of you only loyalty to the self-evident truth, that every change must have an adequate cause. The Ariadne clew has now brought us mercilessly up to the certainty that the adequate cause of all this weaving of living tissues must be something having unity; something not in flux with the constant changes of the particles of the body; something that is as steady as the rainbow drawn across the east, while all the drops of rain are rapidly changing their position.

It is not every untrained or trained mind that is able to follow even this axiomatic Ariadne clew through all this labyrinth of philosophy. Sometimes I think that philosophers are to be divided into classes like generals, according to their capacity to manage intricate problems. There are generals that can command ten thousand men; but Napoleon said, there are only a few who can command five hundred thousand. There are intricacies in philosophy which it takes a Lotze or an Ulrici, a Kant or a Hamilton, a Helmholtz or a Beale, to walk through without bewilderment. Adhere to the writers who are clear. Many a general on the field of philosophy can take care of ten thousand; but only now and then one can manage five hundred thousand men.

If you come to the conclusion that there is an invisible, non-atomic, ethereal enswathement, which the soul fills, and through which it flashes more rapidly than electricity through any cloud, you must remember that the majestic authority for that statement is simply the axiom that every change must have an adequate cause. This is cool precision; this is exact research on the edge of the tomb. Pro-

fessor Beale says in so many words, "that the force which weaves these tissues must be separable from the body;" for it very plainly is not the result of the action of physical agents. Ulrici shows, especially in a magnificent passage on immortality,[1] that all the latest results of physiological research go to show that immortality is probable.

You say that, unless we can prove the existence of something for the substratum of mind, we may be doubtful about the persistency of memory after death; but what if this non-atomic, ethereal body goes out of the physical form at death? In that case, what materialist will be acute enough to show that memory does not go out also? You affirm, that, without matter, there can be no activity of the mind; and that, although the mind may exist without matter, it cannot express itself. You say, that unless certain, I had almost said material, records remain in possession of the soul when it is out of the body, there must be oblivion of all that occurred in this life. But how are you to meet the newest form of science, which gives the soul a non-atomic enswathement as the page on which to write its records? That page is never torn up. The acutest philosophy is now pondering what the possibilities of this non-atomic, ethereal body are when separated from the fleshy body; and the opinion of Germany is coming to be very emphatic, that all that materialists have said about our memory ending when our physical bodies are dissolved, and about there being no possibility of the activity of the soul in separation from the physical body, is simply lack of education. There is high authority and great unanimity on the propositions I am now defending; and although I do not pledge myself always to defend every one of these theses, yet I must do so in the present state of knowledge and in the name of a Gulf-current of speculation which is twenty-five years old, and has a very victorious aspect as we look backward to the time when the microscope began its revelations.

22. It becomes clear, therefore, that, even in that state of existence which succeeds death, the soul may have a spiritual body.

What! you are preaching to us the book called the Holy Word? Yes, I am; and here is a page of it [with a hand on coloured diagrams of living tissues]. A spiritual body! That is a phrase we did not expect to hear in the name of science. It is the latest whisper of science, and ages ago it was a word of revelation.

23. The existence of that body preserves the memories acquired during life in the flesh.

24. If this ethereal, non-atomic enswathement of the soul be interpreted to mean what the Scriptures mean by a spiritual body in distinction from a natural body, there is entire harmony between the latest whisper of science and the inspired doctrine of the resurrection.

What if I should dissect a human body here? I might have a man made up of a skeleton; then I could have a human form made up of muscle. If I should take out the arteries, I should have another human form; and just so with the veins, and so with the nerves.

[1] Gott und der Mensch, vol. i. pp. 222–225.

Were they all taken out and held up here in their natural condition, they would have a human form, would they not? Very well; now, which form is the man? Which is the most important? But behind the nerves are those bioplasts. If I could take out those bioplasts that wove the nerves, and hold them up here by the side of the nerves, all in their natural position, they would have a human form, would they not? And which is the man? Your muscles are more important than your bones; your arteries, than your muscles; your nerves, than your arteries; and your bioplasts, that wove your nerves, are more important than your nerves. But you do not reach the last analysis here; for, if you unravel a man completely, there is something behind those bioplasts. There are many things we cannot see that we know exist. I know there is in my body a nervous influence that plays up and down my nerves like electricity on the telegraphic wires. I never saw it; I have felt it. Suppose that I could take that out. Suppose that just there is my man made up of nerves, and just yonder my man made up of red bioplasts; and that I have right here what I call the nervous influence separated entirely from flesh. You would not see it, would you? But would not this be a man very much more than that? or that? What if death thus dissolves the innermost from the outermost? We absolutely know that that nervous influence is there. We know, also, that there is something behind the action of these bioplasts. If I could take out this, which is a still finer thing than what we call nervous influence, and could have it held up here, I do not know but that it would be ethereal enough to go into heaven, for the Bible itself speaks of a spiritual body. You know it is there, this nervous influence. You know it is there, this power behind the bioplasts. When the Bible speaks of a spiritual body, it does not imply that the soul is material; it does not teach materialism at all; it simply implies that the soul has a glorified enswathement, which will accompany it in the next world. I believe that it is a distinct biblical doctrine that there is a spiritual body as there is a natural body, and that the former has extraordinary powers. It is a body which apparently makes nothing of passing through what we call ordinary matter. Our Lord had that body after His resurrection. He appeared suddenly in the midst of His disciples, although the doors were shut. He had on Him the scars that were not washed out, and that in heaven had not grown out. I tread here upon the edge of immortal mysteries; but the great proposition I wish to emphasise is, that science, in the name of the microscope and the scalpel, begins to whisper what revelation ages ago uttered in thunders, that there is a spiritual body with glorious capacities.

This is a sad world if death is a leap in the dark. But, gentlemen, we are following haughty axiomatic certainty. In clear and cool precision, science comes to the idea of a spiritual body. We must not forget that this conclusion is proclaimed in the name of philosophy of the severest sort. The verdict is scientific; it happens also to be biblical. Is it the worse for that? It is more and more evident, as the training of the world advances, that everything funda-

mentally biblical is scientific, and that everything fundamentally scientific is biblical.

In every leaf on the summer boughs there is a network which may be dissolved out of the verdant portion, and yet retain as a ghost the shape which it gave the leaf from which it came. In every human form, growing as a leaf on the tree Igdrasil, we know that network lies within network. Each web of organs, if taken separately, would have a form like that of man. There might be placed by itself the muscular portion of the human form, or the osseous portion, or the veins, or the arteries, and each would show the human shape. If the nerves could be dissolved out, and held up here, they would be a white form, coincident everywhere with the mysterious, human, physical outline. But the invisible nervous force is more ethereal than this ghost of nerves. The fluid in which the nervous waves occur is finer than the nervous filaments. What if it could be separated from its environment, and held up here? It could not be seen; it could not be touched. The hand might be passed through it; the eyes of men in their present state would detect no trace of it; but it would be there.

Your Ulricis, your Lotzes, your Beales, adhere unflinchingly to the scientific method. The self-evident axiom, that every change must have an adequate cause, requires us to hold that there exists behind the nerves a non-atomic, ethereal enswathement for the soul, which death dissolves out from all complex contact with mere flesh, and which death, thus unfettering without disembodying, leaves free before God for all the development with which God can inspire it.

"Then long Eternity shall greet our bliss
With an individual kiss,
And joy shall overtake us as a flood,
When everything that is sincerely good
And perfectly divine,
With Truth and Peace and Love, shall ever shine
About the supreme throne
Of Him to whose happy-making sight, alone,
When once our heavenly-guided souls shall climb
Then, all this earthly grossness quit,
Attired in stars we shall for ever sit,
Triumphing over Death and Chance and thee, O Time!"

MILTON.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE object of the Boston Monday Lectures is to present the results of the freshest German, English, and American scholarship on the more important and difficult topics concerning the relation of Religion and Science.

They were begun in the Meionaon in 1875; and the audiences, gathered at noon on Mondays, were of such size as to need to be transferred to Park-street Church in October, 1876, and thence to Tremont Temple, which was often more than full during the winter of 1876-77.

The audiences contained large numbers of ministers, teachers, and other educated men.

The thirty-five lectures of the last season were stenographically reported in the Boston Daily Advertiser, and most of them were republished in full in New York and London.

The lectures on Biology oppose the materialistic, and not the theistic, theory of Evolution.

The lectures on Transcendentalism contain a discussion of the views of Theodore Parker.

The Committee having charge of the Boston Monday Lectures for the coming year consists of the following gentlemen :—

His Excellency A. H. Rice, Governor of Massachusetts.
Hon. Alpheus Hardy.
Hon. William Claflin, Ex-Governor of Massachusetts.
Prof. E. P. Gould, Newton Theological Institute.
Rev. J. L. Withrow, D.D.
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Right Rev. Bishop Foster.
Prof. L. T. Townsend, Boston University.
Robert Gilchrist.
Samuel Johnson.
Rev. Z. Gray, D.D., Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.
William B. Merrill.
M. H. Sargent.
M. R. Deming, *Secretary*.
Henry F. Durant, *Chairman*.

Boston, September, 1877.

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TRANSCENDENTALISM.

I.

INTUITION, INSTINCT, EXPERIMENT, SYLLOGISM, AS TESTS OF TRUTH.

The Fifty-ninth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"He would be thought void of common sense who, asked on the one side or on the other, went to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be."—LOCKE, *Essay*, Book I, chap. iii.

"There is here a confession, the importance of which has been observed neither by Locke nor his antagonists. In thus appealing to common sense or intellect, he was in fact surrendering his thesis that all our knowledge is an educt from experience. For in admitting, as he here virtually does, that experience must ultimately ground its procedure on the laws of intellect, he admits that intellect contains principles of judgment, on which experience being dependent, cannot possibly be their precursor or their cause. What Locke here calls common sense he elsewhere denominates intuition."—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, *Reid's Collected Writings*, vol. II. p. 784.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

UNLESS the children of the dangerous and perishing classes are to blame for being born, they, at least, whatever we say of their parents, cannot be shut out from a victorious place in our pity. This is a festal day; and, if the Author of Christianity were on the groaning earth to make calls, probably the most of them, in the cities of the world, would be in unfashionable places. Why should we be so shy of the visitation in person of death-traps and rookeries? There is ineffable authority and example for going from house to house doing good. Visits thus enjoined cannot be made by proxy. No doubt organized and unorganized charity is usually, in its modern form, a result of the Christian spirit. Celsus said Christianity could not be divine, because it cared insanely for the poor. Old Rome's mood toward the miserable the world of culture now loathes. Philanthropy swells the tide of

commiseration for the unfortunate; and sometimes the most erratic opinions have been conjoined with the soundest behaviour toward those who have hardly where to lay their heads. Orthodoxy itself is often shy of personal contact with the very wretched, and goes from house to house by proxy. Organized charity, we think, is the whole of our duty. But Thomas Guthrie, and Dr. Chalmers, and all who have had much to do with the perishing classes in great cities, have taught the Church that, when men are sick and in prison, they are to be visited. I know a great orator in this city, whose name is a power from sea to sea, and whose silvering honoured head often bends over couch and cradle in the most miserable houses. It is safe to go to the North End now; it is not safe in the fiercest heats of summer.

Our North winds in winter strike us all the way from Boothia Felix, and their iciness seals some fever-dens, whose doors swing wide open every summer under the guardianship, as one must suppose, of the negligence of the Board of Health. I am not speaking at random; for, according to the city reports, there were in 1876 sixty-eight houses condemned as not conforming to the sanitary regulations of this city; and of these only seventeen were really vacated; the rest were whitewashed. The truth is, that if there were ten Boards of Health, and if they all did their duty, we could not avoid having a large population born into the world miserable.

This nation now has one-fifth of its population in cities. What are we to do with the social barriers which allow a great city to be not only a great world, but ten great worlds, in which one world does not care at all for what the other worlds are doing?

In every great town there are six or ten strata in society; and it is, one would think, a hundred miles from the fashionable to the unfashionable side of a single brick in a wall. Superfluity and squalor know absolutely nothing of each other—such is the utter negligence of the duty of visiting the poor, in any other way than by agents. I do not undervalue these, nor any part of the great charities of our times; but there is no complete theory for the permanent relief of the poor without personal visitation. Go from street to street with the city missionary or the best of the police; but sometimes go all alone, and with your own eyes see the poor in the attics, and study the absolutely unspeakable conditions of their daily lives. Not long ago, I was in a suffocated tenement-house where five or six points on which I could put my hand were in boldest violation of the laws which it is the business of the Board of Health in this city to see executed. The death-rate of Boston in summer, in the North End, is often above thirty-five in the thousand. The registrar-general of England says that any deaths above seventeen in a thousand are unnecessary. Live one day where the children of the perishing poor live, and ask what it is to live there always. I know a scholar of heroic temper and of exquisite culture, who recently resolved to live with the poor in a stifling part of this city, and who, after repeated and desperate illness, was obliged to move his home off the ground in order to avoid the necessity of putting his body underground. You cannot understand the poor by newspapers, nor even by novels.

Our distant lavender touches of the miserable show the barbaric blood yet in our veins. Going about from house to house doing good is a great Christian measure permanently instituted by a typical example, which in a better age may be remembered, and be the foundation of a nobility not yet visible on the planet. There was One who washed His disciples' feet, and in that act founded an order of nobility; but this second symbolic act seems not to be apprehended even yet by some good Samaritans—in gloves. The way from Jerusalem to Jericho lies now through the city slums; and, for many an age to come, there will be the spot where men oftenest will be left stripped and

sore and half dead. We want all good influences of the parlour and press, from literature and the interior church of the church, to work upon the problem of saving the perishing and dangerous classes in great cities.

> Poor naked wretches, whereso'er you are,
> That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
> How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
> Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you,
> From seasons such as this? Take physic, pomp
> Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
> That thou mayst shake the superflux to them,
> And show the heavens more just.
>
> LEAR, act iii. sc. iv.

THE LECTURE.

NAPOLEON I., one day riding in advance of his army, came to a bridgeless river, which it was necessary that his hosts should immediately cross on a forced march. "Tell me," said the great emperor to his engineer, "the breadth of this stream."—"Sire, I cannot," was the reply. "My scientific instruments are with the army; and we are ten miles ahead of it."—"Measure the breadth of this stream instantly."—"Sire, be reasonable."—"Ascertain at once the width of this river, or you shall be deposed from your office." The engineer drew down the cap-piece on his helmet till the edge of it just touched the opposite bank; and then holding himself erect, turned upon his heel, and noticed where the cap-piece touched the bank on which he stood. He then paced the distance from his position to the latter point, and turned to the emperor saying, "This is the breadth of the stream approximately;" and he was promoted. Now, in all marches of thought, metaphysical science measures the breadth of streams with scientific instruments indeed; but it uses no principles which men of common sense, at their firesides, or in politics, or before juries, or in business, do not recognise as authoritative. Your Napoleon's engineer, after his instruments came up, no doubt made a more accurate measurement than he had done by his skilful expedient of common sense: but the new and exact determination of the distance must have proceeded upon precisely the same principle by which he had made his approximate calculation. Both the estimates would turn on the scientific certainty that the radii of a circle are equal. The distance to the opposite bank is one radius in a circle of which the position of the observer is the centre; and, if now he wheels round the radius, of course the radius here is just as long as the radius yonder; for things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other. The most exact instruments ever invented would have behind them only that incontrovertible, axiomatic, self-evident truth. You can measure a river in the way Napoleon's

engineer did; but you think that research of the metaphysical sort has something in it incomprehensible, mystical, and suspicious. Let us not stand in too much awe of the theodolite. As the engineer's final measurement of the river with scientific instruments was simply his pacing made exact, so metaphysics is simply common sense made exact.

After three months on Evolution, Materialism, and Immortality the current of discussion in this Lectureship enters on a new vista; but the river is the same, for it flows out of that tropical land of Biology we have been traversing together, and the chief theme is always the relations of religion and science. It will yet be our duty to meditate on the application of the principle of evolution to philosophy, and especially to ethics; for I am now bidding adieu to Materialism as a topic, and am approaching Transcendentalism, and so Conscience, and so the natural conditions of the peace of the soul with itself and with the plan which inheres in the nature of things—that is, with God.

Here, as everywhere, religious science, like every other science, asks you to grant nothing but axiomatic truth. In considering Transcendentalism, or axiomatic tests of certainty, I must seem, therefore, to be almost transcendentalistic at first; for such is and must be all sound thought, up to a certain point. I am no pantheist; I am no individualist; I am no mere theist, I hope; but so far forth as Transcendentalism founds itself upon what Aristotle and Kant and Hamilton have called intuition, self-evident truths, axioms, first principles, I am willing to call myself a transcendentalist, not of the rationalistic, but of the Kantian, Hamiltonian, and Coleridgian school.

Both wings of the army front of Transcendentalism must be studied, and it will be found that it is only the left or rationalistic wing that has been of late thrown into panic. That serried and scattered and very brave host made bold marches in Boston thirty years ago. Its leaders now confess that it has been substantially defeated. *It is time for the right wing and centre to move.* This portion of Transcendentalism never broke with Christianity: the other portion did; and to-day, according to its own admission, is not only not victorious, but dispirited (Frothingham, Transcendentalism in New England, *passim*). Its historians speak of it as a thing of the past. Self-evident truths, axioms, necessary belief however, can never go out of fashion; they can be opposed only being assumed; they are a dateless and eternal noon.

Mr. Emerson's theoretical tests of truth are the intuitions or axioms of the soul, and undoubtedly these are the tests which the acutest philosophical science of the world now justifies, and has

always justified. Whether the tests themselves justify pantheism, whether they give countenance to individualism like Mr. Emerson's, whether they establish mere theism, are grave and great questions that cannot be discussed here and now, but which we shall reach at the proper time. The whole of metaphysics, the whole philosophy of evolution, the whole of materialism, the whole of everything that calls itself scientific, must submit itself to certain first truths; and therefore on these first truths we must fasten the microscope with all the eagerness of those who wish to feel beneath them, somewhere in the yeasting foam of modern speculation, a deck that is tremorless.

What is an intuition?

Theodore Parker held that we have an "instinctive intuition" of the Divine Existence, and of Immortality, and of the authority of the moral law. He constantly assumed that these facts are intuitive or self-evident, and as incontrovertible as the proposition that every change must have an adequate cause. He used the word "intuition" carelessly, and did not carefully distinguish *intuition* and *instinct* from each other. Very often, in otherwise brilliant literature, this vacillating and obscure use of the word "intuition" leads to most mischievous confusion of thought. We are told that woman's intuitions are better in many respects than man's; we are assured that the intuitions of childhood are purer, clearer, or more nearly unadulterated, than those of middle life: in short, our popular, and many of our scientific discussions, so far as these proceed from persons who have had no distinctively metaphysical training, use the word "intuition" with the most bewildering looseness. Individualism is justified by intuition; pantheism, mere theism, orthodoxy, or whatever a man feels, or seems to feel, to be true, he says his intuitions affirm. There are those who confuse intuition, not only with instinct, but with mere insight; that is, with an imaginative or reflective swiftness or emotional force, which, by glancing at truth, catches its outlines better than by laborious plodding. The loftiest arrogance of individualism justifies itself often simply by calling its idiosyncrasies intuitions. In all ages mysticism of the devoutest school has frequently made the same wild mistake. Gleams of radiance across the inner heavens of the great poetic souls of the race we must reverence; but shooting-stars are not to be confounded with the eternally fixed constellations. Undoubtedly a single flash of lightning from the swart, thunderous summer midnight, often ingrains the memory of a landscape more durably on the memory than the beating of many summer noons; but even lightning glances are not intuitions.

Our first business, then, my friends, will be to obtain a distinct

definition of the strategic word "intuition." This is a scientific technical term; and, when correctly used as such, has outlines as clearly cut as those of a crystal.

We must approach the definition in a way that will carry all minds with us, step by step.

1. It is possible to imagine all the *articles* in this room to be annihilated, or not in existence.

You feel very sure, do you not, as you cast a glance on the capacities of your mind, that you can believe that these articles *might* never have existed; and so of all other objects that fill space? Orion flames in our skies now; but you can at least imagine that this constellation might never have been. The Seven Stars we can suppose to be annihilated. I do not mean that we can prove matter to be destructible, but that we can imagine its non-existence. You are entirely certain of your mental capacity to imagine the non-existence of any material object in any part of space.

2. It is impossible to imagine the *space* in this room to be annihilated, or not in existence.

Notice the strange fact that you cannot so much as imagine the annihilation of a corner of the space in this room. You bring down in thought the space from one corner, as you would roll up a thick curtain; but you have left space behind, up yonder in the corner. You lift up this floor and bring down the ceiling: but you have left space beneath and above. You draw in all four sides of this temple at once, and cause its dimensions to diminish equally in every direction; but in every direction you have left space. If you go out into infinite space with the best exorcism of your magic, if you whip it as Xerxes whipped the ocean, you will find your heaviest lashes as unavailing as his. No part of space can even be imagined not to be in existence. We cannot so much as imagine that the space through which Orion and the Seven Stars wander should not be; by no possibility can you in thought get rid of it, although you easily get rid of them. That is a very curious fact in the mind.

3. It is possible to suppose all the *events* since sunrise not to have taken place.

I know not but that at this moment the English fleet lately in the Bosphorus is floating across the purple ripples of the Piræus harbor at Athens, in sight of the Acropolis. It may be that the Russians are commencing a march upon Turkey. But whatever has happened since sunrise I can imagine not to have happened at all. It is perfectly easy for me, in thought, to vacate all time of all events. Anything that has taken place in time may be ima-

gined not to have taken place. We can imagine the non-existence of whatever we call an event.

4. It is impossible to suppose any portion of the *duration* from sunrise to the present moment not to have existed.

If you will try the experiment with yourselves, and analyze your minds, you will find that it is really impossible to think of any portion of duration as annihilated. You annihilate an hour, as you say; but there is a gap left, and it is an hour long. You annihilate an age in the flow of the eternities, and there is a gap of an age there. If you will simply notice your own thoughts, you will find that in this case, as in the case of space, we strike upon a most marvellous circumstance. The mind is so made, that it is not capable even of imagining the non-existence of time or of space. There are hundreds of proofs of this; and those who hold the materialistic philosophy do not deny the existence of this necessity in the human mind. They explain its origin and meaning in a way that I do not think clear at all; but they, with all men who understand their own mental operations, admit that all events and all objects we may annihilate in thought; but not space, not time. Moreover, we are convinced that always there was space, and always there will be; that always there was time, and always there will be.

5. It is *possible* to believe that any effect or change that has taken place might not have taken place.

6. It is *impossible* to believe that any change can have taken place without a cause.

This latter is an amazing but wholly incontrovertible fact in the mind.

Our idea of the connection of cause and effect is equally clear with our ideas concerning space and time; and the axiom which asserts that every change must have a sufficient cause is not a merely identical proposition either. I know that materialistic schools in philosophy are often saying that most axioms are simply equations between different expressions for the same thought. Whatever is, is. That, undoubtedly, is an identical proposition. It means simply, as John Stuart Mill said, that when any proposition is true in one form of words, we have a right to affirm the same thing in any other form of words. But take an axiom which is not an identical proposition, and that is admitted even by materialists not to be one: the proposition that the equals of equals are equal to each other.* You feel perfectly sure about that; you

* See Bain, Professor A., *Mental and Moral Science*, English edition, p. 187.

cannot be made to believe that that is not true. Take the proposition that every change not only *has*, but *must* have, an adequate cause, and that is by no means an identical proposition. What is beyond the verb there does not mean only what that does which is on the first side of the verb. An identical proposition is simply an equation: what is on the left side of the verb means just what that does which is on the right of the verb. But in the proposition that every change has and must have an adequate cause, these words on the right of the verb do not express just the meaning of the words on the left; and yet you are perfectly sure of the connection between these two phrases. Not only *has*, but *must*, you and all men put in there; and you are sure about that vast double assertion. For all time past, and all time to come, that is an axiom, you say, not only for this globe, but for the sun, and the Seven Stars, and Orion. You are sure about that truth; and, if you try ever so skilfully, you cannot make yourself believe but that every change must have an adequate cause; and yet, if you try to prove that proposition, you cannot do it by anything that does not assume it. It is not only evident: it is self-evident. It is not evident through any other truth. It is a primitive and not a derivative truth. It is a first truth. Nevertheless, although there is no demonstration of that proposition, except by looking directly on it, or the supremest kind of demonstration—absolute mental touch—you are sure that it is true not only here, but everywhere; not only now, but for ever.

7. The ideas of space and time are called in philosophy necessary ideas.

8. The belief in the connection of cause and effect is called in philosophy a necessary belief.

9. All real axioms are necessary truths.

10. All necessary truths are not only evident, but self-evident.

You may say that the proposition that it is two thousand feet from here to the gilded dome yonder is evident, but not that it is *self-evident*. You ascertain the distance by measurement and reasoning. But it is self-evident that the shortest distance between this point and that is a straight line. On that proposition you do not reason at all; and yet you are unalterably sure of it.

11. Self-evident and necessary truths are universally true; that is, everywhere and in all time.

We feel sure that it is, always was, and always will be true that a whole is greater than a part, and that the sums of equals are equals; that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. We are confident that these laws hold good here, and in Orion, and everywhere.

We arrive thus at an incisive definition :—

12. *An intuition is a truth self-evident, necessary, and universal. It is a proposition having these three traits,—self-evidence, necessity, and universality.*

13. Since Aristotle, these three have been the established tests of intuitive truths.*

14. An intuition is to be distinguished from an instinct. The latter is an impulse or propensity existing independent of instruction, and prior to experience.

15. An intuition is to be distinguished from insight, emotional, reflective, or poetic.

16. An intuition is to be distinguished from inspiration or illumination, sacred or secular.

17. In scientific discussion any use of the word "intuition" to denote other than a proposition marked by self-evidence, necessity, and universality, is a violation of established usage.

18. The supreme question of philosophy is whether the self-evident, necessary, and universal truths of the mind are derived from experience, or are a part of the constitution of man brought into activity by experience, but not derived from it, nor explicable by it. Do these self-evident truths arise *à priori*, or *à posteriori*; that is, do they exist before or only after experience?

Up to this point we are all agreed, and we have attained distinctness, I hope, as to our fundamental term. From this point onward we may not all agree; but I must venture these further propositions :—

19. This fundamental question has a new interest on account of the recent advances in philosophy, and especially in biology.

20. These advances, if the German as well as the English field is kept in view, favour the *à priori* or the intuitional school.

On one point there is no debate any longer; namely, that there are certain truths which are not only evident, but self-evident; which are absolutely necessary beliefs to the mind; and which are, therefore, universal, both in the sense of being explicitly or implicitly held by all sane men, and in that of being true in all time and in all places.† Immanuel Kant instituted a great inquiry, you remember, as to the origin of this particular class of truths, especially of those which are not identical propositions; and now

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* See Sir William Hamilton's celebrated *Note A, Appendix to Reid's Works.*

† See Mill's admissions *passim*, in his *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy.*

I beg leave to ask this audience whether it is not worth while for us—now that Germany has gone back to Immanuel Kant, and dares to-day build no metaphysical superstructure except on his foundations or their equivalents—to ask over again, in the light of all the recent advances of biological science, the supreme question: *Are the self-evident, necessary, and universal ideas of the mind derived solely from experience, or are they a part of the original furniture of the soul, not derived at all from sensuous impressions?*

I am quite aware that Mr. Frothingham of New York City, who in philosophy seems to have very little outlook beyond the North Sea, says that the Transcendentalism of which he is the historian has for the present had its day. Here is his graceful book; and, although it is only a sketch, there is large meaning between its lines in its plaintive undertone of failure. This coast of New England the Puritans made mellow soil for all seeds promising religious fruitfulness. Transcendentalism rooted itself swiftly here for that reason; but the effort was made to bring up that seed to the dignity of a tree without any sunlight from Christianity. Mr. Frothingham says the attempt has failed. I believe the seed, if it had had that light, might have lived longer. Let it never be forgotten that there are two classes of those who revere axiomatic truth—the Kantian, Hamiltonian, and Coleridgian on the one side, and the purely rationalistic on the other. Mr. Frothingham says New England Transcendentalism deliberately broke with Christianity; but in that remark he overlooks many revered names.

His own school in Transcendentalism was indeed proud to shut away from the growth of the seeds of intuitive truth the sunlight of Christianity. No oak has appeared in the twilight; but does this fact prove that the tree may not attain stately proportions if nourished by the noon? Already axiomatic truth is an oak that dreads no storms; and forests of it to-day stand in Germany, watered by the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Oder; and one day similar growths will rustle stalwart in New England, watered by the Mystic and the Charles; and the stately trees will stand on the Thames at last, in spite of its grimy mists. There will be for Intuitionalism in philosophy a great day, so soon as men see that the very latest philosophy knows that there is a soul external to the nervous mechanism, and that materialism must be laid aside as the result simply of lack of education.

21. The positions of Kant, Sir William Hamilton, and Coleridge, and not those of the rationalistic wing of Transcendentalism, are favoured by the researches of the most recent German philosophy.

22. As materialism and sensationalism assert, there is in the

spiritual part of man nothing which was not first in the physical sensations of the man.

23. Leibnitz long ago replied to this pretence by his famous and yet unanswered remark: "There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the sensations, *except the intellect itself.*" *

24. It is now proved that the soul is a force external to the nervous mechanism, and that the molecular motions of the particles of the latter are a closed circuit not transmutable into the activities of the former.

25. *We know now, therefore, that besides what furniture sensation and association give to the soul, there are in us, wholly independent of experience, the soul and the plan of the soul.*

26. Of this plan, which must be the basis of all philosophy relating to man, the self-evident, necessary, and universal truths, or the intuitions on the one hand, and the organic or constitutional instincts on the other, are a revelation.

27. *Every organic instinct must be assumed to have its correlate to match it.*

28. *Every really intuitive belief must be held to be correct.*

Proof that there is a soul is proof that there is a plan of the soul.

It is now a commonplace of science that the universality of law is incontrovertible. If the soul has an existence, it has a plan, for the universality of law requires that everything that exists should have a plan; and, if the soul exists, there is no doubt a plan according to which it was made, and according to which it should act.

When, therefore, we prove that the soul is something different from matter, or that it is as external to the nervous system as light to the eye, and the pulsations of the air to the ear; when physiological science, led by the Lotzes and Ulricis and Beales, asserts that the soul is possibly the occupant of a spiritual body; or when, not going as far as that, we simply say there is a soul,—we affirm by implication that it is made upon a plan. In the light of the best biological science of our day, it is incontrovertible that we have in man two things at least that did not originate in his senses; namely, the soul and the plan of the soul. That is not a proposition of small importance. It means that these necessary beliefs, these self-evident truths, these first principles, inhere in the very plan of our soul; and that they are, therefore, a supreme revelation to us from the Author of that plan.

Self-evident truths thus take hold of the roots of the world. If,

* Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, *nisi ipse intellectus.*—Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais.*

now, I raise the question whether instinctive beliefs, whether the first truths, which Aristotle said no man could desert and find surer, whether self-evident propositions, are not made self-evident of necessity by the very structure of our souls, you will not think I am running into mysticism, will you? You believe there is a soul, and you hold that everything is made on a plan; or that from the eyelash that looks on Orion, up to Orion itself, there is no escape from the universality of law; therefore, you must hold, that since everything is made on a plan, the soul itself is. Just as you know that your hand was not made to shut toward the back, but toward the front, you know that the soul is made according to a certain plan. If we can find out that plan, we can ascertain what is the best way in which to live. It is said we can know nothing; but do we not already know that there is a best way to live, and that it is best to live the best way, as assuredly as we know that our hand was not made to shut toward the back, but toward the front? I think I know that, in spite of all the wooden songs of materialism.

Germany yet listens to Immanuel Kant, and to those who, succeeding him with the microscope and scalpel, have carried biological knowledge far beyond its state in his time, and are now asserting not only the existence of the soul, and its independence of the body, but that, because law is universal, the soul must be made on a plan; and that, therefore, the supreme question of moral science and intellectual philosophy, and of all research that founds itself on mere organism, must be to ascertain what the plan of the soul is, in order that, through a knowledge of the plan, we may learn to conform to it.

What, then, must philosophy to-day call the supreme tests of truth?

In the ceiling of this temple will you imagine a great circle to be drawn, and will you call one quarter of it Intuition, another quarter Instinct, another Experiment, another Syllogism? Let our attempts at arriving at certitude all consist of endeavours to rise to the centre from which all these arcs are drawn. If you will show me what the intuitions are, and do that clearly, I can almost admit that you may strike the whole circle from simply a knowledge of that quadrant. I know that, if you can inductively determine any curve of the circle, you can then determine deductively the whole. But, my friends, we have seen too many failures in this high attempt to describe the circle of the universe by determining three points only. No doubt through any three points a circle may be drawn; but so vast is the circle of infinities and eternities, that our poor human compasses cannot be trusted, if we

use one of these quadrants only. *Let us be intuitionalists, but much else.* Let us test quadrant by quadrant around the whole circle of research. Let us conjoin the testimony of Intuition, Instinct, Experiment, and Syllogism. Show me accord between your quadrant of Intuition and your quadrant of Instinct, and between these two and the quadrant of Experiment,—this latter is the English quarter of the heavens, and that of Intuition is the German,—and between these three and the quadrant of Syllogism; and, with these four supreme tests of truth agreeing, I know enough for the cancelling of the orphanage of Doubt. I know not everything; but I assuredly can find a way through all multiplex labyrinths between God and man, and will with confidence ascend through the focus of the four quadrants into God's bosom.

Archbishop Whately said that the wider the circle of illumination, the greater the circle of surrounding darkness. Acknowledging that this is true, we shall be devoutly humble face to face with inexplicable portions of the universe. Nevertheless, let us, with the faith of Emerson, with the insight of Theodore Parker, with the acuteness of John Stuart Mill, as well as with the deadly precision of Kant, and of all clear and devout souls since the world began, hold unalterably, in this age of unrest and orphanage, that if these four quadrants agree, we may implicitly trust them as tests of truth. The supreme rules of certitude were never more visible than in our distracted day; and they are Intuition, Instinct, Experiment, Syllogism. Each is a subtle verification of every other. Let us image these vast quadrants of research as so many gigantic reflectors of a light not their own. At the focal point of the four, Religious Science, strictly so called, lights its immortal torch.

II.

TRANSCENDENTALISM IN NEW ENGLAND.

The Sixtieth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

Delivered in Tremont Temple.

"Φήμη δ'οὔποτε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται ἥν τινα πολλοὶ
Λαοὶ φημίζουσι· θεός νύ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή."
Hesiod: *Works and Days.*

"Let us do what we can to rekindle the smouldering, nigh-quenched fire on the altar. The remedy is first soul, and second soul, and evermore soul."—Emerson; *Address at Cambridge*, July 15, 1838.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

A serious man must rejoice to have Christianity tested philosophically, historically, and in every great way, but not in a certain small, light, and inwardly coarse way, of which the world has had enough, and is tired. Yesterday the most scholarly representative of what calls itself Free Religion told Boston that the Author of Christianity is historically only an idolized memory inwreathed with mythical fictions. Will you allow me to say that the leading universities of Germany, through their greatest specialists in exegetical and historical research, have decisively given up that opinion? Thirty or forty years ago it was proclaimed there in rationalistic lecture-rooms very emphatically: to-day such lecture-rooms are empty, and those of the opposing schools are crowded. On the stately grounds of Sans Souci, where Frederick the Great and Voltaire had called out to the culture of Europe, "*Ecrasez l'infame!*" King William and his queen lately entertained an Evangelical Alliance gathered from the Indus, the Nile, the Danube, the Rhine, the Thames, and the Mississippi. Histories of the rise and progress and decline of German Rationalism, and especially of the power of the Mythical Theory, have been appearing abundantly for the last fifteen years in the most learned portions of the literature of Germany. The incontrovertible fact is, that every prominent German university, except Heidelberg, is now under predominant evangelical influences. Heidelberg is nearly empty of theological students. Lord Bacon said that the best materials for prophecy are the unforced opinions of young men. Against twenty-four theological students at rationalistic Heidelberg there were lately at evangelical Halle two hundred and eighty-two; at evangelical Berlin two hundred and eighty; and at hyper-evangelical Leipsig four hundred and twelve.

Before certain recent discussions and discoveries on the field of research into the history of the origin of Christianity, the rationalistic lecture-rooms were crowded, and the evangelical empty. It is notorious that such teachers as Tholuck, Julius Müller, Dorner, Twesten, Ullmann, Lange, Rothe, and Tischendorf, most of whom began their professorships at their universities

with great unpopularity, on account of their opposition to rationalistic views, are now particularly honoured on that very account.*

We often have offered to us in Boston the crumbs from German philosophical tables; and, although I must not speak harshly, the truth must be told, namely, that the faithful in the uneducated ranks of scepticism—I do not deny that there are vast masses of Orthodoxy uneducated also—are not infrequently fed on cold remnants swept away with derision from the scholarly repasts of the world. If you open the biography of David Friedrich Strauss, by Zeller, his admiring friend, and a professor at Heidelberg, you will read these unqualified words: "Average theological liberalism pressed forward eagerly to renounce all compromising association with Strauss after he published the last statement of his mythical theory."† It did so under irresistible logical pressure, and especially because recent discoveries have carried back the dates of the New Testament literature fifty years.

Thirty years ago it used to be thought that the earliest date at which the New Testament literature can be shown to have been received as of equal authority with the Old was about A.D. 180; but, as all scholars will tell you, even Baur admitted that Paul's chief Epistles were genuine, and were written before the year 60. This admission is fatal to the mythical theory put forth by Strauss when he was a young man, and now for twenty years marked as juvenile by the best scholarship of Germany. These letters of Paul, written at that date, are incontrovertible proof that the leading traits of the character of the Author of Christianity, as given in the so-called mythical Gospels, were familiar to the Christian world within twenty-five years after His death.‡ There is now in the hands of scholars incontrovertible evidence that even the Gospels had acquired authority with the earliest churches as early as A.D. 125. Schenkel, Renan, Keim, Weizsäcker, and others widely removed from the traditional views, teach that the Fourth Gospel itself could not have appeared later than a few years after the beginning of the second century.§ These discoveries explain the new attitude of German scholarship. They carry back the indubitable traces of the New Testament literature more than fifty years. They shut the colossal shears of chronology upon the theories of Baur, Strauss, and Renan. They narrow by so much the previously too narrow room used by these theories to explain the growth of myths and legends. Strauss demands a century after the death of Paul for his imaginative additions to Christianity to grow up in. It is now established that not only not a century, but not a quarter of a century, can be had for this purpose. The upper date of A.D. 34, and the lower date of A.D. 60, as established by exact research, are the two merciless blades of the shears between which the latest and most deftly-woven web of doubt is cut in two. There is no room for that course of mythical development which the Tübingen school describes. As a sect in biblical criticism, this school has perished. Its history has been written in more than one tongue.‖

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* See article on the "Decline of Rationalism in the German Universities,' *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1875.

† See Zeller, Professor Eduard, *Strauss in his Life and Writings*, English translation, London, 1874, pp. 135, 141, 143.

‡ Thayer, Professor J. Henry, of Andover, *Boston Lectures*, 1871, p. 372.

§ See Fisher, Professor George P., *Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, 1870, *Preface*, p. xxxviii.

‖ Thayer, Professor J. Henry, *Criticism Confirmatory of the Gospels*, *Boston Lectures*, 1871, pp. 363, 364, 371.

Chevalier Bunsen once wrote to Thomas Arnold this incisive exclamation: "The idea of men writing mythic histories between the time of Livy and Tacitus, and Saint Paul mistaking such for realities!" * Paul had opportunity to know the truth, and was, besides, one of the boldest and acutest spirits of his own or of any age. *Was Paul a dupe?*

But who does not know the history of the defeat of sceptical school after sceptical school on the rationalistic side of the field of exegetical research? The naturalistic theory was swallowed by the mythical theory, and the mythical by the tendency theory, and the tendency by the legendary theory, and each of the four by time. Strauss laughs at Paulus, Baur at Strauss, Renan at Baur, the hour-glass at all. "Under his guidance," says Strauss of Paulus,† "we tumble into the mire; and assuredly dross, not gold, is the issue to which his method of interpretation generally leads." "Up to the present day," says Baur of Strauss,‡ "the mythical theory has been rejected by every man of education." And yet New York lips teach it here in modern Athens! "Insufficient," says Renan of Baur § "is what he leaves existing of the Gospels to account for the faith of the apostles." He makes the Pauline and Petrine factions account for the religion, and the religion account for the Pauline and Petrine factions. "Criticism has run all to leaves," said Strauss in his bitter disappointment at the failure of his final volume.

Appropriately was there carried on Richter's coffin to his grave a manuscript of his last work—a discussion in proof of the immortality of the soul: appropriately might there have been carried on Strauss's coffin to his grave his last work, restating his mythical theory, if only that theory had not, as every scholar knows, died and been buried before its author.

The supreme question concerning the origin of the New Testament literature is now, whether, in less than thirty years intervening between the death of the Author of Christianity and A.D. 60, in which Paul's Epistles are known to have become authorities, there is room enough in the age of Livy and Tacitus for the growth and inwreathing of mythical fictions around an idolized memory lying in the dim haze of the past. An unscholarly and discredited theory was presented to you yesterday, gracefully, but not forcefully.

Let us see what a vigorous and unpartisan mind says on the same topic. "I know men," said Napoleon at St. Helena—the record is authentic: read it in Liddons' Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of Our Lord, the best recent book on that theme—"I know men, and I tell you that Jesus of Nazareth was not a man." Daniel Webster, on his dying-bed, wrote on the marble of his tomb-stone "The Sermon on the Mount cannot be a merely human production." Renan was particularly cited to you yesterday; but when I went into the study of Professor Dorner, Schleiermacher's successor, at Berlin, and conversed with him about the greatest sceptics of Europe, I came to the name of Renan, and said, "What are we to think of his 'Life of Jesus'?"

"Das ist Nichts," he answered, and added no more. "That is nothing."

No doubt, in the fume and foam and froth of literary brilliancy serving a lost, bad cause, there may be iridescence, as well as in the enduring opal and pearl; but, while the colours seven flashed from the fragile spray are as beautiful as foam and froth, they are also just as substantial.

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* Arnold's *Life, Letter* cxliv.

† *New Life of Jesus*, English translation, p. 18.

‡ *Krit Unters. uber die canonische Evangel.*, 121, 40-71.

§ *Etude d'Hist. Rel.*, 163.

‖ See Zeller, *Life of Strauss*, p. 143.

THE LECTURE.

SIDE by side under the lindens in the great cemetery of Berlin lie Fichte and Hegel; and I am transcendentalist enough myself to have walked one lonely day, four miles, from the tombs of Neander and Schleiermacher, on the hill south of the city, to the quiet spot where the great philosophers of transcendentalism lie at rest till the heavens be no more. I treasure among the mementoes of travel some broad myrtle-leaves which I plucked from the sods that lie above these giants in philosophy; and, if I to-day cast a little ridicule upon the use some of their disciples have made of the great tenets of the masters, you will not suppose me to be irreverent towards any fountain-head of intuitive, axiomatic, self-evident truth. You wish, and I too, wish, cool draughts out of the Castalian spring of axioms. You are, and I too, am, thirsty for certainty; and I find it only in the sure four tests of truth,—intuition, instinct, experiment, syllogism,—all agreeing. But of the four tests, of course the first is chief, head and shoulders above all the rest.

Even in Germany the successors of the great transcendentalists have made sport for the ages; and no doubt here in New England it was to have been expected that there should be some sowing of "transcendental wild-oats." That phrase is the incisive language of a daughter of transcendentalism honoured by this generation, and likely to be honoured by many more. I am asking you to look to-day at the erratic side of a great movement, the right wing and centre of which I respect, but the left wing of which, or that which broke with Christianity, has brought upon itself self-confessed defeat.

What has been the outcome of breaking with Christianity in the name of intuitive truth in Germany? Take up the latest advices—which it is my duty, as an outlook committee for this audience, to keep before you—and you will find that Immanuel Hermann Fichte, the son of this man at whose grave I stood in Berlin, has just passed into the Unseen Holy; and that, as his last legacy, he left to the ages a work entitled, "Questions and Considerations concerning the Newest Form of Speculation." When, one day, the great Fichte heard the drums of Napoleon beat in the streets of Berlin, he closed a lecture by announcing that the next would be given when Prussia had become free; and then enlisted against the conqueror, and kept his word. The son has had a more quiet life than the father; but he has given himself exclusively to philosophy. The second Fichte was the founder of the "Journal

of Speculative Philosophy," now conducted by Ulrici and Wirth; and he has lived through much. He knew his father's system presumably well. Has it led to Pantheism or materialism with him, as it has with some others? *If Emerson has made pantheism a logical outcome of Fichte's teachings, what has Fichte's son made of them?* The son of the great Fichte has been a professor at Dusseldorf and Bonn, and, since 1842, at Tübingen. He is a specialist in German philosophy if ever there was one; and his latest production was a history of his own philosophical school. He attempted to show that the line of sound philosophy in Germany is represented by three great names—Leibnitz and Kant and Lotze. You do not care to have from me an outline of his work; and perhaps, therefore, you will allow me to read the summary of it given by your "North-American Review," for that certainly ought to be free from partisanship. Thus Fichte loftily writes to Zeller, the biographer of Strauss, and his positions are a sign of the times:—

"Ethical theism is now master of the situation. The attempt to lose sight of the personal God in nature, or to subordinate His transcendence over the universe to any power immanent in the universe, and especially the tendency to deny the theology of ethics, and to insist only upon the reign of force, are utterly absurd, and are meeting their just condemnation." *

Concord once listened to Germany. Will it continue to listen? Cambridge cannot show at the foot of her text-book pages five English names where she can show ten German. In the footnotes of learned works you will find German authorities a dozen times where you can find English six, or American three. Let us appeal to no temporary swirl of currents, but to a Gulf Stream. Of course history is apt to be misleading, unless we take it in long ranges. Read Sir William Hamilton's celebrated summary,† if you wish to see the whole gulf current of belief in self-evident truth since Aristotle. But here in Germany is a vast stretch of modern philosophical discussion, beginning with Leibnitz, running on through Kant, and so coming down to Lotze; and it is all on the line of intuitive truth, and it never has broken with Christianity, nor been drawn into either the Charybdis of materialism or the Scylla of pantheism.

The latest and acutest historian of German theology, Schwartz of Gotha, says that Strauss designates not so much a beginning as

* *North-American Review*, January, 1877, p. 147.
† *Note A, Appendix to* Reid's *works.*

an end, and that the supreme lack in his system is twofold—the absence of historical insight and of religious sensibility. Now, I will not deny that rationalism in New England, with eight generations of Puritan culture behind it, has often shown religious sensitiveness. Some transcendentalists who have broken with Christianity I reverence so far forth as they retain here in New England a degree of religious sensibility which is often utterly unknown among rationalists abroad. Heaven cause my tongue to cleave to the roof of my mouth if ever I say ought ironical, or in any way derogatory, of that consciousness of God which underlies the vigour of Theodore Parker, which is the transfiguring thing in Emerson, and which, very much further down in the list of those who are shy of Christianity, is yet the glory of their thinking, and of their reverence for art, and is especially the strength of their philanthropic endeavours! We have no France for a neighbour; wars have not stormed over America as they have over Europe; and it cannot yet be said, even of our erratics, as undoubtedly it can be of many French and German ones, that they have lost the consciousness of God.

What is Transcendentalism?

You will not suspect me of possessing the mood of that acute teacher, who, on the deck of a Mississippi steamer, was asked this question, and replied, "See the holes made in the bank yonder by the swallows. Take away the bank and leave the apertures, and that is Transcendentalism." The answer to this is the certainty that we are all bank-swallows. The right wing and the centre of this social, twittering human race live in these apertures, as well as the left wing; and it would be of little avail to ridicule the self-evident truths on which our own peace depends. I affirm simply that Transcendentalism of the left wing has not been consistent with Transcendentalism itself.

My general proposition is, that rationalistic Transcendentalism in New England is not Transcendentalism, but, at the last analysis, Individualism.

Scholars will find that on this occasion, as on many others, discussion here is purposely very elementary.

1. The plan of the physical organism is not in the food by which the organism is sustained.

2. The mechanism by which the assimilation of food is effected exists before the food is received.

3. But, until the food is received, that mechanism does not come into operation.

4. The plan of the spiritual organism is not in the impressions received through sensation and association.

5. The fundamental laws of thought exist in the plan of the soul anterior to all sensation or association.

6. But they are brought into operation only by experience through sensation and association.

7. It is absurd to say that the plan of the body is produced by its food.

8. It is equally absurd to say that the plan, or fundamental intuitive beliefs of the soul, are produced by sensation and association.

9. Therefore, as the plan of the body does not have its origin in the food of the body, so the plan of the mind does not have its origin in the food of the mind.

You receive food, and a certain plan in your physical organism distributes it after it is received, assimilates it, and you are entirely sure that the mechanism involved in this process exists before the food. It may be that every part of my physical system is made up of food and drink which I have taken, or of air which I have breathed; and yet there is one thing in me that the food did not give me, or the air; and that is the plan of my physical organism. Not in the gases, not in the fluids, not in the solids, was there the plan of these lenses in the eye, or of this harp of three thousand strings in the ear.

Besides all the materials which go to make up a watch, you must have the plan of the watch. If I were to place a book on my right here, and then take another copy of the book and tear it into shreds, and cast these down on the left, it would not be lawful to say that I have on one side the same that I have on the other. In one case the volume is arranged in an intelligible order: in the other it is chaotic. Besides the letters, we must have the co-ordination of the letters in the finished volume. So in man's organism it is perfectly evident that the food which we eat, and which does, indeed, build everything in us, is not us; for the plan of us is something existing before that food enters the system, and that plan separates the different elements, and distributes them in such a way as to bring out the peculiarities of each individual organism.

Now, whether or not you admit that there is a spiritual organism behind the physical—whether or not you agree with your Beales and Lotzes and Ulricis in asserting that the scientific method requires that we should suppose that there is in us a spiritual organism which weaves the physical—you will at least admit that, so far as the individual experience is concerned, we have within us laws fundamental, organic, and if not innate, at least connate. They came into the world with us; they are a part of the plan on

which we are made. When we touch the external world with the outer senses, and the inner world with the inner senses, no doubt food is coming to our souls; but that plan is the law according to which all our experiences through sensation and association are distributed.

10. The school of sensationalism in philosophy maintains that the soul's laws are only an accumulation of inheritances.

11. To that school, self-evident truths themselves are simply those which result from an unvarying and the largest experience; or those which have been deeply engraven on our physical organisms by the uniform sensations of our whole line of ancestors back to the earliest and simplest form of life.

12. Human experience cannot embrace all space and time.

13. Sensationalism in philosophy, therefore, which holds that all the intuitive or axiomatic truths arise from experience, must deny that we can be sure that these truths are true in all space and time.

14. But we are thus sure; and sensationalism is wrecked on its palpable inability to explain by experience this confessed certainty.

Face to face with this inadequate explanation which evolution offers for the self-evident, necessary, and universal truths of the soul, let us look at the worst.

It matters to me very little how my eyes came into existence, if only they see accurately. You say conscience was once only a bit of sensitive matter in a speck of jelly. You affirm that, by the law of the survival of the fittest, in the struggle of many jelly-specks with each other for existence, one peculiarly vigorous jelly-speck obtained the advantage of its brethren, and so became the progenitor of many vigorous jelly-specks. Then these vigorous jelly-specks made new war on each other; and individuals, according to the law of heredity with variation, having now and then fortunate endowments, survived, and transmitted these, to become better and better, until the jelly-specks produce the earliest seaweed. By-and-bye a mollusk appears, under the law of the survival of the fittest, and then higher and higher forms, till at last, through infinite chance and mischance, man is produced. Somewhere and somehow the jelly-specks get not only intellect, not only artistic perception, but conscience and will, and this far-reaching longing for immortality, this sense that there is a Mind superior to ours on which we are dependent. Now, for a moment, admit that this theory of evolution, which Professor Dawson, in an article in the last number of the "International Review," on Huxley in New York, says will be regarded by the next age as one of the most

mysterious of illusions, is true, the supreme question yet remains —whether my conscience is authority?

Take something merely physical, like the eyes. When I was a jelly-speck of the more infirm sort, or at least when I was a fish, I saw something, and what I saw I saw. When I was a lichen, although I was not a sensitive-plant, I felt something, and what I felt I felt. So when, at last, these miraculous lenses began to appear, as the law of the survival of the fittest rough-hewed them age after age, I saw better and better; but what I saw I saw: and to-day I feel very sure that the deliverance of the eyes is accurate. I am not denying here any of the facts as to our gradual acquisition of the knowledge of distance and of dimension; that comes from the operation of all the senses; but we feel certain that what we see we see.

Suppose, then, that, in this grand ascent from the jelly-speck to the archangel, the process of evolution shall at last make our eyes as powerful as the best telescopes of the present day. It will yet plainly be true, will it not, that what we see we see? and as the eyes are now good within their range, so, when they become telescopic, they will be good within their range? Just so, even if we hold to the evolutionary hypothesis in its extremest claims, we must hold, that, if conscience was good for anything when it was rudimentary, it is good now in its higher stage of development. If by-and-bye it shall become telescopic, what it sees it will see. I will not give up for an instant the authority of *connate*, although you deny all *innate* truth. You may show me that fatalism is the result of your evolutionary hypothesis; you may prove to me that immortality cannot be maintained if your philosophy is true; you may, indeed, assert, as Häckel does, that "there is no God but necessity," if you are an evolutionist of the thorough-going type, that is, not only a Darwinian, but an Häckelian. But let Häckel's consistent atheistic evolutionism, which Germany rejects with scorn, be adopted, and it will yet remain true that there is a plan in man; and that while there is a plan in man, there will be a best way to live; and that, while there is a best way to live, it will be best to live the best way.

There is, however, no sign of the progress of the Häckelian theory of evolution toward general acceptance. On every side you are told that evolution is more and more the philosophy of science. But which form of the theory of evolution is meant? The Darwinian is *a* theory, the Häckelian is *the* theory, of evolution.

15. Observing our mental operations, we very easily convince ourselves that we are sure of the truth of some propositions, concerning which neither we nor the race have had experience.

16. If it be true that all these certainties that we call self-evident arise simply from experience, it must be shown that our certainties do not reach beyond our experience.

It is very sure, is it not, that the sun might rise to-morrow morning in the west? Neither we nor our ancestors have had any experience of its rising there. Space is a necessary idea, but the rising of the sun in the east is not; and yet our experience of the one is as invariable as that of the other. That blazing mass of the suns we call Orion might have its stellar points differently arranged; and yet I never saw Orion in any shape other than that which it now possesses. I am perfectly confident that the gems on the sword-hilt of Orion might be taken away, or never have been in existence; but I never yet saw Orion without seeing there the flashing of the jewels on the hilt of his sword.

John Stuart Mill would say, and so would George Henry Lewes, —whose greatest distinction, by the way, is, that he is the husband of Marian Evans, the authoress of "Daniel Deronda,"—that, although my own experience never has shown to me Orion in any other shape than that which it now possesses, perhaps my ability to give it another shape in thought may arise from some experience in the race behind me. We are told by the school of evolution that it is not our individual experience that explains our necessary ideas, but the transmitted experience of the race behind us. We have inherited nervous changes, from the whole range of the development of the species; and so, somewhere and somehow in the past, there must have been an experience which gives you the capacity to say that the sun may rise in the west, and that Orion might have another shape. But is it not tolerably sure that none of my grandfathers or great-grandfathers, back to the jelly-speck, ever saw the sun rise in the west? The human race never saw Orion in any other shape. The truth is, that experience goes altogether too short a distance to account for the wide range of such a certainty, as that every effect, not only here, but everywhere, must have a cause.

17. Experience does not teach what *must* be, but only what *is*, but we know that every change not only *has*, but *must* have, a cause.

I never had any experience in the Sun, or in the Seven Stars; I never paced about the Pole with Ursa Major, across the breadth of one of whose eye-lashes my imagination cannot pass without fainting; I know nothing of the thoughts of Sagittarius, as he bends his bow of fire in the southern heavens: but this I do know, that everywhere and in all time every change *must* have a cause. You are certain of the universality of every necessary truth. How are you to account for that certainty by any known experience?

18. *We cannot explain by experience a certainty that goes beyond experience.*

John Stuart Mill, perfectly honest and perfectly luminous, comes squarely up to this difficulty, and says in so many words, "There may be worlds in which two and two do not make four, and where a change need not have a cause." * So clearly does he see this objection, that, astounding some of his adherents, he made this very celebrated admission, which has done more to cripple the philosophy of sensationalism, probably, than any other event in its history for the last twenty-five years. Even mathematical axioms may be false. You and I, gentlemen, feel, and must feel, that this conclusion is arbitrary; that it is not true to the constitution of man; that we have within us something which asserts not only the present earthly certainty, that every change must have a cause, but that for ever and for ever, in all time to come, and backward through all time past, this law holds.

19. Everywhere, all exact science assumes the universal applicability of all true axioms in all time and in all places.

Rejecting in the name of exact science, therefore, Mill's startling paradox, we must conclude that we are not loyal to the indications of our own constitution, unless we say that there is in us a possibility of reaching certainty beyond experience. Now to do that is to reach a transcendental truth.

20. Transcendental truths are simply those necessary, self-evident, axiomatic truths which transcend experience. Transcendentalism is the science of such self-evident, axiomatic, necessary truths.

Kant gave this name to a part of his philosophy, and it is by no means a word of reproach. Of course I am treating Transcendentalism, not with an eye on New England merely, but with due outlook on this form of philosophy throughout the world, especially upon Coleridge and Wordsworth, Mansel and Maurice, and Sir William Hamilton, and Leibnitz, and Kant and Lotze. I am not taking Transcendentalism in that narrow meaning in which some opponents of it may have represented it to themselves. That every change, here and everywhere, not only has, but must have, a cause, is a transcendental truth; it transcends experience. So the certainty that here and everywhere things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other is a transcendental certainty. Our conviction in the moral field that sin can be a quality only of voluntary action is a transcendental fact. This

* Examination of Hamilton's *Philosophy*; see also Mill's *Logic*, book iii. chap. xxi.

moral axiom we feel is sure in all time and in all space. There are moral intuitions as well as intellectual. There are æsthetic intuitions, I believe; and they will yet produce a science of the beautiful, as those of the intellect and the conscience produce sciences of the true and the good. If man have no freedom of will, he cannot commit sins in the strict sense, for demerit implies free agency; and we feel that this is a moral certainty, and you cannot go behind it.

Coleridge complained much in his time of "that compendious philosophy which contrives a theory for spirit by nicknaming matter, and in a few hours can qualify its dullest disciples to explain the *omne scibile* by reducing all things to impressions, ideas, and sensations." * What would he have said to the recent attempt by Tyndall to nickname matter, and call it mind, or a substance with a spiritual and physical side? Only the other day, Lewes endeavoured to nickname sensation, and call it both the internal law of the soul and the external sense. Will you please listen to an amazing definition out of the latest, and, perhaps, the subtlest attempt to justify sensationalism in philosophy? "The sensational hypothesis is acceptable, if by sense we understand *sensibility and its laws of operation.* This obliterates the very distinction insisted on by the other school. It includes all psychical phenomena under the rubric of sensibility. It enables pyschological analysis to be consistent and exhaustive." †

This passage affirms, that, if you will say food is the body, food will explain the body. If you will take the metal which goes to make the watch as not only the metal, but the plan of the watch too, then your matter and your plan put together will be the watch. He wants sensation to mean sensibility and its laws; that is to say, he would have the very fundamental principles of our soul included in this term, which, thus interpreted, I should say, with Coleridge, is a nickname. Such a definition concedes much by implication; but Lewes concedes in so many words, that, "if by sense is meant simply the five senses, the reduction of all knowledge to a sensuous origin is absurd."

Such is the latest voice, my friends, from the opponents of the Intuitional school in philosophy; and it is substantially a confession, that, unless a new definition be given to sensation, the sensational philosophy must be given up. Stuart Mill affirmed that two and two might make seven in Orion, and that a change possibly might not have a cause in the North Star. He was forced

* *Biograph. Literaria*, chap. xii.
† Lewes's *Problems of Life and Mind*, 1874, vol. i. p. 208.

to no greater straits than the husband of George Eliot is, when he says that the only escape from the necessity of adopting the intuitional philosophy is to assume its definitions as those of the sensational school itself. Bloody, unjust exploits are often performed by lawless men on the battle-field of philosophy; but, after all, the ages like to see fair play. We must observe the rules of the game. When Greek wrestlers stood up together, the audience and the judges saw to it that the rules of the game were observed. These were defined rigidly. All religious science asks of scepticism, in this age or any other, is, that it will observe the laws of the scientific method. We must adhere to the rules of the game; and when established definitions are nicknamed, as they now are by materialism, suicide is confessed.

III.

THEODORE PARKER'S ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

The Sixty-first Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Si l'expérience interne immédiate pouvait nous tromper, il ne saurait y avoir pour moi aucune vérité de fait, j'ajoute ni de raison."—LEIBNITZ.

> "CORPUS enim per se communis deliquat esse,
> Sensus; quo nisi prima fides fundata valebit,
> Haud erit occultis de rebus quo referentes,
> Confirmare animi, quicquam ratione queamus."
>
> LUCRETIUS.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

IT was once my fortune in the city of Edinburgh to visit the famous room in which Burke and Hare committed fourteen murders by dropping men through a trap-door, and afterwards strangling them, that they might obtain human bodies to sell to physicians for medical purposes. Across the street from this classical cellar of horrors, there used to be an old tan-loft in the midst of a population one quarter of which was on the poor-roll, and another quarter measly with the unreportable vices. When Thomas Chalmers was a professor in the University of Edinburgh, he deliberately selected this verminous and murderous quarter as the spot in which to begin a crucial trial of a plan of his for the solution of the problem as to the management of the poor in great cities. It was his audacious belief that there is no population so degraded in any of our large towns, that it will not maintain Christian institutions if once these are fairly set on foot. Southward from the gray cliff on which Edinburgh's renowned historic castle stands, he took the district called the West Port, with a population of about two thousand, and divided it into twenty sub-districts, and appointed over each one a visitor, sometimes a lady, and sometimes a gentleman. It was the business of these angels of mercy to go once each week into every family, without exception, and to leave there, not often money, not always food, but an invitation to the children to attend the industrial and religious schools, and to parents to become members of the church of which Chalmers had the supreme courage to begin the formation in the old tan-loft, face to face with that room in which fourteen murders had been committed. This visitation was made thorough. Every person aided was taught to pay something, however little, for the support of the school and church opened for his benefit. A feeling of self-respect was thus systematically cultivated. This was an essential portion of the Chalmerian plan. The enterprise of founding a self-supporting church among the poor and vile

in the West Port of Edinburgh was in five years so successful, that, out of a hundred and thirty-two communicants, more than a hundred in the church were from the population of the West Port. Not a child of suitable age lived in the district and was not in school. A savings bank had been instituted, a washing-house had been opened, an industrial school had been maintained day and night in the secular portions of the week. Better than all, the entire expense of all these institutions, amounting to thirty thousand dollars a year, was paid by the West Port; and that improved section of paupers had money enough every year to contribute seventy pounds for benevolent purposes outside the borders of their own territory.

It was thought this enterprise would fail on Chalmers's death; but, so far from doing so, his famous territorial church is to-day in a flourishing condition, and has been extensively copied in Scotland. His plan of territorial visitation and self-supporting religious enterprises has become one of the best hopes of the poor in Scotland's great cities. I worshipped once in the West Port church, and found there the names of fifty or sixty church officers of various kinds posted up on the doors, and arranged in couples, with their specific districts for visitation definitely named on the bulletin. A hushed, crowded audience of the cleanly and respectable poor listened to a vigorous address, and made touching contributions for religious purposes. Mr. Tasker, the pastor whom Chalmers had chosen, said to me at his tea-table, "There is nae rat in yon kirk. I told the people at the first I would na minister to a congregation of paupers. Every steady attendant pays more or less, and so keeps up self-respect. He helps the poor most who helps them to help themselves. Yon kirk is self-supporting."

Chalmers did not live to see these larger results; but he saw enough to cause him to anticipate them; and he perfectly understood the vast political importance of the complex problem he had attacked. He foresaw that more and more the population of the world must mass itself in cities. His experiment he did not consider complete without aid from the civil arm, which ought to second the efforts of philanthropy by executing all righteous public law.

Most eloquently Chalmers wrote in his advancing years: "I would again implore the aid of the authorities for the removal of all these moral, and the aid of the Sanitary Board for the removal of all those physical, nuisances and discomforts which are found to exist within a territory so full of misery and vice at present, yet so full of promise for the future. *Could I gain this help from our men in power, and this co-operation from the Board of Health, then with the virtue which lies in education, and, above all, the hallowing influence of the gospel of Jesus Christ, I should look, though in humble dependence on the indispensable grace from on high, for such a result as, at least in its first beginnings, I could interpret into the streaks and dawnings of a better day; when, after the struggles and discomforts of thirty years, I might depart in peace, and leave the further prosecution of our enterprise with comfort and calmness in the hands of another generation.*"*

Chalmers's celebrated scheme for throttling the troubles of the poor and vicious in great towns embraced these three provisions:—

Territorial visitation, or systematic going about from house to house doing good.

Self-supporting benevolent and religious institutions among the needy and degraded.

The execution of righteous law against the tempters and fleecers of the poor.

Gentlemen, some of us here are young yet; and we have heard the departing

* See *Memoirs of Chalmers*, by Reverend William Hanna, London, 1859, chapter entitled "The West Port," p. 413.

footsteps of the great problem of slavery in our own land. We who have in expectation our brief careers are listening to the first heavy footfalls of a far more menacing problem, that concerning greed and fraud in politics, when the gigantic and crescent party-spoils of a land greater than Cæsar ever ruled are made the reward of merely party success. But behind that black angel, with his far-spreading Gehenna wings shadowing both our ocean shores, some of us who are looking forward, and are rash, as you think, can but notice the stealthy advance of another fell spirit with whom we must contend; and his name is The Metropolitan. He is the genius that presides over the neglect of the poor in great towns. He is the archfiend, who, as the growth of all means of intercommunication, causes the world to mass its population more and more in cities, breathes upon many fashionable churches the sirocco of luxury, and leaves them swinging in hammocks, attached, on the one side, to the Cross, and on the other to the forefinger of Mammon, and not easy even then, unless they are eloquently fanned, and sprinkled, as the Eastern host sprinkles his guest, with lavender ease. Meanwhile, the fiend Metropolitan Evil advances with a footfall that already sometimes rocks the continent, and yet it appears to be unheard. Now and then the cloven, ominous hoof breaks through the thin crust, and there starts up a blue flame, as at Paris in communism; but the light is unheeded. Twenty centuries will yet be obliged to look at it. One-fifth of the population of the United States is now in cities, and we had but one twenty-fifth in cities at the opening of the century. The disproportionate growth of great towns is a phenomenon of all civilized lands, and not simply of the United States. London increases faster than England, Berlin than Germany, as well as New York City than New York State, and Chicago than Illinois.

This last week in Boston, the American Social Science Association discussed work schools in cities,—a topic not likely to look empty to honest eyes. Much after Thomas Chalmers's plan, there was founded at the North End, yesterday, a biblical and evangelical, but wholly undenominational, church for the poor. It is a good sign.

Boston is now a crescent, stretching around the tip of the tongue of Massachusetts Bay, from Chelsea Beach to the Milton Hills. When you and I are here no longer, this growing young moon will embrace Mount Auburn, and line with its increasing light both shores of our azure sea for miles toward the sunrise. It is, however, unsafe to act upon the supposition, which some seem to harbour, that all the old peninsula here will be needed as a stately commercial exchange, and that the very poor can be crowded out of it into homes beyond a ferry or reached only by railway. The poorest of the poor must live very near their work. We want model lodging-houses for them, like the London Waterlow buildings, which pay six per cent. on their cost. For a more fortunate class we must have cheap houses outside municipal limits. But more than all we want self-supporting churches among the destitute and degraded.

Boston is more favourably situated than any other American city to show how democracy and Christianity can govern a great town well. First at the throat of Slavery, will Boston be the first American city to throttle the Metropolitan Evil?

Chalmers used to affirm that cities can be managed morally as well as the country-side, if their religious privileges are made as great in proportion to their population.

But, gentlemen, while we embrace every opportunity to call out the efforts of the church in personal visitation of the poor, and in the founding of self-supporting religious institutions, let us not forget the responsibility of the civil arm for the shutting up of the dens of temptation. If you will visit your more desolate quarters in this city—and the most infamously vicious are not at the North End—you will find reason to go home with something more sub-

stantial as your programme of future efforts than weak regrets, expressed at your fireside over æsthetic tea and your newspaper, about the lack of the execution of good laws here. Seventy-five millions of dollars in this city are engaged in the liquor traffic; and, if I could shut up the multitudinous doors to temptation, I might shut up the alms-houses. This is so trite a truth that you blame me for presenting it; but your Governor Andrew used to say that this truth is trite only because it is so superabundantly true and important as to have been repeated over and over.

You loathe the unjust judges of history; you place in pillories of infamy men whose duty it has been to execute law, and have not done it. Are you safe from such pillories? When we, as American freemen, give in our account before that bar where there is no shuffling, we do so as a population to whom the sword of justice was given largely in vain. We the people, and especially that professional class represented here, are entrusted with power, most of which is not a terror to evil-doers nor a praise to them who do well. Under the murky threats of the years ahead of us, it is the duty of the parlour, the pulpit, the press, politics, and the police—the five great powers of these modern ages—to join arms and go forward in one phalanx for the execution of all those just public enactments which shut places of temptation, and leave a man a good chance to be born right the second time by being born right the first time.

THE LECTURE.

Professor Tholuck, in his garden at Halle-on-the-Saale, once said to me, "The Tübingen school, as you know, is no longer in existence at Tübingen itself: as a sect in biblical criticism, it has perished: its history has been written in more than one language. Only a few years ago, however, we had six broad-backed Englishmen take their seats on the university benches at Tübingen, and ask to be taught Bauer's theology. But Professors Beck and Landerer and Palmer, who oppose that scheme of thought, now outgrown among our best scholars, told the sturdy sons of Britain that they must seek elsewhere for instruction of that sort; whereupon they turned their faces homeward, sadder, but wiser."

Theodore Parker was a scholar of the Tübingen school. His characteristic positions concerning the Bible are those which have seen battle and defeat of late in Germany. They are perfectly familiar to all who have studied that great range of criticism called the Tübingen exegetical biblical criticism. This had great influence about the time Parker was forming his opinions; and he began his public career by launching himself upon what time has proved to be only a reactionary eddy, and not the gulf-current, of scholarship.* His first work was a translation of De Wette. In his formative years of study the now outgrown Tübingen critics were his chief reading.

* See article on the "Decline of Rationalism in the German Universities," *Bib. Sacra*, October, 1875.

In philosophy, as distinguished from biblical research, we all see that Theodore Parker has founded no new school. His distinctive positions have no large following, even among our erratics. Mr. Frothingham of New York City, who is one of his biographers, and perhaps more nearly than any other man his successor, said in 1864, in the "North American Review," that he anticipates for Theodore Parker as a metaphysician no immortality.

Let me quiet your apprehensions, gentlemen, by affirming at the outset my reverence for Theodore Parker's anti-slavery principles. Theodore Parker's memory stands in the past as a statue. The rains, and biting sleet, and winds beat upon it. A part of the statue is of clay: a part is of bronze. The clay is his theological speculation: the bronze is his anti-slavery action. The clay will be washed away; already it crumbles. The bronze will endure; and, if men are of my mind, it will form a figure to be venerated.

What are the most essential positions of Theodore Parker's absolute religion?

1. That man has an instinctive intuition of the fact of the Divine existence.

2. That he has an instinctive intuition of the existence and authority of the moral law.

3. That he has an instinctive intuition of his own immortality.

4. That an infinitely perfect God is omnipresent or immanent in the world of matter and in that of spirit.

5. That this idea of the Divine Perfection and Immanence is unknown to both the Old Testament and the New, and to every popular theology.

6. That the accounts of miracles in the Bible are all untrustworthy.

7. That when we are free from the love of sin we are also free from the guilt of it.

8. That sin is the tripping of a child who is learning to walk, or a necessary, and, for the most part, inculpable stage in human progress.

A very ugly and dangerous set of propositions are these last four; a rather inspiring set are the first four: but all eight were Theodore Parker's.* Some of his hearers fed themselves on the former, some on the latter; and hence the opposite effects he seemed to produce in different cases. It was on the first four that he not doubtfully supposed himself to have been successful in founding what he called an absolute, or natural religion.

No other document written by Theodore Parker is so important,

* See Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. pp. 455, 470, 472.

as an exposition of his views, as that touching, but in places almost coarsely irreverent, letter sent from the West Indies to the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, after he had fled away from America to die. Nothing else in that letter, which he called "Parker's Apology for Himself," is as important as this central passage:—

"I found certain great primal intuitions of human nature, which depend on no logical process of demonstration, but are rather facts of consciousness given by the instinctive action of human nature itself. I will mention only the three most important which pertain to religion:—

"1. The instinctive intuition of the divine,—the consciousness that there is a God.

"2. The instinctive intuition of the just and right,—a consciousness that there is a moral law independent of our will, which we ought to keep.

"3. The instinctive intuition of the immortal,—a consciousness that the essential element of man, the principle of individuality, never dies.

"Here, then, was the foundation of religion laid in human nature itself, which neither the atheist nor the more pernicious bigot, with their sophisms of denial or affirmation, could move, or even shake. I had gone through the great spiritual trial of my life, telling no one of its hopes or fears; and I thought it a triumph that I had psychologically established these three things to my own satisfaction, and devised a scheme, which, to the scholar's mind, I thought could legitimate what was spontaneously given to all by the great primal instincts of mankind. . . . From the primitive facts of consciousness given by the power of instinctive intuition, I endeavoured to deduce the true notion of God, of justice, and futurity. Here I could draw from human nature, and not be hindered by the limitations of human history; but I know now, better than it was possible then how difficult is this work, and how often the inquirer mistakes his own subjective imagination for a fact of the universe. *It is for others to decide whether I have sometimes mistaken a little grain of brilliant dust in my telescope for a fixed star in heaven.*" *

Julius Müller, professor in the University of Halle, is commonly regarded now as the greatest theologian in the world. His chief book is a discussion of sin. From first to last, his scheme of natural religion is built with scientific exactness on self-evident, axiomatic, intuitive truth. The very rock on which Parker planted

* Weiss: *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 455

his foot is a corner-stone of the acutest evangelical theology of the globe to-day. Read Julius Müller's discussions * and you will find him more reverent than Theodore Parker toward intuitive, axiomatic, self-evident propositions of all kinds. He, however, has cleared the whole surface of the rock of which Parker, in his haste, saw but a part. Instead of building on that broader foundation a slight structure, he has begun the erection of a palace. He has been obliged to stretch its foundations out to correspond in every part with the once unsuspected extent of this whole support of natural adamant. Parker strangely overlooked the fact that we have an intuitive knowledge of sin as a fact in our personal experience. That knowledge must shape our philosophy. Building upon it, Julius Müller did not ask whether the rising walls he constructed would or would not meet, point for point, the walls of the celestial city, which, Revelation teaches, lay in the air above him. He did not look upward at all, but downward only, upon this revelation in the constitutional intuitions and instincts. He explored conscience. He brought to the light the surface of the whole of intuitive moral truth, and not merely that of a part of it. He built around its edges after the plan shown in the adamant itself. It turns out that to-day Germany calls that man her chief theologian, because it has found that these walls, rising from the adamant of axiomatic truth, wholly without regard to the foundations of the floating celestial city above, are conterminous and correspondent with those upper walls in every part, and that the two palaces are one.

It is a solemn provision of the courts of law, that a man under oath must tell the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. In the use of intuitions and instincts, experiment and syllogism, the thing I am chiefly anxious about, is, that we clear the whole platform before we begin to build. We must take the testimony of all the intuitions; we must be willing to look into the deliverance of all the instincts; we must neglect no part of man's experiments, continued, age after age, in his philanthropic and religious life; we must revere the syllogism everywhere. James Freeman Clarke has repeatedly pointed out that an inadequate use of our intuitive knowledge of the fact of sin in personal experience is a most searching and perhaps fatal flaw in Parker's scheme of thought. Give our intuitive knowledge of the fact of sin its proper place, and, if you are true to the scientific method, the fact that you are sick will make you ask for a physician. I am not asserting the sufficiency, but only the efficiency, of a wholly

* *Doctrine of Sin*, trans. in T. & T. Clark's Library, Edinburgh.

scientific, natural religion. Every day it becomes clearer to philosophical scholarship, that the whole deliverance of the Works is synonymous, in every vocal and in every whispered syallble, with the whole deliverance of the Word. Certain it is that the whole list of moral intuitions, of which Theodore Parker made use of but a part, is the basis of the acutest evangelical natural theology today. When I compare the structure that Theodore Parker erected here in Boston on a fragment of this admamant of axiomatic truth, it seems to me a careless cabin, as contrasted with Julius Müller's palatial work. What your New York palace, appointed in every part well, is to that wretched squatter's tenement, standing, it may be, face to face with it in the upper part of Manhattan Island yonder, such is the complete intuitional religious philosophy, compared with Theodore Parker's absolute religion.

What are the more important errors in Theodore Parker's system of thought?

1. It is possible to imagine that the soul is not immortal.

Every materialist here will of course grant me this proposition. I am willing to admit that I think it entirely possible to imagine the non-existence of the soul as a personality after death. The idea of the soul's immortality is, therefore, not a necessary idea. Of course spiritual substance, like material substance, we suppose to be indestructible; but, as a personality, the soul may at least be imagined to cease to exist. I cannot, however, so much as imagine that space should not exist, or that time should not, or that every change should not have a cause. There is a perfect incapacity in my mind to conceive of the annihilation of space or time: therefore it is perfectly clear that the idea of the soul's immortality is not a necessary idea in the same sense in which my ideas of space and time are necessary ideas.

Nor is this idea of immortality a universal idea, as that of space or time is. Some sane men appear to be without any confidence in immortality as a fact; but there never was a sound mind that did not act upon the practical supposition that every change must have a cause, and that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time in the same sense. Your urchin on Boston Common who holds a ball in his hand behind him, and who hears the assertion from some other urchin that the ball is in another place, knows better. He has the ball in his hand; and he is perfectly confident that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. You state that proposition to him, and he will stare at you with wide eyes. He knows nothing of the metaphysical statement: nevertheless, that proposition is in his possession implicitly, though not explicitly. He acts upon it with

perfect intelligence. He knows that the ball is in his hand, and that therefore that ball is not anywhere else. This is a self-evident, axiomatic, necessary belief, or an intuition in the scientific sense of the word. Not in that sense can we call the fact of immortality an intuitive truth.

We have an *instinctive anticipation of* existence after death. We can prove that. There is no real *intuition* of existence after death.

The proposition that the soul is immortal is therefore not marked by the three traits of intuitive truth,—self-evidence, necessity, and universality.

Only a slovenly scholarship could assert that this proposition is marked by these traits. Theodore Parker asserted, however, that the fact of immortality is an intuitive truth. This unsupported assertion was a corner-stone of his absolute religion.

You will, therefore, allow me to say that—

2. Theodore Parker did not carefully distinguish from each other *intuition* and *instinct*.

To blunder on that point is so common, that I shall be unable to convince you of the importance of error there, unless you take pains in your libraries to apply these tests of self-evidence, necessity, and universality to a certain class of truths, and see how the tests distinguish that class from every other set of propositions that you can imagine. Only those truths which show the traits of self-evidence, necessity, and universality, are intuitive. Loose popular speech may use the word intuition carelessly; but when a great reader like Theodore Parker confounds *instinct* and *intuition*, and speaks now about our having an intuition, and now of our possessing an instinctive intuition of the immortality of the soul, we must say that he is careless: for it is two thousand years now that self-evidence, necessity, and universality have been used as the tests of intuitive truth. Between an *instinct* and an *intuition* there is as palpable a distinction as between the right hand and the left; and to confuse the two, as Theodore Parker's deliberate speech does, is unscholarly to the degree of being slovenly. I put once before the chief authority of Harvard University in metaphysics the question whether metaphysical scholars have commonly classed immortality among the intuitive truths. He smiled, and said, "Who taught you that they have?"—"Why I have read," said I, "that there was once in Boston a religion built up on the idea that immortality is an intuition." And the smile became even broader, although the man was very liberal in his theology. "Theodore Parker," said he, "was not a consecutive, philosophical thinker. No metaphysician of repute has ever classed immortality among

the intuitive truths, although it has again and again been classed as a deliverance of our instincts."

3. It is not safe to assert, as Parker does, that the Divine Existence is a strictly intuitive truth.

Pace amantis! Peace to all lovers of the doctrine that belief in the Divine existence is intuitive! I wish to treat reverently that school of philosophy which asserts that we have an intuition, strictly so-called, of the fact that God exists. To me the Divine existence is evident; but it is not, strictly speaking, self-evident. It is evident by only one step of reasoning, and is the highest of derivative, but is not really a primitive, first truth, or axiomatic fact. It is sure as any axiom; but it is not an axiom that God is. I can, I think, imagine that God might not exist. I cannot imagine that space does not, or that time does not. I know that Sir Isaac Newton said that space and time are attributes, and that every attribute must inhere in some substance; and that if space and time are necessary existences, and are really objective to the mind, and are not merely a green color thrown upon the universe by the mental spectacles which we now wear, then God must be, for space and time must be. *Pace amantis*, once more! I know how many scholars agree in the opinion that time and space are merely necessary ideas, and not objectively real. They are in the colour of the glasses through which we look. The truth is, that recent philosophy more and more approaches the conclusion of Sir Isaac Newton, that space and time are objectively real. Dr. McCosh of Princeton, George Henry Lewes, materialistic though he is, and a score of other recent representatives of rival philosophical schools, regard space and time as mysterious somewhats, which very possibly have a real existence outside our spectacles. They are not simply necessary ideas, fixed colours in our spectacles, but something outside of us.

Now it is true that if space and time be objectively real, they imply the existence of something that is just as necessary in its existence, and just as eternal, as they. If they are qualities of anything, instead of mere colours in the lenses through which we look, there must be a substance that is necessary in its existence, eternal, and absolutely independent; and that can be only an infinitely perfect being. You cannot imagine the non-existence of space or time; you cannot think that they ever were not, or that they ever will cease to be; and so, if they are attributes, they are the attributes of a Being that was, and is, and is to come.

Many are now turning to that philosophy which the later and the older investigation supports, namely, that space and time are objectively real, and that this fact contains incontrovertible proof

of the Divine Self-Existence. But you derive that argument from the existence of space and time; you do not look directly upon the Divine Existence even then. There is a single step of reasoning; and so the truth, although evident, is not self-evident.

I know how many are puzzled to prove the Divine Self-Existence. Paley's argument from the watch, we are told by some who misunderstand it, proves too much. A design proves a designer? Yes. But must not God Himself, then, have had a designer, and his designer a designer, and his designer a designer, and so on for ever? This inquiry is familiar to religious science, under the name of the question as to the Infinite Series. The reply to all that tantalizing objection is, that intuitive truth demonstrates the existence of dependent being, and that there cannot be a dependent without an independent being. There cannot be a *here* without there being a *there*, can there? There cannot be a *before* without there being an *after*, can there? There cannot be an *upper* without there being an *under*, can there? If, therefore, I can prove there is a *here*, I can prove there is a *there;* if I can prove there is a *before*, I can prove there is an *after;* if I can prove there is an *upper*, I can prove there is an *under*. Just so, by logical necessity, there cannot be a *dependent* being without an *independent;* and therefore there is an Independent or Self-Existent Being.

Thus I must be cautious or modest enough not to assert that we have a direct intuition of the Divine Existence. This truth is instinctive, not intuitive. It seems to lie capsulate in all our highest instincts. Our sense of dependence and obligation—great facts, if barely scratched with the point of a scalpel of analysis—reveal Almighty God, and make the soul's cheeks pale. I cannot affirm, however, that the Divine Existence is self-evident, although it is evident as the noon.

Theodore Parker's assertion that the Divine Existence is known to us by intuition implies that this truth has the three traits of self-evidence, necessity, and universality.

Only a slovenly scholarship can assert that the truth possesses these traits.

On a score of other points it might be shown that Parker was misled, by not making a sharp distinction between instinct and intuition.

4. He did not carefully distinguish inspiration from illumination.

Once more: peace to the lovers of the doctrine that modern men of genius are inspired more or less—especially less!

There is a book composed of sixty-six pamphlets, written in

different ages, some of them barbarous; and I affirm that there are in the volume no adulterate moral elements. It is a winnowed book. Its winnowedness is a fact made tangible by ages of the world's experience. Of course I need not say to this distinguished audience, what Galileo said to his persecutors, that the Bible is given to teach how to go to heaven, and not how the heavens go. Do not suppose that inspiration guarantees infallibility in merely botanical truth. A small philosopher said to me once, "The Bible affirms that the mustard-seed is the smallest of all seeds. Now, there are seeds so small that they cannot be seen with the naked eye. Where, therefore, is your doctrine of inspiration?" I thought that man's mind was the smallest of all mustard-seeds. Inspiration is rightly defined in religious science as the gift of infallibility in teaching moral and religious truth. The Scriptures are given by inspiration in this sense, and therefore are profitable for what? For botany? That is not the record. They are profitable for reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness. They are a rule of religious, and not of botanical, faith and practice. My mustard-seed philosopher, like many another objector to the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scripture, appeared to be in ignorance of the definition of inspiration.

Perfect moral and religious winnowedness exists in the Bible, and in no other book in the world. Is there any other book the ages could absorb into their veins as they have the Bible, and feel nothing but health as the result?

Mr. Emerson told a convention of rationalists once, in this city, that the morality of the New Testament is scientific and perfect. But the morality of the New Testament is that of the Old. Yes, you say; but what of the imprecatory Psalms? A renowned professor, who, as Germany thinks, has done more for New England theology than any man since Jonathan Edwards, was once walking in this city with a clergyman of a radical faith, who objected to the doctrine that the Bible is inspired, and did so on the ground of the imprecatory Psalms. The replies of the usual kind were made; and it was presumed that David expressed the Divine purpose in praying that his enemies might be destroyed, and that he gave utterance only to the natural righteous indignation of conscience against unspeakable iniquity. But the doubter would not be satisfied. The two came at last to a newspaper bulletin, on which the words were written,—"Baltimore to be shelled at twelve o'clock." "I am glad of it," said the radical preacher; "I am glad of it."—"And so am I," said his companion, "but I hardly dare say so, for fear you will say I am uttering an imprecatory psalm."

One proof of the inspiration of the Bible is its perfect moral winnowedness; and there are a thousand other proofs. Inspiration must at least guarantee winnowedness; and I find no modern inspiration that guarantees even as little as that. I am not giving the proof of inspiration, but only illustrating the distinction between *inspiration* and *illumination*.

Why, our literati will probably bow down before Shakspeare as an inspired man, if that phrase is to be taken in the loose, misleading sense in which Parker used it. How often otherwise brilliant literature tells us that inspiration is of the same kind in all writers, sacred and profane, differing only in degree! Very well: if any modern man has been inspired, perhaps Shakspeare was. But is there moral winnowedness in his writings? Shakspeare's father was a high bailiff of Stratford-on-Avon: John Shakspeare, alderman, high bailiff, and justice of the peace, the worshipful,—these were Shakspeare's father's titles; and it was his business to execute the laws. But in 1552 he was fined for the unsavoury offence of allowing a heap of refuse to accumulate in front of his own door. The next year he repeated this violation of law.*

The son afterwards exhibited by fits much of his father's mind. I never read certain passages in Shakspeare without thinking of that experience of the high bailiff on Henley-street in Stratford. Nevertheless, although Shakspeare's mirror is so wide that it takes into its lower ranges the gutter and the feather-heads, it takes in, also, in its upper ranges, eternity itself. This great soul held the mirror up, not merely to time, but in some sense to the Unseen Holy. I reverence him fathomlessly, but not as a winnowed writer. "He never blotted a line," said Ben Jonson. "Would he had blotted a thousand!"

There is no winnowed writer outside of the Bible. You cannot put together out of the world a dozen, or six, to say nothing of sixty-six pamphlets, that shall contain, as the sixty-six in the Bible do, an harmonious system of religious truth, and no morally adulterate element. Where are there six volumes that could be stitched together, even from among those that Christianity has inspired, of which we can say they possess this lowest, and by no means exhaustive trait of true inspiration—perfect moral and religious winnowedness? The difference between illumination and inspiration is as vast as that between the east and west. Long enough we have heard, here in Boston, that all men are inspired more or less; and long enough have we learned that the confusion of inspiration

* White's *Shakspeare*, vol. i. p. 15.

and illumination with each other may work endless mischief, even when a man as honest as Theodore Parker endeavours to build up, after confusing them, a system of faith.

It is not unimportant to notice that our faith in inspiration, rightly defined, would not be touched at all, even if we were to prove a geological error in every verse of the first chapter of Genesis. I do not believe there is any geological error there. With Dana, with Guyot, with Pierce, with Dawson, we can hold that the record of the progress of events in the creation of the world is correct. If this is correct, it must have been inspired; for, unless it was taught to him from above, no man could have known the complex order accurately of events that occurred before man was. Dana says, in his last chapter of his Geology, "*This document in the first chapter of Genesis, if true, is of divine origin.* It is profoundly philosophical in the scheme of creation it presents. It is both true and divine. It is a declaration of authorship, both of creation and the Bible." * Read Thomas Hill's subtly powerful articles just issued in a book on "The Natural Sources of Theology," and you will find this ex-president of Harvard University, together with Professor Pierce, holding similar views. The biblical record states that light was created before the sun,—a most searching proof of inspiration; for we know now that the first shiver of the molecular atoms must have produced light; and the sun, according to the nebular hypothesis, must have come into existence long afterwards. But what if merely geological or botanical error, touching no religious truth, were found in the Bible, we should yet hold, that, in the first leaves of the Scriptures, we have most unspeakably important religious truth. They teach the spiritual origin of creation; they teach that man had a personal Creator; they show that in the beginning, God, an individual Will, brought into existence the heavens and the earth. I do not admit that scientific error has been proved against the Bible anywhere; but if an error in merely physical science, touching no religious truth, were proved, inspiration would yet stand unharmed. Parker's trouble with the Bible arose largely from his carelessness in definitions. Confusing intuition and instinct, and inspiration and illumination, he made almost as great mistakes as when he confused the *supernatural* with the *unnatural*.

Call up, gentlemen, that day when Theodore Parker left New York, and put in his Bible an Italian violet opposite the words, "I will be with thee in the great waters." I stood alone, at Florence, at the side of the grave of Elizabeth Barrett Browning,

* *Geology*, pp. 767, 770.

and looked on the grave of Theodore Parker. The sturdy Apennines gazed on the soft flow of the Arno; melodious murmurs whispered through the fatness of the olive-branches; there fell in deluges out of the unspeakable azure in the Italian sky the light of the sun and of the sun behind the sun. I remembered the culture of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and her faith. I could not forget how wide was her outlook upon the inner world as well as upon the outer, how subtle beyond comment her instincts and intuitions; and in my solitude I asked myself, which faith—hers, or his—was likely to be of most service to the world in the swirling tides of history, and which the best support to individual souls in the great waters on which we pass hence. I remembered tenderly the good there was in this man and in this woman; but I asked which had the better faith for service in great waters. Both loved the poor; there was in each one of these souls at birth a spark out of the empyrean; and, under that Italian azure, I asked which faith had been the most efficient in fanning that spark to flame. It seemed to me, at the side of those graves in Italy, that Elizabeth Barrett Browning, had she stood there alive, would have had eyes before which those of Theodore Parker would have fallen, to rise again only when possessed of her deeper vision. Strike out of existence that teaching which has come to us through the God in Christ, whom Elizabeth Barrett Browning worshipped, but whom Theodore Parker held to be a myth, or merely a man; strike out of existence that healing which is offered to the race in an ineffable Atonement, which in the solitudes of conscience may be scientifically known to be the desire of all nations; strike out of existence these truths,—and then, if the moral law which Parker glorified none too much continues its demands, you will have stricken out the solution of life's greatest enigma. Great is the law, said Theodore Parker. Yes, I know it is great, said Elizabeth Barrett Browning; I know that the law is spiritual; it is glorious; all you say of it I affirm with deeper emphasis: but I am carnal; I am not at peace before that law: *who shall deliver me?* Faithfulness to all the intuitions would have brought that man, as it brought this woman, to this supreme question, the resounding shore of our mightiest inner sea; and it would have given assured safety there in the last day for your reformer who disbelieved, as for your poetess who believed; and the safety would have been in this only possible answer: "I will be with thee in the great waters."

IV.

CARICATURED DEFINITIONS IN RELIGIOUS SCIENCE.

The Sixty-second Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship.

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"In natural philosophy there was no less sophistry, no less dispute and uncertainty, than in other sciences, until, about a century and a half ago, this science began to be built upon the foundation of clear definitions and self-evident axioms. Since that time, the science, as if watered with the dew of heaven, hath grown apace: disputes have ceased, truth hath prevailed, and the science hath received greater increase in two centuries than in two thousand years before."—REID: *Collected Writings*, vol. i. p. 219.

"It is well said by the old logicians, *Omnis intuitiva notitia est definitio;* that is, a view of the thing itself is its best definition. This is true both of the objects of sense and of the objects of self-consciousness."—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

If Belgium or Holland had two kings, we should loftily look down on those European states as illustrations of the effeteness of monarchical government. But South Carolina is twice as large as Belgium, and Louisiana three times as large as Holland, and each of these States has two legislatures elected in our centennial year. Nevertheless, face to face with our wide areas of Mexicanized politics, we loftily foster our pride, or lightly excuse ourselves from political duties, as if after us were to come the deluge. Something of a deluge, one would think, has already swept over us in a civil war; but it fell out of a cloud that was once thought to be not larger than a man's hand. A murky threat in it, indeed; but when that cloud had overspread all our national horizon, when its leagued massive thunders filled all our azure, when its forked zig-zag threats blazed above all business and bosoms, the best of us were yet doubtful whether there was to be much of a shower. The most popular orator of this nation I heard address a collegiate audience three days before Sumter fell; and, walking to the edge of the platform, he asked, "What is going to happen?" and then whispered, with his hand above his lips, "Just nothing at all."

Perhaps it is worth while to look a little at the murky threat of Mexicanization in portions of our politics; for who knows whether we are to be saved from all our difficulties by an *ex post facto* electoral law? Will troubles never come again? What if a presidential election as close as the last had taken place in the midst of our civil war? Will indecisive contests for political primacy in a territory greater than Cæsar governed never again tempt the gigantic contestants to fraud? Will colossal partisan spoils and political corruption soon cease to stand in the relation of cause and effect? Our fathers studied British precedents to avoid British dangers; but is it not high time to

begin to study American precedents in order to avoid American dangers? Are we now seeking to throttle the real causes of our civil distresses, or dealing only with a few of their effects? How long is intimidation to last on the Gulf? How long will the ignorant ballot be a threatening political fact in the slums of Northern cities?

Massachusetts, you say, is very highly cultured, and is outgrowing the evils that attend on the youth of republics. Are you sure that, when the population of Massachusetts is as dense as that of England, your Massachusetts laws will make everything smooth here? Has this Commonwealth a right to be proud of its exemption from illiteracy? There are here a million six hundred thousand people, and a hundred thousand of them are illiterates. Of a hundred thousands citizens in Massachusetts above ten years of age, and of seventy-seven thousand above twenty-one, it is true either that they cannot read or that they cannot write.

The days that are passing over us are serious in the last degree, because it is very evident that our present difficulties—with the ignorant ballot, and with intimidation and trickery in close elections, and with the atrocious rule that to political victors belong all political spoils—will grow. Certainly the perils arising from the ignorant ballot, and from greed and fraud in contests for spoils greater than Cæsar, Antony, and Lepidus fought for, will enlarge as cities grow more numerous and populous, and as political party patronage becomes fatter and vaster.

We may escape from intimidation at last, but not in your generation or mine. There will be, while we are in the world, whole ranges of States in which it will be at times hardly safe to vote against the will of the governing class, and where a perfectly free election will be the exception and not the rule.

Lord Macaulay, you know, in letters lately published, though written in 1858, predicted that whenever we have a population of two hundred to the square mile the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian parts of our civil polity will produce fatal effects. You say Macaulay is unduly full of tremor as to the future of republican institutions, and that France frightened him too much with her revolution; but he is exceedingly cautious. Europe has only eighty inhabitants to the square mile; and this historian says, that, when we have two hundred to the square mile, we shall be obliged to manage our politics on some other plan than that which supposes that all problems can be settled "by a majority of the citizens told by the head; that is to say, by the poorest and most ignorant part of society."

What do I want? Am I here to make a plea for aristocratic institutions? Massachusetts has a reading test: New York has not. It was my fortune, or misfortune, to be born in the Empire State, and it is a grievous thing to me to know that that vast commonwealth, which, above and west of the Highlands of the Hudson, is only a prolongation of New England, is politically under the heels of New York, below the Highlands, and would not be if the reading-test, which my State used to have, had been retained in the popular suffrage. In 1821 our State constitution was revised in New York; and Martin Van Buren, when the reading-test was stricken out, predicted precisely the metropolitan evils which have arisen from the ignorant ballot in New York City. Eighteen or twenty thousand voters in every municipal election in New York cannot read or write; and they are a make-weight sufficient, in the hands of a few astute and unscrupulous men, to determine the result of any ordinary political contest in that city.

Drop out her twenty thousand ignorant ballots, and New York City, politicians say, could with no great difficulty be restored to the control of her industrious and intelligent classes. If New York were London, and if her igno-

rant ballot were large in proportion to her size, not merely New York State, but, I fear, New England, would be under the heels of the lower half of New York City.

What are we to do about these things? Civil-service reform is up for discussion from sea to sea; and why should not President Grant's repeated official words on the ballot be also up in this serious time for public thought? In this distinguished audience it cannot have escaped attention that his recommendation of the reading-test in the national vote has escaped attention. President Grant would take the ballot from nobody who has it now. He would let all men who have received the right to vote hold that right. But he would open the school doors; he would cause a common school education to be free as the air; he would make it as compulsory as the summer wind is upon the locks of the boy, trudging his way to the recitations of the morning; he would remove every obstacle to the acquisition of a knowledge of reading and writing; and then, after, say, the year 1890, he would refuse the ballot to everybody who has not learned to read and write. I am glad that Boston does not let this presidential recommendation sleep.

We must be more thoughtful of what is to come in America, or much will come of which we do not think Which is the more worthy of the culture of a scholar in politics—to throttle evils before, or only after, they themselves throttle us?

Theodore Parker was a Pastor in Boston, and he writes in his journal one day, concerning William Craft, the fugitive slave: "I inspected his arms,—a good revolver with six caps on, a large pistol, two small ones, a large dirk and a short one: all was right." That was efficient pastoral inspection of a parish. Yonder, on the slope of Beacon Hill, Theodore Parker performed the rites of marriage for William and Ellen Craft, two cultured coloured people belonging to the society of which he had charge. At the conclusion of the ceremony he put a Bible into the left hand of the hunted black man; and, as some one had laid a bowie-knife on the table, an inspiration of the moment caused Theodore Parker to put that weapon into the man's right hand. He then said to the escaped slave, "If you cannot use this without hating the man you strike against, your action will not be without sin; but to defend the honour of your wife, to defend your own life, and to save her and yourself from bondage, you have a right to use the Bible in your left hand and the bowie-knife in your right." Say, if you please, that all that was melodramatic; say, if you will, that this style of action was Parker's first, and not his second or his third thought. I affirm, that, in the little cloud which we thought had in it no deluge, he foresaw civil war; and that, if pastors all through the North had been equally efficient, there would have been no bloody rain at Gettysburg.

THE LECTURE.

When Daniel Webster was asked how he obtained his clear ideas, he replied, "By attention to definitions." Dr. Johnson, whose business it was to explain words, was once riding on a rural road in Scotland, and, as he paused to water his horse at a wayside spring, he was requested by a woman of advanced age to tell her how he, the great Dr. Johnson, author of a renowned dictionary, could possibly have defined the word "pastern" "the *knee* of a horse." "Ignorance, madam," was the reply,—"pure

ignorance." For one, if I am forced to make a confession as to my personal difficulties with Orthodoxy of the scholarly type, I must use, as perhaps many another student might, both Webster's and Johnson's phrases as the outlines of the story. Before I attended to definitions, I had difficulties: after I attended to them in the spirit of the scientific method, my own serious account to myself of the origin of my perplexities was, in most cases, given in Johnson's words, "Ignorance, pure ignorance."

Theodore Parker's chief intellectual fault was inadequate attention to definitions. As a consequence, his caricatures or misconceptions of Christian truth were many and ghastly. I cannot discuss them all; but in addition to his failure to distinguish between *intuition* and *instinct*, and between *inspiration* and *illumination*, it must be said, in continuance of the list of his chief errors:—

5. He did not carefully distinguish from each other *inspiration* and *dictation*.

When Benjamin Franklin was a young man, one of his hungriest desires was to acquire a perfect style of writing; and, as he admired Addison more than any other author, he was accustomed to take an essay of the "Spectator," and make very full notes of all its thoughts, images, sentiments, and of some few of the phrases. He then would place his manuscript in his drawer, wait several weeks, or until he had forgotten the language of the original, and then would take his memoranda, and write out an essay including every idea, every pulse of emotion, every flash of imagination, that he had transferred from Addison to his notes. Then he would compare his work with the original, and humiliate himself by the contrast of his own uncouth rhetorical garment with Addison's perfect robe of flowing silk. He studied how to improve his crabbed, cold, or obscure phrases by the light of Addison's noon of luminousness and imaginative and moral heat. Now, Franklin's essay was, you would say in such a case, not *dictated* by Addison, but was *inspired* by Addison.

Plainly there is a difference between inspiration and dictation. Orthodoxy believes the Bible to be inspired; and her definition of inspiration is the gift of infallibity in teaching moral and religious truth. But by *inspiration* thus defined, Orthodoxy does not mean *dictation*. She means that the Bible is as full of God as Franklin's echoed essay was of Addison. As in his essay there were both an Addisonian and a Franklinian element, so, speaking roundly, there are in the Bible a divine and a human element; but the latter is swallowed up in the former even more completely than the Franklinian was in the Addisonian. All the thought in

Franklin's essay is, by supposition, Addison's, and some of the phrases are his; but Franklin's words are there. All the moral and religious thought of the Bible is, according to the definition of inspiration, divine, and so are some of the phrases; but human words are there.

The chief proof, after all, that the Bible is good food, is the eating of it. The healing efficacy of a medicine when it is used is the demonstration that it is good. Now, the world has been eating the Bible as it never ate any other book, and the Bible has been saturating the veins of the ages as they were never saturated by the food derived from any other volume; but there is no spiritual disease that you can point to that is the outcome of biblical inculcation. We all feel sure that it would be better than well for the world if all the precepts of this volume were absorbed and transmuted into the actions of men. *The astounding fact is that the Bible is the only book in the world that will bear full and permanent translation into life.* The careless and superficial sometimes do not distinguish from each other the biblical record and the biblical inculcation. I know that fearful things are recorded in the Bible concerning men who, in some respects, were approved of God; but it is the biblical inculcation which I pronounce free from adulterate elements, not the biblical record. Of course, in a mirror held up before the human heart, there will be reflected blotches; but the inculcation of the Scriptures, from the beginning to the end of the sixty-six pamphlets, is known by experience to be free from adulterate elements; and I defy the world to show any disease that ever has come from the absorption into the veins of the ages of the biblical inculcation. And, moreover, I defy the ages to show any other book that could be absorbed thus in its inculcations, and not produce dizziness of the head, pimples on the skin, staggering at last, and the sowing of dragon's teeth.

There is something very peculiar about this one book, in the incontrovertible fact that its inculcations are preserved from such error as would work out, in experience, moral disease in the world. Plato taught such doctrines, that if the world had followed him as it has the Bible, and had absorbed not his account of men's vices, but his positive inculcation, we to-day should be living in barracks, and we could not know who are our brothers, and who are our sisters.* There was in Plato, you say, inspiration. Very well. His inculcation under what you call inspiration, and I call illumination, would, as every scholar knows, have turned this fat world into a pasture-ground for the intellectual and powerful on the one side; but

* Grote's *Plato, The Republic*, "Social Laws."

the poor on the other side it would have ground down into the position of unaspiring and hopeless hewers of wood and drawers of water; and, worse than that, it would have quenched the divinest spark in natural religion,—family life.

Dictation and plenary inspiration are not the same. I avoid technical terms here; but you must allow me, since Theodore Parker so often spoke against the plenary inspiration of the Bible, to say that by plenary inspiration Orthodoxy does not mean verbal inspiration. Franklin's essay was plenarily, but not always verbally, inspired by Addison. If the Bible is written by dictation or verbal inspiration, as Theodore Parker often taught that Orthodox scholarship supposes that it is, even then it would not be at all clear that any translation of the Bible is verbally inspired. If anything was dictated, of course, only the original was dictated.

In places I believe we have in the Bible absolute dictation; and yet inspiration and dictation are two things; and the difference between them is worth pointing out when Orthodoxy is held responsible for a caricature of her definition, and when men are thrown into unrest on this point, as if they were called on to believe self-contradiction. The fact that all portions of the Bible are inspired does not imply at all that King James's version, or the German, or the French, or the Hisdustanee, or any other, is dictated by the Holy Ghost. Even these versions, however, are full of God, as Franklin's essay was of Addison, and fuller. *They, too, will bear translation into life.* Sometimes, as in the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount, and in transfigured Psalm and prophecy, it well may be that we have, in the original, words which came not by the will of man.

There are three degrees of inspiration; and the distinctions between them are not manufactured by me, here and now, to meet the exigency of this discussion: they are as old as John Locke. It is commonplace in religious science to speak of the inspiration of superintendence, as in Acts or Chronicles; the inspiration of elevation, as in the Psalms; and the inspiration of suggestion, as in the Prophecies. The historical books of the Scriptures have been so superintended that they are winnowed completely of error in moral inculcation. But the inspiration of superintendence is the lowest degree of inspiration. We come to the great Psalms, which assuredly have no equals in literature, and which are palpably rained out of a higher sky than unassisted human genius has dropped its productions from. These Psalms, we say, are examples of the inspiration of elevation. But we have a yet higher range of the action of inspiration in passages like the distinct predictions that the Jews should be scattered among all nations and neverthe-

less preserved as a separate people, as they have been; or that Jerusalem should be destroyed, as it was; or that there should come a supreme Teacher of the race, as He has come. We find in the biblical record unmistakably prophetic passages, and these are seals of the inspiration of suggestion; for they could have been written only by suggestion. Infidelity never yet has made it clear that the Old Testament predictions concerning the Jews have not been fulfilled. Rationalism, in Germany, whenever it takes up that topic, drops it like hot iron. "What is a short proof of inspiration?" said Frederic the Great to his chaplain. "The Jews, your majesty," was the answer. If there be in the Bible a single passage that is plainly prophetic, there is in that passage a very peculiar proof of its own divine origin. We have our Lord pointing out the prophecies concerning Himself, and He makes it a reason why we should turn to the Old Testament, that they are they which testify of Him. Now, if there be some passages of the Bible that contain these prophetic announcements, then the Teacher thus announced is divinely attested, and we are to listen to Him.

If, however, we stand simply on the amazing fact of the moral and religious winnowedness of Scripture, we have also a divine attestation. That winnowedness is providential. What God does He means to do. He has done this for the Bible,—He has kept it free from moral and religious error in its inculcations. He has done that for no other book; and what He has done He from the first intended to do. Therefore the very fact of the winnowedness of the Bible is proof of a divine superintendence over it.

Superintendence, elevation, suggestion, are different degrees of inspiration, which is of one kind. But inspiration and illumination, according to established definitions, differ in kind, and not merely in degree; for inspiration, as a term in religious science, —I am not talking of popular literature,—always carries with it the idea of winnowedness as to moral and religious truth.

There is nothing in the intuitive ranges of truth that comes into collision with biblical inculcation; but there is no other sacred book on the globe which those same ranges of axiomatic moral truth do not pierce through and through and through in more places than ever knight's sword went through an opponent's shield. A few brilliants plucked out of much mire are the texts sometimes cited to us from the sacred literature of India, China, Arabia, Greece, and Rome. I defy those who seem to be dazzled by these fragments, to read before any mixed company of cultivated men and women the complete inculcations of the Vedas, Shastar, and Koran. Those books have been absorbed into the veins of nations; and we know what diseases have been the result. *They must be tried by the*

stern tests which the Bible endures; that is, by intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism. All the sacred literatures of the world come into collision with the intuitions of conscience, or with the dictates of long experience, except that one strange volume, coming from a remoter antiquity than any other sacred book, and read to-day in two hundred languages of the globe, and kept so pure in spite of all the tempests of time that have swept through its sky, that above the highest heavens opened to us by genius, and beyond all our latest and loftiest ideals, the biblical azure spreads out as noon risen on mid-noon.

6. Theodore Parker was not careful enough to distinguish between inspiration and revelation.

By revelation I mean all self-manifestation of God, in His words and His works both: inspiration is His self-manifestation in the Scriptures alone. Allow me to assert, face to face with the learning of this audience, in the presence of which I speak with sincere deference, that Christianity would stand on the basis of revelation—that is, on the self-manifestation of God in His works, including the facts of the New Testament history—even if the doctrine of inspiration were all thrown to the winds. You have been taught too often by rationalism that Christianity stands or falls on the truth of the doctrine of inspiration, whereas the nature and the degree of inspiration are questions between Christians themselves. Christianity, as a redemptive system, might stand on the great facts of the New Testament, if they were known as historic only, and the New Testament literature were not inspired at all. Religion based on axiomatic moral truth would stand on revelation thus defined, even if inspiration were given up as a dream.

Will you remember that the configuration of New England is the same at midnight and at noon? It is my fortune to be a flying scout, or a kind of outlook committee, for my learned brethren here, and I carry a guide book to this delicious nook of the round world; but what if I should lose that volume? Would not the Merrimack continue to be the most industrious river within your borders, the Connecticut the most majestic, the White Hills and the Green Mountains the most stately of your elevations? Would there be any gleaming shore on your coast, where the Atlantic surge plays through the reeds, that would change its outline at all by day or by night because of the loss of my guide-book? Would not north and south, east and west, be just the same? *Inspiration gives us a guide-book: it does not create the landscape.* Our human reason, compared with inspiration, is as starlight contrasted with the sunlight; but the landscape of our relations to

God is just the same whether it be illumined or left in obscurity. We might trace out by starlight much of the map. The sun of inspiration arises, and we know the Merrimack and Connecticut as never before; but the sun did not create the Merrimack or the Connecticut. On all our shores the orb of day shows to the eye the distinction between rock and wave; but it does not create that distinction, which we not dimly knew before by the noises in the dark, and by the wrecks.

There is a soul, and there is a God; and, since law is universal, there must be conditions of harmony between the soul and God. *Since the soul is made on a plan, there must be natural conditions of its peace, both with itself and with God; and these conditions are not altered by being revealed.* Newton did not make the law of gravitation by discovering it, did he? The Bible does not create, it reveals, the nature of things. As long as it remains true that there is a best way to live, it will be best to live the best way; and religion is very evidently safe, whether the Bible stands or falls.

7. Theodore Parker did not carefully distinguish from each other the supernatural and the unnatural.

There are three kinds of natural laws—physical, organic, and moral. It is very important to distinguish these three from each other; for penalty under the one class of laws does not always carry with it penalty under the others. A pirate may enjoy good health, and yet lose his desire to be holy, and thus be blessed under the organic, but cursed under the moral, natural laws. A Christian, if he is thrown into the sea, will sink in spite of his being a saint; that is, he will be condemned under the physical law of gravitation, although blessed under the moral. We are stupid creatures; and so we ask naturally whether those on whom the Tower of Siloam fell were sinners above all others. Were those who perished in the Ashtabula horror sinners above all others? A sweet singer—one whose words of melody will, I hope, for some centuries yet, prolong his usefulness on this and every other continent—may have been rapt away to heaven in a bliss which his own best poems express only as the spark expresses the noon. But there was somewhere and somehow a violation of physical law, and the penalty was paid. While that penalty was in process of execution, the bliss of obedience to the moral law may have been descending also; and thus, out of the fire and the ice, and the jaws of unimaginable physical agony, this man may have been caught up into eternal peace.

The distinction between the physical, organic, and moral natur laws, however, is not as important as that between the higher

the lower natural laws. Do you not admit that gravitation, a physical law, is lower than the organic force that builds animal and vegetable tissues? In the growth of the elms on the Boston mall yonder, is not gravitation seized upon by some power superior to itself, and is not matter made to act as gravitation does not wish?

Is it not a common assertion of science, that chemical forces are counteracted by the organic forces which build up living tissues? Has not my will power to counteract the law of gravitation? A higher may anywhere counteract a lower natural law. Scientific Theism does not admit that all there is of God is in natural law. He transcends nature: therefore He may reach down into it, as I, with the force of my will, reach into the law of gravitation. *If He counteracts nature, His action is supernatural, but it is not unnatural.*

Charles Darwin, and Bishop Butler say that the only clear meaning of the word "natural" is "stated, fixed, regular," and that "it just as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to effect anything statedly, fixedly, regularly, that is, naturally, as it does to effect it for once, that is, "supernaturally." * According to Darwin and Butler, therefore, a natural law is simply the usual, fixed, regular method of the Divine Action. A miracle is unusual Divine Action. *In the former we see the Divine Immanency in Nature; in the latter the Divine Transcendency beyond it.* In fundamental principle a miracle is only the subjection of a lower to a higher law, and therefore, although supernatural, it is not unnatural.† But Theodore Parker taught that "a miracle is as impossible as a round triangle," ‡ because it involves a self-contradiction. Brought up in the benighted New-England and German schools called evangelical, it never entered my head that self-contradiction was involved in the supernatural; for I was trained to think that there is a distinction between the supernatural and the unnatural.

Mr. Furness, of Philadelphia, says that a marvellous character, such as our Lord was, must be expected to do marvellous works. We know that when men are illumined by the poetic trance they have capacities that no other mood gives them. There are lofty zones in human experience, and, when we are in them, we can do much which we can do in none of our lower zones. What if a man should appear filled with a life that leaves him in constant com-

* Butler's *Analogy*, part. i. chap. i., cited as a motto in Darwin's *Origin of Species*.

† Art. on "Miracles," Smith's *Bible Dictionary*.

‡ Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 452.

munication with God? What if there should come into existence a sinless soul? What if it should remain sinless? What if there should appear in history a being in this sense above nature, is it not to be expected that he will have power over nature, and perform works above nature? Endowed as the Author of Christianity was, we should naturally expect from that supernatural endowment, works not unnatural, but supernatural

It is Parker's teaching that said the resurrection has "no evidence in its favor." De Wette, whose book he translated, affirmed in his latest volume, as I showed you the other day, that the fact of the resurrection, although a mystery that cannot be dissipated hangs over the way and manner of it, cannot be brought into doubt, any more than the assassination of Cæsar.

Theodore Parker, in his middle life, stood vigorously for the propositions which he reached at the Divinity School at Cambridge and in West Roxbury. He was attacked too early. He says himself that he had not completed his system of thought. But he was attacked vigorously; and with the spirit of his grandfather, who led the first charge on the British troops, he stood up and vehemently defended himself. But that early attack caused some of his crudities to crystallize speedily. He was afterwards too much absorbed in vast philanthropic enterprises to be an exact philosopher in metaphysics or ethics. He never made himself quite clear in these sciences, or even in the latest biblical research. His own master, De Wette, went far beyond him, and admitted, in the face of German scholarship, that the resurrection can be proved to be an historic certitude. Theodore Parker, although De Wette did not make that admission till 1849, lived ten years longer, and never made it.

Attacked early, and defending his unformed opinions vigorously, Parker's scheme of thought crystallized in its crude condition. *Theodore Parker's absolute religion is not a Boston, but a West Roxbury creed.* It is the speculation of a very young man, besides.

8. Theodore Parker seemed to understand little of the distinction etween belief and faith.

He never misconceived Orthodoxy more monstrously than when e said, "It is this false theology, with its vicarious atonement, *salvation without morality or piety, only by belief in absurd doctrines*, which has bewitched the leading nations of the earth with such practical mischief." * Gentlemen, is that Orthodoxy? This audience says that this is not a fair statement: I therefore shall under-

* Weiss, *Life of Theodore Parker*, vol. ii. p. 497.

take to call it a caricature. It is omnipresent in Parker's works. Whether it was a dishonest representation I care not to determine. My general feeling is that Theodore Parker was honest. He rarely came into companionship with Orthodox scholars of the first rank: when he did, he seemed to be pleased and softened, and was, in many respects, another man. Attacked, he always stood up with the spirit of the drum-major of Lexington under his waistcoat.

What is saving faith? What is the difference between belief and faith? I venture much; but I shall be corrected swiftly here if I am wrong. Saving faith, rightly defined, is—

1. A conviction of the intellect that God, or God in Christ is, and

2. An affectionate choice of the heart that God, or God in Christ, should be, both our Saviour and our Lord.

The first half of this definition is belief; the whole is faith. All of it without the last two words would be merely religiosity, and not religion. There is nothing in that definition which teaches that a man is saved by opinion irrespective of character. Belief is assent, faith is consent, to God as both Saviour and Lord.

On April 19, 1775, a rider on a horse flecked with blood and foam brought to the city of Worcester the news of the battle of Lexington, in which Theodore Parker's grandfather captured the first British gun. The horse fell dead on the main street of the city, and on another steed the rider passed westward with his news. Some of those who heard the intelligence were loyal, and some disloyal. They all heard that there had been a victory of the American troops over the British, and they all believed the report. Now, was there any political virtue or vice in the belief by the Tory in Worcester that there had been a victory over the British? Was there any political virtue or vice in the belief by the patriot yonder that there had been a victory over the British? Neither the one nor the other. Where, then, did the political virtue or political vice come in? Why, when your Tory at Worcester heard of the victory, he believed the report, and was sorry; and was so sorry, that he took up arms against his own people. When the patriot heard the report, he believed it and was glad; and was so glad, that he took up arms and put himself side by side with the stalwart shoulders of Parker's grandfather. In that attitude of the heart lay the political virtue or political vice. Just so, in the government of the universe, we all hear that God is our Saviour and Lord, and we all believe this, and so do all the devils, and tremble. Is there any virtue or vice in that belief taken alone? None whatever. But some of us believe this, and are sorry. We

turn aside, and, although we have assent, we have no consent to God; and we take up arms against the fact that He is our Saviour and Lord. Others of us believe this, and by divine grace are glad; we have assent and consent both; we come into the mood of total, affectionate, irreversible self-surrender to God, not merely as a Saviour, but also as Lord. When we are in that mood of rejoicing loyalty to God, we have saving faith, and never till then. How can salvation be obtained by assent alone, that is, by opinion merely? What is salvation? It is permanent deliverance from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin. Accepting God gladly as Saviour, we are delivered from the guilt of sin, and, accepting Him gladly as Lord, we are delivered from the love of sin. Only when we accept God as both Saviour and Lord are we loyal; only when we are affectionately glad to take Him as both are we or can we be at peace. When we believe the news that He is Saviour and Lord, and are glad, and so glad as to face the foe, we are in safety.

V.

THEODORE PARKER ON THE GUILT OF SIN.

The Sixty-third Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

φέρει φέροντ', ἐκτίνει δ' ὁ καίνων·
αἰμνει δὲ μίμνοντος ἐν χρόνῳ Διός,
παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντ· θέσμιον γάρ.
ÆSCHYLUS: *Agamemnon*, 1562.

Εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος
Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις.
SOPHOCLES: *Œdipus*, 1381.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

If every one would mend one, then all would be amended. If every one would mend one, no doubt the union of multitudinous personal efforts would seem to produce wholesale conversions; but these would be only the massed piecemeal results of individual faithfulness. The snows that descend the Alps in avalanches fall out of the sky flake by flake. If every one were to mend one, undoubtedly there would appear to be some excitement in society. If every one were to mend one, no doubt in the process some mistakes would be made, even by the conscientious. But, if every one would mend one, there would come into society a consciousness of the Divine Omnipresence, and we should forget men, and lose sight of ourselves, in an overshadowing awe of a Power not ourselves. It is an endlessly suggestive fact, that all deeply-conscientious action brings to the actor, and often to the beholder, a sense of the nearness of a Power not of man. A perfectly holy choice makes tangible to the soul the touch of the Unseen Holy. Boston means to do her duty, and therefore already she feels that God is here. While her holy choice continues, that feeling will continue; and if that feeling continues long, the fashion of her countenance will be altered.

You, men of letters and of the learned professions; you, students; and you, who call yourselves highly cultured, will agree with Cicero, will you not, when he says, that, in the great speeches of Demosthenes, there is always something immense and infinite, and not of man? You are ready to affirm, are you not, with Matthew Arnold, that there is in human history a Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness? Now, if we could live under the fructifying although insufferable light of the scientific certainty that this Power not only was, but is, and is to come, and that it is here; if we could rise up, every one desiring to mend another, and go into society, in the name of Something immense and infinite, that is not of society, although in it, we should be in the right mood to be illuminated of the Holy Spirit this winter

in Boston, and so to be useful among the poor, and in the brothels, and in the gambling-saloons, and in the dens of drunkenness.

These places are to be visited. It was no empty bugle-note you heard yesterday on that matter of personal visitation among the destitute and degraded. Astounding as it seems that we are to go into these haunts of vice; women to go into places of infamy to find their fallen sisters, young men into places of drunkenness to find their brothers, middle-aged men into the places where human forms sit as spiders behind the webs of greed to draw in whatever souls can be tempted by the coarser side; however amazing it may seem that these things are to be done in Boston, they have been done in Edinburgh, London, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. In the next three months you will see them done here. Some of you will be doing them soon. Immense wants are to be met by immense truths. The law of supply and demand, the commercial principle, is God's law of revivals.

Are there any who think that Boston is learning to rely on scepticism? There is no scholarly scepticism in Boston. In this city, there have been three attempts to found a new religion, and each effort looks now, on the boughs of time, like a last year's bird's nest.

You remember that when Timothy Dwight began his career at Yale College, in 1795, only one student out of the whole undergraduate membership of that university remained at the Lord's Supper. Young men there were accustomed to name themselves after the French infidels. The college was full of unreportable vices. Those were the days, says Lyman Beecher, who was then in college, when boys, as they dressed flax in the barn, read Tom Paine, and believed him. For a long period our land had been full of enthusiasm for France. Jefferson had just come to the presidential chair. There was hardly a leading individual in public life, in his administration, who held what are now called evangelical opinions. President Dwight met a sceptical senior class in Yale College, and they urged him to discuss the question of the inspiration of the Scriptures. He discussed it; he heard them oppose what he regarded as Christian established truth; he urged them to be thorough. He listened to their best attacks patiently, and answered them fully and fairly. For six months he delivered massive courses of thought against sciolism in religious science; and from that time infidelity ran into hiding-holes in Yale College.

Harvard University, yonder, dear to me as my Alma Mater, as are the ruddy drops that visit this sad heart, was as full as Yale of the unrest of this French scepticism at the end of the Revolution. Lafayette turned the whole heart of our people toward France. Young men in Harvard, as often as in Yale, were proud to name themselves after the French infidels. The atrociously shallow and unclean, but brilliant and audacious, Parisian infidelity of the period—a scheme of thought which we now regard with pity, and which no scholar cares to hear named—was then attractive even to scholarly undergraduates. Harvard never had a President Dwight to take the poison of our French period out of her veins. In that fact begins the history of Boston scepticism. This is frank speech; it is not bitter. It is the sad truth; but it will do to tell this now and here, for we have slowly outgrown the poison.

It lay in the veins of Harvard and Eastern Massachusetts all the more deeply, and had the more sorcerous effect, because of the half-way covenant which many Massachusetts churches adopted, admitting to the communion those who did not pretend to have entered on a new life at all; and this simply under the political pressure of the time, or because, for a while in Massachusetts, only church-members could vote.

While these powerful evils of the half-way covenant and French infidelity were yet operative, there was an attempt to found a new religion. And this

religion has had many names, which it would be invidious to mention; but it was always of a liberal sort. I beg you not to understand me to be in other than the mood of tears. There is a scholarly liberalism; a learned liberalism; there is also a limp, lavender liberalism. It was limp, lavender liberalism that we had ingrafted upon New England in this sickly time, when French atheism and the half-way covenant had prepared the way for the setting of that scion. I do not see that the grafted bough has produced fruit of any great importance; certainly it is to be judged by what it has brought forth. The old boughs are not only the more vigorous, but they produce fruit that is more likely to satisfy the fathomless human hunger for the bread of life. Scholarship has tried limp, lavender liberalism, and has come to believe in a learned, large Christian liberalism that has in it not much lavender, and that is not limp, simply because the nature of things on which religious science is founded is not all lavender, and is not limp at all.

Boston, in the name of exact science, believes, I undertake to say, that until a man loves what God loves, and hates what God hates, it is ill with him, and that it will continue to be ill until that dissonance ceases. That simple creed taken alone would be enough to empower and equip us for religious activity, and even

"To put a soul
Under the ribs of death."

On all sides of us men are living in the love of what God hates, and in the hate of what God loves. I hold it to be incontrovertible, that all clear heads, the globe around, are now united in the conviction, that, until a man acquires similarity of feeling with God, it is ill with him. They are, I think, almost unanimously united in the conviction, that, if a man goes through life cultivating dissimilarity of feeling with God, this prolonged personal dissonance may become chronic, and he may fall into a final permanence of bad character, and this under the momentum of evil habit, and by the simple law of the self-propagating power of sin. That stupendous and irresistible natural law by which men fall into final permanence of character, either good or bad, is in operation around us. We are called upon, joining hands with that law, that is, with Almighty God, to live in similarity of feeling with Him, and then to cast ourselves into organizing and redemptive conflict for the deliverance of men from dissonance with God. In the name of tremorless certainty we must proclaim everywhere, that as a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, so, unless a man loves what God loves, and hates what God hates, unless a man comes into affectionate, total, irreversible self-surrender to God as both Saviour and Lord, it is ill with him, and must be so until the dissonance ceases; and that the dissonance is assuredly less and less likely to cease, the longer it continues.

THE LECTURE.

KEEP, my friends, the hush of what Hegel calls the highest act of the human spirit, prayer, in this assembly while we ask whether there is such a thing in man as enmity of the heart against God. Theodore Parker said there is not. When the unclean sweeper of chimneys, a dissipated man, comes into the presence of a pure and queenly woman, he understands his leprosy, perhaps for the first time, simply because it is brought into contrast with that virtue of which Milton said,—

> "So dear to Heaven is saintly chastity,
> That, when a soul is found sincerely so,
> Ten thousand liveried angels lackey her,
> And in clear dream and solemn vision
> Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear."
>
> *Comus*, 453.

It is only when a hush, produced by the sense of the Divine Omnipresence, fills the chambers of philosophy, that they are fit places in which to discuss the fact of sin. Not always in Paris has that condition been fulfilled; not always at Berlin or London; not always in Boston. Our ears are too gross to hear the innermost truths of conscience until we feel the breath of eternity on our cheeks. But what a man sees only in his best moments as truth is truth in all moments. As now there falls a hushed sense of the Unseen Holy upon this city of scholarship, it is a fit time to raise the question whether sin is a self-evident fact in human experience. Theodore Parker affirmed that it is not.

James Freeman Clarke, when Theodore Parker was in Italy in 1859, went into the pulpit of the latter, and was so faithful, both to science and to friendship, as to criticise Parker's scheme of thought for not adequately recognizing the significance of the fact of sin. In reply to that criticism, there came to Mr. Clarke, from Italy, a letter, which he gave to Theodore Parker's biographer, who has given it to the world. It is a painful duty of mine to-day to cite this latest and frankest expression of Theodore Parker's views. In his youth Parker had written: "I think no sin can make an indelible mark on what I call the soul. I think sin makes little mark on the soul, for much of it is to be referred to causes exterior, even to the physical man, and much to the man's organization. Ninety-nine hundredths of sin are thus explicable. I am sure that sin, the result of man's circumstances, or of his organization, can make no permanent mark on the soul."*

Were these not the crude opinions of a beginner in philosophy? Did he hold these opinions through life? Substantially from his death-bed, Theodore Parker wrote from Italy, in 1860, to James Freeman Clarke:—

"Many thanks for standing in my pulpit and preaching about me and mine: all the more thanks for the criticisms. Of course, I don't *agree* with your criticisms: if I did, I should not have given you occasion to make them.

. . . . . .

"Now a word about *sin*. It is a theological word, and is commonly pronounced *ngsin-n-n-n!* But I think the thing which

* Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. i. p. 149.

ministers mean by *ngsin-n-n-n* has no more existence than *phlogiston*, which was once adopted to explain combustion. I find *sins*, i.e., *conscious violations of natural right*, but no *sin*, i.e., no conscious and intentional preference of wrong (as such) to right (as such); no condition of 'enmity against God.' I seldom use the word 'sin': it is damaged phraseology, tainted by contact with infamous notions of man and God. I have some sermons *of sin* and of *sins*, which I may live long enough to prepare for printing, but also may not.

"Deacon Wryface of the Hellfire Church says, 'Oh, I am a great sinner: I am one mass of sin all over; the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. In me there dwelleth no good thing. There is no health in me.' 'Well,' *you* say to him, 'for once, deacon, I think you pretty near right; but you are not yet quite so bad as you talk.

"'What *are* the special sins you do commit?'

"'Oh, *there ain't any:* I hain't got a bad habit in the world,—no, not one!'

"'Then what did you mean by saying just now that you were such a sinner?'

"'Oh, I referred to my *natur*': it is all *ngsin-n-n-n*.'

"That is the short of it: all men are created equal in *ngsin-n-n-n*.

"O James! I think the Christian (!) doctrine of sin is the Devil's own, and I hate it,—hate it bitterly. Orthodox scholars say, 'In the heathen classics you find no consciousness of sin.' It is very true: God be thanked for it!

. . . . . .

"I would rather have a good, plump, hearty heathen, like Aristotle, or Demosthenes, or Fabius Maximus, than all the saints from Peter, James, and John (*dokountes stuloi einai*), down to the last one manufactured by the Roman Church; I mean as those creatures are represented in art. For the actual men I have a reasonable respect; they had some spunk in them; while the statues even of Paul represent him 'as mean as a *yaller* dog.' But let *ngsin-n-n-n* go." *

Gentlemen, that is an amazing letter. The tone of it is unworthy of a cultured man, and is astounding in a dying man. Never would such words have been chosen by Channing, never by Emerson, and never by Parker himself, if there had been behind his phrases a calm, scientific conviction that on this majestic theme he was philosophically right. There is in that letter an

* Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. i. p. 151.

irritability, I had almost said a vulgarity, of tone, proceeding not from Theodore Parker's better nature, but largely, I think, from his fear that his positions as to sin would not bear the test of scientific criticism, and yet could not be wholly given up without giving up the very Malakoff and Redan of his absolute religion.

Why, if you should adopt as an established truth the proposition that there is not to be found in man any intentional preference of wrong to right, or no enmity against God, and if you should carefully expurgate literature by that rule, how would Shakspeare look? There is no such thing as preference of wrong, to right, Theodore Parker says. If there were to be edited an edition of Shakspeare according to this principle, how much would be left of the naturalness of that mirror of humanity? We now have character after character in Shakspeare represented as making evil a delight, and as knowing the right and approving it, and as abhorring the wrong and yet pursuing it. Your Shakspeare edited after the Parker principle, that there never is in man a preference of wrong to right, would be a limp, boneless, flaccid, lavender thing. You would scorn to call such a Shakspeare a fair mirror of human life. You would find such an expurgated edition plentifully misleading in the study of man's nature. In the case supposed you could not admit that Shakspeare is the prince of philosophers, as well as the prince of poets, and that he becomes both the one and the other simply by holding up his mirror to all that is.

Were you to expurgate the laws of the civil governments of the world according to Parker's rule, where would justice be? Ask the gentlemen who every day stand in courts of justice, and administer in God's name the eternal law of right, and they will tell you that the expurgation of our courts by the principle that there is no intentional preference of wrong to right would reduce legal equity to moral chaos; and that everything in law proceeds upon the supposition that man does choose the wrong when he knows it to be wrong.

Where would philosophy be, if it were expurgated by the Parkerian principle? We have, in the last twenty-five years, studied more deeply than ever before the subjective experiences of the human heart in the moral region. It is coming now to be one of the highest offices of philosophy to explore the deepest inmost of conscience, and to reveal to man the extent of that disturbance which must arise in his nature when he loves what God hates, and hates what God loves. It is now the highest office of philosophy to show man not only that he has conscience, but that conscience has him.

I affirm that, as men who love clear ideas, we do not want either philosophy, or law, or literature, expurgated according to Parker's

principle; but do you want theology expurgated by it? Do you want this delicate little shoot you call religious science shut away from the healthy winds of criticism? Is it to be kept behind the walls of some colossal authority, and not allowed to battle its way to its full size in all the tempests that strike it out of the north, south, east or west? How is religious science ever to become a stalwart oak, throwing out its boughs in every direction, vigorously and graciously, and no fear of tempests, unless it contend with all the shocks of criticism that beat on philosophy and law and literature? Religious science must take her chances according to the law of the survival of the fittest. I maintain that if you will not expurgate literature, law, and your philosophy, according to the principle that a man never has enmity against God, you must not expurgate your theology according to that principle. We must not play fast and loose with the scientific tests of truth.

Having already shown that Theodore Parker did not carefully distinguish intuition from instinct, or inspiration from illumination, or inspiration from dictation, or the supernatural from the unnatural, or belief from faith, I must further affirm that he made no adequate distinction between human infirmity and human iniquity.

What are the chief points established by self-evident truths, as to the fact of sin?

1. Moral good is what ought to be in acts of choice.
2. Moral evil is what ought not to be in acts of choice.
3. Conscience intuitively perceives the difference between what ought to be and what ought not to be in the soul's intentions or acts of choice.

These are central definitions, and apprehensible, I hope. Remember that I do not say that conscience knows what ought to be in any matter of expediency outside of the soul. Strictly speaking, there is no right or wrong in external action taken wholly apart from its motives: there is in such action only expediency or inexpediency. There may be physical evil outside the field of motives; but moral evil is to be found only in the acts of choice. Conscience intuitively perceives intentions, or choices, to be either good or bad. Here stands on one side of the will a motive, and on the other is another motive; and, looking on what we mean to do, we decide whether we will do the best we know or not. Right and wrong in motives are pointed out by conscience, and not in merely external action. I do not know by conscience, but only by judgment, whether it is best for me to vote for the electoral bill or not; but I should vote for it if I were in Congress.

There is in conscience the power of tasting motives, just as in

the tongue there is the power of tasting flavours. I know by the tongue whether a given fruit is bitter or sweet. No doubt we bring up the fruit to the lips by the hands; no doubt we look at it with the eyes; no doubt we perceive its odour by the nostrils: but only by the tongue do we taste it. So, no doubt, the intellect is concerned in bringing up considerations before the inner tribunal; but, after all, the moral character of our motives is tasted by a special power which we call conscience. This perceives intuitively the difference between a good intention and a bad. But a good motive is one which conscience not only pronounces right, but one which conscience says *ought* to rule the will. Two things are thus pointed out by conscience in motives,—rightness and oughtness. The former is perceived intuitively; the latter is felt instinctively. The *oughtness* is a mysterious, powerful constraint cast upon us by some force outside of ourselves, and operating through all our instincts. I am willing to define conscience as *that which perceives and feels rightness and oughtness in motives or intentions.*

You cannot go behind this rightness and oughtness which conscience points out. Why is this fruit bitter to the human taste? Why is this other sweet? We are so made, that the tongue tastes here bitterness and there sweetness, and you cannot go behind that ultimate fact. You are so made, that, if you do what you know has behind it a wrong intention, there is a constraint brought upon you. You have violated the supreme law of things in the universe. You are in dissonance with your own nature; and there springs up in you, under the inflexible law of conscience, a sense of guilt.

4. Conscience reveals, therefore, a moral law.

5. That law is above the human will, and acts without, and even against, the consent of the will.

6. There cannot be a thought without a being who thinks; nor a law without a being who wills; nor a moral law without a moral lawgiver.

There must have been the thought of the right and of the good before there could have been a law promulgated in the universe supporting the right and the good. That thought of the right and the good, which must have gone before the law, could have existed only in a thinker. The choice of that thinker to promulgate a law eternally supporting the right and the good could have proceeded only from a righteous thinker. There cannot be a law without a being who wills; for law is only the method of the operation of a will. That is Darwin, if you please. That is not Häckel, nor Huxley; but it is Charles Darwin, and ninety-five out of a hundred of all the foremost men of physical science. It is

Bishop Butler, too, and Julius Müller, and none the worse for that. There cannot be a moral law without a moral lawgiver.

7. When, therefore, the will chooses to act from a motive which conscience pronounces evil, that act of the will is disobedience, not to abstract law only, but to God.

8. Thus evil becomes sin.

I have defined moral evil as that which ought not to be, or as that which is condemned by the moral law revealed by conscience. Sin is disobedience to the moral law considered as the revelation of a Personal Lawgiver. Sin is a choice of wrong motives. Personal disloyalty to the Infinite Oughtness—that is sin. All agree to this latter definition; but the Somewhat, which I call the Infinite Oughtness, is, to all men who think clearly, not merely a Somewhat, but a Someone.

Let us now proceed cautiously, step by step, and convince ourselves that on this theme much may be placed beyond controversy by a simple statement of the acknowledged laws of the operation of conscience.

9. It is incontrovertible that man often hears a still small voice within him saying "I ought."

Does anybody deny this? I wish to be very elementary, and to carry the assent of your minds point by point; and I forewarn you here and now that immense consequences hang on your admission of these fundamental, simple principles. Be on your guard. Do you deny that sometimes we all hear a still small voice within us saying "I ought"? If a man is conscious of any great defect in his organization,—intellectual, moral, or physical,—he does not blame himself for it; but the instant a man violates a command of conscience uttered in this whispered "I ought," he blames himself. I may have limitations of my faculties, such that I never can amount to much; but I do not blame myself. But, the instant I do what conscience pronounces *wrong*, that moment I know that I am to blame. That is human nature; and Edmund Burke used to say, "I cannot alter the constitution of man." It is in every sane man to say "I ought."

10. It is incontrovertible that man often answers the voice which says "I ought," by saying "I will not."

You doubt that? Is it not a fact, certified to you by any narrative of your own experience, that you have multitudes of times replied to this small voice "I ought," by a soft or vehement "I will not."

11. It is incontrovertible, that instantly and invariably, after saying to "I ought" "I will not," a man must say, "I am not at peace with myself."

12. It is incontrovertible, that he must say also, "I am not in fellowship with the nature of things."

Why, this is only tautology. If a man has a powerful faculty within him that says one thing, and another powerful faculty which says another thing, there is within him civil war. Peace ends. He recognizes the condition of the republic of his faculties by his wails of unrest. He knows that the disturbance of his nature resulted from his saying "I will not" to the still small voice, "I ought."

13. It is incontrovertible, that he must say also, "I have lost fellowship with God."

What is there in sin more mysterious than the sense which always comes with it, that the stars in their courses fight against us when we do not say "I will" in response to "I ought"? There is in the inner heavens a voice saying "Thou shalt," "Thou oughtest;" and we reply to that celestial summons, "I will not:" and instantly out of the inner heavens falls on us a thunderbolt. It is by irreversible natural law that every man who says "I will not," when the inner voice says "I ought," falls into dissonance with himself, and into a feeling that the stars in their courses fight against him. There is nowhere a heart, given at all to sensitive self-study, that does not understand perfectly how the sun behind the sun may be put out by saying "I will not" to the still small voice which says "I ought." *God causes the natural sun to rise on both the just and the unjust, but not the sun behind the sun.* We are so made, that the only light of our inner sky is peace with ourselves. In the nature of things, the sun behind the sun comes not, and cannot come, forth for us, from the east, if we say "I will not," when conscience says "I ought." The simple refusal to follow that still small voice leaves a drought in the soul; for it dries up the sweetest rains from the sky behind the sky. It is terrific, scientific, penetratingly human truth, that the sun behind the sun does not rise equally upon the just and the unjust; and that the rains from the sky behind the sky do not fall, never have fallen, and in the nature of things never will or can fall, in this world or the next, equally upon the righteous and the unrighteous.

14. It is incontrovertible, that he who is disloyal to the voice which says "I ought," must also say "I ought to satisfy the injured majesty of the law I have violated." Sin creates an obligation to satisfy the injured majesty of the moral law.*

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* See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. i. pp. 1-200.

15. It is incontrovertible, that, in the absence of expiation, man forebodes punishment.

That sounds like a theological and biblical proposition: it is simply an ethical and purely scientific one. It is what is taught everywhere in Shakspeare and the Greek poets. It is what is illustrated by all the history of Pagan sacrifices since the world began. If we are to estimate the strength of any human impulse by the work it will do, then this perception that sin creates an obligation to satisfy the injured majesty of the moral law must be presumed to have behind it a most powerful force. Again and again, age after age, it has shown itself to be stronger than love or death. There is nothing clearer than that a man is so made, that after he has been disloyal, after he has looked into the face of God, and said "I will not," he feels that this act has created an obligation which must in some way be discharged to satisfy the majesty and the moral right of the moral law.

It is not a pleasant thing to say that that is the way a man is made; but that *is* the way he is made. A liberal theology is one that looks at all the facts. "Instead of fashioning with great labour a theory that would account for all the facts," Theodore Parker, his biographer Mr. Weiss says, "overcame doubt by a human and tender optimism."*

Gentlemen, there must be a philosophy that will account for all the facts of human nature, if we are ever to have a religious science; for whether you will or not think boldly, north, south, east, and west, men by-and-bye will do so, and they will look into all these astounding certainties of human nature. When a man says "I ought," and then says "I will not," he must say, "I am not at peace with myself," "I am dropped out of fellowship with the nature of things," "I am not in fellowship with God," "The stars fight against me," "Nature is against me," "I ought, I ought to render satisfaction." That is the way Nature acts. Shakspeare was philosopher enough to make one of his characters say, when one complained that he was a man whom fortune had most cruelly scratched, that it was "too late to pare her nails now," and that "Fortune is a good lady, and will not have knaves thrive long under her." † Even Shakspeare speaks of a "primrose way to the everlasting bonfire," ‡ and of "the flowery way that leads to the broad gate and the great fire."§ Too late! Probably

* *Life of Parker*, vol. i. p. 150.
† *All's Well that Ends Well*, act. v. sc. ii.
‡ *Macbeth*, act ii. sc. i.
§ *All's Well that Ends Well*, act. iv. sc. v.

Shakspeare meant something by that phrase, and knew what he meant. For one, I think he meant that it is possible for a man to fall into a final permanency of character, hating what God loves, and loving what God hates.

16. It is incontrovertible, that even after a man disloyal to conscience has reformed, he has behind him an irreversible record of sin in the past.

It will always remain true that he has been a deserter; and therefore conscience will always leave him at far lower heights than those of peace, if he be not sure that some power beyond his own has satisfied the moral law.

17. It is incontrovertible, that, when man is free from the love of sin, he is not free from constitutional apprehension as to the effect of the guilt of past sin on his personal future in this world and the next.

18. It is incontrovertible, that the desire to be sure that the guilt of sin will be overlooked is one of the most powerful forces in human nature.

19. It is incontrovertible, that an atonement may thus in the solitudes of conscience be scientifically known to be the desire of all nations; that is, of all who have fallen into that disturbance of the moral nature which is called sin.

20. The atonement which reason can prove is needed, revelation declares has been made.

I do not affirm, my friends, that by reason I can prove the fact of the atonement. I believe, as assuredly as that I exist, that by reason I can prove our need of the atonement. I do not assert the sufficiency of natural religion; I assert merely its efficiency. I believe that Julius Müller building on the same axiomatic truths which Parker relied upon, and forming his system with entire freedom, and at last finding it correspondent with Christian truth, has been far more loyal to the scientific method than he who asserted that there is in man no enmity against God. That an atonement has been made you must learn from revelation; that an atonement is needed you can learn from human reason.

Old man and blind, Michael Angelo, in the Vatican, used to stand before the Torso, the famous fragment of a statue, made, possibly, by one of the most skilled chisels of antiquity; and with his fingers upon the mutilated lines, he would tell his pupils how the entire figure must have been formed when it was whole. He would trace out the fragmentary plan, and say that the head must have had this posture, and the limbs that posture, and that the complete work could have been only what the fragments indicated. Religious science with the dim torch of reason, and not

illuminated by revelation, is a blind Michael Angelo, standing before the Torso of the religious universe, and feeling blindly along fragmentary lines. Although the head of this statue is infinitely beyond our touch or sight in the infinities and the eternities above us, and although its feet stand on adamant lower than thought can reach with its plummet, we do know, in the name of the universality of law, that the lines we touch in our blindness in natural religion would, if completed according to the plan which is tangible to us, be revealed religion, and nothing less.

VI.

FINAL PERMANENCE OF MORAL CHARACTER.

The Sixty-fourth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship.

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Repeated sin impairs the judgment.
He whose judgment is impaired sins repeatedly."
BHAGVAT GHEETA.

παλαιγενῆ γὰρ λέγω
παραβασιαν ὠκύποινον·
αἰῶνα δ' ἐς τρίτον μένει.
ÆSCHYLUS: *Theb.*, 742.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

BAD advice, John Milton says, may slay not only a life, but an immortality. We have no right to advise the religiously irresolute to anything which they might die doing, and die unsaved. Applying strenuously to practice that searching and transfiguring principle, from how much dawdling advice should we and those whom we counsel be delivered!

Not a few of us are likely to be called upon this winter to advise inquirers after the religious life; and perhaps some of us will think it sufficient to say, "Read good books," "Converse with pious friends," "Attend church." A man might die doing all these things, and die unsaved. What is salvation? Deliverance from the love of sin and the guilt of sin. Shall we say to the soul which as yet is disloyal to conscience, "Listen to the best public, and read the best printed, discussions of religious truth?" A man might die doing that, and die unsaved. "Attend devotional meetings; throw yourself into those assemblies where the union of many minds and hearts in one purpose, and that the loftiest, makes religion contagious?" A man might die doing that, and not die free from the love of sin or from the guilt of sin.

Of course, you will not understand me to undervalue these tried and crowned instrumentalities for the religious awakening and culture of the soul. They are efficient; they are not sufficient. Nevertheless, many who call themselves intelligent Christians give no other than this dawdling, unscientific, completely unbiblical, and often incalculably mischievous advice to the religiously irresolute.

Will the use of stereotyped religious phrases make our advice sufficient, if it is followed, to save a soul from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin? "Look to Jesus," you say. Surely a man might do that, in the sense in which many understand the phrase, and not be free from the love of sin or the guilt of sin. I do not say that any soul can do that intelligently, and not be saved. What misunderstanding is there of that phrase, and of the hallowed expres-

sion, "Come to Jesus"! Some say, "Believe that Jesus is Christ, and you shall be saved. Do you believe that Jesus is God? Then you are saved." I have heard that statement made in not a few inquiry-rooms; but a more infamous disloyalty to both scriptural and scientific truth cannot be imagined than the assertion that salvation comes from merely believing that Jesus is the Son of God. I know where I am speaking, and what I am saying, I hope. It is not unfamiliar business to me to study the holy of holies of a religious awakening; for it was my fortune for some years to act as evangelist in part; and I have often found in that innermost shrine the most ghastly misconceptions doing immortal mischief. The religiously irresolute must be allowed to rest in nothing which does not involve their immediate and total self-surrender to God as both Saviour and Lord.

Your Romish priest comes to the dying soldier on the battle-field, and there are but a few minutes for religious conversation. Very possibly he holds the crucifix before the eyes in which the film of death is already visible, and says, "Believe that Jesus is Christ, and you will be saved." To witness such a scene many times is enough to make a wise man insane. To misdirect a parting spirit not yet loyal to conscience is to slay, perhaps, not life, but immortality. How does the poor, weak, doubting, trembling soul understand that language? Perhaps he has no other meaning conveyed to him than that if he believes that God was in some way Christ, he will be saved. Beyond all controversy, he might believe that, and not be free from the love of sin or the guilt of sin. We read on high authority that the black angels believe as much as that and tremble. We must beware of falling into the Romish error of confounding assent with consent, or belief with faith. In the name of science, no less than in that of the Bible, we must beware of advising the unconverted to do anything that does not include immediate, total, affectionate, irreversible self-surrender to God as both Saviour and Lord.

Stereotyped phrases, although struck out originally at white-heat, may, in religious as well as in poetic phraseology, at last, after centuries of use, become cold cinders. Cant is the use of cooled cinders in place of glowing coals. There is as much literary as religious cant in the world. Eloquent as many of our oldest human religious phrases may be, touchingly historic as they are to an educated mind, and measurelessly deep as some of them are to a student, their stereotyped character of course often diminishes greatly their clearness to the head, and vastly their impressiveness to the heart, of the inattentive and half-educated. Once a century the world needs a new set of phrases for all its greatest truths. Changing phrases for truths that never change keeps the latter always new.

There are two styles of languages—the biblical and the scientific. As a precaution against fitful misunderstanding, why should we not employ both, since our personal interpretation of biblical phrases is often not that which the mind of the inquirer makes? There is a great difference between believing and believing in. I *believe* Congress when it makes a public statement; but I do not *believe in* all the acts of Congress, nor in all its members. I believe Benedict Arnold when he writes an autobiographical sketch; but I do not believe *in* Benedict Arnold. I believe Washington and Lincoln when they write letters; and I also believe *in* Washington and Lincoln. On the one hand we have *believing*, and on the other *believing in* or *on*; and the Greek tongue makes even a clearer distinction between the two than the English. But when the great words are cited, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," how often, although this language is biblical, does it fail to convey the meaning it always contains, of the necessity of affectionate self-commitment of the soul to God, or of rejoicing personal loyalty to Him as both Saviour and Lord? Coleridge said, "I believe Plato and Aristotle: I believe in Jesus Christ." To believe *in* a

person implies admiration of that person's character, and naturally results in confidence, gladness, pride, and alacrity in following his lead.

If in this sense you *believe in* God in Christ, you accept Him loyally as Prophet, Priest, and King, or as both Saviour and Lord, and you are learning to love what He loves, and to hate what He hates; and the nature of things will no longer be against you. But until you not only *believe*, but *believe on* and *believe in*, and thus affectionately choose, God as both Saviour and Lord, of course, there is no safety for you, for there cannot be any similarity of feeling between you and God. When you come to believe in Him, that means that you love Him, and that you are ready to obey Him, not slavishly, but with delight. I believe in Lincoln; I believe in Washington: and therefore I am ready to have them for my guides, I am proud and glad to follow whithersoever they lead. If we are to be Christians in a similar sense, we are to believe in God not only as Lord, but also as Saviour.

Shall we look on God chiefly as Saviour, or chiefly as Lord? Which of these infinities shall we gaze on first, if by the gaze the soul is to be transformed into the Divine image?

Two things are meant by the one word "guilt:" first, demerit or blameworthiness; secondly, obligation to suffer the punishment due to our offences. Revelation teaches that Christ our Lord had laid on Him our guilt in the latter sense, but not in the former. He assumed the obligation to satisfy the demands of justice on our part; He did not assume the demerit or blameworthiness of our transgressions.* In the nature of things, demerit cannot be transferred from person to person. Ill-desert rests on the transgressor for ever. A criminal who has served out his legal term in prison is freed from all further *obligation to suffer the punishment of the law;* but he is not free from the *demerit* of having been a criminal. He is delivered from guilt in the second sense, but not from guilt in the first sense of the word. A man who has been a deserter comes back to his king, and should receive a thousand stripes. His king takes a hundred in his place, and that chastisement is substituted for the deserter's punishment. The deserter's *demerit* remains; in the nature of things, his king could not assume that. For ever and for ever it will be true that the man has behind him the record of a deserter. Even Omnipotence cannot make what once has been not to have been. But for ever and for ever the deserter's debt to the law is paid, and its payment cannot be demanded of the deserter. *If, now, that deserter wishes motives to loyalty, what ought he to keep vividly before his thoughts?* His Lord's power, or his Lord's unspeakable condescension? His Lord as his King, or his Lord as his Redeemer? All hearts that understand it, this question melts in this age, as it has in every past age, and will in every future age. Let the deserter remember his own irremovable demerit; let him fill his soul with thoughts of his King as his Redeemer.

What am I saying? Look on what God has done; look on what God is. In the old and majestic language, of a depth unfathomable, "Look on the Cross," *and you will lose the desire to sin.* You will find departing from every pulse of your soul all hate of what God loves, and all love of what God hates. Look first on God as Saviour, and you shall learn to choose Him affectionately as Lord. *Now, now, now, behold and trust Him as your Redeemer, and take Him gladly as King.* This is a direction which a man cannot die following, and die without deliverance from the love of sin and the fear of its penalties. So long as you fail to choose God affectionately as both Saviour and Lord, so long your love of sin and fear of its penalties will continue; and so long in

* Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. ii. p. 189.

the nature of things—a terrible authority!—you cannot enter into peace. When you have accepted God gladly as both Saviour and Lord, you, as a returned deserter, can have peace, not *by*, but not *without*, facing the foe.

THE LECTURE.

When Charles IX. of France was importuned to kill Coligny, he for a long time refused to do so publicly or secretly; but at last he gave way, and consented in these memorable words: "Assassinate Admiral Coligny, but leave not a Huguenot alive in France to reproach me." So came the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. When the soul resolves to assassinate some holy motive; when the spirit determines to kill, in the inner realm, Admiral Coligny, it, too, delays for a while; and, when it gives way usually says, "Assassinate this accuser of mine, but leave not an accusing accomplice of his in all my kingdom alive to reproach me." So comes the massacre of the desire to be holy.

Emerson quotes the Welsh Triad as saying, "God Himself cannot procure good for the wicked." Julius Müller, Dorner, Rothe, Schleiermacher, no less than Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, assert that, in the nature of things, there can be no blessedness without holiness. Confucius said, "Heaven means principle." But what if a soul permanently loses principle? *Si vis fugere a Deo fuge ad Deum*, is the Latin proverb. If you wish to flee from God, flee to Him. The soul cannot escape from God; and can two walk together unless they are agreed? Surely there are a few certainties in religion, or several points clear to exact ethical science in relation to the natural conditions of the peace of the soul.

It is plainly possible that a man may fall into free permanent dissimilarity of feeling with God, or fail to attain a predominant desire to be holy.

If he does, it remains scientifically certain that even Omnipotence and Omniscience cannot force upon such a character blessedness. There can be no blessedness without holiness; and there can be no holiness without a supreme love of what God loves, and a supreme hate of what God hates. It is possible that a man may so dissarrange his nature as not to attain a permanent and predominant desire to be holy.

Theodore Parker, as his biographers admit, must be called a great reader rather than a great scholar. But De Wette, his German master, although most of his works have ceased to be authorities in biblical research, ought to have prevented Theodore Parker from asserting that the Founder of Christianity did not

teach that there may be a failure in a free agent to attain a permanent and predominant desire to be holy. Theodore Parker himself ought to have prevented himself from that assertion. In his earlier career he held that our Lord did teach a possibility of the failure of some for ever and for ever to attain a supreme love of what God loves, and supreme hate of what God hates. He thought that the New Testament, properly interpreted, does contain in it a statement that it is possible for a man to fail permanently to attain the predominant desire to be holy; and this was one of Parker's reasons for rejecting the authority of the New Testament. But toward the end of his career he tried to persuade Frances Power Cobbe that the Founder of Christianity did not teach that any will be lost. Parker's writings are self-contradictory on this supreme topic, most of the real difficulties of which he skipped.

It is the wisdom of all science, however, never to skip difficulties. I know how widely intellectual unrest on the topic I am now introducing fills minds that never have been much troubled by Theodore Parker. I know that many conscientious and learned persons have asked themselves the question the disciples once asked our Lord: "Are there few that be saved?" He answered that inquiry very distinctly, "Yes, there are few." Does science answer in the same way?

It would not follow, my friends, even if you were to take our Lord's answer as supreme authority, as I do, that this universe is a failure. All ages to come are to be kept in view; all other worlds. Our Lord's words referred to our present evil generation; and, if you ask the central question in the best modern form, you must answer it in His way. How many, in the present state of our earth, love predominantly what God loves, and hate predominantly what God hates? How many have acquired predominant similarity of feeling with God? Only those who have can be at peace in His presence either here or hereafter. That is as certain as any deduction from our intuitions concerning the nature of things. As sure as that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, in the same sense, so sure is it that a man cannot be at peace with God when he loves what He hates, and hates what He loves. There must be harmony or dissonance between them; and dissonance is its own punishment. Dissimilarity of feeling with God carries with it immense wages, in the nature of things. In the name of science ask, Are there few that have acquired a predominant love of what God loves, and a predominant hate of what God hates? We must answer, in the name of science, that broad is the way and wide is the gate, which, in our evil generation, leads to dissimilarity of feeling with God; and

many there be who go in thereat: but strait is the way and narrow is the gate which leads to similarity of feeling with God; and few are they in our time that find it. But there are other worlds; there are other ages. "Save yourselves from this untoward generation." Who knows that, in the final summing-up, the number of the lost may be greater than that of the saved? or, as Lyman Beecher used to say in this city, "greater than the number of our criminals in penal institutions is in constrast with the whole of the population." But I talk of the galaxies: I talk of the infinities and of the eternities, and not merely of this world in which you and I are to work out our deliverance from the love of sin and the guilt of sin, and have reason to do so with fear and trembling.

I ask no man here to-day, or any day, to take my opinions. You are requested to notice whether discussion is clear, not whether it is orthodox. Let us put aside entirely all ecclesiastical and denominational tests. This Lectureship has for its purpose simply the discussion of the clear, the true, the new, and the strategic, in the relations between science and religion.

What are some of the more important natural laws which enable us to estimate scientifically the possible extent of the natural penalties of sin?

1. Under irreversible natural law sin produces judicial blindness.

Kill Admiral Coligny, drive out the Huguenots, permit the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and you have made a new France. Carlyle says that it pleased France to slit her own veins and let out the best blood she had, and that she did this on the night of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew; and that, after that, she was historically another creature. Having killed Coligny, you cannot look his friends in the face; you kill them, and your kingdom is a new one. When a man sins against light, there comes upon him an unwillingness to look into the accusing illumination: and the consequence is that he turns away from it. But that effect itself becomes a cause. Keep your eyes upon your Shakspeare, upon your Greek poets, or upon whatever is a good mirror of human nature, and tell me whether these six propositions are not all scientifically demonstrable:—

(1.) Truth possessed, but not obeyed, becomes unwelcome.

(2.) It is therefore shut out of the voluntary activities of memory and reflection, as it gives pain.

(3.) The passions it should check grow, therefore, stronger.

(4.) The moral emotions it should feed grow weaker.

(5.) An ill-balanced state of the soul thus arises, and tends to become habitual.

(6.) That ill-balanced state renders the soul blind to the truths most needed to rectify its condition.

"On the temperate man," says Aristotle,* "are attendant, perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, good opinions and appetites as to pleasures; but on the intemperate, the opposite."

A man sins against light boldly. To the divine "I ought," he answers "I will not;" to the divine "Thou shalt," or "Thou oughtest," he replies "I will not." The consequence instantly is, that he ceases to be at peace with himself; and light, instead of becoming a blessing, is to him an accusation. The slant javelin of truth that was intended to penetrate him with rapture, fills him now with torture. If we give ourselves to an exact study of the soul's pains and pleasures, we shall find in man no greater bliss than conscience can afford, and no greater pain than it can inflict. In this stage of existence, the highest bliss comes from similarity of feeling with God, and the highest pain from dissimilarity of feeling with Him. The greatest pains and pleasures, therefore, are set over against our greatest duties; and so God's desire that we should agree with Him is shown by our living under the piercing points of all these penalties and blisses. But, light having become an accuser, man turns away from it. Then the virtues which that light ought to quicken are allowed to languish. The vices which that light ought to repress grow more vigorous. Repeated acts of sin result in a continued state of dissimilarity of feeling with God. That state is an effect; but it becomes a cause. According to New England theology, sin exists only in acts of choice; but the newest school of that theology need have no war with the oldest, for the former recognises as fully as the latter can, that the state of dissimilarity of feeling with God is the source of the evil acts of choice. That state of the dispositions is the copious fountain of sin, and as such is properly called depravity. This state, continuing, becomes a habit; then that habit, continuing long, becomes chronic; and so the result is an ill-balanced growth of the character.

When I hung my hammock up last summer on the shores of Lake George, I noticed that the trees nearest the light, at the edge of the forest, had larger branches than those in the interior of the wood; and the same tree would throw out a long branch toward the light, and a short one toward obscurity in the interior of the forest. Just so a man grows toward the light to which he turns. According to the direction in which he turns with his supreme affection, he grows; and as he grows he balances; and

* *Rhetoric*, Bohn's edition, p. 70.

under the irreversible natural law of moral gravitation,—as fixed, as scientific a certainty in the universe as the law of physical gravitation,—as he balances, so he falls; and, according to science, after a tree has fallen under that law, the prostrate trunk continues to be under the law; and, therefore, as it falls so it lies.

Under moral gravitation no less surely than under physical, every free object that falls out of the sky strikes on its heavier side. They showed me at Amherst, the other day, a meteorite that dropped out of the azure; and it struck on which side? Of course, on its heavier. As the stream runs, so it wears its channel; as it wears its channel, so it runs. All the mythologies of the globe recognize this fearful law of judicial blindness.

Go yonder into Greenland with the learned traveller Ranke, and you will find a story among the men of the lonely North to the effect that if a sorcerer will make a stirrup out of a strip of seal-skin, and wind it round his limbs, three times about his heart, and thrice about his neck, and seven times about his forehead, and then knot it before his eyes, that sorcerer, when the lamps are put out at night, may rise into space, and fly whithersoever his leading passion dictates. So we put ourselves into the stirrup of predominant love of what God hates, and predominant hate of what God loves, and we coil the strands about our souls. They are thrice wound about our heart, three times around the neck, seven times around our foreheads, and knotted before our eyes. If the poor savages yonder, where the stars look down four months of the year without interruption, are right in their sublime theory as to the solemnities of the universe, we, too, when the lamps are out, shall rise into the Unseen Holy, and fly whithersoever our leading passion dictates.

Greenland says that hunters once went out and found a revolving mountain, and that, attempting to cross the chasm between it and the firm land, some of these men were crushed as the mountain revolved. But they finally noticed that the gnarled, wheeling mass had a red side and a white side. They waited till the white side came opposite them, and then, ascending the mountain, found that a king lived on its summit, made themselves loyal to him, surrendered themselves to him affectionately and irreversibly, and afterwards found themselves able to go and come safely. But the mountain had a red side; and it turned and turned, and there was no safety on it, except on the white side and in loyalty to the king at the summit in the clouds. That mythology of the North, lately read for us by scholars, has in it eternal verity, and a kind of solemnity like that of the long shining of the Arctic stars, and the tumbling icebergs, and the peaceable gurgle of the

slow-heaving Polar Ocean, far-gleaming under the Boreal Lights or the midnight Arctic sun. Stunted, you think, the men of that zone? Why, on the banks of the Charles yonder, your Longfellow, taking up a German poet, finds the same idea in far less sublime and subtle imagery, and translates it for its majesty and truth:

> 'The mills of God grind slowly;
> But they grind exceeding small."

To me there is in Macbeth nothing so terrible as Lady Macbeth's invocation of the spirits which produce moral callousness in the soul. There is no passage in that sublime treatise on conscience which we call Macbeth, so sublime to me as this, on the law of judicial blindness:

> "The raven himself is hoarse
> That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
> Under my battlements. Come, you spirits.
> . . . . . Unsex me here,
> And fill me, from the crown to the toe, topful
> Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
> Stop up the access and passage to remorse.
> . . . . . Come, thick night,
> And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
> That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
> Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
> To cry, 'Hold, hold!'"
>
> *Macbeth*, act i. sc. 5.

That invocation is likely to be uttered by every soul which has said "I will not" to the divine "I ought." It is as sure to be answered as natural law is to be irreversible. Macbeth himself, in a similar mood says:

> "Come, seeling night,
> Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day;
> Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
> Which keeps me pale! Light thickens; and the crow
> Makes wing to the rooky wood."
>
> *Macbeth*, act iii. sc. 2.

Have you ever offered in the rooky wood of sorcerous temptation a prayer for blindness? *In the nature of things every sin against light draws blood on the spiritual retina.*

You say that after death you are to have more illumination, and that therefore you will reform beyond the grave. How do you know that you will see greater illumination, even if you are in the presence of it? How do you know that you will love it, even if you do see it? There can be no blessedness without holiness;

there can be no holiness without a free, affectionate acknowledgment of God as King, or a supreme love of what He loves, and hate of what He hates. Are you likely to obtain these soon under the law of judicial blindness? You will have what you like; but do you like the light? You have more and more illumination now as the years pass. Do you see it? Do you love it? There are two questions about this greater light beyond the grave: first, Will you see it? second, Will you like it? Unless you have authority in the name of science for answering both these questions in the affirmative, you have no right in the name of science to rely on a mere possibility, on a guess, and take your leap into the Unseen, depending on a riddle. I for one will not do this for myself; and I will not teach others to do so.

Shakspeare has not left us in doubt at all on this theme; for in another place he says:

> "But when we in our viciousness grow hard,
> The wise gods seal our eyes;
> In our own slime drop our clear judgments, make us
> Adore our errors; laugh at us while we strut
> To our confusion."
>
> *Antony and Cleopatra*, act iii. sc. 13.

Carlyle quotes out of the Koran a story of the dwellers by the Dead Sea, to whom Moses was sent. They sniffed and sneered at Moses; saw no comeliness in Moses; and so he withdrew: but Nature and her rigorous veracities did not withdraw. When next we find the dwellers by the Dead Sea, they, according to the Koran, are all changed into apes. "By not using their souls they lost them. And now," continues Carlyle, "their only employment is to sit there and look out into the smokiest, dreariest, most undecipherable sort of universe: only once in seven days they do remember that they once had souls. Hast thou never, O traveller! fallen in with parties of this tribe? Methinks they have grown somewhat numerous in our day."

The old Greek proverb was, that the avenging deities are shod with wool; but the wool grows on the eyelids that refuse the light. "Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad;" but the insanity arises from judicial blindness.

Jeremy Taylor says that whoever sins against light kisses the lips of a blazing cannon.

I never saw a dare-devil face that had not in it something of both the sneak and the fool. The sorcery of sin is, that it changes a man into a sneak and a fool; but the fool does not know that he is a sneak, and the sneak does not know that he is a fool.

If I were a sculptor, I should represent sin with two faces, like those of Janus, looking in opposite directions: one should be idiotic, the other Machiavellian. But the one face would not see the other. The idiot would not know he is Machiavellian; the Machiavelli would not know that he is idiotic. The sneak would not know that he is a fool, nor the fool that he is a sneak.

2. Under irreversible natural law, there is a self-propagating power in sin.

Of course, this self-propagating power depends upon the law of judicial blindness very largely, but by no means exclusively. So are we made, that every effect in the growth of our characters becomes a cause, and every good effect no less than every bad one.

The laws of self-propagating power of habit bless the righteous as much as they curse the wicked. The laws by which we attain supreme bliss are the laws by which we descend to supreme woe. In the ladder up and the ladder down in the universe, the rungs are in the same side-pieces. The self-propagating power of sin and the self-propagating power of holiness are one law. The law of judicial blindness is one with that by which the pure in heart see God; and they who walk toward the east find the morning brighter and brighter to the perfect day.

Of course, I shall offend many, if I assert that there may be penalty that has no remedial tendency. But, gentlemen, I ask you to be clear, and to remember that an unwelcome truth is really not destroyed by shutting the eyes to it. There are three kinds of natural laws, the physical, the organic, and the moral. *I affirm that "Never too late to mend" is not a doctrine of science in the domain of the physical laws, nor is it in that of the organic.*

Under the physical laws of gravitation a ship may careen to the right or left, and only a remedial effect be produced. The danger may teach the crew seamanship; it makes men bold and wise. Thus the penalty of violating, up to a certain point, the physical law, is remedial in its tendency. But let the ship careen beyond a certain line, and it capsizes. If it be of iron, it remains at the bottom of the sea; and hundreds and hundreds of years of suffering of that penalty has no tendency to bring it back. Under the physical natural laws plainly there is such a thing as its being too late to mend. In their immeasurable domain there is a distinction between penalty that has a remedial tendency, and penalty that has no remedial tendency at all.

So, under the organic law, your tropical tree, gashed at a certain point, may throw forth its gums, and even have greater strength than before; but gashed beyond the centre, cut through, the organic law is so far violated, that the tree falls; and after a

thousand years you do not expect to see the tree escape from the dominion of the law which is enforcing upon it penalty, do you? There is no tendency in that penalty toward remedial effect; none at all, and you know it. Therefore, under the organic laws, there is such a thing as its being too late to mend.

Now, gentlemen, keep your eyes fastened upon the great principle of analogy, which Newton and Butler call the supreme rule in science, and ask yourselves whether, if you were to find some strange animal in a geological stratum, and if you were to know, by having one of its hands free, that it had three fingers, and if you were to find two fingers on the other hand free from the rock, and both shutting toward the palm, you would not infer that the third finger, if you could loosen it from the rock, would also be found closing toward the palm? Just so, I ask, whether, if we find that, under two sets of natural laws which are all included under three classes, there is incontrovertibly such a thing as penalty without remedial effect, may there not be the same under the third set? Two fingers shut towards the palm. I cannot quite trace the whole range of the moral law, but I know by analogy that if two fingers shut towards the palm, the third probably does. *If there is such a thing as its being for ever too late to mend under the organic and the physical natural law, probably, and more than probably, there is such a thing under the moral natural law.*

Yes; but you say the will is free, and therefore that it cannot be supposed that a man will fall into final dissimilarity of feeling with God, or can so lose the desire to be holy, that he will not choose the right when greater light comes. You affirm that the self-propagating power of sin may place necessity upon the disordered nature. You say that the denial that all moral penalty is remedial requires us to deny that the will of lost souls continues free. I beg your pardon again, and that in the name of science. Gentlemen, there may be certainty where there is no necessity.

Is John Milton putting together a self-contradiction when he pictures Satan as making evil his good, and as yet retaining a free will? Is he uttering self-contradiction when he shows us a fiendish character which retains yet some elements of its original brightness? Has Milton's Satan lost free will? I affirm that you know that John Milton's Satan is not an impossible character. You say you do not care what Milton says; but I am not asking you to accept his theology. Let me not be misunderstood in my citations of the poets as witnesses to what man is. "Paradise Lost" is a great classic; and no poem attains that rank if it is full of manifest absurdities. Now, Milton's Satan is a character in which the disarrangement of the

soul is supposed to have become permanent; he has fallen into final permanence of evil character; and yet he is represented as absolutely free, and not very near annihilation. I appeal to classical literature to show that a permanent evil character with a free will is not a psychological self-contradiction. You admit this readily, age after age, in your great classics; but the instant I, here, standing face to face with natural religion, assert that there may be a final permanence of free character, bad as well as good, and good as well as bad, you stand aghast at your own proceeding. Gentlemen, you and I must have no cross-purposes with the nature of things. If Milton's description is not a psychological self-contradiction, there may be a person of permanently bad character, absolutely free, and therefore responsible.

Origin used to teach that the prince of fiends might return to a glad allegiance to God; and so did Robert Burns, whom Emerson commends for using these words, originally written to attack the proposition I am now defending, but, after all, containing most subtle confirmation of it:

> "Auld Nickie Ben,
> An' wad ye tak a thought and men',
> Ye aiblins might — I dinna ken —
> Still hae a stake."

No, gentlemen; the self-propagating power of sin may produce a state of soul in which evil is chosen as good, and in which it is for ever too late to mend, and yet not destroy free will.

3. *Under irreversible natural law character tends to a final permanence, good or bad. In the nature of the case, a final permanence is attained but once.*

If asked whether final permanence of character is a natural law, what should you say, if we were to speak without reference to conclusions in religious science? How have men in all ages expressed themselves in literature and philosophy on this theme? Is it not perfectly certain that all the great writers of the world justify the proposition that character tends to a final permanence, good or bad?

Gentlemen, this universe up to the edge of the tomb is not a joke. There are in this life serious differences between the right hand and the left. Nevertheless, in our present career, a man has but one chance. Even if you come weighted into the world, as Sindbad was with the Old Man of the Sea, you have but one chance. Time does not fly in a circle, but forth, and right on. The wandering, squandering, desiccated moral leper is gifted with no second set of early years. There is no fountain in Florida

that gives perpetual youth; and the universe might be searched, probably, in vain for such a spring. Waste your youth; in it you shall have but one chance. Waste your middle life; in it you shall have but one chance. Waste your old age; in it you shall have but one chance. It is an irreversible natural law that character attains final permanence, and in the nature of things final permanence can come but once. This world is fearfully and wonderfully made, and so are we, and we shall escape neither ourselves nor these stupendous laws. It is not to me a pleasant thing to exhibit these truths from the side of terror; but, on the other side, these are the truths of bliss; for, by this very law, through which all character tends to become unchanging, a soul that attains a final permanence of good character runs but one risk, and is delivered once for all from its torture and unrest. It has passed the bourn from behind which no man is caught out of the fold. He who is the force behind all natural law is the keeper of His sheep, and no one is able to pluck them out of His hand. Himself without variableness or shadow of turning, He maintains the irreversibleness of all natural forces, one of which is the insufferably majestic law by which character tends to assume final permanence, good as well as bad.

4. Under irreversible natural law there may be in the soul a permanent failure to attain a predominant and enduring desire to be holy.

With incisive scientific clearness, Julius Müller says, "*Such is the constitution of things that unwillingness to goodness may ripen into eternal voluntary opposition to it.*" *

The inveteracy of sin! have you ever heard of that? Out of its acknowledged inveteracy will *not* easily arise its evanescence. Out of its prolongation comes its inveteracy, and out of its inveteracy may come its permanence.

Here and now I do not touch the topic of the annihilation of those who fall into permanent dissimilarity of feeling with God; for I do not see that this cause produces any tendency to annihilation in this world, when a man becomes incorrigibly bad. Villains do not commonly lack force. Nero, with his murders and leprosies, has put his nature out of order; but look at his evil face in marble on the Capitoline Hill, and you start as if gazing into a demon's eyes. He is as little weak as a volcano. What do men mean when they talk of vice annihilating souls? It disarranges them; but disarrangement is not annihilation. Tacitus says that Nero heard the sound of a trumpet and groans

* *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii.

from the grave of his mother Agrippina whom he had murdered. His disarrangement was not derangement. Acting fitfully, all the wheels of the faculties continued to exist in Nero; and they are none of them without movement. They grind on each other, no doubt; but I do not find that spiritual wheels can be pulverized. Do you know how they can be? This idea that evil is to annihilate us ought to have some distinctly scientific support in the experience of this life.

5. Under irreversible natural law there may exist in the universe eternal sin.

It is not my duty here to expound the Scriptures; but you will allow me to say, gentlemen, that "eternal sin" is a scriptural phrase. As all these scholars know, we must read in the twenty-ninth verse of the third chapter of Mark, *hamartematos*, and not *kriseos*. He who sinneth against the Holy Ghost is in danger of "*eternal sin*." Theodore Parker used to say that the profoundest expressions in the New Testament are those which are most likely to have been correctly reported. What phrase on this theme is profounder than "eternal sin"? Dean Alford well says, that "it is to the critical treatment of the sacred text that we owe the restoration of such important and deep-reaching expressions as this." Lange calls it "a strong and pregnant expression."

It is not the best way in which to teach the truth of future punishment, to say that a man is punished for ever and for ever for the sins of that hand's-breadth of duration we call time. If the soul does not repent of these with contrition, and not merely with attrition, the nature of things forbids its peace. But the Biblical and the natural truth is, that prolonged dissimilarity of feeling with God may end in eternal sin. If there is eternal sin, there will be eternal punishment. Final permanence of character under the laws of judicial blindness and the self-propagating power of sin is the truth emphasized by both God's word and His works.

6. Under irreversible natural law there can be no blessedness without holiness.

Here I leave you face to face with the nature of things, the authority which dazzled Socrates. God's Omnipotence cannot force blessedness on a soul that has lost the predominant desire to be holy. Omniscience cannot make happy a man who loves what God hates, and hates what God loves. If you fall into predominant dissimilarity of feeling with God, it is out of His power to give you blessedness. Undoubtedly we are of all men most miserable, unless, with our deliverance from the guilt of sin, there comes to us also deliverance from the love of it. Without holiness there can be no blessedness; but there can be no holiness without

a predominant love of what God loves, and hate of what God hates. We grow wrong; we allow ourselves to crystallize in habits that imply a loss of the desire to be holy; and at last, having made up our minds not to love predominantly what God loves, and hate what He hates, we are amazed that we have not blessedness. But the universe is not amazed. The nature of things is but another name for the Divine Nature. God would not be God if there could be blessedness without holiness.

VII.

CAN A PERFECT BEING PERMIT EVIL?

The Sixty-fifth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est! ita dico, Lucili: sacra inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos: hic, prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat."—SENECA.

"Dieu nous veult apprendre que les bons ont autre chose à esperer, et les mauvais autre chose à craindre, que les fortunes ou infortunes de ce monde."—MONTAIGNE.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

BEFORE landing on the surly Massachusetts shore, our fathers, in the cabin of the Mayflower, drew up a civil compact. It opens with a sentence which Daniel Webster used to say is really the first clause in the Constitution of the United States: "In the name of God, Amen." There are now in this yet young nation church-members enough, including Romish, to constitute one in six of the entire population. It would appear that this first clause of the Constitution would be good for something, if church-members were good for anything. In 1800 we had only one in fifteen inside the church.

Professor Tholuck, with the emphasis of tears in his deep, spiritual eyes, once said to me, at Halle, in his garden on the banks of the Saale, that he regretted nothing so much in the arrangements of the German state churches as that the distinction between the converted and the unconverted, which Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards drew so deeply upon the mind of New England, is almost unknown, not to the theories, but to the church practices, of Germany. "We are all mixed pell-mell together," said he. "After confirmation, we are all, in one sense, members of the church. I have always regarded the distinction you preserve in New England between a man who has made a solemn public profession of his purpose to lead a religious life, and the one who has not, as the most important portion of the unwritten constitution of your nation." Except Scotland, there is no land on the globe that makes as much of this distinction as New England does. So has the spirit of the unwritten law permeated society at large here and in Scotland, that disgusts of the world with the church are sure to stifle the usefulness of the latter, if this law is administered laxly.

Whitefield often affirmed that he would rather have a church with ten men in it right with God than one with five hundred at whom the world laughs in its sleeves. Not long ago, I heard of a church-member who had failed four times,

and only paid ten cents on the dollar, and who had three times assigned his property to relatives in an infamous manner. He was making a speech in a summer evening devotional gathering; and the shutters of the basement of the church were open, and the quick, sharp boys of the common were within hearing. This religious man was saying, "I am of the opinion that our congregation should all alone maintain a missionary on some foreign shore. For such a purpose I will myself give a hundred dollars."—"Ten cents on the dollar?" said a boy outside the shutters of a window. Now, what if that boy had been placed face to face with that man for conversation on personal religion? You say this is an extreme case? but, under our voluntary system, which, no doubt, teaches us religious activity and generosity, there will be, as our population grows, cases like this arising with alarming frequency in great towns, where men cannot watch each other, although they are members of the same church. Your voluntary system has priceless effects; but one of its incidental disadvantages is, that, unless a spirit of most uncommon piety pervades and fires the church, you cannot shut out the dross you would not have, while you take in the gold you must have. Judas, in your voluntary church-system, often carries the bag; often, I say, not always; and sometimes, when he does carry it, the infelicity is, that he rules the purse-strings, and will not go and hang himself. What is the chief difficulty in such conversations as we are many of us sure to be asked this winter to enter into with the unconverted? Hands not clean in business; ledgers that will not bear a neighbour's glance; a personal record behind the church-member which he dares not open to the world; or, in brief, any lack of crystallineness that prevents the transmission of God's light through you. If we are indeed open to all the influences of conscience as the air is to the light, then, when the radiance of the sky behind the sky shines on us, it will shine through us; and it will be found that God's sunbeams will in such a sense penetrate us, that through us men may look into His face. But there are smutched windows, on the panes of which the soot and grime of city greed and fraud have fallen flake by flake. Who cares to look through them toward God? That kind of dim religious light is not of the devoutest sort; and the world knows the fact.

No doubt, the disgusts of the world with the church are many of them unjustifiable; and particularly is it improper for the pulpit to be called upon to be as brilliant twice or thrice a week as the lecture platform is once a year. We ask our ministry to perform arduous parish duties, and to be brilliant orators besides, three times or twice a week before the same audience, year after year. No such task is put upon any lecturer or upon any congressman. As matters stand, I think the average sermon is intellectually as able as the average congressional speech. You cannot have a Burke or Shakspeare in every editor's chair; but pulpits are more numerous than newspapers. If, therefore, you think it natural that some of our newspapers should be the weakest of weeklies, and if some of them are conducted by men who make portions of our press lineal descendants of the reptiles that filled old Egypt, what must we say when pulpits, more numerous than editors' chairs, must all be filled by men who have character? The American ministry, for intellectual equipment and general intellectual capacity, assuredly compares favourably with any other the world ever saw, and with any profession of equal numbers.

But the world has a right to be disgusted if moral faults in the church sow the soil of religious society with the bowlders of distrust. When we cast in the ploughshare, when we try to turn up to God's noon the soil of New England to-day, we meet yet with bowlders enough beneath the soil. Some prayer-meetings you cannot get young men into any more than you can a rat into a trap without a bait; and the reason is, that business men are there who have no good record with society. Give me but a few princes in business,

who are also princes in the church—and there are some such princes in Boston; they are not infrequently found throughout New England, although their names are infrequently heralded—give me princes among men, and I will give you princes who can set religious fashions of the divine sort easily.

What are the chief parts of the religious conversation which the religiously resolute should hold with the religiously irresolute? I think four things should occur in every religious conversation of this endlessly sacred sort. First, let there be secret prayer on your part, of the kind that approaches God through total, affectionate, irreversible self-surrender to conscience; and this act will permeate you, by fixed natural law, with a strange power not your own. Unless you know how to obtain an equipment of entire genuineness, beware how you approach any human being on religious topics. Next ask the person you converse with, "What is your chief religious difficulty?" It is vastly important to avoid debate in such secret moments, and it is yet more vastly important to turn all thoughts upon the deepest inmost of conscience. This question I, for one, have found, in somewhat more than a hand's breadth of experience, quite as useful as any other in effecting both these objects. Perhaps the man with whom you converse does not know what his greatest difficulty is; but, if you induce him to make an effort to state that difficulty, you will help him to solve it. Difficulty well stated is half solved. "What is the knot that chokes you"? Perhaps he thinks of some secret sin of his own; and thinks, also, that you have a greater secret sin. If he thinks this, you will not untie the knot; perhaps he may untie yours. Nothing so stimulates a dead man as to set him at the work of reviving the dead. Try, next, to untie the knot by clear ideas and sound words. Then, lastly, kneel down with that man, and, by the contagious self-surrender of two souls face to face with the Unseen Holy, ask the Divine Nature to untie the knot.

Give me a complete self-surrender of the will to God as both Saviour and Lord, and there is no knot that will not be untied in time. Indeed, whoever will untie that supreme knot of dissimilarity of feeling with God which now chokes us all, will find that he has done something strangely strategic; he has brought into his service the law of the self-propagating power of divine affections; and little by little he will be taken into the fold, from behind which no force, human or infernal, has power to snatch him out. Nay, not little by little! On the instant of total self-surrender, the kneeling man may be crowned, or may have given him from on high a new, supreme passion. If he be really genuine in his self-surrender to God, there will, at the instant of such surrender, spring up in him a new life, consisting of a predominant love of what God loves, and a predominant hate of what God hates. Thus the drunkard will lose his thirst, as he cannot under any resolution of a merely secular sort. Thus, as a supreme miracle, she who might be queenly, she who had a mother pure as yours was, she whom you tread into the mire, she whom natural instincts of her own sex are the swiftest and none too swift to condemn, may have given her of Almighty God at the instant of her total and glad surrender to Him, though never till then, the kiss which awaits a returning prodigal sister; and, after His kiss, deserve yours.

THE LECTURE.

In the Singalese books of Gotama Buddha, written under the shadow of the Himalayas, we find the statement, that as surely as the pebble cast heavenward abides not there, but returns to the

earth, so, proportionate to thy deed, good or ill, will the desire of thy heart be meted out to thee in whatever form or world thou shalt enter. It was the opinion of Socrates, recorded with favour by Plato, that "the wicked would be too well off if their evil deeds came to an end."*

All disloyalty to the still small voice which declares what ought to be is followed by pain. *What if it were not?* Is God God, if, with unscientific liberalism, we in our philosophy put the throne of the universe upon rockers, and make of it an easy-chair from which lullabys are sung both to the evil and to the good?

Whatever we do, God is on our side! So say many who would not dare to affirm, that, whatever we do, the nature of things is on our side. But the nature of things is only the total outcome of the requirements of the perfections of the Divine Nature. God is behind the nature of things; and you and I cannot trifle with Him any more than with it. He was; He is; He is to come. It was; it is; it is to come. It is He.

Great literature always recognizes the law of moral gravitation. Seeking the deepest modern words, I open, for instance, Thomas Carlyle, and read:

"'Penalties': quarrel not with the old phraseology, good reader; attend, rather, to the thing it means. The word was heard of old, with a right solemn meaning attached to it, from theological pulpits and such places, and may still be heard there, with a half meaning, or with no meaning, though it has rather become obsolete to modern ears. But the *thing* should not have fallen obsolete: the thing is a grand and solemn truth, expressive of a silent law of heaven, which continues for ever valid. The most untheological of men may still assert the thing, and invite all men to notice it as a silent monition and prophecy in this Universe, to take it, with more of awe than they are wont, as a correct reading of the Will of the Eternal in respect of such matters, and in their modern sphere to bear the same well in mind.

"The want of loyalty to the Maker of this universe!—he who wants that, what else has he, or can he have? If you do not, you Man or you Nation, love the Truth enough, but try to make a chapman-bargain with Truth, instead of giving yourself wholly, soul and body and life, to her, Truth will not live with you, Truth will depart from you; and only Logic, 'Wit' (for example, 'London Wit'), Sophistry, Vertu, the Æsthetic Arts, and perhaps (for a short while) Book-keeping by double entry, will abide with you. You will follow falsity, and think it truth, you unfortunate Man

* Jowett's *Plato, Introduction to Phædo.*

or Nation. You will, right surely, you for one, stumble to the Devil; and are every day and hour, little as you imagine it, making progress thither." *

This majestic keynote of scientific, ethical truth is the deep tone that leads the anthem of all great thought since the world began. Open, now, Theodore Parker; and how harshly his words clash with Carlyle's!

"The infinite perfection of God is the corner-stone of all my theological and religious teaching, the foundation, perhaps, of all that is peculiar in my system. It is not known to the Old Testament or the New; it has never been accepted by any sect in the Christian world. The idea of God's imperfection has been carried out with dreadful logic in the Christian scheme. In the ecclesiastical conception of the Deity there is a fourth person in the Godhead,—namely, the Devil,—an outlying member, unacknowledged, indeed, the complex of all evil, but as much a part of Deity as either Son or Holy Ghost, and far more powerful than all the rest, who seem but jackals to provide for this roaring lion.†

"God is a perfect Creator, making all from a perfect motive, for a perfect purpose. The motive must be love, the purpose welfare. The perfect Creator is a perfect Providence, love becoming a universe of perfect welfare." ‡

"Optimism is the religion of science." "*Every fall is a fall upward.*" §

One feels, in reading Theodore Parker, that whatever we do, God is on our side. Carlyle is of a very different opinion. He is moved by no faith deeper than that the distinction between duty and its opposite is "quite infinite." What is in the lines here in Parker is not so painful as what is between the lines. Place side by side this free-thinker Carlyle, and that free-thinker Parker, and ask which is the truer of the two to the deep intuitions of the soul. Contrast the seriousness of Buddha, and the tone of this man of Massachusetts Bay. Compare Socrates and Plato under the shade of the Acropolis, with this modern man under the shade of—what? Of a stunted mental philosophy, rooted well, indeed, in our soil in his time, but only a very imperfect growth as yet, and hardly risen above the ground, when the attempt was made here to deny the existence of sin, and of its natural wages in the universe in the name of an intuitive philosophy, which asserts precisely the opposite in both cases.

* Carlyle, *Frederick the Great*, vol. i. pp. 270, 271.
† Weiss, *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 470.
‡ Ibid., p. 471.
§ *Sermons on Theism*, p. 408. *See also* pp. 147 and 299.

Of course, gentlemen, you expect me not to skip the topic of the origin of evil; for, after all, the question which touches that theme quite as often as any other drives men into intellectual unrest, throwing some into atheism, some into a denial of the authority of Scripture, some into various forms of a false, loose, unscholarly liberalism.

What are the more important points which the use of the scientific method can make clear on this multiplex, overawing theme of the origin of evil?

1. There cannot be thought without a thinker.
2. There is Thought in the universe.
3. Therefore there is a Thinker in the universe.
4. But a thinker is a Person.
5. Therefore there is a Personal Thinker in the universe.

You will grant me at least what Descartes made the basis of his philosophy, *Cogito, ergo sum:* "I think, therefore, I am." I know that I think, and therefore I know that I am, and that I am a person. Agassiz says, in his Essay on Classification, that the universe "exhibits thought;" and that is not a very heterodox opinion. You know with what magnificent logical, rhetorical, and moral power, the massive Agassiz, in that best of his books, gathers up range after range of the operations of the natural laws, and closes every paragraph with this language: "These facts exhibit thought," "these facts exhibit mind;" and so on and on, across heights of intellectual scenery, gigantic as his own Alps, and as little likely to be pulverized. When that man, in presence of the scientific world, bowed his head in silent prayer in the face of the audience at Penikese, he did it before a Person. What cared he for the lonely few sciolists who assume that there is no reason for holding their heads otherwise than erect in this universe? As I contrast his mood and theirs, I think always of the old apologue of the heavy heads of wheat, and light heads: the heavy heads always bend.

You say that you are sure you are a thinker, because you know there is thought in you. *I know there is a Thinker in the universe, because there is Thought in it; and there cannot be thought without a thinker.* There cannot be a here without a there. There cannot be a before without an after. Just so, in the nature of things, there cannot be a Thought without a Thinker. If we know there is Thought in the universe, let us quit all doubt about a Divine Thinker.

What! falling into anthropomorphism, are you? That is a long word; but it means making God too much like man. Stern Ethan Allen, who made a speech once near Lake George, in a fort

the ruins of which were part of my playground in earliest years, said, in a book written to attack Christianity, "There must be some resemblance between the divine nature and the human nature. I do know some things, and God knows all things; and therefore, in a few particulars, there is resemblance between man and God." * Anthropomorphism, or the likening of God to man, is not quite as bad as likening God to mere blind physical force, is it? Most of those who are shyest of what is called anthropomorphism are advocates of a theory which likens God to what? To the highest we know? Not at all. To the next to the highest? No. They liken Him to one of the lowest things we know,—to mere physical force, which has in itself no thought or will. Force, the unknown God, forsooth? No doubt He whom we dare not name is behind all force; but to take one of the lower manifestations of His power as that according to which we will describe His whole nature is far more scandalous than to take the loftiest we know, and to say that God is at least equal to that; and how much better neither man nor angel knows, or ever will. Descartes wrote, in a passage closely following his famous aphorism, and which ought to be as famous as that: "I must have been brought into existence by a Being at least as perfect as myself." The Maker must be better than his work. "He must transcend in excellence my highest imagination of perfection."

Is it anthropomorphism to say that there cannot be thought without a thinker, and that there is Thought, and that therefore there must be a Thinker, in the universe? That is a necessary conclusion from self-evident, intuitive, axiomatic truth. It is an inference as tremorless as the assertion that, if there is a *here*, there is a *there*. So are we made, that we cannot deny that if there is Thought in the universe, there must be a Thinker. Gentlemen, let us rejoice with gladness as shoreless and reverent as this noon above our heads. Let us occupy our privileges. Let our souls go out to Him who holds the infinities and eternities in His palm as the small dust of the balance! Let our thoughts, if possible, not faint as they pass from the planet which He governs by His will called gravitation, or from the winkings of our eyelids, which the Asiatic proverb says are numbered, up to the star surf of the galaxies in which all the drops are known by name to Him who makes no mistake. This Thinker, with omnipotence and omniscience revealed by his works, ought to be holy. His unfathomable greatness raises the presumption of his holiness.

* "*Oracles of Reason.*"

But we are not left in doubt upon this theme ; for special light is given in the universe wherever doubt would be the most dangerous.

6. Every law in nature is the method of action of some will.

Having on previous occasions presented to you the proof of that proposition which ninety-five out of a hundred of the foremost names in physical science assert, I need do now no more than recite the names of Dana, Agassiz, Carpenter, Faraday, Helmholtz, Wundt, and Lotze, in support of a truth which transfigures the universe.*

7. There is in the universe an eternal law which makes for righteousness.

Matthew Arnold is authority for that, although his outlook on religious science and philosophy is much like a woman's outlook on politics.

8. The existence of that law is revealed in all outer experience or history.

Even Matthew Arnold says, that, if you wish to know that fire will burn, you can put your hand in it and obtain proof; and that you can, in the same experimental way, convince yourself that there is in history a Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.

9. This law is revealed with vividness in the inner experience in all the natural operations of conscience.

10. There is, therefore, in the universe a Holy Will.

11. But a Holy Will can belong only to a Holy Person.

12. But we know that the moral law is perfect ; for it requires invariably and unconditionally *what ought to be.*

A fathomless deep that word *ought !* An intuition of rightness and oughtness lies at the centre of it. In every individual, moral good is simply *what ought to be,* and moral evil *what ought not to be,* in the choices of the soul among motives.

13. The Maker must be more glorious than the thing made.

14. *The perfection of the moral law inhering in the nature of things proves the perfection of the Divine Nature.*

15. *The perfection of the moral law is a self-evident, axiomatic, intuitive truth.*

16. *All objections to the belief that God is perfect are, therefore, shattered upon the incontrovertible fact of the perfection of the moral law.*

17. The perfection of the Divine Nature having been proved on the basis of axiomatic truth, it follows that the present system of the universe is the best possible system, and that the present moral government of the world is the best possible moral government of the world.

* See closing chapters of Carpenter's *Mental Physiology.*

18. *In all investigations concerning the origin of evil, we must keep in the foreground the axiomatically demonstrated fact of the perfection of the Divine Nature.*

Gentlemen, there is no one here deeply impressed with the duty of using intuition, instinct, syllogism, and experiment as tests of truth, who will not grant me the proposition that there is a perfect moral law in the universe. There is no man here who grants me that proposition, who can analyze it in the light of self-evident truth, and not find himself obliged to admit, that, as there is a perfect moral law, there must be a perfect moral lawgiver. You will allow me, in view of previous discussions here, to use, from this point onwards, the incontrovertible deliverance of the intuitional philosophy, *that the existence in the nature of things of a perfect moral law implies the existence in the universe of a holy will; which will can belong only to a Perfect Person.*

The perfection of the Divine Nature having been proved from the perfection of the moral law, what inferences follow as to the origin of evil?

1. It is a self-evident or intuitive truth that sin exists in this world.

2. God is perfect.

3. *Why did God permit sin to exist?*

4. *Of the many answers to this question, all are, perhaps, conjectures.*

Take up Kant, and read his discussion of "Religion inside the Range of Mere Reason," and you will find him concluding that the moral law itself, which he regarded as the sublimest thing known to man, cannot be quite explained to the human understanding. We know that this law has unconditioned authority; and yet, if we try to go behind its unconditional "categorical imperative," "Thou oughtest" and "Thou shalt," we find ourselves stopped by something beyond our comprehension, although not behind our apprehension. Just so Julius Müller, discussing the topic of the origin of evil, quotes this language of Kant's, and says that the student of religious science need not be ashamed to say that the origin of evil is involved in much mystery. * Although we can know some things, we do not pretend to know all things, concerning it. We may make many conjectures concerning it; we may say that it arises in the abuse of free will: but what led to that abuse of free will? The very arbitrariness of will when it chooses evil—was that the cause of the abuse of free will by itself? Müller, you will remember, teaches explicitly, as Kant did im-

* Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii. p. 172.

plicitly, that the origin of evil is to be referred back to an extra temporal existence, where conditions unknown to man brought about the first sin. He would account for the origin of evil, not by what we see in this world, but by what may have occurred in some state of existence before this, and in which man was implicated as a personality. I am not adopting that portion of Julius Müller's scheme of thought. Many of the deepest students of the theme affirm that we cannot explain the origin of evil without going back to a state of existence previous to this.

5. Even among conjectures there may be a great choice.

6. Is sin permitted, as a dragooning process, to eventuate in good at last?

No: for then sin ought to be; and conscience affirms that it ought not to be.

Is sin the necessary means of the greatest good?

No: for the same reason.

Has all sin an ultimately beneficial effect? or is every fall a fall upward?

No: for, if this be the case, there is reason to doubt whether God is perfectly benevolent.

Let us suppose that there stands on the right, here in the universe, a marble staircase, and on the left a staircase of red-hot iron. Let both ascend to the same height, namely, to a universe from which all sin shall be eliminated. You go up by the marble staircase; you reach that stage—a universe in which there is no sin. You go up by the red-hot iron staircase; you reach the same stage—a universe in which there is no sin. I beg you to be cautious now and here lest you be misled. I warn you that just here is the place where you will think I was too rapid, and that you did not quite know what you admitted. You say that all penalty for sin has a remedial tendency, and that ultimately we shall reach a state in which there will be no evil in the universe. Men are going up the red-hot iron staircase. This represents the path of their suffering for sin. Ultimately, however, this staircase, you say, will bring all who go up into freedom from all sin.

Be mercilessly clear. Could not God take men up the marble staircase to that same height? "Yes," you say, "He is omnipotent, omniscient." Do you admit that? Immense consequences turn on your being clear just here. God might take men up the marble staircase, which represents the path of holy free choice, and freedom from the penalties of sin. A universe free from sin is what you wish to reach. Men may be taken up this marble staircase to that height; or they may be taken up the red-hot iron staircase of suffering to the same height.

I affirm that your theory of evil is dishonourable to God ; for we do know that men are going up on the fiery staircase. They are suffering remorse ; they are filled with anguish ; and the outcome of all that suffering is to be only the attaining of a height to which God, according to your theory, might have raised them without any suffering at all. *Therefore here are useless pains. He who inflicts them cannot be supremely benevolent.* You might attain the platform which represents the absence of sin from the universe by that marble staircase : you are attaining it by the red-hot iron staircase. Why does He permit men to ascend to that height by pain, when they might ascend to the same height without pain? *If He has no motive in that red-hot iron staircase, except to take men up, why does He not take men up by the cold marble?* He is not taking men up by the cold marble : He is taking them up the other way. But if, as you say, He has no motive but to take men up—if, as Theodore Parker said, every fall is a fall upward—how are you to prove the divine benevolence, face to face with His preference for that staircase, when He might have chosen the other?

Assuredly, the theory that all evil is a dragooning process, and that evil is the necessary means to the greatest good, not only is false to the intuitions which declare that evil ought not to be, but is in conflict with the truth that God is perfect. You cannot make it clear that God is perfect, if every fall is a fall upward ; for men might go up the marble staircase, whereas they do go up by the red-hot iron. *There is some other reason for the red-hot iron than to take men up.*

The theory that every fall is a fall upward dishonours God. I know not but that billions of times more spirits go up the marble staircase than up the red-hot staircase ; but, if billions and billions do go that way, why could not you or I go that way?

It is inadmissible to assert that a benevolent Being chooses to subject His creatures to extreme pain, and attains by that means nothing that He might not attain without pain.

What answer does religious science give to the question as to the origin of evil? On this theme there are two strategic questions :

1. Can God prevent sin in a moral system?
2. Can God prevent sin in the best moral system?

Go to New Haven, and from the pupils of one of the profoundest and most original of New-England theologians, Dr. N. W. Taylor, you will find authority for answering these questions in this way :

1. "Can God prevent sin in a moral system?"—"We do not know that He can."

2. "Can God prevent sin in the best moral system?"—"No"—"How do you know?"—"Because He has not prevented it."*

Go to Andover and ask these questions, and you will find them answered in this way:

1. "Can God prevent sin in a moral system?"—"Yes."—"How do you know?"—"Because He that can create can do any thing that is an object of power. God can do anything that does not involve self-contradiction. We must suppose that a system of living beings, all with free wills, might be so influenced by motives as to retain their free will, and yet not sin. God can prevent sin in *a* moral system."

"Can God prevent sin in the *best* moral system?"—"No."—"How do you know?"—"Because He has not prevented it."

The Divine Perfection is proved by the perfection of the moral law. Sin exists. There is no conclusion possible, except that sin cannot be prevented wisely.

What are possibly some of the reasons why a perfect God cannot wisely prevent sin in the best moral system?

1. In the nature of things, there cannot be an upper without an under, a right without a left, a before without an after, a good without, at least, the possibility of evil.

2. *In the nature of things, the gift of free agency carries with it the possibility that the wrong as well as the right may be chosen.*

3. In the nature of things, a created being must be a finite being.

4. In the nature of things, a finite is an imperfect being.

5. *In the nature of things, there will be the possibility of less than absolutely perfect action in every less than absolutely perfect agent.*

6. Man is such an agent.

Julius Müller and Tholuck, in their earlier years, were wont to fall into long conversations upon the origin of evil; and they at last fastened upon Leibnitz's great thought, that the necessary limitations of power and wisdom in all finite beings leave open a possibility to evil. Do not think Leibnitz asserted that the limitations of the finite creature made evil necessary. He asserts only that they make evil possible. I know that I am here not following the authority of Dr. Hodge of Princeton, who asserts that Leibnitz makes evil a necessity in the universe. He does not, if Julius Müller understands him. And, if some reading of the Theodicee proves anything to me, Leibnitz means to assert that the *possibility* of evil inheres in the very nature of things. If there is to be a created being brought into existence, that created

* See Taylor's *Moral Government.*

being must be finite; and so *may*, not *must*, fall into sin. While the *possibility* of sin arises thus from the necessary limitation of the wisdom and power of created beings, the *fact* of sin, according to Leibnitz, comes from abuse of free will.*

7. It may be that God cannot prevent sin, if He deals with finite creatures according to what is due to Himself.

8. It may be better to allow free agents to struggle with sin, and thus grow in the vigour of virtue, than to preserve them from such struggle, and thus allow them to remain weak.

But, my friends, let us rejoice, that, after proving the Divine Perfection, we know enough for our peace as to the origin of evil. It is not at all necessary to establish the soundness of any of these conjectures; for none of them are needed to prove that God is perfect.

In the heavens of the soul there ride unquenchable constellations, which assert that we alone are to blame, if we do what conscience says we *ought* not to do. We are just as sure of the fact that we, and only we, are to blame when we do what conscience pronounces *wrong*, as we are of our own existence. Our demerit is a self-evident fact. All men take such guilt for granted. We know that we are responsible as surely as we all know that we have the power of choice. We know both facts from intuition. Our existence we know only by intuition; and by that same axiomatic evidence we know our freedom. How does sin originate in us? By a bad free choice. Just so it originated in the universe. But God brought us into existence. Yes; and He maintains us in existence. Very well; but the axioms of self-evident truth prove that He has given to us free will. The ocean floats the piratical vessels; the sea-breeze fills the sails of the pirate; but neither the ocean nor the sea-breeze is to blame for piracies.

*See Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. i. p. 276.

VIII.

THE RELIGION REQUIRED BY THE NATURE OF THINGS.

The Sixty-sixth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Um Mitternacht
Kämpft ich die Slacht,
O Menscheit, deiner Leiden:
Nicht konnt ich sie entscheiden
Mit meiner Macht
Um Mitternacht.

Um Mitternacht
Hab' ich die Macht,
Herr über Tod und Leben,
In deine Hand gegeben;
Du hältst die Wacht
Um Mitternacht.

RÜCKERT.

"Miraris tu si Deus ille bonorum amantissimus, qui illos quam optimos esse atque excellentissimos vult, fortunam illis cum quâ exercentur adsignat?"—SENECA.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

IT would be a sad whim in the art of metallurgy if men should take up the notion that a white heat is not useful in annealing metals; and so it is a sad whim in social science when men think that the white heat we call a religious awakening is not useful in annealing society. Twice this nation has been annealed in the religious furnace just previously to being called on to perform majestic civil duties. You remember that the thirsty, seething, tumultuous, incalculably generative years from 1753 to 1783, or from the opening of the French war to the close of the Revolution, were preceded by what is known to history as the Great Awakening in New England in 1740, under Whitefield and Edwards. So, too, in 1857, when we were on the edge of our civil war, the whole land was moved religiously, and thus prepared to perform for itself and for mankind the sternest of all the political tasks that have been imposed in this century upon any civilized people. But our short American story is no exception to the universal experiences of social annealing.

Discussing the subtler meaning of the Reformation, Carlyle says, "Once risen into this divine white-heat of temper, were it only for a season and not again, a nation is thenceforth considerable through all its remaining history. What immensities of *dross* and crypto-poisonous matter will it not burn out of itself in that high temperature in the course of a few years! Witness Cromwell and his Puritans, making England habitable even under the Charles

Second terms for a couple of centuries more. Nations are benefited, I believe, for ages, by being thrown once into divine white-heat in this manner."*

That is the historical law for nations, for cities, for individuals. Do not be afraid of a white heat: it is God's method of burning out dross.

Standing where Whitefield stood, on the banks of the Charles, a somewhat unlettered but celebrated evangelist years ago, face to face with the culture of Harvard, was accused of leading audiences into excitement. "I have heard," said he in reply, "of a traveller who saw at the side of the way a woman weeping, and beating her breast. He ran to her and asked, 'What can I do for you? What is the cause of your anguish?'—'My child is in the well! my child is in the well!' With swiftest dispatch assistance was given, and the child rescued. Farther on this same traveller met another woman wailing also and beating her breast. He came swiftly to her, and with great earnestness asked, 'What is your trouble?'—'My pitcher is in the well; my pitcher is in the well!' Our great social and political excitements are all about pitchers in wells, and our religious excitements are about children in wells." A rude metaphor, you say, to be used face to face with Harvard; but a distinguished American professor, repeating that anecdote in Halle-on-the-Saale in Germany yonder, Julius Müller heard it and repeated it in his university; and it has been used among devout scholars all over Germany. Starting here on the banks of the Charles, and listened to, I presume, very haughtily by Cambridge and Boston, it has taken root in a deep portion of German literature as one of the classical illustrations of the value of a white heat.

We must beware how we fall into pride at the size of our present religious audiences; for Boston has seen greater assemblies than are now gathered here in revivals. I hold in my hand a very significant portion of George Whitefield's journal, written in 1740 in this city. Let us not forget that the doctrine of the new birth, which was drawn so incisively on the mind of New England by Whitefield and Edwards that it seems commonplace now, was, in their time, and in the form in which they taught the truth, a disturbing novelty. The doctrine of the new birth as an ascertainable change was not generally admitted in the religious portion of any New England community when the awakening of 1740 began.† Whitefield taught, to the dismay of New England, that a man does not become a saint in his sleep; and that credible evidence of personal entrance upon a life of love of what God loves, and of hate of what God hates, should be required before a man is made a member of the church; and that especially this change must take place in a minister; otherwise he is unfit to lead the living or the dead. These doctrines were not new to our Puritan fathers in 1640. But in 1740, under the political pressure caused by allowing only church-members to vote, and which led to the vastly mischievous, half-way covenant, by which persons not pretending to have entered on a new life at all were admitted to the church, we had lost the scientifically severe ideals of Plymouth Rock. It was a novel theory to us, that a man should be inexorably required to give credible evidence of a new life, as a condition of being allowed to preach.

"I insisted much on the doctrine of the new birth," writes Whitefield,‡ "*and also on the necessity of a minister's being converted before he could preach aright. Unconverted ministers are the bane of the Christian Church. I think that great and good man, Mr. Stoddard, is much to be blamed for endeavouring to prove that unconverted men might be admitted into the ministry.* A sermon

* Carlyle, *History of Frederick*, vol. i., book 3, chap. viii.

† See Tracy, *History of the Great Awakening*, pp. 46, 130.

‡ *Journals in New England*, London, 1741, p. 48.

lately published by Mr. Gilbert Tennent, entitled 'The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry,' I think unanswerable." "The Spirit of the Lord enabled me to speak with such vigour against sending unconverted ministers into the ministry, that two ministers, with tears in their eyes, publicly confessed that they had laid hands on two young men, without so much as asking them whether they were born again of God or not."

Whitefield spoke with such vigour on this topic, that at this moment we need no speaking on it at all. Rhetorical students sometimes express amazement at the ineffectiveness of the printed addresses of Whitefield when read to-day; but they contain little that is new now, because they impressed so powerfully so much that was new then. Their present ineffectiveness arises from their past effectiveness.

"Mr. Edwards," Whitefield wrote at Northampton (this is Jonathan Edwards, of whom you may have heard), "is a solid and excellent Christian. I think I may say I have not seen his equal in all New England." "He is a son himself, and hath also a daughter of Abraham for his wife. A sweeter couple I have never yet seen. Their children were dressed not in silks and satins, but plain. She talked feelingly and solidly of the things of God. She caused me to renew those prayers which I have put up to God, that He would be pleased to send me a daughter of Abraham to be my wife. I find, upon many accounts, it is my duty to marry." "Minister and people wept much." "Dear Mr. Edwards wept during the whole time of exercise."

You say that in Boston yesterday, in audiences of six thousand and seven thousand, women wept too much, and that men were excited; but in 1740 men like Jonathan Edwards wept; and he is supposed to have had a head as well as a heart.

Gaze a moment on what this city of Boston did when she was hardly more than a village, and while the frontier settlements of New England were yet in danger of intrusions from the savages. All that was mortal of George Whitefield lies on the shore of the sea at Newburyport yonder, at rest until the heavens be no more. When he bade adieu to New England, he spoke on the Boston Common, the very soil over which every day you and I are walking lightly, and wondering whether we cannot go hence in peace, whatever we do. This orator writes in Boston, Sunday, Oct. 12, 1740, while no doubt the transfiguration of gold and russet and crimson hung upon some of the trees, of which we can now almost hear the whispering: "I went with the governor in his coach to the Common, where I preached my farewell sermon to nearly thirty thousand people—a sight I have not seen since I left Blackheath, and a sight, perhaps, never before seen in America. It being duskish before I had done, the sight was more solemn. Numbers, great numbers, melted into tears when I talked of leaving them. I was very particular in my application, both to rulers, ministers, and people; commended what was commendable; blamed what was blameworthy; and exhorted my hearers steadily to imitate the piety of their forefathers; so that, whether I was present or whether I was absent, I might hear of their affairs, that with one heart and mind they were striving together for the faith of the gospel." So Boston responded to the memory of Cromwell and Hampden and Milton. She was young, and she yet is in the gristle. Is there better blood to put into her veins than that of our fathers?

THE LECTURE.

When Ulysses sailed past the isle of the sirens, who had the power of charming by their songs all who listened to them, he heard the

sorcerous music on the shore; and, to prevent himself and his crew from landing, he filled their ears with wax, and bound himself to the mast with knotted thongs. Thus, according to the subtle Grecian story, he passed safely the fatal strand. But when Orpheus, in search of the Golden Fleece, went by this island, he, being, as you remember, a great musician, set up better music than that of the sirens, enchanted his crew with a melody superior to the alluring song of the sea-nymphs; and so, without needing to fill the Argonauts' ears with wax, or to bind himself to the mast with knotted thongs, he passed the sorcerous shore, not only safely, but with disdain.

The ancients, it is clear from this legend, understood the distinction between morality and religion. He who, sailing past the island of temptation, has enlightened selfishness enough not to land, although he rather wants to; he who, therefore, binds himself to the mast with knotted thongs, and fills the ears of his crew with wax; he who does this without hearing a better music, is the man of mere morality. Heaven forbid that I should underrate the value of this form of cold prudence; for wax is not useless in giddy ears, and Aristotle says youth is a perpetual intoxication. Face to face with sirens, thongs are good, though songs are better.

> "Sin hath long ears. Good is wax,
> Wise at times the knotted thongs;
> But the shrewd no watch relax,
> Yet they use, like Orpheus, songs.
> They no more the Sirens fear;
> They a better music hear."

When a man of tempestuous, untrained spirit must swirl over amber and azure and purple seas, past the isle of the sirens, and knots himself to the mast of outwardly right conduct by the thongs of safe resolutions, although as yet duty is not his delight, he is near to virtue. He who spake as never mortal spoke saw such a young man once, and, looking on him, loved him, and yet said, as the nature of things says also, "One thing thou lackest." Evidently he to whom duty is not a delight does not possess the supreme pre-requisite of peace. In presence of the siren shore, we can never be at rest while we rather wish to land, although we resolve not to do so. Only he who has heard a better music than that of the sirens, and who is affectionately glad to prefer the higher to the lower good, is, or in the nature of things *can* be, at peace. Morality is Ulysses bound to the mast. Religion is Orpheus listening to a better melody, and passing with disdain the sorcerous shore.

Aristotle was asked once what the decisive proof is that a man has acquired a good habit. His answer was, "The fact that the practice of the habit involves no self-denial of predominant force among the faculties." Assuredly that is keen; but Aristotle is rightly called the surgeon. Until we do love virtue so that the practice of it involves no self-denial of that sort, it is scientifically incontrovertible that we cannot be at peace. In the very nature of things, while Ulysses wants to land, wax and thongs cannot give him rest. In the very nature of things, only a better music, only a more ravishing melody, can preserve Orpheus in peace. This truth may be stern and unwelcome; but the Greek mythology and the Greek philosophy which thus unite to affirm it are as luminous as the noon.

What is the distinction between morality and religion, and how can the latter be shown by the scientific method to be a necessity to the peace of the soul?

1. Conscience demands that what *ought to be* should be *chosen* by the will.

2. In relation to persons, what we *choose* we *love*.

3. Conscience reveals a Holy Person, the Author of the moral law.

Conscience, therefore, demands that rightness and oughtness in motives should not only be obeyed, but loved.

5. It demands that the Ineffable Holy Person revealed by the moral law should not only be obeyed, but loved.

6. This is an unalterable demand of an unalterable portion of our nature.

7. As personalities, therefore, we must keep company with this part of our nature, and with its demand, while we exist in this world and the next.

8. The love of God by man is, therefore, inflexibly required by the nature of things. Of all the commandments of exact science this is the first: Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy mind and might and heart and strength.

9. Conscience draws an unalterable distinction between loyalty and disloyalty to the Ineffable Holy Person the moral law reveals, and between the obedience of slavishness and that of delight.

10. Only the latter is obedience to conscience.

11. But morality is the obedience of selfish slavishness.

That sounds harsh; but by it I mean only that a man of mere morality is Ulysses bound with thongs. He intelligently chooses not to land; but he wishes to do so. He loves what conscience declares ought not to be. His chief motive is selfishness acting under the spur of fear. In the nature of things, the fear of the

Lord is the beginning of wisdom; but the end of wisdom is the perfect *love* that casteth out fear. You say that I have been appealing to fear. Very well, that is the beginning of wisdom, and I do not revere highly any love of God that has never known any fear of God. Show me that kind of love of God which has not felt what the fear of God is, and I will show you not principle, but sentiment—not religion, but religiosity. Of necessity, loyalty fears disloyalty. But loyalty is love for the Holy Person the moral law reveals; and such love conscience inexorably demands as what *ought* to be.

12. Religion, as contrasted with morality, is the obedience of affectionate gladness. It is the proud, rejoicing, unselfish, adoring love which conscience demands of man for the Ineffable Holy Person which conscience reveals.

13. As such, only religion, and not morality, can harmonize the soul with the nature of things.

So much may be clearly demonstrated by exact research.

Shakspeare says of two characters who conceived for each other a supreme affection as soon as they saw each other,

> "At the first glance they have changed eyes."
> *Tempest*, act i. sc. 2.

The Christian is a man who has changed eyes with God. In the unalterable nature of things, he who has not changed eyes with God cannot look into His face in peace.

What is that love which conscience says ought to be given by the soul to the Ineffable Holy Person which the moral law reveals? Is it a love for a fragment of that Person's character, or for the whole? for a few, or for the whole list, of His perfect attributes?

14. In the nature of things, a delight in not only a part, but in all, of God's attributes, is necessary to peace in His presence.

15. *A religion consisting in the obedience of affectionate gladness, or a delight in all God's attributes, is therefore scientifically known to be a demand of the nature of things.*

It will not be to-morrow, or the day after, that these fifteen propositions will cease to be scientifically certain. Out of them multitudinous inferences flow, as Niagaras from the brink of God's palm. In a better age, philosophy will often pause to listen to these deluging certainties poured from the Infinite Heights of the nature of things. The roar and spray of them almost deafen and blind whoever stands where we do now: but they are there although we are deaf; they are there, although we are blind.

Three inferences from these fifteen propositions are of supreme importance:

1. It is a sufficient condemnation of any scheme of religious thought to show that it presents for worship not all, but only a fragment, of the list of the divine attributes.

2. A religion that is true to the nature of things in theory will, of course, be found to work well in practice. The true in speculation is that which is harmonious with the nature of things. The fortunate in experience is that which is in harmony with the nature of things. The true in speculation, therefore, will turn out to be the fortunate in experience when applied to practice. If a scheme of thought does not work well in the long ranges of experience, if it will not bear translation into life age after age, that scheme of thought is sufficiently shown to be in collision with the nature of things.

3. By all the tests of intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism, religious science must endeavour to obtain the fullest view possible to man of the whole list of the divine attributes.

What scheme of religious thought will bear these three tests best?

Does such underrating of the significance of sin, as Theodore Parker's absolute religion is guilty of, work well in the long range of experience? *All religious teaching that in a wide and multiplex trial does not bear good fruits is presumably out of accord with the nature of things. Does the doctrine that every fall is a fall upward bear good fruits?* Does the assertion that sin is a necessary, and, for the most part, an inculpable stage in human progress, improve society? Does the proposition that character does *not* tend to a final permanence, bad as well as good, and good as well as bad, work well when translated into life age after age?

Gentlemen, let us make a distinction between false and true liberalism. Let us speak with proper respect of a learned, cultured, Christian liberalism. Let us speak with proper disrespect of a lawless, limp, lavender liberalism. It has been the fault of the latter style of unscientific liberalism in every age, and it is especially the fault of Theodore Parker's theism, that it represents only a fragment of the divine attributes as the whole list.

The supreme question, then, my friends, if you are convinced that man cannot have peace unless he has a delight in all attributes of the Holy Person revealed by the moral law, is to know what the full list is. Whether Boston cares, or Harvard, to know what the natural conditions of the soul's peace with the nature of things are, I do not know; but, for one, I feel very sure I am going hence, and that I wish to go hence in peace, and that I cannot go hence in peace unless I love not only a fragment, but the whole list, of the divine attributes.

What can science of the ethical sort do toward presenting us with a full view of the divine attributes? That is a very central and a very strategic question. Suppose, in order to make our thoughts clear, that we begin our answer by substituting scientific for biblical phraseology. Try for once the experiment, and see how we shall come out. Everybody admits there is a nature of things. Now, what if we assert simply that it is necessary to the soul's peace to acquire harmony with the nature of things? Say nothin about God now. It is certain that there is in the universe wha science calls the nature of things; and it is tolerably clear that that has not changed much for some years. It is without any variableness or shadow of turning. It was; it is; it is to come. For one, when I ask the question whether I can know God, I am always asking, immediately after that, whether I can know the nature of things. What if the nature of things is but another name for His nature? What if the nature of things, which has not changed in eternity past, and is not to change in eternity to come, is but a revelation of Him with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning? I know that the nature of things is infinitely kind toward virtue. I know that the nature of things is infinitely stern toward vice. What if, while science gazes on the nature of things, and looks fixedly into it, she finds behind it the will of a personal God, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, invisible, but in conscience spiritually tangible?

1. In the nature of things, to work for good is to work against evil.

Does anybody doubt this? Is not that a proposition just as clearly true as that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time, and in the same sense, as any other intuitive deliverance of our faculties?

2. In the nature of things, God cannot work for good without working against evil.

I am assuming only that God cannot deny Himself. That *cannot* is to me at once the most terrible and the most alluring certainty in the universe. He cannot deny the demands of His own perfections. These are another name for the nature of things. We feel sure that, in the nature of things, there cannot be a here without a there, an upper without an under, or any working of God for good without working by Him against evil. The nature of things is not fate, but the unchangeable free choice of infinite perfection in God.

Allow no one to mislead you by overlooking the distinctions between *certainty* and *necessity*, *will* and *shall*, *occasioning* and

necessitating, *infallibly* certain and *inevitably* certain. Let no one assert that faithfulness to self-evident truths as to the nature of things leads to a system of thought consisting of adamantine fatalism. There can be but one best way in which to conduct the universe. Omniscience will know that way. Omnipotence will choose and adhere to that way. There will be no deviation from that way in the course of the government of the universe. There will thus appear to be fate in the infinities and eternities; but there is there in reality only the infinitely wise and holy, and therefore unchanging, free choice of Almighty God.

Even man's free will may illustrate the law of *certainty* without falling at all under that of *necessity*.

Near the great sea there lives yonder at Salisbury a renowned poet, on whom the light of the golden Indian summer of genius is now shining. It was once my surprising fortune to hear this revered man say seriously that he could not quite agree with Andover and Jonathan Edwards in wholly denying the freedom of the will. I made no attempt to correct this error; for I had proper reverence for that poet whom Germany regards as the deepest heart among all American writers of lyrics,* a man in whom there is an unquenchable Hebrew fire, which quite as effectively as any other flame, moved before us as a pillar of radiance in the dark days of our anti-slavery contest.

Now, it may be that Andover does not understand Jonathan Edwards; but she does not understand him to deny the freedom of the will. And as for denying the freedom of the will herself, you might as well ask whether Andover denies the immortality of the soul, or whether Jefferson Davis asserted that Federal power ought to be supreme over State rights, or whether Plymouth Rock will float. There is no monstrosity greater as a misconception than to affirm that New-England theology denies the freedom of the will; and yet I see that affirmation made almost monthly by irresponsible scribblers, and now and then responsibly, over names which I honour.

3. In the nature of things, God is not God, unless He works for good.

4. Therefore, in the nature of things, He is not God, unless He works against evil.

5. He is perfect; and therefore, with all His attributes, He works for good.

6. He is perfect; and therefore, with all His attributes, He works against evil.

* See Brockhaus' *Conversations Lexicon*, art. "Whittier."

7. Sin exists in the universe by the abuse of free will.

It is incontrovertible that conscience declares that we, and we alone, are to blame when we do what we know to be wrong. Of course, I keep in mind the distinction between an error and sin, or between a mistake of the moral kind and a wrong of the moral kind. When I speak of sin, I mean a free choice of motives which conscience pronounces to be bad. In every bad free choice there comes upon the soul, after the act, a sense of personal demerit. If that deliverance of the self-evident truths of the soul is *not* to be received, several rather large results follow.

If you deny the intuition which proves that the will is free, you cannot prove your own existence; for you know your own existence only by intuition. How do I know there is an eternal world? By intuition. How do I know that I am in existence? By intuition. How do I know that I am personally to blame when I do what conscience pronounces wrong? By intuition. We are not to play fast and loose with this supreme test of truth. Intuition is the soul's direct vision of all truths which to man have these three characteristics—*self-evidence, necessity, universality. An intuition may mean a truth, self-evident, necessary, and universal; or it may mean the act of the mind in beholding such a truth.* When I say any thing is affirmed by intuition, I mean that it is guaranteed by that capacity of the soul through which we have a direct vision of self-evident, axiomatic, necessary truth. It is an intuitive truth that the will is free; and, as Johnson used to say, "there is the end of it." We know we are to blame when we choose the wrong; and there is an end of that. If you know by self-evident, axiomatic, necessary, universal truth that you exist, you know by the same evidence that you are free, and that you have incurred personal demerit whenever you choose a motive which conscience pronounces to be a bad one.

What you take for granted in business, and in law, and in literature, you must allow me to take as proved in religious science.

Does anybody doubt that he is free in business? Very well, will anybody doubt, then, that he is free in religion? Does anybody doubt that God gives the harvest, but that nevertheless man must sow and plant? Does not the husbandman every spring go forth and act as if everything depended on him? and does not God work with him to fill the valley with fatness? Just so in the spiritual realm: a man must go forth and sow good seed; and God will give the increase. There is no collision in business between freedom of will and fate; and so, as the laws of the universe are the same in both fields, there is no collision in religion. *Pre-*

destination does not mean *destiny*. This is one of the most mischievous words in theology; and the trouble is with the syllable "dest." I never use the word predestination; for that syllable "*dest*" implies destiny, and destiny implies necessity. In religious science the word "predestination" does not mean necessity, but only certainty.

8. *While sin continues, God cannot forgive it without making the sinner worse.*

In this city six thousand people were told, the other evening, with great depth of thought, that if a child deliberately lies, and you forgive the child before he has exhibited any sorrow for the act, you make the child worse. That is, indeed, a very simple instance of the moral law; but in scientific minds there is no doubt that the moral law is equally universal with the physical. If you will measure a little arc of the physical law, you can measure the whole circle.

If I were to take flight into space, I should not run beyond the knowledge that I have acquired here of the law of gravitation. That law is one in all worlds so far as science knows. So, too, if I understand the properties of light here, I understand them in Orion and the Pleiades. A good terrestrial text-book on light or gravitation would be of service in the North Star. The universality and the unity of law make our earth, although but an atom, immensity itself in its revelations of truth.* Now, if I know that a man has deliberately lied to me, I cannot here, under the moral law, forgive him before he repents, without making him worse. If I know that, then there is reason to believe that God cannot, in the nature of things, forgive a free agent that has incurred personal demerit by the choice of wrong motives, till he has repented, without making that agent worse. The nature of things, gentlemen—it is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

Here is a Boston sonnet, entitled "A Far Shore;" and it asserts the universality of the moral law as well as of the physical and the organic; and so it applies not only to Greece and Italy, and the shadow of the Pyramids, but also to the shore of that undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns:

> On a far shore my land swam far from sight,
> But I could see familiar native stars;
> My home was shut from me by ocean bars,
> Yet home hung there above me in the night;
> Unchanged fell down on me Orion's light;
> As always, Venus rose, and fiery Mars;
> My own the Pleiads yet; and without jars
> In wonted tones sang all the heavenly height.

* See Dana, *Geology*, chap. i.

So when in death, from underneath my feet
Rolls the round world, I then shall see the sky
Of God's truths burning yet familiarly;
My native constellations I shall greet:
I lose the outer, not the inner eye,
The landscape, not the soul's stars, when I die.

9. The self-propagating power of habit, acting in the sphere of holy affections, places the nature of things on the side of righteousness.

10. The same self-propagating power of habit, acting in the sphere of evil affections, arranges the nature of things against evil.

11. Good has but one enemy, the evil; but the evil has two enemies, the good and itself.*

12. Judicial blindness increases the self-propagating power of evil; remunerative vision increases the self-propagating power of holiness.

"Every man," says the Spanish proverb, "is the son of his own deeds." "Every action," says Richter, "becomes more certainly an eternal mother than it is an eternal daughter."† These are the irreversible laws according to which all character tends to a final permanence, good or bad.

13. God cannot give the wicked two chances without subjecting the good to two risks.

14. Self-evident truth shows that man is free.

15. Self-evident truth proves that man may attain a final permanence of character, good or bad, and in that state, not lose freedom of will.

16. *This may occur in the best possible universe, in which all things will of course work together for good to the good, and therefore, of necessity, for evil to the evil.*

Adhere to the proposition that there cannot be an upper without an under. *Can* God arrange the universe so that all things in it shall work together for the good of the good, without arranging it so that all things shall work together for the evil of the evil? *Can* God be God, and not arrange the universe so that all things in it shall work together for the good of the good? *Can* God be God, and not so arrange the universe, that all things shall work together for the evil of the evil? Follow the deliverance of your intuitional philosophy, that the soul is free. I know how a man is tempted here, and how a silly sciolism will overturn the

* See Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii.
† *Titan*, vol. i. cycle 105.

testimony of the intuitions themselves, rather than admit that man is responsible for all action that conscience pronounces wrong. But, if you overturn the deliverance of the intuitions there, please overturn it elsewhere. You will not play fast and loose much longer, gentlemen; for our age is coming to be, thank God, unwilling to take anything for granted, and more and more loyal to clear ideas. Our greatest philosophies, metaphysical and physical, all stand on the basis of self-evident truth, or intuition; and although your physicist who never has studied metaphysics does not know who sharpened his tools, or sometimes what his tools are, he every day is using self-evident truth, and stands on the intuitions at which he scoffs. You say that the intuitional philosophy sails by dead-reckoning. Well, dead-reckoning by axioms is scientific. You say that the philosophy of self-evident truths is off soundings, and that you prefer to keep in water where you can feel the bottom. I tell you that your sounding-lines themselves are spun by what you call dead-reckoning, or the philosophy of self-evident, axiomatic, necessary truths. Your physicist has no scientific rule, the validity of which is not guaranteed by self-evident truth; and so when you say I sail by dead-reckoning, and am off soundings, and that you are sounding and sounding, and that you know there is an external world, and that you believe only what you can see and touch and handle, I go behind your sounding-line, and ask, "Who spun that?" I ask, "How are you certain there is an external world?" You say, "It is evident." So I say, "It is self-evident." On self-evidence you stand, and on self-evidence I stand; and, if you and I can shake hands at this point, we shall never part. If we are true to the deliverance of all the intuitions, and not merely to a portion of them, we shall vividly behold truth of which neither materialism nor pantheism dreams. We shall see God in not merely a few of His attributes, but in that whole range of them, which the nature of things exposes to human vision; and we shall find it a thing just as glorious to be reconciled with God as it is to be reconciled with the nature of things, and just as little likely to occur in a man asleep, or by accident and haphazard, and dreaming and poetizing.

We shall find it a thing at least as terrible to fall under the power of God as it is to fall under the power of the nature of things. Assuredly the nature of things will not break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax, of loyalty to itself; the nature of things assuredly, too, may be a consuming fire to all disloyalty to itself. It may be an omnipresent kiss or an omnipresent flame. The savages in Peru used to kiss the air as their profoundest sign of adoration to the collective divinities. The nature of things is

above and around and beneath us; and our sign of adoration to it must be not slavish self-surrender, but affectionate, glad preference of what this unbending perfection requires.

You say the permanent existence of sin would be an impeachment of the divine benevolence. Why is not the beginning of it an impeachment? The mystery, my friends, is not, that, under the law of judicial blindness and the self-propagating power of habit, sin may continue: the mystery is, that sin ever was allowed to begin. *It has begun.* There is no doubt on that subject, and, when you will explain to me the consistency of your philosophy with the beginning of sin, I will explain to you the consistency of a final permanence of free evil character with that same philosophy.

What we do know is, that, the more a man sins against light, the less sensitive he is to it. What we do know is, that over against judicial blindness stands remunerative vision, and we cannot change one law without changing the other. The nature of things is the flame; the nature of things is the kiss: God is God by being both. What God does is successfully done. What God does is well done.

Mrs. Browning, whom England loves to call Shakspeare's daughter, and who is in many respects the deepest interpreter of the modern cultivated heart and head, rests in God's goodness:

> 'Oh the little birds sang east, the little birds sang west!
> And I said in underbreath, All our life is mixed with death,
> And who knoweth which is best?
>
> 'Oh the little birds sang east, the little birds sang west!
> And I smiled to think God's goodness flows around our incompleteness;
> Round our restlessness His rest."

Had she paused there, she would not have been the prophetess of science as she is; for, without resting in an unscientific liberalism, she says also:

> "Let star-wheels and angel-wings, with their holy winnowings,
> Keep beside you all your way,
> Lest in passion you should dash, with a blind and heavy crash,
> Up against the thick-bossed shield of God's judgment in the field."
>
> *Rime of the Duchess May.*

IX.

THEODORE PARKER ON COMMUNION WITH GOD AS PERSONAL.

The Sixty-seventh Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Religion ist anfangs Gottlehre; recht ist sie Gottseligkeit. Auf Marktplatz und Schlachtfeld steh' ich mit zugeschlossener Brust, worin der Allhöchste und Allheiligste mit mir spricht, und vor mir als nahe Sonne ruht."—RICHTER: *Levana.*

'So schaff' ich am sausenden
Webstuhl der Zeit."
GOETHE: *Faust.*

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

ONE day in Parliament William Pitt said, "I have no fear for England: she will stand till the day of judgment." But Edmund Burke replied, "What I fear is the day of *no* judgment." The relation of the temperance reform to the future of great cities has an unsounded depth of interest from Edmund Burke's point of view. In 1800 one twenty-fifth of the population of the United States was in towns numbering eight thousand or more inhabitants; in 1870 one-fifth.*

Of course I need not emphasize the fact that many of our churches are doing their duty on the topic of temperance in great towns. I do not overlook starry exceptions. I remember that Roswell Hitchcock's church in New York was once called together in order that two persons who had joined it might have work assigned them on the church philanthropic committees. There was no other business before the gathering than to set two persons at work; the only ones out of a very large church who had not something definite to do in our sorely-tried metropolis. Other individual churches are active, but the mass of our churches are singularly inefficient in moral reform in cities. The other day I saw a heap of manuscript books, in which the names of the most abandoned streets and lanes in this city were written down, and in which a competent number of fit persons were assigned to the work of visitation in these desolate quarters. Now, is it not a circumstance rather humiliating that a man who is comparatively a stranger in this city must come half-way across the continent to set us here in Boston at work which we ought to know better than he does how to do? Is it not a fact somewhat inexpressible in its wincing outcome, as it touches our poor pride, to know that many a town in New England, Boston not excepted from the list, is allowing a Young Men's

* Walker, *Statistical Atlas*, 1876.

Christian Association, for instance, that wishes to do just such work as this, to starve? You are not giving half money enough to the agents you employ for religious effort among the poor and degraded in cities; and you do not work yourselves. You act through the finger-tips of a few saints; women missionaries, city missionaries; and you are starving them. There is not a city missionary, there is not an established religious agency of yours among the perishing and dangerous classes and their fleecers, that has adequate financial support, to say nothing of sympathy. You say this is plain speech; but I had rather speak plainly than bring upon myself the charge of being inattentive to what has been brought so prominently before New England in the great audiences in the noon yonder in the Tabernacle, when reformed men have spoken and been addressed, in the presence of thousands, in tears. We need every season just such effort as is now making temporarily here for the abandoned quarters in this and other cities.

There is in Boston a great orator, whose name is a power from the surf of the Bay of Fundy to the waterfalls of the Yosemite. Stand in front of his house, in the street where Slavery once mobbed him, and you may count thirty grog-shops within sight of his windows. Yes: Wendell Phillips told you the other day that he could count thirty-nine, and that for thirteen of these only is Massachusetts law responsible. The truth is, that the Church, after all, is, or should be, the sheet-anchor of all moral reform. I do not undervalue Washingtonianism; I do not undervalue temperance legislation; in fact, though there may be no one prohibitory law with all the details of which I should sympathize, yet I must call myself a prohibitionist. [Cheers and a few hisses. Mr. Cook turned to the quarter from which the hisses proceeded, and said,] Wait two hundred years, and see whether you will hiss prohibition! Wait until Macaulay's two hundred are the average number of inhabitants for every square mile between Plymouth Rock and the Golden Gate, and see whether you will hiss prohibition! Wait until a quarter of our population shall be massed in cities, and Edmund Burke's day of no judgment appears, and see whether you will hiss prohibition!

Massachusetts now has laws by which sales of liquor are forbidden at all times to minors and drunkards, and to persons to whom the sellers have been requested to cease selling by their families or employers. Are you executing that law? The letting of real estate for the illicit selling of liquor is made more perilous by a new clause requiring the magistrate to serve notice of the conviction of any party of such an offence on the lessor of the premises. The latter is thereupon required, by the old law of common nuisance, to eject the tenant, under penalty. Are church-members in Massachusetts who own real estate in degraded quarters never implicated in the violation of that righteous public law?

America wants her churches to organize themselves for permanent and aggressive, just as they occasionally have organised themselves for temporary and timid, work for the squalid and debased. I read in the newspapers the other day that some noble women, lineal descendants, no doubt, of those whom Paul saw on Mars Hill, or of those who were among the most efficient of all the powers that cowed old Rome by the purity of Christian life, have gone into the jaws and throat of despair in certain abandoned quarters of this city, and have found homes for degraded women, and taken the almost incredible word of hope to persons like some to whom our Lord Himself spoke. This work is going on silently; it must not be heralded. What is needed is that it should be made permanent.

Lessing said, that by-and-bye, when the world has found out what church does the most good, it will know in what church to believe. Show me the church that is willing to wash the feet of the degraded; show me the church

that goes about from house to house doing good ; show me the church organized for permanent, aggressive, audacious, moral effort ; show me a church that has not lost her Master's whip of small cords, and I will show you the church, and the only church, that can save America when she has two hundred inhabitants to the square mile.

There was in our Christian and Sanitary Commission in the civil war a great hint for our years of peace. The Sanitary Commission and the Christian Commission followed our armies like white angels; and why should not the flight of these two ministering spirits be in some sense perpetuated in our great cities, which are always battle-fields ? One thousand years ago the Norsemen came up Boston Harbour in shallops, every one of which had on its sail a painting of a cormorant raven, and at its prow a wolf's head. Bryant says the Norse pirates sailed up yonder azure bay a thousand years ago. What I know is, that the Norse raven yet flies in America, and the Norse wolf yet howls. What I want to fly side by side with the raven, what I want to run side by side with the wolf, is organized, permanent, aggressive, audacious, loving Christian effort.

New England has seen lately some new indications that temperance discussion in the church will be heard by the masses outside of it. Look at the Merrimack River and its cities, and notice what one man, Dr. Reynolds, has done there. You do not believe in all his methods, although experience is endorsing them significantly ? Very well : will you invent better ones ? What are we about, when men, and some women, through the country, more rapidly than under the scythe of war, are falling into their graves under the flame of these gross, consuming habits, that we do not turn all the moral power of the church, at least once a month in cities, on this conflagration ? We have power to put down by moral suasion a great amount of this evil, and our responsibility is proportionate to our power. Let moral suasion once have free course, and legal suasion will follow of the right sort. Whenever temperance has tried to fly on one wing, that is, either with legal suasion alone on the one hand, or with moral suasion alone on the other, her flight has been a sorry spiral. She never will ascend to God, or even make the circuit of the globe, until she strikes the air with majestic equal vans keeping rhythm with each other, moral suasion and legal suasion, acting side by side, to bear her on, and to winnow the earth of both the tempters and the temptable.

Shrewd men ought to perceive that undefiled religion in the heart is the only adequate dissuasive from Circe's cup at the lips. "To conquer," said Napoleon, "we must replace." To conquer unholy passion we must replace it by holy passion. Undoubtedly a man may lose in the religious renovation of his nature his appetite for strong drink. It is, you say, a very vexed question whether a converted man loses his appetite for liquor. Cases of deep inherited disease may be set aside as not under discussion here. Put this question on another plane of thought. Have you not known some men morally transfigured by the power of a supreme earthly affection ? Have you not seen some father bereaved of a darling boy, and changed thereafter to the finger-tips ? Have you not known often a great crisis in life to take a bad appetite out of a man, even when the crisis was merely secular ? There are some derangements infinitely more infamous than inherited appetites for strong drink; but even these are often removed wholly by a holy love, filial, conjugal, or paternal, if once the affection takes hold of the deepest inmost in the soul. Can you not believe, that, when God is loved supremely, there may come to a man such an awakening of the upper zones of his nature, that he shall no longer have an appetite for strong drink ? He, and only he, will be lifted above temptation who falls in love with God with all his heart.

THE LECTURE.

THE Russian poet Derzhavin has the honour of having written an ode, to the rhythm of which all cultivated circles have bowed down, from the Yellow Sea westward to the Pacific. The stanzas of it you may see to-day embroidered on silk in the palaces of the Emperors of Japan and China. You will find the poem translated into Persian, into Arabic, into Greek, into Italian, into German; and, when I open the most popular of our American anthologies, I find that the book closes with this Russian anthem:

"O Thou Eternal One, whose presence bright
All space doth occupy, all motion guide,
Unchanged through Time's all-devastating flight!
Thou only God; there is no God beside!
Being above all beings! Mighty One!
Whom none can comprehend and none explore,
Who fill'st existence with Thyself alone,
Embracing all, supporting, ruling o'er,
Being whom we call God, and know no more!

. . . . . .

God! thus alone my lowly thoughts can soar,
Midst Thy vast works admire, obey, adore;
And when the tongue is eloquent no more,
The soul shall speak in tears of gratitude."

Translation of Sir John Bowring

When a poem has the majestic fortune to be adopted as a household word of culture in twenty nations, we are scientifically justified in the conclusion that the deep instincts of the human heart from the rising to the setting sun assert what the poem expresses. Thus we judge in the case of the songs of love; and so, I insist, we must judge in relation to the anthems of religion. Indeed, these latter sink more penetratingly into history than the former. Nothing is treasured by the best part of the world so painstakingly, from the epic we call the Book of Job to Derzhavin's poem on the Divine Nature, as the literature that is struck worthily to the keynote of adoration of the Infinite Perfection of a Personal God. This is a literary fact which the Matthew Arnolds and Herbert Spencers would do well to fathom. The native human instincts are ascertainable by the reception all races and tribes and tongues give to the literature of communion with God as personal. *Such instincts are a scientific proof of the existence of their correlate.* There can be no thought without a thinker. There is thought in the universe; therefore, there is a thinker in the universe. But a thinker is a person: therefore there is a Personal

Thinker in the universe. There can be no such organic hungering as all nations have for communion with God as personal without the possibility of such communion. Men who revere the natural will not scorn Theism, for it is as natural as anything else in nature. The veracity of our theistic instincts is proved by their naturalness. Julius Müller gives as one definition of religion the communion of the soul with God as personal.

1. Men as they are can be made holy only by loving a holy person.

2. Nothing so effectually purifies the heart as love; for nothing so effectually wooes us from selfishness.

3. There can be no love without trust, and no trust without purity.

4. Love produces in the lover the mood of the object loved.

5. Souls grow more by contact with souls than by all other means.

6. Growth, strength, bliss, arise naturally from spiritual love.

7. All these laws of the higher affections apply to the communion of the human spirit with the Ineffable Holy Person whom the moral law reveals.

8. Under these irreversible natural laws, religion is affectionate communion with God as personal.

In Locksley Hall, Tennyson, speaking merely as an observer of human nature in its social zone, utters one of the profoundest of all the truths of its religious zone, when he says,

> "Love took up the harp of life; smote on all the chords with might;
> Smote the chord of self, which, trembling, passed in music out of sight."

Is there any hand but that of love that can produce this effect? *Under natural law can man be made unselfish or holy in any other way than by loving a holy person?* Tennyson knows of no other way; religious science knows of no other.

The truth is, my friends, we are acquainted with no furnace which will burn selfishness out of a man, except this fiery bliss we call a supreme spiritual affection. There is admiration of men by each other; but there is no burning the selfishness out of men until they come to trust and to love, and to that intersphering of soul by soul which is always the result of trust of the transfigured sort,—one of the rarest things on earth. Do not think that I am putting before you a low ideal of trust: for I speak of those forms of love—conjugal, filial, paternal—which the poets love to glorify.

I read the other day two Boston sonnets entitled "Trust," which made of the crystalline window of one of the deepest human ex-

periences an opening through which to look into the sky behind the sky.

I know that thou art true and strong and pure.
My forehead on thy palm, I fall asleep:
My sentinels with thee no vigils keep,
Though elsewhere never without watch secure.
How restful is thy palm! I life endure:
These stranger souls whose veils I shyly sweep,
These doubts what secrets hide within the deep,
Because, aglow within the vast obscure,
Thy hand is whitest light! My peace art thou;
My firm green isle within a troubled sea;
And, lying here, and looking upward now,
I ask, if thou art this, what God must be:
If thus I rest within thy goodness, how
In goodness of the infinite degree?

But there are lightnings wherever there is love; for character cannot have one side without having two sides; we cannot love good, and not abhor evil; and so the second sonnet, equally true to trust, contrasts with the first:

This crystal soul of thine, were it outspread
Until the drop should fill the universe,
How in it might the angels' wings immerse;
And wake and sleep the living and the dead;
Bereaved eyes bathe; rest Doubt its tossing head;
Swim the vast worlds; dissolve Guilt's icy curse;
And sightless, if but loyal, each disperse
Fear by full trust, and, by devotion, dread!
And yet these perfect eyes in which mine sleep
Would not be sweet were not their lightning deep.
In softest skies the swiftest fire-bolts dwell.
Thine eyes mix dew and flame, and both are well.
If thus I fear this soul, O God! how Thee,
Both love's and lightning's full infinity?

In the Portuguese Sonnets, the most subtle and tender and sublime expressions of affection ever written by woman, it is not so much Mrs. Browning who sings, as Robert Browning, the future husband. When Tennyson, in the In Memoriam, commemorates the young Hallam, it is not Tennyson who sings, so much as Hallam. When Robert Hall and Canning form a friendship for each other at Eton, it is Canning who appears in Hall, and Hall who appears in Canning. When Thomas Carlyle, John Sterling, and Edward Irving, are friends, it is Irving that appears in Carlyle at times, and Carlyle that appears in Irving; and, when Sterling lies dying, it is Carlyle that makes up more than half his soul. Always when two human personalities are united by a supreme spiritual affec-

tion, they intersphere each other, and produce the moods of one in the other; and, when there is a transfiguration in personal affection, there is thus a smiting of the chord of self, till it passes in music out of sight. Of course, therefore, there is no method to produce growth, strength, and bliss in the soul, like the pure contact of spirit with spirit. Carlyle says we grow more by contact of soul with soul than by all other means united. Literature, if possessed of power, is the mirror of soul, and causes those who love it to grow by contact with the pulsating, reflected depths of genius.

But a Persian proverb says, "Look into the sky to find the moon, and not into the pool." Look into the faces of your elect living friends, and into the souls of those whom you trust most. Make much of your giant friendships of all kinds, and be thankful if you have one genuine friendship of any kind, and let unforced trust enswathe you, if you would be transfigured. You grow more in these high moments of personal affection when you look at the moon in the sky than by much meditating on the moon in the pool. Friendships with authors and heroes in a far past are undoubtedly honourable to us, and transfiguring, and in loneliness are, perhaps, the highest human solace; but they are not the highest possible to man; they are not the moon in the sky.

Gentlemen, you all foresee that I am to affirm that a human spirit may commune with the Infinite Spirit, and that all these laws of transfiguration are to be kept in view when we would explain the renovating power on man of the communion of the soul with God as personal. You anticipate that in a moment I shall be asking, in the name of the scientific method, that you, face to face with the Holy Person the conscience reveals, should give free course to all those majestic natural laws by which soul transfigures soul through personal affection. Gentlemen, I do ask this, and in the stern name of the scientific method. Is any one thinking, that, as a benighted soul, brought up in the mossy mediævalism of our latest theology, I cannot worship one God, because I believe in three Gods? Do not pity mediævalism too much; it knows the difference between Trinity and Tritheism. I wish just now to thank God, if you can worship one God as Derzhavin does. I rejoice with you, if you can go as far as scientific Theism does, and worship one God, who was, who is, who is to come. Let us to-day not go farther than with Derzhavin to admire, obey, adore One King, eternal, immortal, invisible, and in conscience spiritually tangible.

Samuel Johnson, when he had finished his great dictionary, received a note from his publisher in these words: "Andrew Miller sends his compliments to Samuel Johnson, with the money in pay-

ment for the last sheet of his dictionary, and thanks God he is done with him." To this rude note Johnson replied, "Samuel Johnson sends his compliments to Andrew Miller, and is very glad to notice, as he does by his note, that Andrew Miller has the grace to thank God for anything." You call yourselves deists; you call yourselves theists; you hold, that in the name of science, we can worship one God, who must be behind all natural law. I thank God that you believe as much as that. Perhaps more lies wrapped up and capsulate in your belief than you think. Here are a few slight notes from a Boston marching-song, on which my eyes fell the other day, when I was alone. They are sung in the name of exact science; and surely we can sing together anything attuned to that key-note.

Bounds of sun-groups none can see;
Worlds God droppeth on His knee
Galaxies that loftiest swarm,
Float before a loftier Form.

Mighty the speed of suns and worlds
Mightier who these onward hurls;
Pure the conscience's fiery bath;
Purer fire God's lightning hath.

Brighter He who maketh bright
Jasper, beryl, chrysolite;
Lucent more than they whose hands
Girded up Orion's bands.

Sweet the spring, but sweeter still
He who doth its censers fill;
Good is love, but better who
Giveth love its power to woo.

Lo, the Maker! greater He,
Better, than His works must be:
Of the works the lowest stair
Thought can scale, but fainteth there.

Thee with all our strength and heart,
God, we love for what Thou art;
Ravished we, obedient now,
Only, only perfect Thou!

Will you sing that tremorless song of science, and keep entranced, stalwart step to your singing, and then turn to me and say that these sublime natural principles by which human affection transfigures the soul do not apply in the sphere of man's relations to the Ineffable Holy Person the moral law reveals? There is such a law; there is such a person. It follows that there are relations between that holy person and ourselves. In the name of that ascertained natural law, I affirm that men as they are can be made holy only by loving a holy person. In the reli-

gious as well as the social zone of our faculties, only love can smite all the chords with might, or smite the chord of self into invisibility and music. *But the love which can do this is no admiration only; it is adoration.*

Theodore Parker's absolute religion fails to distinguish properly between the admiration and the adoration of the Ineffable Holy Person which Parker admits that the moral law reveals.

1. Admiration does not always imply a full and vivid view of the Infinite Holiness of the Infinite Oughtness revealed by the moral law. Adoration always does imply this.

2. Admiration does not always imply a glad self-commitment of the soul to the Infinite Holiness. Adoration always does.

3. Admiration usually has but a fragmentary view of the Divine attributes as revealed in the nature of things. Adoration has, or is willing to have, a full view.

4. Admiration may give pleasure for a time. Adoration gives bliss.

5. Admiration may have delight in only a few of God's attributes. Adoration is supreme delight in all God's attributes.

6. Admiration of God is often all that is found, or all that it is thought necessary to require, in the distinctively literary or poetic schemes of sceptical religious thought. Adoration, however, and not merely admiration, of an Infinitely Holy Person revealed by the moral law, is scientifically known to be necessary to the peace of the soul with the nature of things.

What are the signs of this error in Parker's writings?

1. Theodore Parker made only a fragmentary use of the intuitions or self-evident truths of the soul.

2. Hence his view of that portion of the divine nature which may be known to man was fragmentary.

3. The inadequate emphasis he laid on the fact of sin shows how fragmentary this view was.

4. Parker's fragmentary view of the Divine nature is shown in his constant undervaluing of the nature of things as it is faithfully represented in the Old Testament.

Goethe's literary insight, you will probably think, was quite as keen as Matthew Arnold's is; and he, long before Arnold, applied purely literary tests to the Hebrew Scriptures, as religious science herself has been doing for a hundred years. The Old Testament is not sterner than the nature of things. It is amazing that Matthew Arnold believes his famous literary test to be a new one. Goethe said, and Parker used in his earlier career to quote the words admiringly, "The Hebrew Scriptures stand so happily combined together, that, even out of the most diverse elements, the

feeling of a whole still rises before us. They are complete enough to satisfy, fragmentary enough to excite, barbarous enough to arouse, tender enough to appease." *

The Old Testament Scriptures out of date? Not till the nature of things is! I rode once from a noon on the Dead Sea, through moonlight on the Mar Saba gorges, to Bethlehem in the morning light. I passed through the scenes in which many of David's psalms had their origin, so far as human causes brought them into existence. On horseback I climbed slowly and painfully out of that scorched, ghastly hollow in which the Salt Lake lies. I found myself, as I ascended, passing through a gnarled, smitten, volcanic region, and often at the edge or in the depth of ravines deeper than that eloquent shaft yonder on Bunker Hill is high. At a place where, no doubt, David had often searched for his flocks, I found the famous convent of Mar Saba clinging to the side of its stupendous ravine, and I lay down there and slept until the same sun rose which David saw. I looked northward from above Mar Saba, and saw Jerusalem above me yet to the north; for I had been ascending from a spot greatly below the level of the Mediterranean. As I drew near Bethlehem, through brown wheat-fields in which a woman called Ruth once gleaned, I opened and read the book which will bear her name yet to thousands of years to come. Johnson, you remember, once read that book in London, and moved a parlour full of people to tears by it, and to curiosity enough to ask who was the author of that beautiful pastoral. In my saddle there in Syria I was moved as Johnson's hearers were in London; but when I opened the Psalms, one by one, and looked back over the ravines toward the Dead Sea, and northward toward Jerusalem, and upon the hill of Bethlehem, to which all nations after a gaze of nineteen hundred years in duration, were looking yet, and at that season sending pilgrims; when I remembered how that terraced hill of olive-gardens had influenced human history as no other spot on the globe has done, and that in God's government of this planet there are no accidents; when I took up the astounding harp of Isaiah, and turned through the list of the prophets to find mysterious passage after passage predicting what would come and what has come; and when I thought of those critics under the western sky who would saw asunder the Old Testament and the New, and put into the shade those Scriptures which Goethe calls a unit in themselves, and which are doubly a unit when united with the New Testament, I remembered Him who, on the

* See Forthingham's *Parker*, p. 56.

way to Emmaus, opened the Old Testament Scriptures, and with them made men's hearts burn.

God and the nature of things have no cross-purposes. Truth works well, and what works well is truth.

If we are out of harmony with the nature of things, we may be scientifically certain that we are out of harmony with God.

Only a religion consisting of delight in all God's attributes, or adoration of the whole nature of things as representative of the Divine Nature, can satisfy the demands of self-evident truth.

With multitudes of other careless students of the nature of things, Theodore Parker taught the admiration rather than the adoration of God.

I do not forget those prayers of this man, which seem to ascend always as into a dateless noon of mercy, and I do not deny the existence of that dateless noon; but, even if I were to forget, uncounted ages would yet remember that the prayers which caused great drops of blood to fall down to the ground were not quite in that mood, and that no doubt He who offered them knew the full reach of the Divine Mercy, and that it would go as far as the Divine Justice can, but that there are moral impossibilities to a Holy Being.

My friends, you may do as you please; but I, for one, will not take my leap into the Unseen Holy without looking for the truth around the whole horizon of inquiry; and I find that the most sceptical of you are agreed that there is a stern and an infinitely tender nature of things; and that, even if God exists not, you must be reconciled with the nature of things: and that, if God exists, you must yet be reconciled with it, for God Himself has no cross-purposes with it.

If a vivid view of the nature of things produced that bloody sweat, perhaps you and I ought not to dream through life, thinking that every fall is a fall upward, and that it never can be too late to mend. *All history proves that such a faith does not work well.* A faith that does not work well is scientifically known to be out of harmony with natural law.

What effect arises by natural law in the soul when a man is brought to a vivid sense of the nearness of the Holy Person the moral law reveals? This question I, for one, am anxious should be investigated in the light of exact research; for the use of the scientific method in answering this inquiry opens the door to the proof that Christianity is the religion of science.

1. The more a man has of the religion demanded by the nature of things, that is, the more adoration he has of the Infinite Holiness of the Infinite Oughtness revealed by the moral law, the

more he is thrown into silence as to his own righteousness, into self-condemnation, and into unrest and fear as to the future effect of his past sins.

Gentlemen, I affirm that this is a fair rendering of the history of the human heart age after age. When a man comes near to God, his mood is not that of self-justification. Wait until eternity breathes on your cheek, wait until you come face to face with Somewhat in conscience that Shakspeare says makes cowards of us all, and then ask whether the Infinite Holiness of the moral law will be altogether satisfactory to you. Put the question here and now, whether we, in our characters as they stand at this moment, should be happy if we were in heaven with our characters unchanged. Whitefield asked that question on Boston Common yonder in 1740. It has been asked in every century for eighteen hundred years, and now is asked by science; and every one in his senses, when listening to the still small voice, has said, "As for me, I am the son of a man of unclean lips, and I am a man of unclean lips, and in my own righteousness I cannot stand alone before God." What are we to make of this action of human nature? It is a fact, and it is an immeasurably significant fact. That is the way of history; and I defy any man to show that I am not true to the unforced outcome of human nature outside of all the creeds, when I say that a view of all God's attributes humiliates man, puts him out of conceit with his own righteousness, and brings him more and more, even after he has reformed, into fear lest it may not be well with him, because there is a past behind him which ought to be covered. We are made so; and when a religion will not work well in those deep hours in which we see the structures of our own souls, I am afraid to take it in my lighter hours. Addison said that a religion should work well in three places, if it is good for anything, on death-beds, in our highest moments of emotional illumination, and when we are keenest rationally. A religion does not work well anywhere unless in all these three places. Take your scheme of thought that assumes that it is never too late to mend, or that every fall is a fall upward, and bring it face to face with these deepest expressions of human nature, age after age. Does it work well there in these deepest moments? If I find, that, age after age, a scheme of thought is not likely to make men better, is not improving society, is not taking hold of bad lives and making them good, that is for me a sufficient proof that it is out of harmony with natural law. If, in the long course of experience, a scheme of thought does not make me better, does not put a bridle upon passion, does not lift me into harmony with all the divine attributes, I know from the

fact scientifically that it is out of harmony with the Infinite Oughtness which stands behind the moral law.

2. The only conception of God's character given under heaven or among men, by which a man who worships all God's attributes can be at peace, is Christ's conception.

3. The superiority of Christianity to all schemes of natural religion is, that it presents the idea of God as an Incarnate God and as an Atoning God, and of personal love to that Person as the means of the purification of the world.

Christianity does not teach that personal demerit is taken off from us, and put upon our Lord. Such transference is an impossibility in the nature of things. But I hold that Christianity, with the Atonement as its central truth, matches the nature of things, and turns exactly in the wards of the human soul. It has, as a theory of religious truth, a scientific beauty absolutely beyond all comment. The returned deserter, knowing his own permanent and unremovable personal demerit, may yet be allowed to escape the penalty of the law by the substitution of the king's chastisement for the deserter's punishment; and then that deserter, looking on his king as both his Saviour and Lord, needs no other motive to loyalty than the memory of His unspeakable condescension, justice, and love. That memory gives rise to adoration. Whether or not this scheme of thought be the correct one, I am not asking you now to determine; but certainly it is the most moving, the most natural, and the most qualified to regenerate human nature, of all schemes the world has seen. I speak of it here and now only as an intellectual system, and affirm, in the name of the cool precision of the scientific method, that *Christianity, and it only, as a scheme of thought, shows how man may look on all God's attributes, and be at peace. It, and it only, provides for our deliverance from both the love of sin and the guilt of sin.* Merely as a school of ideas adapted to the soul's inmost wants, Christianity is as much above all other philosophy in merit as the noon is more radiant than a rushlight. "The cross," said a successor of Theodore Parker to me the other day, "is full of the nature of things." God be praised that this incisively scientific sentence has come from the lips of a successor of Theodore Parker! "The cross is not an after-thought." We are to love a God who from eternity to eternity is our Redeemer; and, looking on Him as such, we are to take Him affectionately as both Saviour and Lord. Christianity includes all ethics; it teaches adoration before all the divine attributes; it is a philosophy; it is an art; it is a growth; and it is also a revelation of the nature of things which has no variableness nor shadow of

turning. But its central thought is that of a Holy Person revealed by the moral law, and at once Redeemer and Lord, and of love for that Person as the means, and the only possible effective means, for the purification of the world. God as an atoning God, God as revealed in history, the Cross full of the nature of things, the Personal love of Infinite Perfection as a regenerating bath, this is the beautiful and awful which has triumphed, and will continue to triumph.

X.

THE TRINITY AND TRITHEISM.

The Sixty-eighth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

" οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι,
πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος,
πλὴν Διὸς, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως.
οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας
παμμάχῳ θράσει βρύων,
οὐδὲν ἂν λεξαι πρὶν ὤν,
ὃς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφυ, τριακτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών."
ÆSCHYLUS: *Agamemnon*, 163 171.

" Simul quoque cum beatis videamus
Glorianter vultum Tuum, Christe Deus,
Gaudium quod est immensum atque probum,
Sæcula per infinita sæculorum."
Rhythm. Eccl.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

CIVIL-SERVICE reform is to-day to be nominally, and perhaps really, crowned in Washington. Both political parties have demanded on paper the reformation of our system of giving all political spoils to political victors; and that reformation we can now have, if Congress and the people are agreed. The executive and legislative powers and popular sentiments once united, any reform can be carried in the United States. If signs commonly thought sure do not mislead, it may be asserted that popular sentiment and the Executive are now united in favour of what is known as civil-service reform. This is the best news since Gettysburg. The question now is, whether the upper and nether mill-stones of executive and popular power can grind to pieces any selfish or obtuse opposition in Congress, or among the placemen of party to this righteous and momentous cause. In expressing a hope that we may return from the Jacksonian to the Jeffersonian and Washingtonian policy in regard to our civil service, I shall offend no man's prejudices. I assume that everyone who is disappointed in the result of the presidential contest would be sincerely glad to have all that was promised in the Democratic platform carried out in our politics. I shall also assume, with equal audacity, that every member of the political party now in power holds sincerely the propositions announced in the letter of acceptance of him who is to-day inaugurated as the President of a people who will number fifty millions before his term of office expires.

Scholars in politics assuredly are agreed that resistance to the crescent and now haughty evils which have arisen from the application of Jacksonian principles to our national politics cannot be made too swift and decisive. I do not couple Jefferson's name with Jackson's; for the truth is, that we are now beginning to go back from the democracy of Jackson to that of Jefferson. The action of the latter, so far as the civil service is concerned, was one with the practice of Washington and Adams, Madison and Monroe. Never forget, what cannot be too often repeated, that Washington, in all the eight years of his administration, removed only nine men from office; Adams, only nine; Jefferson, thirty-nine, but none for political reasons; Madison, nine; Monroe, five; John Quincy Adams, two; Jackson, according to his opponents, two thousand, and, according to his own admission, six hundred and ninety.*

Some of us younger men, who never saw in use in the civil service any other than our present spoils system, think that the arrangement by which all political spoils are to be given to political victors is a natural law, and originated in that time when the morning stars sang together—not for joy. My State of New York, empire in both commerce and iniquity,—God save her!—saw the origination of the spoils system in the factious quarrels between the inns and outs among the Clintons and Livingstons, from 1800 to 1830. Sitting over the mahogany of their dinner-tables, these great aristocratic families of the Hudson distributed offices among their adherents according to the principle that to party victors belong party spoils. Rotation in office began to be practised in New York and Pennsylvania near the beginning of the century. It was Jan. 24, 1832, when Marcy, making a speech in the Senate in favour of sending Van Buren to England as an ambassador, first defended in Congress the principle that to political victors belong political spoils. It was Aaron Burr himself, who, in 1815, writing a letter to his son-in-law, Allston of South Carolina, first suggested for President Andrew Jackson,—one of the bravest, but not one of the broadest, men the world ever saw. No doubt, if Jackson were alive to-day, he would be among the first to seize by the throat the serpent which came out of the egg which was hatched in our national politics in his administration, although laid first in New York State. Civil-service reform takes patronage from party, and gives it to the people. It was between 1830 and 1840 that the initiative of the people died out in our national politics. While we were busy with an opening West and with anthracite coal and railways, and modern political newspapers, and the electric telegraph, and California, the spoils system grew up. An astounding civil war drew on apace. We had no time to study minor dangers; it was necessary to make Congress strong.

In our first centennial year we had eighty thousand, and, before a second or third centennial, we shall probably have two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand civil-service offices. Are we to follow the spoils system, and turn out or put in that number of partisan placemen with every change of administration? If so, we shall do well to remember Macaulay's predictions, that, when the United States have a population of two hundred to the square mile, the Jeffersonian parts of our polity will produce fatal effects. If you think the Jeffersonian will not, ask yourself, face to face with recent events, whether the Jacksonian will. Massachusetts has not yet a population of two hundred to the square mile. But what if the whole land were as thickly settled as Massachusetts, and we were to manage everything as now, by the Jacksonian rule, that to political victors belong all political spoils?

Twice our land has been washed in blood in the first hundred years of its

* See Greg, *Rocks Ahead, Appendix on American Politics.*

history; and yet, after that washing, Lowell calls America the land of broken promise. There is not on the globe a more patriotic poet than he; and you may count the graves of his relatives who fell in the civil war, if you will go yonder to the eloquent sods the spring is kissing in Mount Auburn. Your Lowell says, and the poem is fit to be read in Boston on this inauguration noon

> "The world turns mild. Democracy, they say,
> Rounds the sharp knobs of character away.
> The Ten Commandments had a meaning once,
> Felt in their bones by least considerate men,
> Because behind them public conscience stood,
> And without wincing made their mandates good.
> But now that statesmanship is just a way
> To dodge the primal curse, and make it pay,
> Since office means a kind of patent drill
> To force an entrance to the nation's till;
> And peculation something rather less
> Risky than if you spelt it with an S,
> Now that to steal by law is grown an art,
> Whom rogues the sires, their milder sons call smart."
>
> *Tempora Mutantur.*

Remembering that this President who is inaugurated to-day went into the civil war, and brought back alive only a third of the officers who enlisted under him; remembering that he, at least, has not corruptly or even anxiously sought his present high position, however much there may be of greed and fraud behind him in the organisation that has elected him; remembering that he has a character, a new thing, rather, in high places; remembering that he left Ohio as Lincoln did Illinois, asking the prayers of all men that the Eternal Providence might watch over his course; remembering that there are things in our land which war could not settle, and which only wise, victorious, patient politics can arrange in a manner to satisfy North and South, East and West alike; remembering especially that this party which the present Chief Magistrate represents has been sixteen years in power, and therefore has presumably had a great deal of temptation, shall we not unite, not only our prayer, but our watching, and send a keen atmosphere of both from the four winds, to breathe on our legislative power, till the civil service practice of Washington and Jefferson shall start up as a flame from its dying embers, and, fed by the colossal fuel of our new political conditions, become once more the light and the glad fireside of the land; and Macaulay and observant Europe, as they gaze into our future, can have on this point no more ground for fear?

THE LECTURE.

THERE is a dim twilight of religious experience in which the soul easily mistakes Ossa and Parnassus for Sinai and Calvary. My feeling is, that orthodoxy itself lives much of the time in this undispersed twilight; and that the unscientific, and lawless liberalism of many half-educated people who have lost the Master's whip of small cords, believe in æsthetic, but not in moral law, and proclaim, that, in the last analysis, there is in this universe nothing

to be feared (Dr. Bartol says so), and therefore, we must add, nothing to be loved!—is always in an earlier and deeper shadow of that misleading haze. The gray, brindled dawn is better than night; but the rising sun is better than the gray, brindled dawn. We must startle mere æsthetics and literary religiosity out of its dream that it is religion, by exhibiting before it the difference between the admiration and the adoration of the attributes of the Holy Person the moral law reveals. If any who are orthodox in their thoughts worship in their imagination three different beings, they, too, must be startled from this remnant of Paganism by a stern use of the scientific method.

As Carlyle says of America, so I of this hushed, reverent discussion,—do not judge of the structure while the scaffolding is up. A glimpse only of the opening of the unfathomable theme which the distinction between the Tri-unity of the Divine Nature and Tritheism suggests can be given here and now; and more than this will be expected by no scholar. Reserving qualifications for later occasions, I purposely present to-day only an outline unobscured by detail. I know what I venture in definition and illustration; but I am asking no one to take my opinions. Nevertheless, in order yet further to save time, I am to cast myself abruptly into the heart of this topic, and to give you personal conviction. After all, that is what serious men want from each other; and the utterance of it is not egotism in you or in me. It is the shortest way of coming at men's hearts, and it is sometimes the shortest way in which to come at men's heads, to tell what you personally are willing to take the leap into the Unseen, depending upon.

What is the definition of the Trinity?

1. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one and only one God.
2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.
3. Neither is God without the others.
4. Each, with the others, is God.

That I suppose to be the standard definition; and, if you will examine it, you will find it describing neither three separate individualities, nor yet three mere modes of manifestation; that is, neither tritheism nor modalism. In God are *not* three wills, three consciences, three intellects, three sets of affections. The first of all the religious truths of exact research is that the Lord our God is one God. It is the immemorial doctrine of the Christian ages, that there are not three Gods, but only one God (Athanasian Creed). He is one substance, and in that one substance are three subsistences; but the subsistences are not

individualities. All the great symbols teach decisively that we must not unify the subsistences; but with equal decisiveness they affirm that we must not divide the substance. In our present low estate as human, we find by the experience of centuries that we do well to heed both these injunctions, and to look on the Divine Nature on all the sides on which it has revealed itself, if we would not fall into the narrowness of materialism on the one hand, or into the vague ways of tritheism or pantheism on the other.

How shall we make clear in our intellectual and emotional experiences the truth of the Trinity, and at the same time keep ourselves in the attitude of those who worship one God, and who therefore do not break, or wish to break, with science, and yet in the position of those who, in the one substance, worship three subsistences, and therefore do not break, or wish to break, with the very significant record of the most fruitful portion of the church through eighteen hundred years? For one, accepting the definition of the Trinity which I have now given as neither tritheistic nor modalistic,—if the learned men here will allow me for once to use technical language,—I personally find no difficulty in this doctrine in the shape of self-contradiction in either thought or terms; and I find infinite advantages in it when I wish to conjoin biblical and scientific truth as a transfiguration for life.

It is sometimes despairingly said, that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be illustrated; and this is true. It is the proverb of philosophy, that no comparison walks on four feet; and what I am about to say you will take as intended by me to exhibit only the parallelisms which I point out. I am responsible for no unmentioned point in a comparison. No doubt you can find as many places where the illustration I am to use will not agree with the definition, as I can places where it does agree. Nevertheless, after dwelling on perhaps a hundred other illustrations, my own thoughts oftenest, and with most of reverence, come back to this.

Take the mysterious, palpitating radiance which at this instant streams through the solar windows of this Temple, and may we not say, for the sake of illustration, that it is one substance? Can you not affirm, however, that there are in it three subsistences? It would be possible for me, by a prism here, to produce the seven colours on a screen yonder. I should have colour there, and heat here, and there would be luminousness everywhere. But in colour is a property incommunicable to mere luminousness or to heat. In luminousness is a property incommunicable to mere heat or to colour. In heat is a property incommunicable to mere

colour or to luminousness. These three—luminousness, colour, heat—are, however, one solar radiance. Heat subsists in the solar radiance, and colour subsists in the solar radiance. The three are one; but they are not one in the same sense in which they are three.

It is one of the inexcusable mistakes of a silly kind of scepticism, which no one here holds, that there are in the Trinity three persons in the literal or colloquial sense of that word. Sometimes with tears, and sometimes with laughter, one pauses over this astounding passage, printed in his manhood by Thomas Paine, in his "Age of Reason;" and yet what he heard read was, I presume, an atrociously careless orthodox discussion :—

"I well remember, when about seven or eight years of age, hearing a sermon read by a relation of mine, who was a great devotee of the church, upon the subject of what is called *redemption by the death of the Son of God*. After the sermon was ended, I went into the garden; and, as I was going down the garden-steps (for I perfectly recollect the spot), I revolted at the recollection of what I had heard, and thought to myself that it was making God Almighty act like a passionate man that killed his son when he could not revenge himself any other way; and, as I was sure a man would be hanged that did such a thing, I could not see for what purpose they preached such sermons. This was not one of those kind of thoughts that had anything in it of childish levity: it was to me a serious reflection, arising from the idea I had, that God was too good to do such an action, and also too almighty to be under any necessity of doing it. I believe in the same manner at this moment. . . . The Christian mythology has five deities; there is God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Ghost, the God Providence, and the Goddess Nature. But the Christian story of God the Father putting his Son to death, or employing people to do it (for that is the plain language of the story), cannot be told by a parent to a child; and to tell him that it was done to make mankind happier and better is making the story still worse, as if mankind could be improved by the example of murder."

There is nothing in Paine's "Age of Reason" worth glancing at now, except this curious paragraph, in which he details the circumstances of the life-long unconscious obtuseness and ignorance out of which arose his opposition to Christianity. Possibly, if he had understood the distinction between the Trinity in God's nature and tritheism, this sharp and crackling pamphleteer for freedom, in spite of his narrow brow and coarse fibre, would not have fallen into this amazing error, which, according to his own account,

underlay all his subsequent career as an infidel. Three separate beings, he thought, Christianity teaches us to believe exist in one God, and one enraged person of these three had murdered another person.

But scholars as a mass, following St. Augustine, centuries before poor Paine's day, copiously affirmed that the word *person* in the discussion of the Trinity does not mean what it does in colloquial speech. The word in its technical use is fifteen hundred years old; and it means in that use now what it meant at first.

How commonplace is St. Augustine's remark, repeated by Calvin, that this term was adopted because of the poverty of the Latin tongue! Everybody of authority tells us, if you care for scholarly statement, that three *persons* never meant, in the standard discussions of this truth, three *personalities;* for these would be three Gods. This Latin word *persona* is incalculably misleading in popular use on this theme. For one, I never employ it, although willing to use it if it is understood as it was by those who invented the term. Let us use Archbishop Whateley's word "subsistence;" for that is the equivalent of the carefully-chosen, sharply cut, Greek term "hypostasis."* We had better say there are in one substance three subsistences, and not mislead our generation, with its heads in newspapers and ledgers, by using a phrase that was meant to be current only among scholars. All these scholars will tell you that it is no evasion of the difficulties of this theme for me to throw out of this discussion at once the word *persons* as misleading; for that word had originally no such meaning in the Latin tongue as the word *person* has in our own. Cicero says, *Ego unus, sustineo tres personas:* I, being one, sustain three characters,—my own, that of my client, and that of the judge. Our English language at this point is, as the Latin was not, rich enough to match the old Greek. With Liddon's Bampton Lectures on "The Divinity of our Lord," the best English book on this theme, though not exhaustive of it, let us say, "One substance and three subsistences," and thus go back to the Greek phrase, and be clear.

Can the four propositions of the definition I have given be paralleled by an illustration?

1. Sunlight, the rainbow, and the heat of sunlight, are one solar radiance.
2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.
3. Neither is full solar radiance without the others
4. Each with the others is such solar radiance.

* *Note to* Whateley's *Treatise on Logic.*

Sunlight, rainbow, heat, one solar radiance; Father, Son, Holy Ghost, one God!

1. As the rainbow shows what light is when unfolded, so Christ reveals the nature of God.

2. As all of the rainbow is sunlight, so all of Christ's divine soul is God!

3. As the rainbow was when the light was, or from eternity, so Christ was when the Father was, or from eternity.

4. As the bow may be on the earth and the sun in the sky, and yet the solar radiance remain undivided, so God may remain in heaven, and appear on earth as Christ, and His oneness not be divided.

5. As the perishable raindrop is used in the revelation of the rainbow, so was Christ's body in the revelation to men of God in Christ.

6. As at the same instant the sunlight is itself, and also the rainbow and heat, so at the same moment Christ is both himself and the Father, and both the Father and the Holy Ghost.

7. As solar heat has a peculiarity incommunicable to solar colour, and solar colour a peculiarity incommunicable to solar light, and solar light a peculiarity incommunicable to either solar colour or solar heat, so each of the three—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—has a peculiarity incommunicable to either of the others.

8. But as solar light, heat, and colour are one solar radiance, so the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God.

9. As neither solar heat, light, nor colour is itself without the aid of others, so neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost is God without the others.

10. As solar heat, light, and colour are each solar radiance, so the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each God.

11. As the solar rainbow fades from sight, and its light continues to exist, so Christ ceases to be manifest, and yet is present.

12. As the rainbow issues from sunlight, and returns to the general bosom of the radiance of the sky, so Christ comes from the Father, appears for a while, and returns, and yet is not absent from the earth.

13. As the influence of the heat is that of the light of the sun, so are the operations of the Holy Spirit Christ's continued life.

14. As is the relation of all vegetable growths to solar light and heat, so is the relation of all religious growths in general history, in the church, and in the individual, to the Holy Spirit, a present Christ.

It was my fortune once, on an October Sabbath evening, to

stand alone at the grave of Wordsworth, in green Grasmere, in the English lake district, and to read there the Ode on Immortality, which your Emerson calls the highest-water mark of modern poetry and philosophy. While my eyes were fastened on the page, the sun was setting behind the gnarled, inaccessible English cliffs, not far away to the west, and a colossal rainbow was spread over the azure of the sky, and the glowing purple and brown of the heathered hills in the east. A light rain fell on me, and with my own tears wet the pages of the poet. What, now, if some one, as I worshipped there, had come to me, in a holy of holies in my life, and had said roughly, in Thomas Paine's way, "You believe in five Gods; you are not scientific"? Or what if some one had said, in Parker's way, "The perfection of God has never been accepted by any sect in the Christian world. In the Ecclesiastic conception of Deity there is a fourth person, the Devil, as much a part of Deity as either Son or Holy Ghost."* "Vicarious atonement teaches salvation without morality, only by belief in absurd teaching."†

"According to the popular theology there are three acknowledged persons in the Godhead. God the Father is made to appear remarkable for three things—great power, great selfishness, and great destructiveness. The Father is the grimmest object in the universe."‡ "He is the Draco of the universe—more cruel than Odin or Baal—the author of sin, but its unforgiving avenger. Men rush from the Father; they flee to the Son." "The popular theology makes Jesus a God, and does not tell us of God now near at hand. Science must lay his kingly head in the dust, Reason veil her majestic countenance, Conscience bow him to the earth, Affection keep silence, when the priest uplifts the Bible."‖

How would all that speech of the Parkers and the Paines have jarred upon my soul, if standing there alone in a strange land, and at the grave of Wordsworth, I had heard the profane collision of their accusations with the holy sentences of this seer, fed from the cradle to the tomb upon Christian truth! If, at Wordsworth's grave, disturbed by such ghoulish attack, I had needed a spell to disperse the accusations, what better *Procul, procul, este profani* could I have chosen than these words, once uttered in this city by a renowned teacher of this accused theology, a man of

* Weiss's *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 470.
† *Ibid*, p. 497.
‡ *Sermons on Theism*, p. 101.
‖ *Discourses on Religion*, pp. 425-427.

whom it might be said, as he once said of Jonathan Edwards, that he might have been the first poet of his nation, if he had not chosen to be its first theologian!

A majestic discourse delivered at the installation of the revered pastor of the Old South Church yonder says, "Other men may be alone, but the Christian, wherever he moves, is near to his Master. Every effect is the result of some free will; but many effects within and without us are not produced by a created will; therefore they are produced by an uncreated. On the deep sea, under the venerable oak, in the pure air of the mountain-top, the Christian communes with the Father of spirits, who is the Saviour of men. All ethical axioms are His revelation of Himself to His children. Their innocent joys are His words of good cheer. Their deserved sorrows are His loud rebukes."

In these words of Professor Park, a benighted believer in three Gods, as you say, is God afar off? Are there three Gods here? Does Science bow her head, Affection grow dumb, Reason muffle her face, as this priest lifts up the Bible?

As the rainbow shows the inner structure of the light, so the character of our Lord shows the inner moral nature of God, so far as that can be known to man. A rainbow is unravelled light, is it not? It was assuredly better for me at Wordsworth's grave to look on the bow I saw in the East than to gaze on the white radiance that fell on the poet's page, when I wished to behold the fullest glory of the light. So assuredly it is better for us to gaze on God's character as revealed in Christ than on God's character as revealed in His works merely, if we would understand God's nature. As the rainbow is unravelled light, so Christ is unravelled God. At Wordsworth's grave I might have heard these hoarse voices from the Paines and the Parkers, and these softer, and I think more penetrating human ones from the Wordsworths and the Parks; but, in the name of the scientific method, it would have been impossible not to have asserted in my soul that the God who was revealed in Christ was, and is, and is to come; for there is but one God, and He was, and is, and is to come; and, therefore, when the bow faded from the East, I did not think that it had ceased to be. It had not been annihilated; it had been revealed for a while, and, disappearing, it was received back into the bosom of the general radiance, and yet continued to fall upon the earth. In every beam of white light there is potentially all the colour which we find unravelled in the rainbow; and so in all the pulsations in the will of God the Father in His works, exist the pulsations of the heart of Him who wept over Jerusalem, and on whose bosom once the beloved disciple leaned; for there is but one God, who

was, and is, and is to come; and on the same bosom we bow our heads whenever we bow our foreheads upon that Sinai within us which we call the moral law. The Holy Spirit to me is Christ's continued life.

But you say, my friends, that this may be philosophical, but that it is not biblical truth. You affirm that I teach myself this by science rather than by Scripture. Gentlemen, under the noon of New England philosophical and biblical culture, and in presence of I know not how many who dissent, I ask you to decide for yourselves what the Scriptures really teach as to the unity of the three subsistences in that Divine Nature which was, and is, and is to come. Assuredly you will be ready, in the name of literary science, to cast at least one searching glance upon this whole theme from the point of view of exclusively biblical statement.

"It is expedient for you that I go away. I have yet many things to say unto you. I will not leave you orphans. I am coming to you. A little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while and ye shall see me, and because I go to the Father." They who heard these sentences, said, "A little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while and ye shall see me, and because I go to the Father? What is this he saith? We cannot tell what he saith." But there came a later day, when He who had made that promise breathed upon them, and said, "Receive ye the gift of the Holy Ghost." We shall not be here, all of us will be mute, and most of us forgotten, when, in a better age, the meaning of that symbolic act of the Author of Christianity is fathomed.

Next there came a day when there was a sound as of a rushing, mighty wind; and this filled all the house where they who had witnessed that act were sitting. This is but the experience of many nations since then,—the rushing sound of a new influence in human history, quickening human consciences, transforming bad lives into good, but, until that time, never felt in the world in deluges, although it had appeared in streams. When that influence came, what was the interpretation put upon it by the scriptural writers? Peter, standing up, said, "We heard, from him whom we know that God has raised from the dead, the promise of the Holy Ghost. He has shed forth this; therefore, let Jerusalem know assuredly that God hath made him Lord." I call that Peter's colossal *therefore*. It is the strongest word in the first oration delivered in the defence of Christianity. The Holy Spirit was promised; it has been poured out; therefore, let those who receive it know that the power behind natural law—our Lord who was, and is, and is to come—is now breathing upon the centuries

as He breathed upon us symbolically. He has shed forth this: therefore, let all men know assuredly that God hath made him Lord. When they who were assembled in Jerusalem at that time heard this *therefore*, they were pricked in the heart.

I affirm that it is incontrovertible, that the New Testament writers, everywhere with Stephen, gaze stedfastly into heaven, and behold our Lord, not in Galilee, not on the Mount of Olives, but at the right hand of the Father. Our imagination always looks eastward through England, as through the east window of a cathedral; and so we look out through vapour sometimes, through literalness, or through materialistic haze, thicker than vapour occasionally; and we have not strength of imagination or fervour of spirit enough to understand this literature of the East, on the face of which the world has gazed eighteen hundred years, and seen its face to be like that of Stephen, as the face of an angel, and from the same cause. The whole New Testament, being full of the Holy Ghost, gazes, not as England and America do, into Gethsemane, or upon any sacred mount, but into heaven, and beholds our Lord at the right hand of the Father. I have bowed down upon the Mount of Olives, I have had unreportable experiences in the Garden of Gethsemane, and on the banks of Jordan, and on the white, sounding shore of Galilee, and on Lebanon, and on Carmel, and on Tabor; and God forbid that I should underrate at all a religion that reverences sacred places; but, of these sacred places the New Testament proclaims, "He is not here; He has arisen and is ascended." It nowhere exhibits our narrowness of outlook.

What if, under the dome of St. Peter's, there were but four windows? What if children were brought up to look out yonder upon the Apennines, and here upon the Mediterranean, and there upon the Coliseum, and here upon St. Onofrio's oak, under which Tasso sung? If children were brought up before these windows, and did not pass from one to the other, they might possibly think the outlook from each one was Italy; and so it is; but it is only a part of Italy. We are poor children, brought up, some of us before the window of science, some of us before the window of art, some of us before the window of politics, some of us before the window of biblical inculcation; and we say in petulant tones to each other, each at his accustomed outlook, "This is Italy." What is Italy? Sweep off the dome, and answer, "There is but one sky." And that and all beneath it is Italy.

As a fact in literature, it must be affirmed that this is the central thought of the New Testament Scriptures.

We find, that, when one called Saul of Tarsus journeyed to

Damascus,—this is trite, because eighteen hundred years have heard it, and the trite is the important thing in history,—he heard, from a light above the brightness of this noon, the words, "I am Jesus;" and so, later on, Paul wrote, that "we, beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are changed with the same image from glory to glory as by the Lord the Spirit." "The Spirit is the Lord," was St. Augustine's reading of Paul's words.

So, in the last pages of Revelation, I find that he who was the beloved disciple was in the Spirit on the Lord's Day, and that he beheld "one whose voice was like unto the sound of many waters, and whose countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength." "When I saw Him," says this great poet and prophet and apostle, "I, who have been called a son of thunder; I who, when Cerinthus was in the same bath with me, cried out, Away, thou heretic! I who have been ready at any time to suffer martyrdom,—I fell at His feet as dead. He laid His right hand on me, saying unto me, fear not: I am the first and the last; I am He that liveth, and was dead; behold, I am alive for evermore, and have the keys of life and of death."

It is significant beyond comment, that our Lord was often called "The Spirit," and "The Spirit of God," by the earlier Christian writers. "The Son is the Holy Spirit" is a common expression. Ignatius said, "Christ is the Immaculate Spirit" (*Ad Smym. init.*). Tertullian wrote, "The Spirit of God and the Reason of God—Word of Reason, and Reason and Spirit of Word—Jesus Christ our Lord, who is both the one and the other" (*De Orat. init.*). Cyprian and Irenæus said, "He is the Holy Spirit."*

Neander, in paraphrase of Peter's oration, says, in summarizing the New-Testament literature, "From the extraordinary appearances which have filled you with astonishment, you perceive, that, in His glorified state, He is now operating with divine energy among those who believe in Him. The heavenly Father has promised that the Messiah shall fill all who believe on Him with the power of the Divine Spirit, and this promise is now being fulfilled. Learn, then, from these events, in which you behold the prophecies of the Old Testament fulfilled, the nothingness of all that you have attempted against Him, and know that God has exalted Him whom you crucified to be Messiah, the ruler of God's kingdom; and that, through Divine Power, He will overawe all His enemies."†

* See Delitzsch's *System of Biblical Psychology.*

† Neander, *Planting of Christianity*, Bohn's edition, i. 19. Summary of Peter's speech in Acts ii.

So Alford writes, "Christ is the Spirit; is identical with the Holy Spirit, not personally nor essentially, but (as is shown by the Spirit of the Lord following) in this department of His divine working: Christ here is the Spirit of Christ."*

Lange, writing on the same passage of this literature, adds, "We find here such an identification of Christ and the Holy Spirit, that the Lord to whom the heart turns is in no practical respect different from the Holy Spirit received in conversion. Christ is virtually the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is His spirit."†

What if Peter at Antioch had beheld the earliest triumphs of Christianity under persecution, and had heard the story of the martyrdoms which became the seed of the Church, and caused Christians to be called by that name, and that shot through with hope the unspeakable despair of Roman Paganism as by the first rays of the dawn, could he not, looking on Lebanon and Tabor, on Jerusalem and Galilee, have said, "He hath shed forth this advance of Christianity in human affairs? God has a plan, and He thus reveals it. God is giving triumph to Christianity: therefore let Lebanon and Tabor, let Jerusalem and Galilee, know assuredly that God hath made our Lord the Lord of the Roman earth indeed, and that the influence of the Holy Ghost is Christ's continued life."

What if, later, when Christianity had ascended the throne of the Cæsars, Peter had stood on the Tiber, and had beheld philosophy, little by little, permeated by Christianity? What if he had looked back on the persecutions and martyrdoms which gave purity and power to early Christianity, and which make her record, even to the infidel Gibbon, venerable beyond comment? Could not Peter, there on the Tiber, have said, looking on the Apennines and Vesuvius and the Mediterranean, and on Egypt, "Let Rome and the Tiber, let Alexandria and the Nile, know assuredly, since our Lord—who was, and is, and is to come—hath shed forth this, that He is Lord"?

What if, later, Peter, standing on the Bosphorus, when Rome had lost her footing on the Tiber, had beheld the rushing in of the Turks to pulverize the sunrise foot of old Rome; what if he had remembered the day, when, standing on two feet, Rome, planting herself on both the Tiber and the Bosphorus, folded her arms, and looked at the North Star, and proclaimed herself likely to be as eternal as that stellar light; what if, remembering all that had come, and all that had gone, he had beheld that Colossus

* Remarks on 2 Cor. iii. 17.
† Lange, 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.

topple toward the West, smite itself into pieces on the Alps, and fall in fragments on the Rhine, on the Elbe, on the Oder, some pieces scattered across the howling North Sea to the Thames, and to the sites of Oxford and Cambridge, these fragments of old Rome, built up in these places into universities which caused at last the illumination which brought the Reformation; what if Peter, beholding thus the Greeks driven toward the sunset, and old Rome becoming seed for the Reformation, had stood on the Seine, on the Elbe, on the Oder, and had witnessed the varied progress of the ideas of Him who affirmed once that He had many things yet to say,—might not Peter there, side by side with Luther, have said once more, "He hath shed forth this: therefore, let the Alps and the Rhine and the Seine and the Elbe, the Thames and the German Sea, know assuredly that this Gulf Current in human history, now two thousand years old, is not an accident; that it means all it expresses; for what God does, He from the first intends to do? He who has thus watched over the cause of Christian truth, and has been breathing the Holy Ghost upon the nations, hath shed forth this; and, therefore, let Berlin and Paris and London, and Oxford and Cambridge, know assuredly that God hath made Him Lord."

What if, later, when the tempest of persecution, rising out of the sunrise, smote upon those universities, and blew the Mayflower across the sea, Peter had taken position in that vessel, as its billowing, bellying, bellowing sails fled across the great deep in the icy breath of that time; and what if he had seen, on the deck of that Mayflower, a few rush-lights taking their gleam from those universities, themselves illumined by the fire that fell at Pentecost? What if Peter, afterward, standing on Plymouth Rock, had seen these rush-lights kindling others, and a line of rush-lights, representing the same illumination of the Holy Spirit, go out into our wilderness, until they glass themselves in the Connecticut and in the Hudson, and in the eyes of the wild beasts of the murmuring pines and hemlocks, and in the eternal roar of Niagara, and in the Great Lakes, and in the Mississippi, and in the springs of the Sierras, and at last in the soft, hissing foam of the Pacific seas; what if, beholding these rush-lights thus carried across a continent by divine guidance, Peter had stood here,—would not the force of his word *therefore* have had new emphasis as he should have said, "He hath shed forth this: therefore, let Boston, let New York, let Chicago, let San Francisco, let the surf of the Bay of Fundy, let the waterfalls of the Yosemite, know assuredly that God hath made Him Lord"?

But what if, when a tempest sprung out of the South, and these

rush-lights were, I will not say extinguished, but all bent to the earth, and painfully tried, some of them blown out, he had beheld the lights, little by little, after the tempest had gone down, begin to be carried southward, and at last glass themselves in the steaming bayous and the Gulf? what if, although some had been extinguished for ever, he had seen them shining on the breaking of the fetters of three million slaves? what if the churches, when the tempest ceases, grow brighter in their assertion of the value of their light, and are filling the land with its influence, and, if God continues to illumine them, will make the rush-lights glass themselves yet in all the streams, in all the springs, and in all the sprays on all the shores of all the land,—could not he, looking on such results in a territory greater than Rome ever ruled over, have said, "He hath shed forth this: therefore, let America know assuredly that God hath made Him Lord"?

But what if, lastly, Peter had beheld a rush-light taken across the Pacific to the Sandwich Islands, and one to Japan, and one to China, and one to India, and had seen the soft rolling globe enswathed in all its zones by rush-lights bearing the very flames which fell at Pentecost, and beaten on, indeed, by persecution here and there, but not likely to be beaten on ever again as fiercely as they have been already; not likely to be blown out everywhere, even if they are in some places, and thus ensphering the globe so that it is not probable at all, under the law of the survival of the fittest, that they will be put out,—could not Peter, then, looking on what God has done, and what He therefore intended to do; looking on the incontrovertible fact, that the islands of the sea and the continents have been coming to prefer Christian thought, and seem likely to remain under its influence,—could he not, while standing on scientific and biblical ground, at once have affirmed in the name both of science and of Scripture the transfiguring truth, "He hath shed forth this: therefore, let Asia on the Himalaya tops, let Europe in the Parthenon and Coliseum, let London's mystic roar, let the New World in her youthful vigour, let all the islands of the sea, know assuredly that the fittest has survived, and that the fittest will survive; and that God hath made him Lord who is fittest to be so"? All the seas, in all their waves, on all their shores, would answer to such an assertion, Hallelujah! So be it. The influences of the Holy Spirit are Christ's continued life.

XI.

FRAGMENTARINESS OF OUTLOOK UPON THE DIVINE NATURE.

The Sixty-ninth Lecture in the Boston Monday Lectureship,

DELIVERED IN TREMONT TEMPLE.

"Vox nostra quæ sit accipe.
Est Christus et Pater Deus:
Servi hujus ac testes sumus;
Extorque si potes fidem.

Tormenta, carcer, ungulæ
Stridensque flammis lamina
Atque ipsa pœnarum ultima;
Mors Christianis ludus est."
PRUD. PERISTEPH. HYMN, 5. 57.

"Deus autem et Pater Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et ipse Sempiternus Pontifex, Dei Filius Jesus Christus, ædificet vos in fide et veritate et in omni mansuetudine, . . . et det vobis sortem et partem inter sanctos suos."—POLYCARP, ad Phil., 12.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

IN 1640 the whole population of New England was English, and consisted of only about four thousand families, or twenty thousand persons. Bancroft points out, that, after the first fifteen years following the landing on Plymouth Rock, there was no considerable addition from England. Your Palfrey shows, that, for one hundred and fifty years, the four thousand families multiplied in remarkable seclusion from other communities, and that it is only within the last fifty years that the foreigners have come. New England is changing the character of her population to such an extent, that we must now look for the descendants of those who crossed in the Mayflower, not so much on the Atlantic slope as in the Mississippi valley and on the Pacific coast. It is not true that New England is becoming New Ireland; but it is hardly epigrammatic to say that manufacturing New England is New Ireland already.

Perhaps we shall do well to remember, that, while the population of the manufacturing centres of New England is increasing with extraordinary rapidity, that of the agricultural and commercial districts is fluctuating, and in many cases, on the decrease. The distinctions between the rich and poor are becoming wider in the manufacturing districts. This is partly the unavoidable result of the natural growth of the power of capital. It is, in part, the consequence of the massing of men in cities as distinct from small towns. It is to some extent, the effect of the organization of manufacturing industry in great corporations on the one side, and an operative population on the other. It is, in large measure, the result of the fact, that, in the manufacturing districts of New England, a vastly greater proportion of the population is now

of foreign descent than fifty years ago. The two most typical things in the territory east of the Hudson are the college bell and the factory chimney The first New England was a church; the second New England is to be a factory.

What is the worth of the church to the working man?

Look at the seven cities on the Merrimack River. I often hang in imagination over that stream as the best emblem of the industrial life of Eastern New England. Child of the White Mountains and the Pemigewasset, the Merrimack rushes under the spindles of seven cities to the sea,—Concord, Manchester, Nashua, Lowell, Lawrence, Haverhill, Newburyport,—doing more work than any other river of its size in the world, and typical more and more of the future into which our Atlantic New-England slope is drifting. These seven cities have in the aggregate, in the last twenty years, more than doubled in wealth and population. Romish cathedral churches are rising in our manufacturing centres, and are not likely to be empty. But, under the voluntary system, many of our Protestant churches are looked upon by a portion of the operatives as close corporations. When a church is not mossy, it is aristocratic, our working men too often think; and so our floating, unchurched populations are coming to be very large in our factory centres.

If I were a working man, I presume I should want fair play between employers and employed. I think I should care for my children, and desire to have a better place for them than Old England gives the very youngest at the factory-wheel. It seems almost incredible, that some of the acutest members of our Protestant factory-population are falling into neglect of the church, when it is certain that only by the diffusion of conscientiousness among the labouring classes can co-operation ever succeed; and that conscientiousness will not be diffused without the use of means which the church herself employs none too thoroughly, but which no other organization pretends to employ at all as a permanent system for the culture of society. Can co-operation ever succeed, unless there are large numbers of honest men in society? How are these to be made? In commerce you want a revival of business. You want, therefore, a revival of undefiled religion. How are you to have that, if you are to neglect, I will not say this or that branch of the church, but the church as a whole? If you are to shut the doors of God's house on the Sabbath, how are you to be sure that diffusion of conscientiousness will come? Why do not working men see the great impropriety of their neglecting the church, and that the church is made up of men, many of whom have risen from the bench of the shoemaker, or from the wheel of the operative? Our New England society is not divided into hereditary and fixed classes. We must look on our churches as the work of the people; and it is not American for a portion of our New England population to regard our churches as aristocratic machines. Perhaps some of them are; I am not defending the whole list of them; but most of them, I think ninety out of a hundred, are eager to be of service in the diffusion of conscientiousness, and all culture and comfort, among the factory population, and in the beating down of all the walls of division between the workmen and their employers.

You want arbitration committees; you want fair consultation between capital and labour? Bring your whole population together once a week in the church, where all class-walls are, or ought to be, broken down. I am not speaking of all the churches; for God has not granted to all men the capacity to burst asunder the silken bonds of luxury: He has to some men, and to some who are very wealthy. But the most of our churches in New England were built by the people, and come from the hearts of the average population; and it is absolutely suicidal for the working-man to let his children grow up without the religious culture of the church.

Have you ever heard that the Sabbath schools have been greatly improved in the last fifty years? There is a liberal denomination which lately has been issuing Sabbath-school volumes with questions about the relations between religion and science. I thank God for that step in advance. Let it be understood that the Sabbath school is now a better thing than it used to be, and that you cannot let your children stay out of it without putting them behind other children. Do you wish to have that spirit of good sense pervade the community which you would like to find in the arbitration board? You will never have it, unless you take possession of the church and of the ministry. The latter are rather a numerous and well-educated class, and they have much opportunity to study public questions: why cannot you win them to your side? There is a strategic act for working men to do on the Merrimack!

When you and I are no longer in the world, the supreme question in New-England civilization will be how to make Plymouth Rock the corner-stone of a factory. Do not say that I am uttering anything irreverent, when I speak of that sacred spot on the shore yonder as fit to be the beginning of the newest New England, as it was of the earliest. Plymouth Rock was the corner-stone of the first New England: shall it be the corner-stone of the second? Where are the builders that shall place that jagged and fundamental rock in line with the other stones of the wall? Shall we hew the factory to make it fit Plymouth Rock, or Plymouth Rock to fit the factory? God send us no future into which Plymouth Rock cannot be built unhewn! You think it is a very unpoetic, prosaic fact, that New England is to be a factory. Goethe, our modern philosopher and poet, used to say the sound of spindles in Manchester was the most poetic sound of this century. Not every man has Goethe's ears. He foresaw the time when a greater proportion than now of the population of the world will be in cities, and when the most numerous inhabitants in cities will be of the operative class. Thomas Carlyle says somewhere, "Have you ever listened to the awakening of Manchester in Old England at half-past five by the clock? ten thousand times ten thousand looms and spindles all set moving there, like the boom of an Atlantic tide. It is, if you think of it, sublime as Niagara, or more so." Sometimes I have repeated to myself these words when waking in the gray morning on Beacon Hill, as I have listened to the factory bells, and allowed imagination to move up the Merrimack, past Newburyport, Haverhill, and Lawrence and Lowell, and Manchester and Concord, and to see crowds of the operative class coming out in streams in the early dawn. It is sublime, and is it to be more and more sublime as the years pass? But only the church, captured by the working-men, and able to capture the working-men in return, can prevent in our free society, when once New England is crowded with manufacturing centres, those collisions between capital and labour which have arisen in the Old World. You never can bridge the chasm between capital and labour here by a kid glove. You never can bridge it with the bayonet. In the Old World it has been bridged by the bayonet on the continent and by the kid glove in England; but in New England the only bridge that will cross that chasm is popular, scientific, aggressive, living Christianity, laid on the buttresses of the Sabbaths and the common schools.

THE LECTURE.

The River Rhine is a majestic stream, until, in the Netherlands of the North Sea shore, it divides into shallows and swamps and steaming oozes. Man's adoration of God is a majestic stream,

until, in the Netherlands of religious experience, it divides among three Gods, or among many Gods, and so becomes a collection of shallows and swamps and steaming oozes. Out of these North Sea hollow lands, wherever they have existed in any age of the moral experience of the race, there has invariably arisen a vapour obscuring the wide, undivided azure, and even the near landscapes of natural truth. Give me the Christian and the scientific surety of the unity of the Divine Nature, and let my whole soul flow toward one God; let me not worship three separate wills, three separate consciences, three separate sets of affections, but one Will, one Conscience, one Heart, which was, and is, and is to come; and so long as the Alps of thought feed me with their cool, impetuous, crystalline streams, I shall be like the Rhine, deep enough in the current of my adoring affections to drive out the drift-wood and bowlders in the stream, and not permit them to accumulate, and form islands to divide the river into shallows and oozes. Let me move toward God, one in nature outside of the soul, one in Christ revealed in history, one as tangible to the conscience in the intuitions. Let me feel that all these subsistences are one Substance; and it may be that the Rhine of the human affections, turned thus toward God as one Will, one Heart, and one Conscience, will be majestic enough to float fleets both for peace and for war, and will go out into the ocean at last, not as a set of befogged shallows and oozes, but as the Amazon goes out, an undivided river into an undivided ocean, a thousand flashing leagues caught up into infinite times ten thousand flashing leagues, the intersphering of wave with wave in every case, the interspersing of a portion of the finite personality with the Infinite Personality, one, invisible, omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, Holy, Holy, Holy, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

For one, I had rather, my friends, go back to the Bosphorus, where I stood a few months ago, and worship with that emperor who lately slit his veins, and went hence by suicide, than to be in name only an orthodox believer, or in theory to hold that there is but one God, but in imagination to worship three Gods. I am orthodox, I hope; but my first concern, is to be straightforward. I purpose to be straightforward, even if I must be orthodox. Revere the orthodoxy of straightforwardness; and when that justifies you in doing so, but only then, revere the straightforwardness of orthodoxy. Mahometan Paganism yonder contains one great truth,—the Divine Unity; and I never touch this majestic theme of the Divine Trinity without remembering what that single truth, as I heard it uttered on the Bosphorus, did for me

when I knelt there once in a mosque with the emperor and with the peasants, with the highest officers of state and with the artisans, and saw them all bow down, and bring their foreheads to the mats of the temple, and heard them call out, from the highest to the lowest, as they prostrated themselves, "Allah el akbar!" "God is one, and God is great." So, prostrating themselves, they three times called out, "Allah el akbar!" and then remained silent, until I felt that this one truth had in it a transfiguration. I affirm that I had rather go back to that shore of the azure water which connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and, omitting the leprosy of Mahometanism, take for my religion pure Theism, than to hold that there are three Gods with three wills, three sets of affections, three intellects, three consciences, and thus to deny the assurances of both scriptural and scientific truth, and make of myself the beginning of a polytheist, although calling myself orthodox.

At what should we arrive, however, if we should adopt the bare idea of the Divine Unity without taking also that of the Triunity? Should we thus be faithful to the scientific method? Should we thus be looking at all the facts? Should we obtain by this method the richest conception of God, or should we see from such a point of view only a fragment of that portion of His nature which man may apprehend?

Theodore Parker taught God's Immanence in mind and matter, and it is amazing that he thought this truth a new one. If you are of my opinion, you will reverence that one portion of his far from original teaching; for it is at once a scientific and a Christian certainty, that, wherever God acts, there He is. The Bridgewater Treatises affirm this truth with more emphasis than Parker ever laid upon it. The one chord which he struck in theology to which all hearts vibrate was the certainty of the Divine Immanence in matter and mind; and this one certainty was the secret of any power he had in distinctively religious endeavour. Men, he said, have a conscience; and in that conscience the moral law is revealed; and that moral law reveals a Holy Person.

Your Helmholtz and Wundt, and Beale and Carpenter, and Herschel and Faraday, and Darwin and Agassiz, as well as your Lotze and Kant and Leibnitz, and your St. Chrysostom, and Jeremy Taylor and Bishop Butler, all unite with Plato and Aristotle, and David and Isaiah, in asserting the Divine Personal Immanence in matter and mind. There is no cloud at this moment shot through by the noon so completely saturated by light as all mind and matter are by the Divine Immanence; that

is to say, by this invisible, incomprehensible Personality which the moral law reveals.

But, granting the fact of the Divine Personal immanence in matter and mind, to what results must a rigid use of the scientific method bring us on the theme of the Triunity of the Divine Nature? I know of no question on this topic fairer or more fruitful than this.

1. Since a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind, it follows, that, in all nature outside the soul, we look into God's face.

2. For the same reason, it is incontrovertible, that in the soul we call Christ, and in His influence in history, we look into God's face.

3. For the same reason, it is certain, that, in the intuitions of conscience, we look into God's face.

4. *These three spheres of His self-manifestation embrace all of God that can be known to man.*

5. *In each of these spheres of the self-manifestation of the Divine Nature, something is shown which is not shown with equal clearness in either of the other spheres. In each of them, the Ineffable Immanent Person says something new.*

6. In external nature He appears chiefly as Creator; in Christ chiefly as Redeemer; in conscience chiefly as Sanctifier.

7. These are all facts scientifically known.

8. *A scientific scheme of religious thought must look at all the facts.*

9. *When all the facts known to man are taken into view, a Trinity of Divine Manifestations is, therefore, scientifically demonstrable.*

10. *But, according to the admitted proposition that a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind, He reveals Himself in each of these manifestations as a Person, and yet as one.*

11. *A Personal Triunity, of which Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier are but other names, is therefore scientifically known to exist.*

12. This is the Trinity which Christianity calls Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and of all parts of whose undivided glory it inculcates adoration in the name of what God is, and of what He has done, and of what man needs.

All these propositions you will grant me, except the second; but you cannot deny that, without throwing away your own admission that a Personal God is immanent in all matter and mind.

Even Rousseau could say that Socrates died like a man, but the Founder of Christianity like a God. Carlyle affirms that Voltaire's attacks on Christianity are a battering-ram, swinging in

the wrong direction. Who doubts, that, at the head of the effect we call Christianity, there was an adequate Cause, or a Person? and who can deny, that, in the soul of that Person, God spake to man as never before or since? Scholarship has outgrown the old forms of historical doubt; and historical science now admits, that, whether we say Christ possessed proper Deity or not, He assuredly has been the chief religious teacher of the race. But that fact means more than much, if looked at on all sides. Keep in mind here that glimpse of the world history on which we were gazing when last we parted from this Temple.

Napoleon at St. Helena said that something mysterious exists in universal history in its relation to Christianity. "Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was?" said this Italian, greater than Cæsar, and as free from partisan religious prejudices. The question was declined by Bertrand; and Napoleon proceeded, "Well, then, I will tell you." I am reading now from a passage authorized by three of Napoleon's biographers, and freely accepted by European scholars as an authoritative statement of his conversation in exile.* "Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and I myself have founded great empires; but upon what did these creations of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone founded His empire upon love; and to this very day millions would die for Him. . . . I think I understand something of human nature; and I tell you all these were men, and I am a man. No other is like Him; Jesus Christ was more than a man. I have inspired multitudes with such an enthusiastic devotion, that they would have died for me: but, to do this, it was necessary that I should be *visibly* present with the electric influence of my looks, of my words, of my voice. When I saw men, and spoke with them, I lighted up the flame of self-devotion in their hearts. . . . Christ alone has succeeded in so raising the mind of man toward the Unseen, that it becomes insensible to the barriers of time and space. Across a chasm of eighteen hundred years Jesus Christ makes a demand which is beyond all other difficult to satisfy. He asks for that which a philosopher may often seek in vain at the hands of his friend, or a father of his children, or a bride of her spouse, or a man of his brother. He asks for the human heart; He will have it entirely to Himself; He demands it unconditionally, and forthwith His demand is granted. Wonderful! In defiance of time and space, the soul of man, with all its powers and faculties, becomes an annexation to the empire of Christ. *All who sincerely believe in*

* See Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Eng. ed., p. 148, for a full list of authorities for this extract.

Him experience that remarkable supernatural love toward Him. This phenomenon is unaccountable; it is altogether beyond the scope of man's creative powers. Time, the great destroyer, is powerless to extinguish this sacred flame: time can neither exhaust its strength, nor put a limit to its range. This is what strikes me most: I have often thought of it. This it is which proves to me quite convincingly the divinity of Jesus Christ."

It is beyond all controversy, that precisely this central thought of Christianity which convinced Napoleon was what most struck the ancient Roman philosophers. Christ's continued life in the Holy Spirit, was that heard of in the first centuries? Why, I open an ancient book, written in opposition to Christianity, and cited by Arnobius, and I read, "Our gods are not displeased with you Christians for worshipping the Almighty God; but you maintain the Deity of one who was put to death on the cross; you believe Him to be yet alive (*et superesse adhuc creditis*), and you adore Him with daily supplications."* Pliny's letter to Trajan implies all this, but is so celebrated, that I need not recite its majestic facts here.

Men showed me at Rome, in the Kircherian Museum, a square foot of the plaster of a wall of a palace, not many years ago uncovered on the Palatine Hill. On the poor clay was traced a cross bearing a human figure with a brute's head. The figure was nailed to the cross; and before it a soldier was represented kneeling, and extending his hands, in the Greek posture of devotion. Underneath all was scratched in rude lettering in Greek, "*Alexamenos adores his God.*" That representation of the central thought of Christianity was made in a jeering moment by some rude soldier in the days of Caracalla; but it blazes there now in Rome, the most majestic monument of its age in the world. †

You believe *your* Lord is yet alive? You adore Him? All the history of the early persecutions of Christianity accords with the import of this Kircherian symbol. Listen to the last words of the martyrs through all the first five centuries of Christianity. They are these, and such as these: "O Lord God of heaven and earth, Jesu Christ, to thee do I bend my neck by way of sacrifice; O Thou who abidest for ever." These were the words of Felix, an African bishop, condemned to death at Venusium. ‡ "O Lord Jesu Christ, Thou Maker of heaven and earth, give peace unto

* Arnobius, *adv. Gentes*, i. 36.

† See Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 396.

‡ See for a multitude of similar instances Ruinart's celebrated work, *Acta Martyrum Sincera*, edition Veronæ.

Thy Church." So spoke Theodotus of Ancyra in the extremity of torture.*

Poor Blandina, there at Lyons in the year 177, you remember how they roasted her, frail girl, on the red-hot iron chair; put her in a net and exposed her to the horns of oxen; whirled her in instruments of torture until her senses were lost, and then plunged her into flames; and day after day did that, while she apparently experienced little pain, calling out at every interval when her strength came back, "I am a Christian: there is no evil done among us." And so she passed hence, but speaks to us as one yet living.† She "hastened to Christ," says an account written by eye-witnesses of her sufferings; and they send "to those having the same faith and hope," "Peace, and grace, and glory from God the Father, and Christ Jesus, our Lord." Multitudes and multitudes, a great army of martyrs, passed out of the world, believing that the influence of the Holy Spirit was Christ's continued life; and, if there is anything mysterious in history, Napoleon had his eye upon it when he asked what it is that makes the martyrs in every age painless when on the bosom of their spouse.

There was a God in Christ, whether you regard Him as divine or not; and that was one revelation of God which was made, and is now making, in this incontrovertible fact of His earthly influence, which Napoleon thought utterly inexplicable on merely human lines of cause and effect. But in conscience there is a God. In the moral intuitions of the soul we look into God's face. Assuredly, even if you and I were not to have, a better age will have, a religious science that will take into view all these facts. There is a God in external nature; there is a God in Christ; there is a God in the intuitions of the human spirit: and if I could not have any other Trinity than that, although I do not believe that to be the best, I would have that, for I want all the truth I can reach. I, therefore, will look on God as manifesting Himself in external nature, and in our intuitions, and in history as influenced by His Spirit; and my God will be thus revealed to me with more fulness than He could be if I had only one of these three personal revelations of Himself. In each of them He says what He does not say elsewhere. Science must be hungry to hear all that all facts say.

God is a person in each one of these revelations. He is a person in the strict sense as seen in external nature. As seen in our Lord, He

* *Acta Martyrum Sincera*, p. 303.

† See Eusebius, v. 1–3, for a contemporary account of Blandina in a letter written from the churches of Lyons and Vienne to those of Asia Minor.

is a person in the strict sense. As revealed in the moral law, He is a person in the strict sense. *But there are not three persons: He is one person in the strict sense; for natural law is a unit in the universe, and reveals but one will.* Three revelations of God are all one person, although in each revelation He is a person. Now, is that mystical? or does that straightforward use of the scientific method give a richer view of human history, a richer view of the human soul, a richer view of external nature, than mere deism, or theism, or materialism, or pantheism, however fortified by modern science, can present to you?

Thus far, gentlemen, I have asked you to notice only what is involved in Theodore Parker's admission that a personal God is immanent in all matter and mind. On this point, as on so many others, Theodore Parker failed to carry out consistently his own principles, and fell into error not so much through a wrong direction as through haste, and incompleteness of research. If, my friends, I must at this point, to save time, drop analytical discussion, and give personal conviction, let me say that Theodore Parker's scheme of thought, melodious as that one feebly-struck note of the Divine Immanence in mind and matter is, compares to me with Christianity as water compares with wine. Tennyson makes one of his characters say to another,

> "All thy passions matched with mine
> Are as moonlight unto sunlight,
> And as water unto wine."

So I aver, in the name of the precision of the scientific method, that any scheme of thought not Christian, as matched with Christianity, and tested fairly by intuition, instinct, syllogism, and ages of experience, is as moonlight matched with sunlight, or as water matched with wine.

I want supremely such a view of religious truth as shall set me at rest about my irreversible record of sin. I want such a view of God as shall present Him as an atoning God, on whom I cannot look without the regeneration of my own nature through gratitude, and on whom I can look, and yet, for His sake, be at peace.

Why do the ages cling to the doctrine of the Trinity? Perhaps their wants have been much like yours and mine. Is the truth of the Divine Trinity dear to us, because it is a fine piece of philosophical speculation? Ah, gentlemen, you know life too well to think that eighteen centuries have offered up their martyrdoms, and the personal careers, which, not ending at the stake, have been bound to the stake perhaps through the better part of the time from birth to death, and that these ages have had nothing more

than philosophy behind them. *Great human organic wants are revealed by the reception the world has given to the deepest religious truths. We know we are going hence. We wish to go hence in peace. We want a religion that can wash Lady Macbeth's red right hand.* We need to know that an atonement has been provided, such that we may look on all God's attributes, and then in His merit, not in our own, be at peace here and in that Unseen Holy into which it is scientifically sure that all men haste.

Religious science never teaches that personal demerit is or can be transferred from an individual, finite personality to God. That is a ghastly error which has been charged to Christianity in every age, and nowhere more audaciously or inexcusably than in this city. It is one of the most monstrous of misconceptions, one of the most unphilosophical of all the hideous caricatures set up by Theodore Parker before the public gaze, that Christianity teaches that personal merit or blame-worthiness may be taken off one soul, and put upon another, and that one an innocent being. We hold nothing of the sort; but we have been taught that there is revealed in Christianity a view of God which represents Him as substituting chastisement for punishment, and as thus making possible the peace of all who are loyal to Him; and this has been the regenerating influence which has brought the human spirit to the highest summits it has ever attained; so that, both by ages of experience and by philosophy, we know that this central portion of the Christian scheme of thought is adapted to man's deepest wants.

If you deny the doctrine of the Trinity, you must deny the whole central portion of this crowned system of truth, in all its philosophical glory and in all its prolonged and multiplex breadth of power in human experience. There was nothing so touching, when Professor Huntington of Harvard University yonder turned toward the doctrine of the Trinity, as his proclamation of the "life, comfort, and salvation" which burst upon his vastly enlarged horizon as he attained at once the scientific, the biblical, and the only historically radiant point of view.*

Only an undiluted Christianity gives such a view of God, that we can be true to the scientific method, and yet at peace with all His attributes.

Gentlemen, you will not soon drive out of human nature the desire to go hence in peace. You will not soon remove from human nature the feeling it has exhibited in every age, that peace

* See Huntington, Bishop, *Christian Believing and Living.*

does not come even when we reform. You will not soon change the natural operations of conscience. You will not soon cause the past to be reversible. You, therefore, will not soon make the atonement anything other than the desire of all nations. But, until you have done all these things, there will be life, there will be a wholly natural and abounding vitality, in that exhibition of God's nature to man, which represents Him as an atoning God, and as a person who was, and is, and is to be with us, because one with Him who made heaven and earth, and with Him who speaks in conscience at this hour, and who, from eternity to eternity, is our Saviour and our Lord.

But, next, I want in my view of religion something that will bring me into harmony with all exact research. I want no mysticism, no mediævalism, no doctrine supported simply by the schools, or of doubtful worth under the microscope and the scalpel. I find it beyond controversy, as Theodore Parker held, that a Personal God is immanent in matter and mind. It is beyond all debate that there is a Holy Person revealed by the moral law. I want a God who shall be one in history, in external nature, and in my intuitions; and I turn to Christianity, and I find a breadth of outlook more than equal to the loftiest philosophical demand. I read that He who is the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, that is the Personal God who is revealed in conscience, is also He whose light shone in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not; and who was in the world which was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He who speaketh in the still small voice is He who spoke, and who yet speaks, as never man spoke. If we do not force upon the Scriptures our own narrowness of thought, we find that science and Scripture are agreed, for both make God perfect and one; and, according to the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit is Christ's continued life.

What are the great proofs in Scripture that God is presented to us as triunity in unity? What are the great biblical proofs that God is triune? What are a few of the tremorless bases of conviction that the Trinity is taught in the New Testament? I hold, my friends, that it is a cheap reply to the assertion that the Trinity is taught in the New Testament, to say that the word is not there. The word "Christianity" is not there; the word "Deity" is not there; the word "humanity" is not there. The question is, whether it is not taught in the New Testament that God is one. You say, Yes. If it be taught in the New Testament that God is one, and that each of the three subsistences is God, the Trinity is taught there implicitly, though not explicitly.

After ages of debate, you know what nine out of ten of the devoutest and acutest think the New Testament teaches in the baptismal formula and the apostolical benediction, two incisive biblical summaries of Christian truth. The direction to the apostles as to baptism was, "Baptize all nations in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," a Triune Name, no distinction being made between these three. So, too, the benediction was pronounced in the Triune Name: "May the love of God, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you." You have been told that Neander says that there is not a passage in the New Testament which asserts the doctrine of the Trinity explicitly; and Neander does say so: but he says a great deal more; namely, that the whole New Testament contains the doctrine implicitly.

"In the doctrine of the Trinity," he writes, "God becomes known as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, in which threefold relation the whole Christian knowledge of God is completely announced. Accordingly all is herein embraced by the apostle Paul, when, in pronouncing the benediction, he sums up all in the formula, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit. God as the living God, the God of mankind, and the God of the church, can be truly known in this way only. This shape of Theism presents the perfect mean between the wholly extra-mundane God of deism and the God brought down into, and confounded with, the world of pantheism. This mode of the knowledge of God belongs to the peculiar science of Theism and the Theocracy."*

As many windows, gentlemen, as there are facts, let us use when we gaze on religious truths. Your mere theism shuts me up to one window. You will not let me look on all quarters of the sky. You shut your eyes to the light when you will not recognize what Napoleon saw in history. *I want no pulpit that is not built on rendered reasons; but I must be allowed to find reasons wherever they exist, whether the heavens stand or fall.*

Let research, with the four tests of intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism, have free course, and I am content. For fear that your conclusions may be a little broader than you like, you will not fail to gaze on the evidence which convinces Neander that the outcome of all looking into the Scriptures and into mere reason must be a belief in a Creator, in a Redeemer, and in a Sanctifier, the three one God, personal, omnipresent, and in conscience tangible.

* Neander, *Hist. of the Chr. Rel. and Ch., Torrey's trans.* i. 572.

When I thus use all my light, I am delivered from materialism; when I thus look on God, I am delivered from pantheism.

Whoever searches the Bible in the spirit of those who wrote it, and of the martyrs, will be kept free from an utterly unscientific narrowness which feels that God in Christ *was* rather than that He *is*. We are not abreast of our privileges when we live always in Judæa. The Scriptures are a map of the universe, and not of Palestine merely. If we are full of their spirit, the wings of philosophy will tire us only by their tardiness, and narrow range of flight.

There are in all ages, and particularly in this age of special studies, the most terrific dangers in a fragmentary view of God. I want this doctrine of the Trinity to save me from fragmentariness of outlook upon the Divine Nature. I will not allow myself to see God merely in my intuitions, and shut up the windows of external nature and of history; for thus I may easily drop down into pantheistic individualism, which, with supreme felicity of speech, your brave, broad, and massive Thomas Hill calls Egotheism.*

Neander says that the doctrine of the Trinity implies that of the Theocracy, or of a government of God in the universe and in national history. Remember, gentlemen, that our fathers came here avowedly to found a Theocracy. What did that mean? A state of which natural law and revelation together, shining under, in, and about legislation, should be the masters; a state where what can be known of God by reason on the one side, and revelation on the other, should lock its two hands around the neck of all vice, and throttle whatever would throttle the Christian well-being of the poorest or the highest, and should thus build up in history a state fit to be called at once natural and God's own. When the Jesuits came to the mouth of the St. Lawrence, they intended to found a Theocracy. The great dream that lay behind Milton's and Cromwell's and Hampden's thoughts and deeds was, that human legislation should be a close copy of the divine and natural law. At the point of view to which exact research has now brought us, we must assert that the fact of the Divine Immanence in matter and mind makes the world and nations a Theocracy; and that politics and social life, no less than philosophy, must beware of fragmentary outlooks on the Divine Nature. Richter said, "He who was the Holiest among the mighty, and the Mightiest among the holy, has, with His pierced

* See Hill, ex-president of Harvard University, *The Theology of the Sciences*, 1877.

hand, lifted heathenism off its hinges, and turned the dolorous and accursed centuries into new channels, and now governs the ages." History, the illuminated garment of God; the Church, Christ's Temple,—did you ever hear of the former in the name of science, or of the latter in the name of Christianity? But to your Titanic Richter the two are one. De Tocqueville affirms anxiously that men never so much need to be theocratic as when they are the most democratic. Democracy will save itself by turning into a Theocracy, or ruin itself by not doing so.

Transfigure society with Richter's thought. Saturate the centuries with the certainty of the Divine Personal Immanence in matter and mind. Do this, and, in the name of science itself, the labouring ages will slowly learn, not merely admiration, but adoration, of one God, incontrovertibly known in external nature, history, and conscience as Creator, as Redeemer, as Sanctifier. When they touch the hem of the garment of a personal God thus apprehended, and never till then, will they be healed of the measureless evils arising from fragmentariness of outlook upon the Divine Nature. Let the forehead of science, in the name of Christianity, bow down upon the moral law as the beloved disciple did upon our Lord's bosom. Let Richter lead; and a time will come when all clear thought, all political action, all individual growth, will call out: Glory be to God revealed in external nature; Glory be to God revealed in Christ and the church; Glory be to God revealed in Conscience! To this secular voice the Church will answer, in words which have already led eighteen centuries, and science will add at last her momentous acclaim: Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end.

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Boston Monday Lectures.

ORTHODOXY,

WITH

PRELUDES ON CURRENT EVENTS,

AND A COPIOUS ANALYTICAL INDEX.

By JOSEPH COOK.

"Es ist gar nicht zweifelhaft, sondern das Gewisseste, was es gibt, ja der Grund aller andern Gewissheit, das einzig absolut gültige Objective, dass es eine moralische Weltordnung gibt. Was du liebst, das lebst du."—Fichte.

London:
RICHARD D. DICKINSON,
89, FARRINGDON STREET, E.C.

1881.

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ORTHODOXY.

I.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

CIVIL OR CANON LAW—WHICH?

HENRY IV., in smock and barefoot, stood three days in the snow before the palace of Pope Hildebrand at Canossa, imploring pardon in vain, until his penance had been sufficiently protracted to become a symbol of the subjection of his nation. Bismarck said in 1872, "Germany is not going to Canossa physically or spiritually." Nevertheless, Bismarck seems to have had what even he would call tolerably serious trouble with the Jesuits of the latest day; and Gladstone assures the British Empire that the time has not yet arrived when free nations can profitably forget the schemes of the power behind the Papacy. That power will not disappear when the present Pope dies. You say that the form which carries the scythe and the hour-glass will pass through the Vatican soon, and change much on the Tiber. But the power behind the Pope made the present Pope. and it will make the new one. Pius IX. began as a reformer. He was taken in hand by a power greater than his own, and he ceased to advocate reforms in the Romish Church. Jesuit Ultramontanism has spoken through him ever since the first quarter of his possession of the papal chair.

As the power behind the power of the Papacy will not change, perhaps it is worth while for us to ask what that power thinks concerning its prospects in the United States. It would be entirely in order for me to read a passage out of the famous Syllabus of Pius IX., to show that he wishes to do in the New World what he endeavours to do in the Old. But we have more definite information as to the American plans of the Pope. I hold in my hand an interesting volume just issued from the press, and written by a distinguished lawyer who is now a member of the cabinet at Washington,—R. W. Thompson,—on "The Papacy and the Civil Power." In it (p. 119) is quoted a highly significant document, which ought to be better known; namely, a letter written by Pius IX. to Maximilian, when it seemed probable, in 1864, that this prince would become emperor of Mexico. What did the Pope say to him?

"Your Majesty is well aware that in order effectually to repair the evils occasioned by the revolution, and to bring back as soon as possible happy days for the Church, the Catholic religion must, above all things, continue to be the glory and the mainstay of the Mexican nation, *to the exclusion of every other dissenting worship;* that the bishops must be perfectly free in the

exercise of their pastoral ministry; that the religious orders should be re-established or re-organized, comformably with the instructions and the powers which *we* have given; that the patrimony of the Church, and the rights which attach to it, may be maintained and protected; that *no person may obtain the faculty of teaching and publishing false and subversive tenets;* that instruction, whether public or *private*, should be directed and watched over by *the ecclesiastical authority;* and that, in short, the chains may be broken which, up to the present time, have held down the Church in a state of dependence, and subject to the arbitrary rule of the civil government" (*Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia*, 1865, p. 749).

Two things concerning the conflict of papal ideas with American institutions are very clear: first, that we cannot resist the introduction here of the thin end of the wedge which has troubled other peoples; secondly, that in some way we must resist the introduction of the thick end of the wedge. You say that I am about to be narrow; and that I am to launch myself upon a theme so vexed and blazing that it cannot be touched here and now without rashness. What I assert is, that somewhere between the thin and the thick end of the Romish wedge, public opinion in America will by-and-by call "Hold!"—I do not know where, but somewhere.

What is the thin end of the wedge? Yonder in Charlestown there is a prison, in which the majority of the convicts are Romish. All who are there are wards of the State. They are not under the care of any denomination. Massachusetts is the preacher to those convicts. Massachusetts directs their moral culture. Massachusetts is not denominational. It has been the opinion of Massachusetts that she had the right to manage the instruction of those convicts according to her own ideas. Massachusetts was so narrow, so benighted, so sectarian, as to suppose that she possessed the right to appoint a chaplain over there, and to instruct him to teach nothing denominational, but to put the Bible into the hands of the convicts; to organize a Sunday religious school, not sectarian at all, but in the hands of all denominations; to hold devotional meetings, and thus train these convicts into preparation for a life of freedom, treating them in all ways as a wise parent would treat an erring child. Massachusetts thought she had a right to do that; and that is what she did.

Within the last ten months there has arisen in that institution, under the shadow of Bunker Hill, a conflict between Catholic canon law and Massachusetts State law. It has been asserted there, in the name of Romanism, that Romish convicts must not attend the Sabbath schools managed by the State chaplain; must not, under pain of excommunication, go to the devotional meetings authorized by Massachusetts; and strenuous objection has been made to the circulation of Protestant Bibles among the convicts. I am now reciting facts from the very significant, incisive, manly report (*Massachusetts Pub. Doc.*, No. 13, October, 1876) of the able and eloquent chaplain, Mr. Speare, who, I hope, will soon have a hearing before a Committee at the State House and before Massachusetts. The thin edge of the wedge is being driven with a muffled hammer. What are you to do about this? Berlin has determined, but has Boston decided how she will treat Ultramontanism?

My impression is, that Massachusetts law ought be made in Massachusetts, and not on the Tiber. If I had a drop of sectarian blood in my veins, I should wish to open the dull flesh, and let out the muddy compound. I want peace with all members of society; but I want first purity. It cannot be, it never will be, that the American people will submit to have canon law enforced over American law.

In Salem yonder, a learned ecclesiastic came into the school board not long

ago, and brought with him a number of volumes to show what the canon law is about instruction such as can be permitted to Romish children. The other gentlemen on that board listened to him for a while, and finally said, "My dear sir, we do not care what the canon law is. We know it is against our proceedings. You are aside from the point in showing us that the ecclesiastical provisions of the Romish Church will not permit the sending of your children to schools in which the Bible is read." Influences public and private, of such a kind, were brought into action in Salem, that the effect, and probably the intended effect, was that when the Bible was read the next time in one of the most prominent of the schools in question, all the Romish children put on their hats, and began to shuffle their feet, and make other signs of irreverence. Those scholars remained members of that school about fifteen minutes. The significant thing, however, was, that after being drawn into ecclesiastical Romish schools for a fortnight or a month, the children were found to be making very unsatisfactory progress; and the parents came to the school board in many cases and said, "Take our children back; they will behave themselves now. If they do not, treat them as you treat other children. We desire to have this matter settled by fair vote, after full discussion. Until it is so settled, we hope you will manage on the American plan. We know that objections are made in ecclesiastical quarters. But your schools are better than ours, and our children must have the best schools." And then in a whisper they added, "We do not care as much for canon law as for American law."

Now, I am not here to cast the slightest odium upon that body of citizens which is in many respects worthy of the fame of Edmund Burke, and Wellington, and O'Connell, and Charlotte Brontë, and John C. Calhoun, and of the best part of Horace Greeley. I do not think that the more intelligent members of the great processions, which on St. Patrick's Day passed through the streets of our chief cities, are inclined to put canon law above American law. I believe I am uttering the secret sentiments of many such men in this Commonwealth, when I say that they want the laws of Massachusetts made on the Merrimack and the Connecticut, and not on the Tiber. I have their support, I doubt not, when I say America must resist the thick end, that is the Maximilian end, of the papal wedge. She cannot resist the thin end. Everything here must go by count of heads and clack of tongues. I am glad this should be so, if only the heads are heavy with the results of fair discussion, and the tongues wise. There must be not a little discussion of this topic before our legislators will understand that there are quite as many Presbyterian sittings in the United States as Romish. You have two million Romish sittings in the United States. You have also two million Presbyterian, three million Baptist, and six million Methodist sittings; and my little denomination, the Congregational, has a million and a half. There are votes for America as well as for Rome; and, therefore, let politicians who are afraid remember that somewhere, between the thin end and the thick end of the wedge, it will be policy to pause.

IS THERE NOTHING IN GOD TO FEAR?

"Se judice nemo nocens absolvitur."—JUVENAL: Sat. xiii. 3.
'Magna vis est conscientiæ et magna in utramque partem, ut neque timeant, qui nihil commiserint et pœnam semper ante oculos versari putent, qui peccârint."—CICERO: *Milo*, 23.

God punishes sin no longer than it endures. Many of the evils of disloyalty to the nature of things may continue even after the soul becomes loyal, as many of the evils of secession persist even after a State has returned to allegiance. But, so far as is possible, the forces which were punitive to the disloyal commonwealth become healing to the loyal; and those that are healing to the loyal become punitive to the disloyal. A Personal will has proclaimed an unbending enactment, which we call the law of causation; and out of that free, holy law, arise all the blessings and all the pains of the universe. Sin's punishment is sin's effect. It is far more wise, therefore, to ask how long sin may endure, than to inquire how long its punishment may last. Of the two methods, the Scientific and the Biblical, by which an answer to this majestic question may be sought, I am here shut up to neither the one nor the other; but I prefer always to put the Scientific method in the foreground. Let me say once for all that I do so, not because I undervalue the Biblical, but because in our time the wants of many minds are best met by combining Scientific and Biblical evidence, and by making now the Scientific the edge, and the Biblical the weight of the weapon behind the edge, and now the Biblical the edge, and the Scientific the weight of the weapon.

According to my view of the Unity of the Divine nature, God is one, as we meet Him in the Old Testament and the Oldest; in the New and the Newest. There are four Testaments: an Oldest and an Old, a New and a Newest. The Oldest Testament is the Nature of Things. The Newest is Christ's continued Life in the Present Influences of the Holy Spirit. The Oldest and Newest are unwritten; the Old and New are written. But the voices of the four are one. Singularly enough, too, the scenery of the four Testaments is one and the same Holy Land; and he who does not feel at home in them all may well suspect the thoroughness of his knowledge of either. Carlyle calls Luther what the future will call Carlyle—"Great, not as a hewn obelisk, but as an Alpine mountain; unsubduable granite, piercing far and wide into the heavens; yet in the clefts of it, fountains, green beautiful valleys with flowers." This is a good map of the human conscience as we know it scientifically. This, too, fairly understood, is a good map of the Old Testament, and of the New, and of the Newest. If the Old Testament Scripture is at once severe and tender; if, in all its gnarled, unsubduable heights, there burst out springs of crystalline water; if, in the inaccessible ruggedness of its peaks, we find green places, soft with celestial visitation of showers and of dew; if there is in the written Word a combination of the Alpine and of the Paradisiacal unfathomable justice matched by

unfathomable tenderness; so in the Newest Testament and in the Oldest—that is to say, in History and in the Nature of things—*we find in the deepest clefts the springs that do most to quench our thirst!* I, therefore, shall dare to ask you to hang over the great chasms in the nature of things, because at the bottom of these, spring up the waters which are the healing of the nation.

Agassiz, wishing to study the glittering interior of an Alpine chasm, allowed himself on one occasion to be lowered into a crevice in a glacier, and remained for some hours at mid-day, at a point hundreds of feet below the surface of the ice. After gratifying his enthusiastic curiosity, he gave the signal to be drawn up. I heard him tell this himself; and he said, "In our haste we had forgotten the weight of the rope. We had calculated the weight of my person, of the basket in which I rode, and of the tackling that was around the basket; but we had forgotten the weight of the rope that sank with me into the chasm. The three men at the summit were not strong enough to draw me back. I had to remain there until one of the party went five miles—two and a half out and two and a half back—to the nearest tree to get wood enough to make a lever, and draw me up." When habit lowers a man into the jaws of the nature of things, it is common, but it is not scientific, to forget the weight of the rope! That weight is a *fact* in the universe, and the importance of not forgetting it is one of the most haughty and unanswerable teachings of science.

Character does not tend to final permanence! You have a large task on your hands, gentlemen, if you are to prove that. You have all the great literatures of the globe against you, to commence with. All the deep proverbs of all nations, and kindreds, and tribes, and tongues, are against you. All the established truths relating to habit are against you. All the instincts in man, which forebode terrible things when we let ourselves sink far down in the practice of sin, are against you. All subtlest sorcery, by which we forget the weight of the rope, is against you. The Oldest Scripture and the Old, the Newest and the New, are against you. The law of judicial blindness the world will understand by-and-by as well as Shakespeare understood it. In that day your proposition that character does not tend to a final permanence will find no scientific believers. The results of evil choice in character are effects, but they become causes; and so every act in itself is an eternal mother more surely than it is an eternal daughter. The weight of the rope! It is as unscientific to forget that in religious science, as it was for Agassiz to forget it among the glaciers of the Alps—and not a little more dangerous!

You wish me to look fairly at all the facts of the case. That, and only that, is what I am endeavouring to do. The question is, whether, while I am doing this, or while I am true to the scientific method, I can agree with Theodore Parker in these propositions:—

1. "There is nothing in God to fear" (PARKER, *Sermons on Theism*, p. 210). Really this language is here.

2. "If God does not care as much for Iscariot as for Christ, as much desiring and insuring the ultimate triumph of the one as the other, then He is not the Infinite Father, whose ways are equal to

all His children; but partial, unjust, cruel, wicked, and oppressive" (p. 299).

3. "Every fall is a fall upward" (p. 408).

Turn over to the last and most emphatic passage in this best book Parker ever wrote, except always his attacks on slavery, and we find this as the concluding sentence :—

4. "Suppose I am the blackest of sinners; that as Cain, I slew my brother; as Iscariot, I betrayed him (and such a brother!); or, as a New-England kidnapper, I sold him to be a slave: and, blackened with such a sin, I come to die. Still I am a child of God,—of the infinite God. He foresaw the consequence of my faculties, of the freedom He gave me, of the circumstances which girt me round; and do you think He knows not how to bring me back? that He has not other circumstances in store to waken other faculties, and lead me home, compensating my variable hate with His own constant love!

"'Come, then, expressive silence, muse His praise.'" (p. 417.)

Gentlemen, Theodore Parker's practice throttled kidnappers. Theodore Parker's theory nursed kidnappers.

1. The theory that a man may die a kidnapper or murderer of the blackest criminality, and yet be sure to come out right in the end, and that God as much desires and insures the ultimate triumph of Iscariot as of Christ, does not work well in this world.

You say that one fact does not mean much; and I am not asking anybody to put the emphasis on it which it seems to me to deserve; but I have four tests of truth—Intuition, Instinct, Experiment in the large range, and Syllogism. Now, to test Parker's explicit teaching, that a man may die a kidnapper, or a Cain, or an Iscariot, and yet be sure of coming out safe in the end, take the test of plain common sense, and suppose society saturated with that belief for thousands of years. Ask how it operates in this life, in long and wide and multiplex trial, to make that the ruling opinion behind law and literature, politics and commerce, peace and war. Does not every man know that the theory that "it is never too late to mend" relaxes the moral fibres, loosens the strenuous curb which mere prudence puts upon greed and fraud, and, even with the most thoughtful and conscientious, inevitably diminishes the imperativeness of the reasons in favour of good morals? Theodore Parker's preciously-loved Iscariot theory hampers—to be perfectly frank, I must say I think it hamstrings—society! If a theory does not work well, I hold that it is scientifically proved to be out of harmony with the nature of things. Any proposition, which, in a long course of absorption into the veins of the world, produces pimples, and dizziness, and ugly ulcers, is not good for food. It is not made for us. The theory that a man may die a Cain, an Iscariot, or a kidnapper, and yet come out right, is one which I never will take the responsibility of proclaiming, for I know it will do harm; and, because I know it will not work well, I, for one, am convinced that it is out of accord with the nature of things, and so is wholly unscientific.

2. *A style of teaching that does not work well in this world is*

adequately discredited as a guide to practical truth as to the next world.

Law is a unit throughout the universe; and therefore a vivid sight of an arc of experience in the seen and temporal exposes by more than a glimpse the course of the whole circle in the unseen and eternal. Even in this life we are not outside of the range of the irreversibly just and the irreversibly tender laws of the nature of things; and therefore, when age after age puts its seal of condemnation on any proposition because it does not work well in this world, I have the right, in the name of the unity and universality of law, and of the principles that truth works well, and that what works well is truth, to brand that proposition as unscientific, and as therefore not to be trusted in its relations to the next world.

3. From our present point of view, look fairly and with your own eyes at the central objection to the theory that there may be punishment in the universe for ever.

Do you admit that the past is irreversible? I hope you do; certainly I do. Very well; if the past is irreversible, there are some six thousand years at least during which not a few men have done what conscience proclaims ought not to have been done. Gentlemen, that record is to last, is it not? "Oh, no! Oh, no! It would be against the deepest of the liberal instincts to suppose that anything that can cause regret and pain will be in existence when the great plan of the universe has been fully executed." What! a record having in it all the Neros and Caligulas, all the perjuries and leprosies and butcheries of all time, and existing there as a thing that ought not to have been, —a record irreversible and inerasable,—and yet this give no regret to consciences looking back upon it, even if they are purified ones? Gentlemen, there will be for ever in the universe a record of every sin that has been committed in it. There will be for ever in the universe regret on the part of all consciences in the universe that that sin was committed. If regret is pain, there will be pain in the universe for ever! What are we to do with these provincial, unscientific, lawless whippers of syllabub in thought, who will not look north, south, east, and west, and who proclaim constantly that there is nothing in God to fear? There is much in the nature of things to fear! "In the last analysis, there will be a painless universe! It cannot but be, that all things will come out as they ought to come out!" Indeed, I think they will; and that is why, for one, I stand in fear before the nature of things. I am not quite a full-grown man; but I am afraid of the power of sin to benumb the moral sense, and of the tendency of human nature to sin repeatedly when the moral sense is once benumbed.

I am afraid of the weight of the rope, when I lower myself into the jaws of Gehenna; and I believe solemnly that I shall never cease to regret any sin which I outgrow. It always will be to me a thing that ought not to have been; and my future will have rays of bliss taken off it by every sin I have committed; and that will be true, no matter what God does for me. He is not likely to change to-morrow, or the day after, the natural laws according to which I and all consciences in

the universe must for ever and for ever condemn whatever ought not to have been.

Look at the fact, the mathematical certainty, that if you deduct from the experience of a man's holiness for a while, you have deducted something of absolutely measureless value. You have poisoned him for once. Now, this positive evil of diminishing the possible bliss of that man is to last some time! It never will stop its course, will it? "There will be no final pain or permanent loss in the universe? Oh, no!" I affirm that you cannot take out of human history six thousand years, and give them over to your blackest sins, or to your least black, without subtracting from the bliss of the universe; and that this gap is a part of the record of the past; and that you never can fill it up. That gap will exist

> "Till the sun is old,
> And the stars are cold,
> And the leaves of the judgment-book unfold."
> (BAYARD TAYLOR'S *translation of a Persian hymn.*)

If you please, my friends, this universe is more serious than poet has ever dreamed, or prophet proclaimed. Any love of ours for what the nature of things condemns is dissonance with Almighty God. If we are not glad to have the nature of things take its course, we are not glad to have God do His will. Whoever reveres the scientific method will never for an instant forget the stern facts, that all the past is irreversible; that a record of sin, once written, will endure for ever; and that a deduction from the bliss of the universe, if made at all, is of necessity made for eternity. So has God arranged all things, that no tears, no infinities of the Divine tenderness, will ever cause that which once has been, but which ought not to have been, to cease to be a part of the record of the past on which you and I and He must gaze for ever and for ever!

Carlyle is as free from partisanship as the north wind is from a yoke, and Boston ought to hear him when he speaks of Cromwell's inner sky. Hampden and Cromwell, Macaulay says, were once on ship-board in England, with the intention of coming to America for life. Milton, Cromwell, and Hampden were the first Americans. "It is very interesting, very natural, this conversion, as they well name it," says Carlyle of Cromwell; "this awakening of a great, true soul from the worldly slough to see into the awful truth of things; to see that Time and its shows all rested on Eternity, and this poor earth of ours was the threshold either of Heaven or Hell" (*On Heroes*, Lect. VI.). "The world is alive, instinct with Godhead, beautiful and awful, even as in the beginning of days. One Life; a little gleam of time between two Eternities; no second chance to us for evermore" (Lect. V.).

The force that moves men to deny that character tends to a final permanence, bad as well as good, is sentiment, and not science. It is a form of sentiment peculiar to luxurious ages, and not to the great and strenuous ones. Let the tone of an age change, and this senti-

ment changes. It is what the Germans call a *Zeit-geist*, and by no means an *Ewigkeit-geist*,—a spirit of the day, and not a spirit of Eternity. Even self-evident truth has sometimes very little power to exorcise what reasoning did not inculcate. But it is the business of Science to make all ages great and strenuous. When Science has done her perfect work in the world, the lawless liberalism, characteristic of luxurious and relaxed ages, will have no authority.

It is scientifically incontrovertible, that the past cannot be changed; and therefore it is sure that, if regret for what ought not to have been is pain, there will be pain in the universe for ever.

This planet moves through space enswathed with light. The radiance of the sun billows away to all quarters of infinity. Behind the globe a shadow is projecting; diminishing, indeed, lost at last in the immeasurable vastness of the illuminations of the scene. The stars sing there; the suns are all glad. No doubt, if Richter was right in saying that interstellar spaces are the homes of souls, there is unfathomable bliss in all these pulsating, unfathomable spaces, so far as they are regions of loyalty to God. There can be no blessedness without holiness, and so there cannot be bliss where loyalty does not exist. Behind every planet there will be that shadow; and as surely as there cannot be illumination on one side without shadow on the other, so surely a record of sin will cast a shadow for ever, and some part of that shadow will sweep over the sea of glass, and not be invisible from the Great White Throne.

You would be true to self-evident propositions. Be true to the certainty that the past is irreversible, and you will break the spell of the unscientific sentiment that there cannot be pain or loss in the universe for ever. So many worlds are around us, so many better ages are ahead of us, that there will be, for aught I know, as much more light than shadow in the moral as there is in the physical universe. Let no man proclaim that the human race thus far has been a failure. Let no man exhibit as Christianity the pandemonium caricature which regards the white lives that come into the world, and go out of it before they are stained with responsible evil, as lost ones! A majority of the human beings who have appeared in the world have gone hence before they were responsible for their actions. I believe the majority of all who have been born into the world thus far are in heaven. But you and I are forced by the precision of the scientific method to admit that the majority of those who live now have not learned similarity of feeling with God; and you and I know incontrovertibly that without similarity of feeling with God, salvation is a natural impossibility.

Erratic opinion itself teaches glad allegiance to God as the natural and inexorable condition of the peace of the soul. Go to your Ryder at Chicago, or your Chapin at New York, and these serious teachers will tell you that they everywhere proclaim the necessity of the new birth. Where is there among the more sober, that is the later, Universalists, a man who really possesses scholarship, who does not teach the necessity of similarity of feeling with God? Dr. Ryder, however, at a late national convention here at Lynn, said that the

Universalist churches have not, on the whole, a good name for spiritual efficiency, and that the Universalist ministry does not seem to feel itself charged with the duty of bringing society into the mood which science pronounces to be a necessity to the welfare of the soul. (See "The Universalist" of date of the convention, 1875.) He criticised this ministry for lack of earnestness in the work of leading men into similarity of feeling with God. That convention, although it came near censuring this formidable frankness by a formal vote, did not cut its own throat by doing so. Even Universalism, if scholarly at all, will admit that without similarity of feeling with God, salvation is a natural impossibility. It knows that it cannot deny that the majority of those now in the world are not living in the love of what God loves, and the hate of what God hates.

We are agreed, therefore, up to this point; and the question is whether, as Parker affirms, a man who passes out of life as incorrigibly bad as the blackest crimes can make him, can be assured, in the name of natural law, that he will attain bliss at last, and that character does not tend to a final permanence!

Your chief objection to the idea that evil may last for ever is drawn, not from Science, nor from Scripture, but from the characteristic of luxurious ages, an unscientific laxness of sentiment. You affirm that there cannot be pain in a perfect universe; that is, in a moral system where all are free, and where what ought to be done is done by the Ruler. I wish to fracture this boulder, which lies upon the necks of many. This vague, easy sentiment has behind it nothing strenuous or clear in thought. I have done enough to throw logical discredit upon that sentiment by simply pointing to the irreversibleness of the past, and the certainty that conscience, as transfigured by the salvation which you say all men will attain, must regret for ever and for ever a record of sin. I have shown that there will be loss for ever and for ever on account of all the sin that has occurred, or that is yet to occur.

Having thus, in the name of the scientific method, thrown across this misty chasm of sentimentality a single thread, will you allow me to carry over on that one strand a cable? When the bridge at Niagara was built, a single wire was carried over by a kite, and on that wire was taken over a cable, and finally a bridge. I wish to span this chasm, and beyond all controversy we see that a single wire is carried across it. Sin having once entered the world, there is a form of loss or evil, and there is one form of pain which we assuredly know will exist for ever. *If, then, some pain and some evil may exist for ever, and God yet be good, do you know enough to say how much evil may exist for ever, and God yet be good?*

Who is there here who dares to say that he is wise enough to authorize Theodore Parker to hiss at the Scripture on this theme?

When you know scientifically that one thread is carried over, how do you know but that the cable which the Scriptures carry across may be absolutely the scientific bridge?

We are all agreed that some evil may last for ever; we are all agreed that God is good: and now, in the name of the fact that God

is good, you desire me to say with Theodore Parker, that a man may die a kidnapper, and yet be saved. You have no reason at the bottom of your demand on that point, except this sentiment, or the feeling of the luxurious hours, and not of the most illumined days of the world, that it cannot be that any pain can last for ever. I say some pain will, and you know it will; some loss or evil will, and you know it will. Is it not high time, therefore, for us to consult some other authority than that of this scientifically discredited sentiment? The question is, whether you are wise enough to estimate the amount of pain, or loss, or evil, which may last for ever?

Apply to this misleading sentiment another and yet sterner test. Suppose that the world were not yet created, and that you were asked, "What will there be in this moral system which God is about to call into existence? Will there be evil in it?"—"I do not think there will be, because God is good."—"Will there be any one in it allowed to lose peace of soul, by falling into love of what God hates, and the hate of what God loves?"—"My sentiments assure me that there will not be: God is good and perfect; there will be no imperfection in His work."—"Will there be in this universe, which is about to come into existence, any free and responsible agent weighted from birth to death with inherited bad tendencies, which, although not sin, are the copious fountain of evil choices? Will there be a law of hereditary descent by which beings innocent, so far as their own acts are concerned, will be brought into the world to suffer to the third or fourth generation, as a consequence of the evil choices of their ancestors?"—"No, that cannot be; a perfect being, with a perfect motive, creating with a perfect purpose, never will call such a law into existence."—"How do you know he will not?"—"My cultured sentiment is all against it. I was born in the city of Boston. It is almost a violation of taste to suppose that God will do anything of that sort. It is too late to teach in the nineteenth century, that Infinite Wisdom and Power, bringing into existence a moral system, will allow to exist in it anything which the spirit of our time would not anticipate! Advanced thought cannot admit that any such imperfection will exist in a universe created by a perfect being. God is good. Evil will not be allowed to begin. I am sure nothing of the kind will be found in the world. It is not to be supposed for a moment, that an Infinite Being will permit sin to exist in a moral system. I am willing to stake my eternity on the veracity of this sentiment."

Turn now to the actual facts of life, and what is here? What Infinite Wisdom and Power and Goodness have permitted, and nothing else. What God does not do cannot be done wisely. He has not prevented sin; He has given to evil as well as to good a power of self-propagation; He has made it a rule that children shall suffer as well as be blessed for the deeds of their ancestors, and this to the third and the fourth generation. It is a fact beyond all comment amazing, that sin has such self-propagating power as to spread itself from birth beyond what we should say is the range of responsibility for it, and that men should come burdened into the world with the offences of those who went before them. But virtue has equally great and even

greater power of self-diffusion. Why could not there have been an upper without an actual under in this free world? Perfectly innocent is many a maniac; perfectly innocent is many a cripple. But not innocent some ancestor whose mischiefs spread by hereditary descent. God allows such things to be, and yet we believe God is perfect.

Archbishop Whately has shown elaborately that all the reasoning which proclaims that sin cannot endure for ever proceeds on principles which prove that sin would never be allowed to begin.

Will your unreasoning sentiment stand in this light of science? or is the universe perhaps more complex and serious than you dreamed? I affirm, gentlemen, that all this unscientific sentimentality is best tested by taking it over to a point previous to the commencement of our present moral system, and applying the reasoning there, fully and fairly. If a sentiment indicates the truth, it will work well there. When I go enswathed in this sentiment into the councils which preceded the formation of this world, I really find myself in a minority there. *Incontrovertibly there is in the universe a different plan than I should think there would be, if I were to follow the lead of this sentiment, which is the secret source of the denial that all character tends to a final permanence.*

Therefore, my friends, as this sentiment fails us when we apply it to a course of facts which we can test, I affirm that it is not safe to take it and apply it to a course of facts which lie beyond the touch of the human spiritual finger-tips. We can reduce this sentiment to absurdity, by applying it to the time before the world was; and therefore I fear that it will turn out an absurdity, if we apply it to the time after the world shall cease to exist.

Yes; but ultimately more good will come if evil is permitted. What! I thought you did not believe that evil is a necessary means of the greatest good! I assumed that you adhered to Theodore Parker's position, that conscience pronounces that evil ought not to be. If evil is the necessary means of the greatest good, then it ought to be.

In any case you will obtain only a painless universe; so we come back precisely to the point where we stood at first, or to the certainty that your marble staircase takes men up no higher than your red-hot iron, and your red-hot iron no higher than they can ascend on your marble; and so, if the only object of evil in the universe is to take men up, God is not benevolent, for He could take men up painlessly to the same height, and He does not do so. That is the position you must reach at last. It is the stern scientific truth on this theme, that you have no ground in this sentiment for denying that character tends to a final permanence.

Fill the ages with the certainty that all character tends to a free final permanence, which can come but once, and you encourage all virtue, and repress all vice—as the nature of things does. That belief works well, and so deserves coronation. It puts beneath every man who is loyal to duty, the everlasting arms. It makes him glad with the unbounded confidence that all things work together for good to those who love God; and serious in an equally measureless confi-

dence that all things do not work together for good to those who do not.

Theodore Parker once proclaimed in a stray passage, that violation of a moral law may be so bold and persistent as to bring with it penalties that have no remedy. He wrote explicitly: "From my own experience, I know the remorse which comes from conscious violation of my own integrity; from treason to myself and my God. It transcends all bodily pain, all grief at disappointed schemes, all anguish which comes from sickness, ay, from the death of dear ones prematurely taken away. To these afflictions I can bow with a 'Thy will, not mine, be done.' But remorse, the pain of sin, that is my work. This comes, obviously, to warn us of the ruin which lies before us; for, as the violation of the natural material conditions of bodily life leads to dissolution of the body, so the wilful, constant violation of the natural conditions of spiritual well-being leads to the destruction thereof" (*Sermons on Theism*, p. 404).

This is clear and straightforward; but it is immediately explained away and repudiated by its own author.

If lost souls repent, they in that act cease to be lost. Will Iago repent? Will Mephistopheles repent? Will Milton's Satan repent? What is the definition of perdition? Permanent dissimilarity of feeling with God. That definition does not imply that a man has lost all tendency to respect what is reasonable, but that he never attains predominant love of what God loves. The failure to attain predominant love of what God loves and hate of what God hates is perdition. In the name of the law by which all character tends to final permanence, all science proclaims that Iago and Mephistopheles may fall into permanence of dissimilarity of feeling with God. Salvation in that condition is a natural impossibility, for salvation includes similarity of feeling with God.

Gentlemen, we want truth winnowed by being held up in the breezes that blow out of all quarters of the sky. I take this proposition that it is safe to die as an Iscariot, and I hold it up in the winds that blow out of the centuries of Roman degradation. It suffers a winnowing even then, for the winds whisper to me, "This teaching would not have cleansed Rome." I hold up the proposition in the winds that blow out of American greed and fraud. The answer is yet more decisive. Safe to die an Iscariot? Safe to die a kidnapper? Safe to die a Cain, with the blood of your brother on your forehead? The scheme does not work well, and it is to be known scientifically and finally by its inevitable fruits.

Thread and cable across the chasm, what is the bridge; and this in one word? It is written in Scripture that there will come a time when in the name of the nature of things it will be proclaimed, "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still." There is to be a day, of which no man or angel knoweth the time, after which the unholy will continue to be unholy, and the holy will continue to be holy. On the last page of the New, as in many another page of the New and Old, and of the Newest and Oldest Testament, the law is proclaimed that all character tends to a final

permanence, good as well as bad, and bad as well as good. The written Scriptures end with this explicit declaration, and in it reach their most awful and their most alluring height.

In the great words, "Let him that is unjust be unjust still," the Greek verb implies that the agent in this eternal sin is wholly free, and can blame only himself (ALFORD, Rev. xxii. 11).

The last verity proclaimed in Scripture is thus the natural permanence of moral character, and the certainty that all crystallization of the soul into final permanence will bring with it its natural wages. The truth that I am afraid of is what all science, what all Scripture, what all human experience affirm, that he who is unholy long enough will be unholy longer; he who is filthy long enough will be filthy longer; and that inveteracy will lead to permanence of voluntary moral remoteness from God; and that this will be its own punishment in the nature of things.

You are at war with the nature of things. Which shall change; you or it? God cannot be an enswathing kiss, without being also a consuming fire.

II.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

ROMISH PERVERSIONS OF FACT, AND ROMISH CHAPLAINS.

One day Prince Bismarck, rolling in triumph towards Paris, had leisure to visit a country school-house; and it was there that he found what he called the saddest sight he saw in France. What was that sight? Some widow with a starving family? Some mained soldier, the only support of a distant home, about to be left in destitution? Some human form riddled with bullets? None of these, but a set of school-books filled with lies! "I took up the volumes," says this statesman, "and found that the tritest facts as to the religious history of Europe were falsified by Romish editors. Scholarship would stand aghast on every third or fourth page, at the monstrosity of the misrepresentations of acknowledged historical truth." To feed the rising generation with falsehood, Bismarck thought a sadder thing than battle-fields. My friends, I hold in my hands a book, copies of which were lately distributed in quantities at Deer Island, in Massachusetts Bay yonder, by Romish priests. It is important for me, as an outlook committee, to observe what passes underneath the surface of society; and I know what a formidable frankness I am exercising now. But it is not a bitter frankness; it is in the interest of straightforward discussion, and even of peace; for certainly it is in the interest of peace to let it be known that there are some things which cannot be done in America, and which therefore had better not be attempted! Opening this volume I find not only the boldest violations of historical veracity, but passages plainly intended to inflame uneducated readers:—

"In 1619 a small pool in Cambridge became as red as blood; the water being taken up into basins still kept the same colour; and many signs were seen in the air, such as armies fighting one against another. In 1666 many Protestants prophesied the downfall of the Pope on the 2nd of September; and on that very day a dreadful fire broke out in London, and continued burning three days and three nights" (p. 73).

"It was not unusual to tear the nails from the fingers of the Catholic prisoners, or to batter the heads of the clergy with sticks and stones till their brains were open to view" (p. 38).

"Have not the Protestants holiness of doctrine? By no means; for it is well known that their first preachers taught these wicked and abominable doctrines: 'That God is the author of sin;' 'That man has no free will to enable him to avoid sin;' 'That it is impossible to observe the commandments;' 'That the most enormous crimes do not injure a person in the sight of God'" (p. 19).

"Must not, then, the Protestant Church, instead of leading men to heaven, infallibly lead them to hell? We certainly have too great reason to apprehend it (p. 100).

"All the saints who are gone to heaven lived and died Roman Catholics" (p. 55).

"Having taken the Devil for his leader, Luther immediately goes to work to

pull down the Catholic faith, and build up the Protestant religion. He declares that all the Catholics must be murdered. What! can a man who was mad with lust; who lived in adultery, and caused others to do the same; who wrote most horrid blasphemy, and corrupted the Bible; who was a notorious drunkard, and companion of devils; who was as proud as Satan himself, a preacher of sedition and murder,—what! can this wretch be compared with Christ and Paul? If this man is a Protestant saint, pray what are their sinners?" (pp. 63, 64.)

"Miracles are wrought in the Catholic Church. We know for certain that she comes from God; for no church can do the *miracles* which she doth, except God be with her. John iii. 2" (p. 81).

If you please, gentlemen, this delicious food for the young has been distributed upon Deer Island in plentiful meals. The book is entitled "A Sure Way to find out the True Religion," and is published by Patrick Donahoe of Boston. You will not be surprised to learn, that, after the character of this volume was found out, it was expelled from Deer Island by order of the chairman of the Board of Directors in charge there.

Ought an American prison to have two chaplains, one Romish and one Protestant, both paid by the State? A law has been passed in Massachusetts by which it is provided that freedom of conscience shall be guaranteed to all inmates of penal institutions. This is a very ambiguous law, and one that was intended, I suppose, to be ambiguous; at least, it was engineered through the State House by E. D. Winslow, a very ambiguous man. There is in that newest legislation no abrogating clause. I am assured by legal authority that the old law stands; and the old law provided in a very sensible way that there should be but one chaplain in one institution. Ask men who have had experience in this matter, and they will tell you that two chaplains under one roof make trouble. The practice of Massachusetts for generations has been to put but one chaplain under one roof; and there is no marked popular demand for the change of that practice. The old law was such that you could appoint a man of any sect chaplain in a penal institution.

The demand often is secretly made, and in a letter lately published by a representative Romanist ("Daily Advertiser," March 22, 1877) it is publicly made in Boston, as it frequently has been in New York and Cincinnati, that in each penal institution there should be two chaplains, after the manner of Austria or France; and of course the implication is, that in America, as in Europe, both should be paid by the State. Yield to that demand, and you will have a division of your public criminal fund. What will come after that? The proposed change means a demand for the division of your school fund. It means a demand for the division of your church fund. It means a demand for the division of your eleemosynary fund. Depart from the American principle, that all sects shall pay their own bills, and you will be obliged to face all these questions that have given so much trouble in those countries where there are State churches.

Of what value is it to tell Americans that two chaplains, each paid by the State, are commonly found in each penal institution in Austria, and France, and Germany, and England? There are State churches in those countries. We have no State church here. There is not the slightest financial connection between State and Church here. We aid no denomination by funds out of the public treasury. Romish ecclesiastics want their chaplains paid by the State. They must learn that they are not in Austria, France, Prussia, or England. *America means that all religious sects, Romanists included, shall pay their own bills. To demand that a sectarian chaplain or schoolmaster be paid by the State, is to act against the whole spirit of American law.*

Ought American policy on this point to be abandoned for European, for the

sake of improving prison discipline? Let us be assured that there are several things in America besides prison discipline which the Romish power desires to improve. What will be the result of granting to one sect State aid? Has the sect which asks such exceptional assistance been exceptionally efficient in preventing ignorance, pauperism, and crime? Are a majority of our convicts Romish? If that fact at first sight seems to favour the appointment of Romish chaplains paid by the State, has it not at second sight a look which hints at a truth pointing in quite an opposite direction? We must face all the facts, and I see the force of the few vastly outweighed considerations that may be urged in favour of the European plan. Of course, prisoners like best the religious instruction to which they have been accustomed; but all infelicities on that point can be removed from prison discipline without sectarian legislation. I am not making objection to Romish priests at Charlestown appearing there, and being of solace to Romish convicts. My proposition is, that we had better not depart from the American principle that *all religious sects, Romanists included, must pay their own bills.* I object to a division of State funds among sectarian State chaplains, and this because the precedent would be the entering wedge for a sectarian division of the school fund. Of course I expect no credit for advocating that proposition until about fifty years hence. I speak for to-morrow, and not for to-day.

Are Romish children in Romish schools, and Romish convicts under Romish chaplains, to have books of this sort put into their hands by State money? It is perfectly pertinent for Massachusetts to ask whether Bismarck was right in saying that the saddest sight he saw was this misleading of the uneducated by the monstrous claim that all history is against Protestantism and in favour of Romanism, and by inciting the prejudices and inflaming the passions of the uneducated. Is it not a thing to be punctured as a bubble not of a glittering sort,—the claim made by Romish leaders that the Protestant Bible is no Bible at all? The scholarship of the world has ridiculed this claim for the last three hundred years. It is admitted that strenuous objection had been made to the circulation of Protestant Bibles among the Catholic convicts yonder under the shadow of Bunker Hill; and the astounding assertion is put forward that the Protestant Bible is no Bible at all. (See "Advertiser," letter of Mr. Tuckerman, March 22.) Such a statement as that is for the uneducated, and not for the intelligent masses.

What, then, is the outcome of this question? American policy and papal policy differ. It is susceptible of the most exact documentary proof, that the troubles we are on the edge of about our public schools and penal institutions are substantially the result of the conflict between Romish canon law and American national law. When a bishop in the Romish Church takes the oath of his office, the act, as Bismarck and Gladstone understand well, is by no means a mere form, but it makes Romish ecclesiasticism—I do not speak of the Catholic masses—a compact organization indisputably owing its first allegiance to a power on the banks of the Tiber.

The following is the oath of allegiance to the Pope, taken by every archbishop and bishop, and by all who are elevated to positions of official dignity by the Pope:—

"I, N., elect of the Church of N., from henceforward will be faithful and obedient to St. Peter the Apostle, and to the Holy Roman Church, and to our Lord, the Lord N., Pope N., and to his successors canonically entering. . . . I will help them to defend and keep the Roman Papacy, and the royalties of St. Peter, saving my order against all men. . . . The rights, honours, privileges, and authority of the Holy Roman Church, of our Lord the Pope, and his aforesaid successors, I will endeavour to preserve, defend, increase, and advance. . . .

Heretics, schismatics, and rebels to our said Lord, or his aforesaid successors, I will to my utmost persecute and oppose. . . . I will, by myself in person, visit the threshold of the Apostles every three years, and give an account to our Lord and his aforesaid successors of all my pastoral office, and of all things anywise belonging to the state of my church, to the discipline of my clergy and people, and lastly to the salvation of souls committed to my trust ; and will in like manner humbly receive and diligently execute the apostolic commands." (DOWLING'S *History of Romanism*, pp. 615, 616. See also THOMPSON, R. W., *The Papacy and the Civil Power*, p. 717.)

Gentlemen, the order of the Romish priesthood is an historical body of which it is trite to say that its organization is astonishingly perfect, and that its power in the cities of America is not likely to diminish speedily if left without check from enlightened public sentiment. These swarming ecclesiastics do not carry weight in the race of life ; they are bachelors, and bachelors are dangerous men in the world. They have nothing to do but to attend to their public duties. It is therefore something worth remembering, that all these detached priests among the nations, or the fingers on every continent, are attached to one palm and one wrist ; and that this is the power on the Tiber. I wish to draw a wide distinction between Romish citizens and Romish ecclesiastics. There is nothing sure, if it is not certain that the allegiance of the Romish ecclesiastics is not first national, but first papal. First a Catholic, next a German : that has been the secret watchword of the Ultramontane party in Germany in the last ten years. That has been the political creed which Bismarck has been ready to contradict at the cannon's mouth. First an Englishman, or first a Catholic? First a Romanist, or first an American? That is the old question which has been debated ever since the time of Philip the Fair.

Pope Boniface wrote to Philip the Fair of France, when France was really more Protestant than now, this letter : "Pope Boniface to Philip the Fair, sends greeting : Know that thou art subject to us, the Supreme Pontiff, in temporal as well as spiritual things." Philip the Fair replied, "Philip to Boniface, little or no greeting : Know thou, O supreme fool, that in temporal things we are not subject to any one." France echoed the scorn of Philip the Fair to the claim to universal temporal power on the part of the Pope, but to-day she is under the control of the Ultramontane party. Germany stands now where Philip the Fair stood ; but it was by a vote of only one, that great, rich, Romish Bavaria decided to help Prussia in the war of 1871 against France. One hundred and ninety millions of the human race are yet pacing to and fro in the snows of Canossa. On this distant shore sometimes, when we make ourselves not unduly sensitive, and watch all that passes in cities, the air is chill. Let the schools never be made sectarian. Let the school fund not be divided. Let there be no State Church. But give us two State chaplains, and pay each out of the State fund, and soon we shall have a demand for two State schoolmasters to be paid out of the State fund. After that precedent, there will be a clamour for State eleemosynary institutions. Will not the pauper as well as the criminal be better off under the direction of his own religious denomination? Will not the pupil improve faster when directed by a teacher of his own religious faith? We must face the whole question of the division of the school fund if we are to face that of the division of the criminal fund among chaplains of various faiths in penal institutions. It is perfectly futile to affirm that there is no line to be drawn, because at the moment you cannot put your finger down, and say precisely where the line ought to be drawn. Somewhere between the thin end of the papal American wedge and the thick, or Maximilian end, the line ought to be drawn, and will be drawn. My impression is, that we never shall divide the school fund.

THE TRINITY A PRACTICAL TRUTH.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE REV. JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE'S CRITICISMS.

"Adfirmabant autem, hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo, quasi Deo, dicere secum invicem, seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent."—PLINY, *Epistles*, Lib. x. Ep. 97.

"*Quid verò sentis de iis hominibus, qui Christum non invocant, nec adorandum censent:* Resp. *Prorsùs non esse Christianos sentio, cum Christum non habeant.* Et licet verbis id negare non audeant, reipsâ negant tamen."—RACOVIAN CATECHISM, Ques. 246.

Charles Kingsley, poet and philanthropist, friend of the working man, and chaplain to the Queen of the British Empire, a stalwart and intense soul, not easily cheated, wrote from St. Leonards in 1857: "My heart demands the Trinity as much as my reason. I want to be sure that God cares for us; that God is our Father; that God has interfered, stooped, sacrificed Himself for us. I do not merely want to love Christ,—*a* Christ, some creation or emanation of God's, whose will and character, for aught I know, may be different from God's. I want to love and honour the abysmal God Himself, and none other will satisfy me. No puzzling texts shall rob me of this rest for my heart, that Christ is the exact counterpart of Him in whom we live and move and have our being. I say boldly, if the doctrine of the Trinity be not in the Bible, it ought to be; for *the whole spiritual nature of man cries out for it.* Have you read Maurice's essay on the Trinity, in his theological essays, addressed to Unitarians? (See Maurice, F.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, Theological Essays, pp. 410-441.) If not, you must read it" (CHARLES KINGSLEY, *Letters and Memories of his Life*, 1877, Am. ed., p. 198). In 1865 Kingsley wrote to Maurice: "As to the Trinity, I do understand you. You first taught me that the doctrine was a live thing, and not a mere formula to be swallowed by the undigesting reason; and from the time that I learnt from you that a Father meant a real Father, a Son a real Son, a Holy Spirit a real Spirit, who was really good and holy, *I have been able to draw all sorts of practical lessons from it in the pulpit, and ground all my morality and a great deal of my natural philosophy upon it, and shall do so more*" (*Ibid.*, p. 357).

In 1875 Charles Kingsley, having bidden adieu to Westminster Abbey and Windsor Castle, lay dying; and, with the breath of eternity on his cheeks, the central thought of this modern man was that "only in faith and love to the incarnate God our Saviour, can the cleverest, as well as the simplest, find the peace of God, which passes understanding." "In this faith," says his wife, "he had lived,—and as he had lived, so he died,—humble, confident, unbewildered." In the night he was heard murmuring, "No more fighting; no more fighting." Then followed intense earnest prayers, which were his habit when alone. His warfare was accomplished; he had fought the good fight; and, on one of his last nights on earth, his daughter heard him exclaim, "How beautiful God is!" The last morning, at

five o'clock, just after his eldest daughter and his physician, who had sat up all night, had left him, and he thought himself alone, he was heard, in a clear voice, repeating the Burial Service : "Thou knowest, O Lord, the secrets of our hearts ; shut not Thy merciful ears to our prayer, but spare us, O Lord most holy, O God most mighty, O holy, merciful Saviour, Thou most worthy Judge Eternal, suffer us not, at our last hour, from any pains of death, to fall from Thee." He turned on his side after this, and never spoke again (*Ibid.*, pp. 481, 482).

This modern martyr, who passed hence at the age of fifty-five, died as martyrs have died ever since the apostolic age ; and I ask you to gaze with proper awe upon this recently unveiled holy of holies, of a brave, late, and adequately cultured life, as a vivid type of what has been happening in the world for eighteen centuries. If you have historic sense, or any other kind of sense, you will not be easily persuaded that teaching which has survived the buffetings of eighteen hundred years, and has been to such crowned multitudes of the acutest and saintliest of the race a source of strength in life, and of peace in death, has behind it only philosophical speculation, metaphysical nicety, cold analysis, scholarly precision, without practical application. I affirm in the name of all accredited history—

1. That the doctrine of the Trinity has always been held by Orthodoxy for its practical value.

2. That it was the doctrine of the Trinity which excluded from power, in human cultured beliefs, the thought of God as fate, and brought in the organizing and redemptive idea of God's fatherhood, and especially of the possibility of the communion of men with God as personal.

The scholarship of the Roman Empire shook off its belief in the fatalism of Paganism by learning the doctrine of the Trinity. Incontrovertibly, the divine aroma of communion with God, as personal, was breathed into history from the lips of that philosophy which speaks of God under a Triune name. Historically, this teaching has borne these fruits ; and the law of the survival of the fittest makes me, for one, reverent toward a proposition which, in so many ages, in so many moods of the world's culture, in such different circumstances of individual growth, has exhibited a power ever fresh, and has yet been the same from the time when the apostolic benediction was pronounced in the Triune name to the last anthem that rolled around the world in that same name. (See Huntingdon, Bishop, "Christian Believing and Living," pp. 359-361.) With the goodly company of the prophets and the apostles ; with the martyrs of the earliest Christian ages ; with the earlier and the later Fathers ; with the strong scholars who, differing on much else, are on this truth essentially and persistently at one ; with the Continental and English reformers, and the Anglican and Puritan and American divines ; with Athanasius and Tholuck ; with Fenélon and Knox ; with Augustine and Anselm ; with Calvin and Wesley ; with Luther and Bossuet ; with Bull and Baxter, Horsley and Howe, Pearson, Newman, Pascal, Cudworth, Wolf, Butler, Tauler and Hopkins, Waterland, Edwards, Sherlock and Dwight, Park and Neander ; with Nice, Trent, Augsburg, Westminster,

Edinburgh, Leipzig, Berlin, Princeton, New Haven, and Andover, shall not Boston say, Let the anthem roll on?

It is amazing to me that any one can have considered my definition of the Trinity as Unitarian. A man whom I honour, and whose candour every one honours, is reported ("Daily Advertiser," March 26, outline of the Rev. James Freeman Clarke's discourse, March 25) to have said publicly, that the view presented here two weeks ago is "almost identical" with his own; and is such as "any Unitarian may readily receive." I am very glad if it is; but, as I understand Mr. Clarke's view, the one presented here and his differ by celestial diameters. What is the definition which this Lectureship has presented?

1. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one and only one God.
2. Each has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.
3. Neither is God without the others.
4. Each with the others is God.

On the street in this city I met, a few days ago, a scholar whom I suppose to be the best authority in America in early ecclesiastical history. Before I had introduced the topic at all, he said to me, with much emphasis, "I have documentary evidence in my possession to prove that your doctrine of the Trinity is the view held in the first four centuries." Two days ago, on the street, I met a theologian whose knowledge of the relations of Christian truth to philosophy seems to me to be unequalled in this country. He said to me, without any introduction of the topic on my part, "That definition of the Trinity which you have given will stand." He made this affirmation twice or thrice; and, in order to be sure that he had really paid attention enough to this poor Lectureship to know what the definition was, I recited the four propositions; and again he said in effect, "The storm in the past has been borne by that definition, or its equivalent, and you will find that the storm of the future will be."

But, gentlemen, it is not by authority that I desire to buttress up any definition. *It is not a definition that I wish to give, but a life.* In the hushed atmosphere of religious science, we invite hither no breath of the unsanctified north wind which has too often blighted Eastern Massachusetts on holy themes. Let a fascinating devoutness lock hands with a fascinating clearness, or no discussion can transmute truth into life. Let luminousness of thought and the whole clustered growth of the divine emotions twine around our lives, as the vines wreathed themselves around the caduceus of Mercury of old; and even then we shall not be ready to study religious science, unless we have, as Mercury had, on feet and shoulders, the wings of the Spirit to enable us to fly whithersoever the Spirit calls.

There are seven tests which any definition of the Trinity must meet. It must not be modalistic nor unintelligible; it must not be tritheistic nor Unitarian; it must not be a contradiction in terms nor unhistorical; and, above all, it must not be unscriptural.

I. The definition given here is not *modalistic;* that is, it does not represent God as simply three manifestations, nor yet as three modes

of being, considered merely as modes. How can it be proved that the definition is not modalistic?

1. It teaches that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.

2. It asserts that each subsistence, with the others, is God; and that neither, without the others, is God.

3. Therefore it asserts in strict terms the Deity of our Lord. Does Mr. Clarke assert that? I hope he does.

4. What is said of Christ in this definition can be said of no human being.

If Socrates had never existed, God would yet be God.

But, if the Holy Spirit had never existed, God would not be God.

If Christ had never existed, God would not be God.

If the Father had never existed, God would not be God.

So, too, Socrates, with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God.

But Christ, with the other two subsistences, is God.

Is it thought that according to this definition God was in Socrates, and in Moses, and in Plato, and in every great, devout soul; and that therefore there is a sense in which divinity or deity may be attributed to these loftiest of the human sort? Mr. Clarke, I have been told, thinks all that is in my definition. I do not see that there; for, according to this definition, Socrates with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God. Let us perfectly understand ourselves here, once for all. Is Socrates, with any two subsistences which we suppose exist in the Trinity, God? If so, you may say that, according to this definition, as God was in Christ, so he was in Socrates. But in the name of clear thought you will never say that, for Christ with the other two subsistences is here affirmed to be God; and each of the subsistences with the others is God; but no human spirit has such qualities that you may make concerning it assertions parallel to these.

5. What is affirmed of Christ in the definition can be said of no created being, however high in rank.

If the highest of the archangels had never existed, God would yet be God.

But, if either of the three subsistences in the Trinity had never existed, God would not be God; for, according to this definition, neither subsistence is God without the others.

So, too, the highest of the archangels with the Father and Son, or with the Son and Holy Spirit, or with the Father and Holy Spirit, is not God.

But Christ, with the other two subsistences, is God.

It is therefore futile to charge this definition with being modalistic. There is no clearness of thought on any theme, if it be not clear that our Lord, according to this definition, displayed a degree of being that was deific. How can a man who holds that definition be charged with holding that Socrates and Isaiah and Plato are to be named in the same list with our Lord? Is it not unspeakably shocking, merely

to the historic, to say nothing of the religious, sense of man; is it not a silly disloyalty to all the incontrovertible facts which reveal Christ's present influence in the world, to run up, in the light style of literary æsthetics, a list from Socrates to Christ, and so on, until, when the vexed catalogue of merely human beings becomes confessedly rather unimportant, you read in the discussions of some that the future is to be drawn on? "We have not quite equalled Him who spake as never man spoke; but we shall! Better things are coming!" How shocking that is to sobriety of all kinds, intellectual and emotional! Historic, to say nothing of religious devoutness, stands aghast at any such contravention of the straightforward reasoning of Napoleon at St. Helena. *Admit, however, as the scientific method requires you to do, that Christ was so exceptional a soul that God was in Him in a thoroughly exceptional manner; admit with Rousseau that He lived a sinless life; admit with the most scholarly of modern infidels, that God was in Him in such a sense as He never was in any other created being: admit this, and you have conceded enough to prove that you logically ought to regard this exceptionally holy and wise Being as veracious; and therefore that you, in consistency with your own admissions, ought to accept Christ's testimony concerning Himself. Take that, as re-enforced by the testimony of the ages to His work in the world, and perhaps you will not be at a loss for reasons for changing your word "divinity" into "deity," if you are logical.* Leibnitz said that those who deny the Deity of our Lord, and yet pray to Him, may be good men, but that surely they are not good logicians.

II. The definition is not *unintelligible*, for the incommunicable peculiarity is defined by several very distinct traits.

Ages of close discussion lie behind the assertions I am making, and you will not think it the temerity of extemporaneous speech for me to recite these propositions rapidly. The ages of discussion make it necessary that I should be cautious; they make it unnecessary that I should be prolix.

1. The peculiarity of each subsistence is incommunicable.

2. It is such that neither subsistence taken alone, wholly without the other subsistence, is God,

3. It is such that each subsistence is of the same dignity as the others.

4. It is such that each subsistence is of the same substance with the others.

5. It is such that the chief office of one subsistence is best expressed by the words Creator and Father; of a second subsistence, by the words Redeemer and Son; and of a third, by the words Sanctifier and Comforter.

6. It is such that each subsistence, with the others, is God.

Beyond these six traits, it is neither necessary nor possible to define the subsistences.

Will you explain to me everything in connection of mind and matter? Will you so illustrate the structure of the human spirit, that there shall be no mystery hanging over the border-land between

the immaterial and the material? Can you in philosophy obviate all the difficulties arising from the limitations of the human faculties? Read your Mansel, your Hamilton, your Kant, and your Lotze, on the relations of attribute to substance. Can substance exist aside from attribute? Has any one a perfectly distinct idea of what substance is, wholly apart from its attributes? Until you get rid of all mystery in the fields of thought purely philosophical, do not say, when we come to realms of existence immeasurably higher above our own than the noon is above the brightness of the transient gleam of the firefly in the summer's meadow, that we shall not find some things inexplicable to our present capacities! If God were perfectly explicable to a finite being, He would not be God.

Merely on account of any mystery left in this portion of the doctrine of the Trinity after these six specifications have been made, you cannot reject a truth which stands here to-day guaranteed by eighteen centuries of good fruits. We know some things, although we do not know all things, about the character of the subsistences. Nobody ever pretended to know all the facts about either of them. Moses Stuart used to refuse with emphasis all appeals to him to define the words "person," "distinction," "subsistence." He held the doctrine of the Trinity most emphatically; but, beyond the truths now enumerated, it is unscriptural, and it is clearly unphilosophical, for a man to pretend to be wise above the range of the human faculties.

What is the difference between a mystery and a contradiction? A mystery is something of which we know *that* it is, although we do not know *how* it is. A self-contradiction is the inconsistency of a proposition with itself or with its own implications. If there is in the doctrine of the Trinity a self-contradiction, we must throw its propositions overboard in the name of learning and of clear thought. But, if there be in it only a mystery, that may be no objection; for a mystery is merely something of which we know *that* it is, although we do not know *how* it is. I know *that* the grass grows, I do not know *how* it grows. I know *that* my will lifts my arm, I do not know *how* it does this. There is mystery in each of these cases; but the mystery does not hinder my believing the facts, although I do not know how they are to be explained. Mystery belongs to physical almost more than to religious truth. We should expect it to appear oftener in religious science than in physical, as the topics of the former are incalculably vaster and more complex than those of the latter; and yet it is a question whether your Tyndalls and your Huxleys do not call on you to believe more mysteries than your Butlers, your Edwardses, and your Channings.

III. The definition is not *tritheistic;* for,

1. It asserts that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one, and only one, God.

2. It denies that either, taken wholly without the others, is God.

Therefore, according to this definition, there are not three Gods. The definition does not in terms assert, but it does imply, that there are not in God three wills, three sets of affections, three consciences, three intellects. According to the Scriptures, are there not in God

such subsistences, that when it is said that the Father sends the Son, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, *some portion of the action involved in these events may not be common to all the three subsistences?* I think so. If you will be careful in your phraseology, and not say that there are literally three wills, three sets of affections, three intellects,—if you will simply say that some portion of the action involved in the sending of the Son, or in the shedding forth of the Holy Spirit, may not be common to all the three subsistences,—you will be asserting only what is affirmed in the second proposition of this definition; namely, that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others.

But I will resist, in the name of the mass of scholarship for the last fifteen hundred years, the proposition that there are in God three persons in a strict, colloquial, literal, modern, English, American, Boston sense. Why do I resist that? Because the word person, in our colloquial speech, implies a species. What is a species? When you say a man is a person, you imply that he belongs to a class of beings called men. If you say there are three *persons* in God, and mean by that word just what you mean by it on the street and in the parlour, you assume that these persons are individuals in a species; and my reply is that there is no species of Gods outside of polytheism. There is nothing of the sort known to either scriptural or scientific truth. No doubt Orthodoxy has often been careless in her phrases. Under the rubric of *idle words* many a stupid and many an incautious expression used in religious and philosophical discussion will, no doubt, be judged at the last day. But it is not stupidity, it is not incautiousness, which causes Orthodoxy to use the word person sometimes. She is always speaking Latin when she uses that word intelligently. She employs it as a technical term, because it has been in the creeds of the Church fifteen hundred years. Adopted in the days of the poverty of the Latin language, it has come down to the days of the richness of the English tongue. Calvin himself said he would be willing that the word person should be dropped for ever out of the discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity, if only the truth could be retained that there are in God three distinctions, each with a peculiarity or a property incommunicable to the others, and each, with the others, God. For three hundred years the definition I have been putting before you, or its equivalent, has been generally regarded as the standard. But, if by persons you understand individuals, you must admit that you cannot make three persons, John, William, and James, one. There is a sense in which each individual, which we describe by the word person in its ordinary sense, is incommunicable, as a whole, to any other individual. This idea of personality, as the word is understood on the street and in the parlour, does not belong to the idea of the three subsistences in the Trinity. Scholarship has always taught that God is one, and has never taught that William and John and James are one. God is one essence or substance. Three persons, in the usual sense of the word, are not of one substance. It is the immemorial teaching of religious science, that we must not divide the substance of God; and we do this whenever we say

that there are in God three persons in the literal, modern, colloquial sense of that word. When the popular is substituted for the technical meaning of this term, men who have little time for thought on the subject are confused, and led to suppose that you are teaching self-contradictions, or that God is three, and that He is only one, and that He is one in the same sense in which He is three. Here in Eastern Massachusetts, on the battle-fields of Unitarianism and Trinitarianism, it is high time that this misapprehension should cease to have any excuse for itself in the carelessness of the phrases used in Orthodox quarters. Say three subsistences ; three distinctions, each with a peculiarity incommunicable to the others ; but not three wills, not three sets of affections, not three intellects. Such, however, is the force of the proposition that each subsistence has a peculiarity incommunicable to the others, that I am not unwilling to affirm that in the whole range of activities involved in God's connection with men there are influences which are not common to all the subsistences. This is Biblical truth ; and this truth is in this definition, which, therefore, as scholars will allow me to say, avoids Patripassianism as well as Modalism.

There are four expressions that can be used,—" All the attributes ;" " Some of the attributes ; " " Property ; " " Peculiarity." Some men say, " All the attributes of one subsistence may be, for aught we know, different from those belonging to either of the other subsistences." Others say, " Some attributes differ." Yet others affirm, " Properties differ." But the word which has been used here is " peculiarity." Why do I adopt that word ? Because, if I use " property," instantly arise all the celebrated forms of speculation about the connection of " substance " and " property," and you may find yourselves befogged by merely philosophical difficulties. " All attributes," " some attributes," " property," " peculiarity,"—that last is the word employed in the definition used here, and the word which I believe will bear not only the microscope and the scalpel of philosophy, but the blaze of the infinity of Biblical truth.

Have there not been teachers who have held that there are three wills in God ? Yes. Have there not been in New England intelligent Christians who have worshipped three beings in imagination, although in their thoughts they have asserted that God is one ? I fear there have been, and that there are yet. Is this, however, the standard doctrine of Christianity, or the more general teaching of the Church ? By no means. Is that divided mood which you find among some, of looking into Judæa for our Lord, and into heaven for the Father, and into the space between the earth and heaven for the vague somewhat which we call the Holy Spirit, Biblical ? Not as I read the Scriptures. Are we to regard those as well-educated Christians, who, in thoughts of God, are constantly thinking of our Lord as if He were at this hour in Gethsemane, or on the Mount of Olives, or walking on the shore of Galilee ; and of the Father as among the constellations ; and of the Holy Spirit as shed down on us from the infinite spaces ; three wills, three intellects, three sets of affections ? You may regard such Christians tenderly ; but, for one,

I regard them tenderly enough to wish that they might be both more Biblical and more scientific. Notice the mood of this audience, which is made up of men in whose presence I speak with bated breath, and which has assembled in a city that has heard, I suppose, more on this theme than any other one city on the globe, except old Rome or Alexandria. It is not pleasant to me to dwell on topics that require us to walk over embers hardly cold; but I belong to a generation that had nothing to do with the discussions that divided God's house in Eastern Massachusetts. The time has come for antagonistic beliefs to attend to each other's definitions, and not to each other's defamations. Seriousness in speech or print usually spends its time more profitably than in gymnastic boxing. Shall we not in the transfigured mood of Boston at this hour call ourselves into God's presence, as He was visible to Stephen, and to Paul, and to John, not on the Mount of Olives, not on the shore of Galilee, but at the right hand of the Father? Let us grasp the transfiguring Biblical certainty that the influences of the Holy Spirit are Christ's continued life. You will not understand me to deny for an instant that our Lord's earthly life and sufferings are a better revelation to us of God's moral attributes than external nature is or can be. Christ is the rainbow, or unravelled light, and the Father is the white light; and *we must look on the seven colours if we would know what is always in the white beam.* Thus our Lord's life and sufferings on earth are to be constantly before us as a picture of the Divine Nature. But the influences of the Holy Spirit are a present Christ, and God is not three, but one. Our Lord Himself is now in heaven and here; and, though we look to Judæa for one part of His life, we must beware how we look there, as Stephen and Paul did not, for the whole of it or for Him. Though the rainbow has ceased to appear, it has not ceased to exist; it has been taken back into the bosom of the general radiance, and yet falls on the earth. *Wherever white light falls the rainbow falls potentially.* The luminousness, the colour, and the heat, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, three subsistences in one substance, all enswathe us here and now, and make the present hour sacred as the beginning of days; for there is but one God, who was, and is, and is to come.

Mr. Clarke is reported as saying that, "if God is seen and shown in Christ as He is seen and shown in Nature, there is no reason for considering one as more divine than the other. God is *in* Christ, and we may worship God as shown to us in Christ. But so is God also *in* Nature, and we may worship God as shown to us in Nature. God is in Christ, and God is in Nature; but that does not make Nature or Christ God, but only manifestations of Him."

Here are two meanings in the one word "nature," a term that has behind it the most mischievous ambiguity, and is perhaps the least innocent bewildering fog in the whole range of philosophical discussion. By nature, what do you mean? The sun and the moon? Of course we do not worship these; we are not Persians. But if by nature you mean that Power of Intelligence and Choice which is behind all natural law, we do worship the God revealed by the Oldest

Testament, or the Nature of Things. But this we understand to be the very God revealed by the New Testament and the Newest. "All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made that is made." "He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." These are words written rather earlier than the year 325 ; and you say (see CLARKE, *Orthodoxy*, p. 508) that there was no doctrine of the Trinity until after this date.

Is it affirmed that we must worship God in conscience? What do you mean by conscience? The human part of the intuitive moral sense, or that divine Somewhat or Some One who is revealed by the moral law, and is in us, but not of us? If you mean the latter, we do, in the name of every text in the Oldest and the Old, the Newest and the New Testament, worship it as "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." But of that light we read that in the beginning it was with God, and was God.

To worship God as in all natural law is not to set natural law above God. What is natural law? The method of action of God's will. Can God's will be above God's will? Even your Maurice says that the Greek from the Thessalian hill heard the voice of God, but mistook it for that of Fate. The old polytheists made Necessity the highest God. Undoubtedly, fixed law is, from one point of view, a revelation of the highest force in the universe; and it becomes us, as stern cultivators of science, to reverence this quite measurelessly important fact. But what the Old Greek at Delphi regarded as fate, we have come to regard as the unchanging, because perfectly holy and wise, choice of Almighty God. It must be that an infinite Being knows what the one best way is in which to manage the universe, and that He will choose and adhere to that way. There can be but one best way to manage the universe. If that self-evident truth is not a part of the nature of things, what is? The Oldest Testament is fearfully orthodox. We know that there can be but one best way, for best is a superlative word, and admits no comparison; and that this one best way Omnipotence and Omniscience will choose and adhere to. Therefore, in the eternities and infinities governed by a perfect Will, there will appear to be fate; but there will be there in reality only the completely wise and holy, and therefore unchanging, choice of Almighty God. Your Oldest Testament says the nature of things is without variableness or shadow of turning. But when your New and your Newest Testament speak of the Father of Lights, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift, they affirm also that, although He is Father, He is without variableness or shadow of turning. We worship one God, but a God free and above all things—except what? The requirements of His own perfections. Theodore Parker used to stand on a platform not five hundred feet from this, and say God cannot make two and two one thousand. Such is God, that He cannot choose to do what ought not to be done. He cannot deny Himself. A moral impossibility inheres in the nature of a Perfect Being. The cans and cannots of all science spring out of the impossibilities existing in a Perfect Nature.

Mr. Clarke says that "Christianity teaches not the sovereignty of

the nature of things, but the sovereignty of the Divine love;" and another liberal critic has affirmed, that, if God be such a Being as the New Testament represents Him to be, He will make short work with the nature of things. What astounding confusion of thought is this, and what misunderstanding of the Oldest Testament and the Old, the Newest and the New! God make short work with the nature of things! What is the nature of things? By definition it is the total outcome of the Divine perfections. God make short work with His own infinite justice and holiness, His own intellectual excellence, and with all that is implied in the infinitude of the Divine nature! What we call the nature of things is but another name for all the requirements of the Divine free choice; and is an infinitely perfect Being to make short work of that? God Himself making short work with the nature of things? God a suicide? These phrases mean the same thing. *It will be of importance for you and me to have no war with the nature of things until the day when God ceases to be God.*

IV. The definition is in no sense *Unitarian;* for,

1. It asserts the Deity of our Lord. There is no form of Unitarianism which asserts this.

2. We have seen that what is said of Christ in the definition can be said of no created being.

V. It is not a *contradiction in terms;* for it does not assert that God is one in the same sense in which He is three, nor three in the same sense in which He is one.

VI. It is not *unhistorical;* for it presents a view of the Trinity consistent with all the greatest symbols in use in the Church for fifteen hundred years.

VII. It is not *unscriptural.* In the celebrated discussions between Unitarianism and Trinitarianism in Eastern Massachusetts, the proof-texts of the Deity of our Lord adduced by Moses Stuart in his letters to Channing have never been answered. Andrews Norton made many philosophical objections to the Trinity, which do not apply at all to the best definition of it. No one has ever shown that the Scriptural passages Moses Stuart adduced do not have the meaning he attributed to them. (SEE STUART, PROFESSOR, *Letters to Channing.*)

We are assured by the scientific method, that in no page of that portion of the volume of the universe which is open to us, is there any light we can spare. Science and practical life alike require that we should be loyal to all the facts within our view. It is incontrovertible, that, when we look into all our light, *a* Trinity is within view. Contemplated closely, *a* Trinity is found to be *the* Trinity. External Nature, History, and Conscience reveal God as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and yet as one. Therefore, we open all the windows of the outer and inner azure by the truth of the Trinity of the Divine Nature. This is the historic force which changed the sky of brass and iron, which bent above the Thessalian hill, into soft azure, all soul and not sky. The inaccessible heaven which stood above Olympus comes near now, and enswathes all the round worlds in its bosom.

But some would build negations above our heads into an obstructing dome, and confine us to a fragmentary view of the Divine Nature. There are two kinds of Unitarianism. One looks through but a single window vividly, and sees from it well only God the Father. In this view there is a simplicity which is pleasing to many. For a time it may be a devout view, especially in modern days with full Christianity behind them and pouring through them, and in these yet early New England years, with Plymouth Rock and all the generations since our fathers landed, to give moods of devoutness to the generation now passing off the stage. There are wants of life, however, which no one quarter of the sky taken alone can meet. History teaches that in the growth of the flowers which blossom against that one window, there is apt to be, in the third or fourth generation, a want of vigour, and a subtle loss of plainly celestial aromas. But there is another and wider belief in the Divine Unity, a Window that has the sun all the day. Sweep off the whole dome, and you open God's Window; behold Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as one undivided heaven of equal height at every point of its pulsating, fathomless azure, whose light and colour and heat, although three subsistences, are one substance, and you have God's Unitarianism.

[After a doxology had been rendered by the organ, the audience rose, and Mr. Cook said,] A question has been put into my hands, which I will answer on the spot: "How do you reply to Mr. Clarke's objection that the 'peculiarity' of each 'subsistence' is either something imperfect, or something perfect? If the latter, then each 'subsistence' lacks a perfection; if the former, the consequence is obvious." The reply is, that the definition asserts that neither subsistence taken alone is God. Each subsistence taken by itself, and wholly without the others, is imperfect in that sense. The three taken together are God; and to the idea of Unity thus defined such an objection is not applicable at all.

III.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

MESSRS. MOODY AND SANKEY IN BOSTON.

In the city of Edinburgh the American evangelists who are now in Boston never had a hall that would seat over fifteen hundred. They reached the Scottish metropolis November 22, 1873, and left it January 21, 1874. They have now been here as long as they were in Edinburgh. It will always be incontrovertible, that a structure which holds from six thousand to seven thousand people has been opened in Boston for religious audiences, and that week after week for two months, on every fair day, and often twice or thrice a day, when an undiluted Christianity has been proclaimed there, this Boston building has been filled to copious overflowing. *What other cause would have filled it as often and as long?* This is the large question which Edinburgh and London, Chicago and San Francisco, will ask. As a help to an interior view of Massachusetts and its capital, it is not improper for me to state, what the evangelists themselves could not perhaps with propriety say publicly, that their opinion is that in Boston the average result of their work has been better than it was in Edinburgh. Both the evangelists have expressed, with detailed reasons and emphasis, that opinion to me; and neither of them has asked me to state the opinion publicly.

Harvard and Yale each strenuously opposed George Whitefield, and each now regrets its opposition. Did you notice that the revered president of Boston University was reported as having silenced a group of critics at the obsolescent Chestnut-street club the other day, by an invulnerable indorsement of the general character of the religious work now being performed in this city? This indorsement came from a scholar of whom it can be said, as I think it cannot be of any other New England president of a college, that before he finished his yet recent German studies he had written in German an elaborate work on religious science, abreast of the latest thought. Boston University, led by this incomparable scholar of the freshest and severest German training, is as cordial toward the American evangelists as the great University of Edinburgh was. When Phillips Brooks appears in the Tabernacle, the culture of Boston and the students of Harvard are there. Of course Harvard University differs from Edinburgh University in its religious attitude; and for that fact there are reasons, prolonged, historic, adequate, but, thank God, of waning force! When James VI. was sixteen years of age, in 1582, Edinburgh University was founded; and it was fed from the Scottish Universities of St. Andrew's and Glasgow, which began their stalwart career before America was discovered. University life in Scotland had venerableness when Harvard was yet in the gristle. It has had a longer time than Harvard in which to judge creeds by the law of the survival of the fittest. It is wiser, therefore; but Harvard one day will be wise under that law.

Are there any points of superiority in this religious awakening to that which occurred in Boston in the days of Whitefield? It must be admitted that there

are some points of inferiority, but are there any of superiority? We are a larger and more heterogeneous community now than we were then; we are fuller of commercial activity; our heads are in newspapers and ledgers, and not as the heads and hearts of the early New England fathers were in the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless it was a temporarily demoralized community which Whitefield and Edwards addressed. A practical union of Church and State had so secularized religious society, that it had sunk farther away from Scriptural and scientific ideals than such society in New England has since done. We all hold now that the ministry ought to be made up of converted men, and that no one should become a member of the church unless he can give credible evidence of having entered upon a religious life. But in Whitefield's day it was necessary for him to insist upon what is now a commonplace truth, that conversion should precede entrance upon the ministry and church-membership. In Edwards's day, many circles of the New England population had forgotten the necessity of the new birth, or did not believe that it is an ascertainable change; and so there was a hush in the revival when Whitefield was here, a sense of sin which ought to exist now, but which probably does not for a great variety of reasons, not all of them to be classed as proofs of the shallowness of the present effort. Would that we had such loyalty to the scientific method, as to have an adequate sense of our dissonance with the nature of things! It were good for us and for America if we had in Boston to-day just that far-penetrating gaze which filled the eyes of New England one hundred years ago, as Whitefield and Edwards turned our fathers' countenances toward the Unseen Holy!

In one particular, however, this revival certainly surpasses that under Whitefield in this city in 1740; namely, in the extent to which types have been consecrated to the work of sending religious truths abroad through the newspaper press. All the leading and all the respectable newspapers of Boston had favoured the revival. It is well, my friends, that you should give encouragement to the hardest-worked class in your community, the reporters. Not only day and night, but day inside of day, and night inside of night, making two hours out of every one, these men are obliged to follow with lightning speed the demands of the press for copy—of what? Of the dullest of all things on earth to report,—sermons. English, German, and French travellers say very suggestively, that the characteristic of American newspaper management, as distinguished from European, is that we are willing to print sermons copiously on Monday mornings. No doubt it pays to publish such discourses; but I am not one of those who think that the critics are right who judge acutely that Mr. Sankey's chief motive in life is to sell a great number of his song-books and organs. Neither am I of the opinion that all the space the daily newspaper press gives to religious truth is the result of a whisper from the counting-room. Let us be just to the corporations that manage our newspapers, and not accuse them of being altogether mercenary. No doubt counting-rooms are sometimes hung around the necks of editors, as mill-stones around the necks of babes in the waves; and it takes a giant like Horace Greeley to be at once a reformer and an editor. It is easier for the platform than for the press to speak for to-morrow against the opinion of to-day. The best part of our press, however, not only mirrors but leads public sentiment, and speaks for to-morrow against the rivalry of the poorer part of both platform and press, which speak only for to-day. *Encourage all speakers for to-morrow.*

In the next place, it deserves to be mentioned, that religious visitation from house to house, and especially among the perishing and degraded, is now going forward in a hopefully thorough manner in Boston. Gentlemen, I hold

in my hands a statement communicated to me officially; and I am able to assure you that two thousand persons are now devoting a large part of their time in this city to religious visitation among the poor. The list of streets and lanes given to these workers was made out by Sampson and Davenport, the publishers of the city Directory. In no other population has there been a more effective arrangement for visitation than here. God be thanked that every lane is to be seen, and that superfluity and squalor are to look into each other's eyes! Of one hundred and ten evangelical churches in this city, ninety have already signified their intention to co-operate in this work. Each pastor of these ninety churches has appointed gentlemen to oversee the work undertaken by his particular church; for instance, on Beacon Hill, in the Mount Vernon Church, where our American evangelist heard the truth effectively for the first time from the lips of the now sainted Kirk, men like Nazro and Merriam are appointed on this business. Is there any one with head or heart shallow enough to sneer at such proceedings? You will sneer, then, at the best executive talent of Boston. There are seventy thousand families within the limits of Boston, and there have been workers appointed to cover sixty-five thousand of these families. In Boston I include Charlestown, East Boston, South Boston, Dorchester, Roxbury, and Brighton. We are to look on this work as performed by picked men and women. There is no quarter of this city so degraded by unreportable vice that it is not being visited by women; lineal descendants, no doubt, of those whom Tacitus says our German forefathers honoured as recipients of special illumination from heaven. The saloons are being visited, and the report now coming in is that the visitors are kindly received; and you will find every now and then a visitor saying, "There are in my district fifteen cases of interest, or persons seriously inquiring how they can get rid of vice, and enter upon a manly or womanly life; and I am to follow these cases up." Remember that this work of visitation is intended not merely for those who are outside of the circle of glad loyalty to religious truth, but for those who are nominally inside of that circle, and are yet inefficient. Nothing quickens a man like trying to quicken another. If there is one measure in which our American evangelist has shown his generalship more effectively than anywhere else, it is in setting men to work, and in so setting them to work as to set them on fire.

But, gentlemen, what are we to say of the prayer-meetings among business men, which have not yet attained their height, and yet are already visible at a distance? It is my privilege and joy to be a flying scout in New England. One morning last week I woke up to the sound of the swollen and impetuous Androscoggin, and in the course of the day passed through Portland, and Portsmouth, and Newburyport, and Salem, and Boston, and Worcester, and Springfield, to Hartford; and all along I had evidence by conversation, and by looking at the local papers, that these business-men's meetings in Boston are visible from the Androscoggin, and from the Connecticut. You have in this Temple a very interesting meeting, which was never matched for weight in Edinburgh. There are crowded prayer-meetings at high noon for men engaged in the dry-goods business, for men in the furniture trade, for men in the market, for men in the fish trade, for newspaper men, for all classes, indeed, of our throbbing, tumultuous, breathless, business community. This, if you will notice the fact, is Boston. When I stated on this platform a few weeks ago, that you would see Boston visited as you had seen other cities visited, you did not receive the affirmation with a smile of incredulity; but the public did. That poor prophecy has been fulfilled, and we have a month more for work.

If you please, the times are serious; and light sneers will do no good now,

and ought not to be noticed by me except in pity. It was my fortune professionally to walk down to a church near the Tabernacle yesterday morning, to give an Easter discourse. As I passed up the street, I met a deluge, not of rain, such as has diminished the audiences in the Tabernacle occasionally, (the month of March is a great enemy to large assemblies,) but a crowd of people, emerging, from I did not at first think where, until I remembered that the Tabernacle service had just closed. They covered acres, and came on in thousands, like the crowds of a gala-day. I noticed their faces ; for the best test of what has been done in a religious address, in any assembly, is to study the countenances of the audience as it disperses. If you see a softened, an ennobled, a "solar look," to use one of the phrases of Bronson Alcott [turning to Mr. Alcott, who sat at the speaker's right], one may be sure that religious truth has done good. I saw the solar look yesterday on the street, in hundreds and thousands of faces ; I saw it sometimes in the gaze of shop-girls, perhaps.

Yes, but high culture in Boston does not care much for shop-girls. Well, it is time it should. There is a low-bred, loaferish liberalism, uttering itself occasionally in sneers because the poor have the gospel preached to them. That sneer has been heard ever since the days of Celsus, and the games in the old Coliseum ; and it has a peculiarly reptilian ring. There are many kinds of liberalism. Christian liberalism I honour ; literary and æsthetic liberalism is to be spoken of with respect, in most cases ; but below what I have called a limp and lavender and unscientific liberalism, there is a low-bred and loaferish liberalism. This, in Boston, has impudence, but no scholarship ; rattles, but no fangs. In the great multitude, the solar look is the best prophecy that can be had for the American future. It is a radiance that is like the rising of the sun, to any man who is anxious about what is to come in America.

After noticing that look, and thanking God for it, I walked on, and happened to pass a lonely Boston corner, where the Paine Hall and the Parker Memorial Hall stand near each other, "*par nobile fratrum.*" On a bulletin on the Paine Hall, the street in front of which looked deserted, I read : "Children's Progressive Lyceum Entertainment this evening ;" "The Origin and Amusements of the Orthodox Hell ;" "Twenty-ninth Anniversary of Modern Spiritualism, *April* 1." Passing by the Parker Memorial Hall, where, no doubt, words of good sense have been uttered occasionally, I found in the window this statement : "To-night, a lecture on the Arctic Regions, with a stereopticon and seventy views."

Gentlemen, all over the world, the equivalent of the scene I saw on that Easter morn may be looked upon almost everywhere within the whole domain of Christendom. Infidelity in Germany is no stronger than it is in Boston. Out of the thirty universities of that most learned land of the globe, only one is called rationalistic to-day.

When the sun stands above Bunker Hill at noon, it has just set on the Parthenon, and is rising on the volcanoes of the Sandwich Isles. As Easter Day passed about the globe, the contrasted scenes which the sun saw here—a multitude fed with God's word, and a few erratics striving to solace themselves without God—were not unlike the scenes which the resplendent orb looked down upon in the whole range of civilization. In two hundred languages of the world, the Scriptures were read yesterday ; in two hundred languages of the world, hymns were lifted to the Triune Name yesterday ; in two hundred languages of the world, the gospel was preached to the poor yesterday.

What is our impecunious scepticism doing here? Has it ever printed a book that has commanded permanent intellectual respect? Theodore Parker's collected works never went into a second edition. I do not know of a single

infidel book over a hundred years old that has not been put on the upper neglected shelf by scholars. Boston must compare her achievements with those of cities outside of America, and take her chances under the buffetings of time. Where is there in Boston anything in the shape of scepticism that will bear the microscope? For one, I solemnly aver that I do not know where, and I have nothing else to do but search. Theodore Parker is the best sceptic you ever had; but, to me, he is honeycombed through and through with disloyalty to the very nature of things,—his supreme authority. It was asserted not long ago, in an obscure sceptical newspaper here, that Parker's works ought to be forced into a second edition by his friends. It was admitted that there was no demand for a second edition; but it was thought, that, if now there was an effort made strategetically, one might be put upon the market. You have no better books than these, and there has been no marked demand in Boston for these; and the attentive portion of the world knows the facts. Why am I proclaiming this? Because, outside of Boston, it is often carelessly supposed that the facts are the reverse, and that this city is represented only by a few people, who, deficient in religious activity, and forgetting the law of the survival of the fittest, are distinguished far more by audacity than by scholarship, and are members of a long line in history, of which Gallio stood at the head.

Let me mention as a fourth prominent trait in this revival, the great effort made for temperance. We have done more in that particular than was done in Whitefield's day; for in his time men were not awake on that theme. It is a good sign to see the Church and secular effort join hands. It is a good sign when our American evangelist himself can say, as he said yesterday, "I have been a professing Christian twenty-two years, and I have been in Boston and other cities for most of that time; and I never saw such a day as this is. I stand in wonder and amazement at what is being done. It seems as if God were taking this work out of our hands. Prayer-meetings are springing up in all parts of the city. If you were asked two months ago if these things were possible, you would have said, 'Yes, if God will open the windows of heaven, and do them.'"

Let us admit that we could all wish for greater blessings. Macaulay said, concerning literary excellence, that we were to measure success not by absolute, but by relative standards. Matching his own history against the seventh book of Thucydides, he was always humble; but, matching it against current productions, Macaulay felt encouraged. Matching this day in Boston against some things in Whitefield's day, matching it against the dateless noon of Pentecost, matching it against our opportunities, we are humble; we have no reason for elation; ours is a day of small things. But compare what has been done here by God's word and religious effort, with all that has been done since Boston was founded by the opponents of God's word, and we are encouraged.

Our opportunity in the second New England is greater than that of our fathers was in the first New England. Let us act as the memory of our fathers dictates. New England, the Mississippi Valley, the Pacific coast, Scotland, England, always know whether or not Boston does her duty. A power not of man is in this hushed air. Who will lock hands with Him whom we dare not name, and go forward to triumph in the cause that cares equally for the rich and the poor, and for to-day and to-morrow?

THE TRINITY, THE MARTYRS' FAITH

Cum ictibus ungularum concussa fortius latera sulcarentur profluensque sanguinis unda violentis tractibus emanaret, Proconsulem sibi dicentem audivit: Incipies sentire quæ vos pati oporteat. Et adjecit: ad gloriam. Gratias ago Deo regnorum. Apparet regnum æternum, regnum incorruptum. Domine Jesu Christe, Christiani sumus; Tibi servimus; Tu es spes nostra; Tu es spes Christianorum; Deus sanctissime; Deus altissime; Deus omnipotens."—RUINART, *Acta*, p. 340.

"Christianorum est etiam deum mortuum credere, et tamen viventum in ævo ævorum."—TERTULLIAN, *Adv. Marc.*, II, 16.

When the Christian martyr Pionius was asked by his judges, "What God dost thou worship?" he replied, "I worship Him who made the heavens, and who beautified them with stars, and who has enriched the earth with flowers and trees." "Dost thou mean," asked the magistrates, "Him who was crucified?" (*illum dicis qui crucifixus est.*) "Certainly," replied Pionius; "Him whom the Father sent for the salvation of the world." (RUINART, *Acta*, p. 125. See LIDDON'S *Bampton Lectures*, p. 409.) As Pionius died, so died Blandina and the whole host of those who, in the first three centuries, without knowing anything of the Nicene Creed, held it implicitly, if not explicitly, and proclaimed it in flames and in dungeons, in famine and in nakedness, under the rack and under the sword.

On the Ægean Sea, under the shadow of the Acropolis, there were undoubtedly sung yesterday, in the Greek cathedrals, words which were written in the second century:—

"Hail, gladdening Light, of His pure glory poured,
Who is the Immortal Father, heavenly, blest,
Holiest of Holies, Jesus Christ our Lord!
Now we are come to the sun's hour of rest,
The lights of evening around us shine;
We hymn the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit divine;
Worthiest art Thou at all times to be sung
With undefiled tongue,
Son of our God, Giver of life alone;
Therefore, in all the world, Thy glories, Lord, we own."

(See original in ROUTH'S *Reliquæ Sacræ*, iii., p. 515.)

This poem is yet a vesper hymn in the Greek Church, and St. Basil quotes it in the third century. It and the Gloria in Excelsis and the Ter Sanctus, which yesterday rolled around the world, were written in the second century, to pay absolutely divine honours to our Lord.

When I open the best book which unevangelical Christianity ever printed in Boston,—James Freeman Clarke's Truths and Errors about Orthodoxy—no! "Truths and Errors *of* Orthodoxy," but the first would have been a better title,—I read: "Down to the time of the Synod of Nice, Anno Domini 325, no doctrine of Trinity existed in the Church" (p. 508). Will that statement bear the microscope of historical science? If it will, I wish to believe it, and to reject everything inconsistent with it.

But I hold in my hands this Greek vesper-hymn and this Ter Sanctus and this Gloria in Excelsis, written in the second century. What do they mean? The dying words of martyrs for three centuries are all in harmony with the present faith of the Christian world.

Here is this statement of the Emperor Adrian, who, when writing to Servian, described the population of Alexandria as divided between the worship of Christ and the worship of Serapis: *Ab aliis Serapidem, ab aliis adorari Christum.* (*Apud* LAMPRID, in *Vita Alex. Severi.*)

About A.D. 165 Lucian says: "The Christians are still worshipping that great man who was crucified in Palestine" (*De Morte Perigrini*, c. 11).

Remember Pliny's explicit official letter to Trajan, affirming that cross-examination and torture had elicited from the martyrs only the statement that "they were accustomed to meet on a stated day, and sing a hymn to Christ as God," and to pledge themselves by a sacrament to abstain from evil of every kind (PLINY, *Ep.*, lib. x. *Ep.* 97). The Ter Sanctus and the Gloria in Excelsis show us what meaning to put upon Pliny's words, *Carmenque Christo, quasi Deo.*

Calvisianus said to the martyr Euplius, "Pay worship to Mars, Apollo, and Esculapius." Euplius replied, "I worship the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I adore the Holy Trinity, besides whom there is no God. Perish the gods who did not make heaven and earth, and all that is in them! I am a Christian" (RUINART, *Acta*, p. 362).

The followers of Artemon maintained that the doctrine of the Trinity was brought into the Church at a late day. A writer quoted by Eusebius observed in reply, that the psalms and the hymns of the brethren, which from the earliest days of Christianity had been written by the faithful, all celebrate Christ, the Word of God, proclaiming His Divinity (EUSEBIUS, *Hist. Eccl.*, v. 28).

Is it true, my friends, that there was no doctrine of the Triune Name before the year 325? Or, if you admit there was a Triune Name before that date, do you deny that these martyrs, who died with prayers to Christ as God, knew what they were about?

Follow up the unimpeached record, and you will find it beyond controversy that the first three centuries taught explicitly the doctrine of the Triune Name. Was that a practical truth?

To be analytical, in order that, if possible, I may be clear, let me say that I wish to show by detailed documentary evidence, that the ante-Nicene Christian literature proves that in the first three centuries the Church held the doctrine of the Trinity.

1. This literature copiously asserts that Christ possessed proper Deity.

2. It teaches copiously that believers are saved by the atonement made by our Lord.

3. It affirms abundantly that the Holy Spirit is a present Christ.

4. It everywhere proclaims that God, as three and one, is omnipresent in natural law.

5. These must be regarded as the most practical of all religious

truths, if judged by the work they have done. They were the inspiration of martyrs' lives, and the solace of martyrs' deaths.

6. These truths contain the doctrine of the Trinity implicitly, and the doctrine of the Trinity contains them implicitly and explicitly.

7. That doctrine, therefore, is the teaching of the first three Christian centuries.

Gentlemen, we are to-day to breathe the spring-time of Christianity. The sights and the sounds of that period may well move us, for they have conquered the world. We are to gaze upon an age which is renowned now, and is to be more and more renowned as the centuries roll on, as that of the Apostolic Fathers. I hold in my hand the first volume of a celebrated series of books (published by T. and T. Clark of Edinburgh), called the "Ante-Nicene Library;" that is, Christian documents existing before the Nicene Council was called together in 325. I am to read to you nothing upon which I have not put elaborate study; but that fact is not assurance that I am right. The world has boxed about these documents in close controversy for fifteen hundred years; and, if anything is known about history, it is known that the select passages I am to present to you are genuine records of the first three centuries. Do not think that I forget, although I cannot mention here in detail, how much is interpolated here, and spurious; but scholarship has been walking over this record until it has found every boggy spot in it; and I am to have you put your feet now only on a few stepping-stones which infidelity itself considers firm as adamant, so far as their historical genuineness is concerned.

There is a marvellous church of St. Clement, near the Coliseum, in Rome. You remember the words, "Rejoice always; and again I say, Rejoice" (Phil. iv. 4). In the verse preceding this, St. Paul mentions a certain Clement of Rome; and that Clement is supposed to be the author of this letter, which now in the year 1877, in Boston, you may hold in your hands, and which was sent from Rome to Corinth, by one church, to admonish another in a majestic age of the world. Clement, the author of this epistle, is known to have written it about the year 97. By common consent he is regarded as one of the pupils of St. Paul. This epistle Eusebius calls "great and admirable," and says that it was very often read in the churches before and during his day (EUSEBIUS, iii. 16).

Purposely I avoid following analytically the order of the propositions I am defending, but at hap-hazard almost I take passages out of this unspeakably electric record; and you shall judge whether or not all that my propositions assert is here implied.

"Content with the provision which God had made for you, and carefully attending to His words, ye were inwardly filled with His doctrine, and His sufferings [whose sufferings? God's sufferings] were before your eyes. Thus a profound and abundant peace was given to you all, and ye had an insatiable desire for doing good, while a full outpouring of the Holy Spirit was upon you all. Full of holy designs, ye did, with true earnestness of mind, and a godly confidence, stretch forth your hands to God Almighty, beseeching Him to be merciful unto you, if ye had been guilty of any involuntary transgression. Day and night ye were anxious for the whole brotherhood, that the number of God's elect might be saved with mercy and a good conscience" (p. 8).

How fresh is this breeze, as from spring hill-sides,—the bursting April of Christianity! It is written in the record of a day which dawned on the world eighteen hundred and forty-eight years ago yesterday (LEWES, *Fausti Scari*), that while it was yet dark Mary Magdalen came to the sepulchre, and the beloved disciple and Peter also; and that, although the beloved disciple outran his companion, Peter went first into the sepulchre. It was yet dark then; but is it not getting to be, in the history of the world, when this letter was written, gray brindled dawn? Remember what persecution surged around the Church, out of which came these words with a tone that belongs only to spiritual greatness of the first rank :—

"Let us set before our eyes the illustrious apostles. Peter, through unrighteous envy, endured not one or two, but numerous labours; and, when he had at length suffered martyrdom, departed to the place of glory due to him. Paul also obtained the reward of patient endurance, after being seven times thrown into captivity, compelled to flee, and stoned. After preaching both in the east and west, he gained the illustrious reputation due to his faith, having taught righteousness to the whole world; and, come to the extreme limit of the west, he suffered martyrdom under the prefects" (p. 11).

"We are struggling in the same arena, and the same conflict is assigned to us" (p. 12).

What historic majesty there is in this language!—

"Wherefore [what? Here is revealed the martyr's inner sky] let us give up vain and fruitless cares, and approach to the glorious and venerable rule of our holy calling. Let us attend to what is good, pleasing, and acceptable in the sight of Him who formed us. *Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious that blood is to God, which, having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world*" (p. 12).

Will Boston in this far day listen to Clement of Rome, speaking in the year 97?

When I turn to that really sublime document, the Epistle of Diognetus, which scholars here will thank me for citing, I come upon this passage, written in the second century :—

"Truly God Himself, who is almighty, the Creator of all things, and invisible, has sent from heaven and placed among men [Him who is] the truth, and the holy and incomprehensible Word, and has firmly established Him in their hearts. He did not, as one might have imagined, send to men any servant or angel, but the very Creator and Fashioner of all things, by whom He made the heavens, by whom He enclosed the sea within its proper bounds, whose ordinances all the stars faithfully observe, from whom the sun has received the measure of his daily course to be observed; whom the moon obeys, being commanded to shine in the night; and whom the stars also obey, following the moon in her course; by whom all things have been arranged and placed within their proper limits, and to whom all are subject,—the heavens and the things that are therein, the earth and the things that are therein, the sea and the things that are therein; fire, air, and the abyss; the things which are in the heights, the things which are in the depths, and the things which lie between. This [messenger] He sent to them. As a king sends his son, who is also a king, so sent He Him; as God He sent Him; as to men He sent Him; as a Saviour He sent Him" (pp. 309, 310).

If this amazing passage asserts the Deity of our Lord, does not the next copiously teach the atonement?

"He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities: He gave His own Son as a ransom for us,—the holy One for transgressors, the blameless One for the wicked, the righteous One for the unrighteous, the incorruptible One for the corruptible, the immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than His righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation! that the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors! Having, therefore, convinced us in the former time, that our nature was unable to attain to life, and having now revealed the Saviour, who is able to save even those things which it was (formerly) impossible to save, by both these facts He desired to lead us to trust in His kindness, to esteem Him our Nourisher, Father, Teacher, Counsellor, Healer, our Wisdom, Light, Honour, Glory, Power, and Life" (pp. 312, 313).

"This is He who was from the beginning, who appeared as if new, and was found old, and yet who is ever born afresh in the hearts of the saints. This is He, who, being from everlasting, is to-day called the Son; through whom the Church is enriched, and grace, widely spread, increases in the saints, furnishing understanding, revealing mysteries, announcing times, rejoicing over the faithful, giving to those that seek, by whom the limits of faith are not broken through, nor the boundaries set by the fathers passed over. Then the fear of the law is chanted, and the grace of the prophets is known, and the faith of the Gospels is established, and the tradition of the apostles is preserved, and the grace of the Church exults" (p. 315).

But now I open another document of equal interest, and read in the Epistle of Polycarp, written about the middle of the second century:—

"Our Lord Jesus Christ, to Him all things in heaven and on earth are subject. Him every spirit serves. He comes as the Judge of the living and the dead. But He who raised Him up from the dead will raise up us also, if we do His will, and walk in His commandments, and love what He loved" (p. 70).

I turn on, my friends, and find in the shorter recension of the Epistles of Ignatius (notice I say the shorter) this statement:—

"He who possesses the word of Jesus is truly able to hear even His very silence, that he may be perfect, and may both act as he speaks, and be recognized by his silence. There is nothing which is hid from God; but our very secrets are near to Him. Let us therefore do all things as those who have Him dwelling in us, that we may be His temples, and He may be in us as our God; which indeed He is" (p. 163).

Is there nothing in this early religion at which modern culture may sneer? In all my reading of antiquity outside the Scriptures, I have never met a passage in prose equal for poetic power to the one I am about to pronounce before you, nor one that is half as worthy as this to be held up in the light of modern science:—

"The heavens revolving under His government are subject to Him in peace. Day and night run the course appointed by Him, in no wise hindering each other. The sun and moon, with the companies of the stars, roll on in harmony according to His command, within their prescribed limits, and without any deviation. The fruitful earth, according to His will, brings forth food in abundance, at the proper seasons, for man and beast, and all the living beings upon it, never hesitating, nor changing any of the ordinances which He has fixed. The unsearchable places of the abysses, and the indescribable arrangements of the lower world, are restrained

by the same laws. The vast immeasurable sea, gathered together by His working, into various basins, never passes beyond the bounds placed around it, but does as He has commanded. The ocean, impassable to man, and the worlds beyond it, are regulated by the same enactments of the Lord. The seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, peacefully give place to one another. The winds in their several quarters fulfil at the proper time their service without hindrance. The ever-flowing fountains, formed both for enjoyment and health, furnish without fail their breasts for the life of men. Take heed, beloved, lest His many kindnesses lead to the condemnation of us all" (pp. 21, 22).

"The Creator and Lord of all Himself rejoices in His works; for by His infinitely great power He established the heavens, and by His incomprehensible wisdom He adorned them. He also divided the earth from the water which surrounds it, and fixed it upon the immovable foundation of His own will. The animals also which are upon it He commanded by His own word into existence. So, likewise, when He had formed the sea, and the living creatures which are in it, He enclosed them within their proper bounds by His own power. Above all, with His holy and undefiled hands He formed man" (p. 30).

"How blessed and wonderful, beloved, are the gifts of God!—life in immortality, splendour in righteousness, truth in perfect confidence, faith in assurance, self-control in holiness! And all these fall under the cognizance of understandings (now); what, then, shall those things be which are prepared for such as wait for Him? The Creator and Father of all worlds, the Most Holy alone, knows their amount and their beauty" (pp. 31, 32).

Does Concord furnish anything better than that? It is pantheism, you say? It is Christian theism in the first century, uttering itself in majestic tones fit to be matched with the anthems of the latest investigation.

So spoke Clement, and he is a pupil of Paul, and is to be interpreted in part by his master; and, if you put Paul and Clement together, the meaning of one and of the other is doubly clear, as is the light in two mirrors when they face each other.

Old Rome is alive. When I entered for the first time the Eternal City, I purposely came in by the last light of day, and under the earliest stars. I took pains not to meet with anything inartistic or trivial. I put myself in a carriage, and did not look outside of it until I reached my rooms, and next morning kept my eyes inside a carriage until I was in presence of the Coliseum. That was the first object I saw in Rome. Mrs. Browning's words were constantly in my thoughts:—

> "And the mountains in disdain
> Gather back their lights of opal
> From the dumb, despondent plain,
> Heaped with jaw-bones of a people."

Cæsar and Antony were near, and Cicero and Sallust, and Horace and Virgil, and Cato and Seneca, and Nero and the rest. After days and weeks of trance I obtained a better historic sense. Suddenly, among the marbles in St. Clement's Church, I remembered Mrs. Browning's other words:—

> "Cæsar's work is all undone;"

but Clement's is not, Peter's not, Paul's not. The feet of these men, too, fell on the seven hills; and their work endures. In the Cata-

combs, the gray crypts of volcanic stone seemed to be the nursery of America, because the cradle of Christianity when it was preparing to ascend that throne of the Cæsars from which it has not yet come down. When in the Coliseum at midnight, and in the Forum at noon, the tallest of the historic forms that filled the living air seemed to be those of the Christian martyrs, for they have ruled the world as Cæsar has not. In the Coliseum, I came at last to understand Richter's words: "Here coiled the giant Snake five times about Christianity; but the Serpent and the Bear crouch. Broken asunder are the gigantic spokes of the wheel which once the stream of the ages drove" (TITAN). In the azure heights of the outer and inner sky the wheel of the universe moves on without variableness in its motion, or shadow of change.

Was the Holy Spirit to the early Christians a present Christ?

To them was God as three and one, omnipresent in natural law?

All history since the Ascension proclaims that the Holy Spirit breathed out to-day is one with that which, eighteen hundred and a few more years ago last evening, was breathed upon the disciples with the words, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost."

IV.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

HELPFUL BOOKS.

THE Spaniards have a proverb which says, "An ounce of mother is worth a pound of clergy." An ounce of conduct is worth a ton of reading. An ounce of self-surrender to truth already possessed is worth a planet's weight of truth not transmuted into deeds. Nevertheless, it is so important to give attention to select reading in the hushed mood of spiritual sensitiveness, which is the only interpreter of souls in print, that perhaps it is timely in Boston now to recite a list of illumined, cheerful, incisive, stalwart books which may be useful to those who lately have entered a Christian life, and some of which may become not only food, but muscle. Let us always remember that mental and spiritual food, without work, are not transformed into nerve and muscle; and it is these you want, and not merely food. Work after food makes strength; and food without work makes—what shall we say? A plethoric, overfed, luxurious, uneasy Christianity, an object of pity to gods and men, and, perhaps, found in as great quantity to the square mile in Eastern Massachusetts as anywhere else on the globe.

What you want, of course, is first the Bible really understood; that is, acted out. How much do you know of Shakspeare until after you are forty years of age? Until a man has surrendered himself to God, he cannot be said to appreciate the Bible or any great merely human production. Let a poet like Milton, or Shakspeare, or Dante, make a painting of the inner sky in man, and he will put into it light and shade almost as strongly contrasted as the light and shade of Christianity. If there is not the sun of the Atonement in it, there will be there the chariot of that sun,—a fathomless desire for peace with God and with the irreversible record of the past. But how can you understand great poetry of the secular sort until you have lived it, and multitudinous rifting experiences have opened your heart? Nevertheless, even with a heart untutored by fulness of life, it is better for you to read great poetry than third-rate poetry,—the light fiddling of the charlatans, who sing the anthem of the stars as if it were a dancing-tune, or make a painting of the sky without the sun in it, or moon, or light, or shade, or much of anything else. It is best for you, in studying what is greatest in the results of human imagination, to avoid mercilessly all second-rate matter, however good. So, too, in feeding your devotional life, it is best for you to avoid Bunyan, and Jeremy Taylor, and Baxter, and Martineau, and Pascal, and Bushnell, and Thomas à Kempis himself, if these books shut out the Bible from daily and almost hourly use. The Germans have a proverb, that "the better is a great enemy of the best." Even the richest of the devotional works are a mischief, if they hinder you from taking the Bible as your supreme inspirer in life, as it will undoubtedly be your supreme solace in death.

Do you know a book that you are willing to put under your head for a pillow when you lie dying? Very well; that is the best volume for you to study while living. There is but one such book in the world. For one, I have not made

up my mind to put under my head, when I lie dying, anything written by Voltaire, or Strauss, or Parker. We are to be scientifically careful when we choose a book for a dying pillow. If you can tell me what you want for a dying pillow, I will tell you what you want for a pillar of fire in life; that is the Bible, spiritually and scientifically understood by being transmuted into deeds. Sentiment is worth nothing until it becomes principle, and principle nothing until it becomes action.

I hold in my hand a publication entitled, "Hints on Bible Marking," by an English authoress, Mrs. Menzies, and issued by the renowned firm of Samuel Bagster and Sons in London. Undoubtedly it is known by all scholars here; and I am not speaking to-day, or any day, to gentlemen in whose presence I ought to be dumb. But there are younger persons here and elsewhere who may be benefited by this sumptuous pamphlet, approved by our American evangelist, who perhaps has not referred to this best production on this topic, because his own name is connected with it. It is delightfully printed in the best London style, and with illustrations of the method of marking a Bible, which you will probably find better than any you can invent. I would not have even this method adopted by any one to the hindrance of originality in the invention of your own method of marking. *You ought to mark a Bible every five years so thoroughly, that you cannot use it any more.* May I whisper that I have a Bible, marked when I was about fourteen or seventeen years of age, and had but just united with the church; and that to-day it is the most unspeakable record on which I can put my hand in my little past? If, every five years, you can mark a Bible thoroughly, and memorize what is marked, it will be your best diary. You can do little better in reading than to fill the margins of a copy of the Scriptures, once every five years, full of the records of the deepest inmost in your souls, to be intelligible to yourself, and to no one else. Shut the door on that record. Enter into your closet, and keep your secrets with Almighty God.

At a trial in Salem, Webster said of the argument of his opponent, "Gentlemen of the jury, this man neither alights nor flies forward; he hovers. Why does he not meet the case?" Our age is full of readers and students who are mere hoverers, who neither fly forward nor alight, and who think the highest philosophical glory is in never coming to a conclusion. Have you not seen these winged, unresting spiritual creatures? Reading is of small account unless it is thought to be of no account in comparison with that style of action which makes obedience to truth an organ of spiritual knowledge.

Among devotional works, if you could have but six authors, which would you take?

1. Jeremy Taylor's "Holy Living and Holy Dying." There you have a great imagination, a flaming heart, a wonderful analytical power, undoubted soundness of thought, and tropical sympathy with all ranges of religious emotion. Outside of Shakspeare and Milton, perhaps there is not a greater imagination in English literature than Jeremy Taylor's. It is good to be acquainted with him, although but a little; and if you once fall in love with this single book of his, renowned now for several generations, all his works will become to you as a temple full of incense, and you will pace up and down in it as men walk up and down in the Cathedral at Cologne, glorious for its architecture, glorious for its atmosphere, glorious for the music in it, but more glorious than for anything else for the light of the East that streams through its many-coloured windows.

2. Thomas à Kempis: "Imitation of Christ." This is a book of which one cannot speak without a hush of tone. A sweet aroma breathes from it as from the earliest and most modest of the spring blossoms. A Romish work, if you

please, but none the worse for that, so far as its devotional side is concerned. It is adopted everywhere by Protestantism, and linked, therefore, to all the ages, Romish and Protestant, back to the day when there was neither Romanist nor Protestant.

3. Bunyan, and not only the "Pilgrim's Progress," but the "Holy War." Take all his devotional works, and read the best of them in some adequately illustrated edition, with Macaulay's Essay on Bunyan as a preface.

4. Pascal: "Thoughts on Religion."

But now, among American writers, whom shall I mention, when I can name but two?

5. Horace Bushnell's "Sermons for the New Life." You have heard me criticize portions of his writings; but what can be better than his discussions of this and all similar themes? Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural" is a prose epic, some strains in which seem likely to be heard many centuries.

6. Huntington's "Christian Believing and Living." He knew Boston; he knew the mind of this city on two sides. His literary equipment was very complete. In the commanding position of preacher to the great university yonder, he passed through a struggle in changing his views from those which he had preached to those which he now preaches; and this book with such an origin has thoughts timely for all culture in a similar state of transition.

I do not forget "St. Augustine's Confessions," nor the "Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius," nor "Plato." "What works of Baxter shall I read?" said Boswell to Johnson. "Read all of them," was the reply; "for they are all good." Are Doddridge and Fuller not to be named? Who will not refuse to part with F. W. Robertson, and twenty biographies, some of which are the best devotional works? Shall I omit Dora Greenwell, and Goulburn, and Hare, and Martineau?

All of these writers are to be commended; but you will not be able to master more than about one hundred books in your short life. It is best that you should not let third-rates crowd out first-rates. Spend time on Milton, Carlyle, Shakspeare, Mrs. Browning, and all great poems, of which there are not a thousand in the world.

On the Deity of our Lord what books deserve to be named, if we can mention only six?

1. Liddon: "Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of our Lord"—a very frequently attacked book, but one which, on the whole, is to be regarded as the best in English on the subject. It is not an exhaustive volume; but you will find it very valuable if you will master its learned references. The footnotes mean something, and you must not skip them.

2. Dorner, professor in the University at Berlin: "History of the Person of Christ." This is a book in four or five volumes, and is to be recommended as perhaps the best which has been transplanted out of the German language on this topic. Dorner and Liddon have never been answered, and they are as fresh as the risen sun.

3. Clarke, James Freeman: "Orthodoxy." Of course you will read both sides.

4. Stuart, Professor Moses: Miscellanies, including letters to Dr. Channing. The proof-texts here are the most incisive portion.

5. Seeley, Professor: "Ecce Homo."

6. Neander: "Life of Christ."

On the Christian evidences let me mention:—

1. Butler's "Analogy." This is the book Edmund Burke always recommended as unanswerable, and it is not outgrown.

2. Paley's "Evidences," but always in connection with later works.

3. Farrar's "Critical History of Free Thought." Bampton Lectures at the University of Oxford, 1862. The references in that work are the best I have seen.

4. Fisher's "Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity."

5. Christlieb: "Modern Doubt," 1864.

6. "Aids to Faith," by distinguished writers of the Church of England, in reply to Essays and Reviews.

7. Whately: "Peculiarities of the Christian Religion;" his proof that "Napoleon" never existed if our Lord never did; and, lastly, his "Christian Evidences."

8. Horne's "Introduction to the New Testament," new edition.

You say I am partisan; and so I take up one of the best of the popular guides, "The Best Reading;" and I find this statement from a man who is no theologian and no partisan:—

"To keep your balance against the often denounced innuendoes of Mr. Gibbon, don't quiddle with the goody little notes to Gibbon, by Milman and others, but having let Gibbon poison you as much as he can,—he won't hurt you if you have much intellect of your own,—turn away and master at once the right side of the main question of Christ in history, by a thorough study and mental appropriation of Horne's 'Introduction to the Study of the Sacred Scriptures.' I mean not the obsolete old edition, still obstinately and improperly kept in the American market to the exclusion of the proper one, but the last edition, with Horne's own latest revisions, and with the addition, by first-class evangelical English scholars, of all the recent learning on the subject. No man of sound mind, having mastered Horne, will ever be materially troubled by such little snips and sneers as Gibbon's, or by any other attempt to destroy the historical argument for the substantial truth of the Bible."

9. Westcott's "Introduction to the Study of the Gospels."

10. Müller, Julius: "The Doctrine of Sin."

11. Hagenbach: "The Decline of German Rationalism." This book Professor Tholuck told me repeatedly he put first into the hands of any student who came to Germany, and wished to know the history of German rationalism.

12. Dorner: "The History of Protestant Theology."

There are many little jeers and quips which are admirably answered by Haley, a late scholarly writer, on the "Alleged Discrepancies of the Bible,"—a book which every one who frequents a (Paine) full hall ought to have.

Read sometimes on your knees. Let us have no debate merely for the sake of debate. Let us have manly transmutation of our conviction into action; and whenever we are loyal to the truth we know we shall have more, and more, and more, until our east window breaks, and the east window of the Unseen Holy receives us into its perfect day.

THEODORE PARKER'S SELF-CONTRADICTIONS.

"The law of contradiction vindicates itself. It cannot be denied without being assented to."—FERRIER: *Ins. of Met.*, p. 21.

"Sunt et belli, sicut pacis jura."—LIVY.

Dean Stanley of Westminster Abbey, in that already famous address of his, delivered but a few days ago at the University of St. Andrew's in Scotland, speaks of Thomas Carlyle as the most famous of living Scotchmen, "who, though winding up the threads of his long and

honourable life at Chelsea, has never disdained the traditions of the Scottish Church and nation, still warms at the recollection of his native Annandale, and still is fired with poetic ardour when he speaks of the glories of St. Andrew's" (*London Times*, March 17, 1877). Has Boston any literary name, on the whole, superior to that of Thomas Carlyle? Did Transcendentalism thirty years ago in this city, does American literature in its yet unended April, owe anything to the author of "Sartor Resartus" and "The French Revolution"? We have in this Scottish author perhaps the greatest imagination Europe has seen since Richter, and, if the German be omitted, the greatest since Milton. A will free as ever was Boreas horsed on the north wind, and yet a man who, Dean Stanley says, has never broken with the traditions of the Scottish Church! That portion of the world which has been too busy or to obtuse to read what is between the lines in Carlyle's writings has wished for information as to Carlyle's religion. This information is given by the lord rector of St. Andrew's University.

It is pointedly understood by scholars that Dean Stanley is not a bigot; but he is a representative of Westminster Abbey, and as such he says in this same address, "I am not here to criticise or disparage the venerable document, which, born under my own roof at Westminster, alone of all such confessions for a short time represented the whole national faith of Great Britain. If the Westminster Catechism has some defects or exaggerations from which our own Thirty-nine Articles are free, yet, on the other hand, it has soared to higher heights, and struck down to deeper depths." When New England was in the gristle, she was fed on what? On the Westminster Catechism, which, in spite of its defects, soared, according to Dean Stanley, to heights farther aloft, and struck down to depths nearer the centre of thought, than had been reached by any other English symbol of religious faith.

Theodore Parker is perpetually assailing what he calls the popular theology; and it is to be admitted that, if by this phrase you mean the misconceptions of the half-educated, fault enough can be found effectively with New England. But what did Parker mean by the popular theology? Although a man of courage, he was usually so prudent as not to give references when he attacked this giant. "I have been careful," he often said, "not to cite authorities, lest individual churches or writers should be deemed responsible for the sin of the mass" (*Discourse on Religion*, p. 429). In the plentiful absence of scholarly references, there is a vagueness in Parker's charges against the popular theology, that is not at all scientific. Surely, if we are to have a definition of the popular theology, we cannot with fairness go lower down than the Thirty-nine Articles. If we are to have any creed brought forward for scientific debate, we must have something to represent it at least as definite and authoritative as that set of symbols which Great Britain and her empire throughout the world, and the renowned Church which adopts those articles, regards as a standard summary of faith. Dean Stanley says the Westminster Catechism is, in some respects, better than the Thirty-nine Articles.

But I will not use the catechism to-day ; I will take the Thirty-nine Articles, in spite of this affirmation that they do not dive as deep, nor soar as high, as the Scottish and New England symbol. I will take the overt services which have grown out of, and express the faith of these articles ; I will employ the Book of Common Prayer, in the pages most used by the people, as the fittest representation of popular theology.

Let us enter Westminster Abbey ; let us examine the popular theology there ; and while the anthems roll, while the incense of the sublime service rises above the tombs of poets, and martyrs, and kings, and orators, and statesmen, let us listen to the contrasted voices of the worshipping assemblies as representing popular theology, and of a Boston critic as representing scientific attack on that theology. On the one hand, Carlyle and Stanley intone majestic words, which have the assent, in what I shall cite, of all the evangelical communions of the world. On the other hand, let Theodore Parker utter in Westminster Abbey what he uttered in Boston. Gather up now all your historic senses, and forget not the vision of martyrs in the air as you listen ; for perhaps the contrasts and echoes here may be more than slightly suggestive. You are standing on the hallowed floor which covers the irradiated tomb of Sir Isaac Newton, and this is what you hear :—

1. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Sabbaoth ;
Heaven and Earth are full of the Majesty of Thy Glory.
The glorious company of the Apostles praise Thee.
The goodly fellowship of the Prophets praise Thee.
The noble army of Martyrs praise Thee.
The holy Church throughout all the world doth acknowledge Thee ;
The Father, of an Infinite Majesty ;
Thine adorable, true, and only Son ;
Also the Holy Ghost and Comforter.

Theodore Parker.—The popular theology regards God as eminently malignant (PARKER, *Sermons on Theism*, p. 101). Its God is diabolical (*Discourse on Religion*, p. 427).

2. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—From all blindness of heart ; from pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy ; from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness, good Lord, deliver us.

Parker.—This system can justify anything out of the Bible. . . . It makes men do nothing from the love of what is good. Its divine life is but a good bargain (*Discourse on Religion*, pp. 426, 428). All the popular vices are sure to have the churches on their side (*Theism*, p. 162). The American churches launch their feeble thunders in defence of every popular wickedness *Ibid.*, p. 141).

3. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—O God, the King of Glory, we beseech Thee leave us not comfortless, but send to us Thy Holy Ghost to comfort us ; and in Thee may we continually dwell, one God, world without end.

Parker.—The popular theology does not tell of God now, near at hand (*Discourse on Religion*, p. 426).

4. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—We beseech Thee to hear us, good Lord : that it may please Thee to give to all Thy people increase of grace to hear meekly Thy Word, and to receive it with pure affection, and to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit. Endue us with the grace of Thy Holy Spirit to amend our lives.

Parker.—The Holy Ghost of theology has nothing to do with schemes for making the world better (*Theism*, p. 11[illegible]).

The Holy Ghost is not represented as loving wicked men ; and no one of the three persons of the Godhead has any love for the soul of the lost (*Ibid.*, p. 102).

5. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—O ye Sun and Moon, O ye Stars of Heaven, bless ye the Lord ; praise Him and magnify Him for ever.

Parker.—The universe is not thought to be the word of God at all (*Theism*, p. 110).

6. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—O ye Showers and Dew, O ye Winds of God, O ye Fire and Heat, O ye Winter and Summer, O ye Dews and Frosts, O ye Frost and Cold, O ye Ice and Snow, bless ye the Lord ; praise Him and magnify Him for ever.

Parker.—It is tacitly taken for granted in the popular theology that God is sometimes taken by surprise, and has to mend His work.

7. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—O ye Nights and Days, O ye Light and Darkness, O ye Lightnings and Clouds, O ye Mountains and Hills, O all ye green Things upon the Earth, O ye Seas and Floods, bless ye the Lord ; praise Him, and magnify Him for ever.

Parker.—Pantheism and the popular theology agree in the negation of the Infinite, and the affirmation of a variable God (*Theism*, p. 302).

8. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—O God, without whom nothing is strong, nothing is holy, Thou being our Ruler and Guide, may we so pass through things temporal that we finally lose not the things eternal. . . . From all evil and mischief and sin, good Lord, deliver us.

Parker.—Piety and morality, natural religion, is no condition of salvation: good works are bad things for that (*Theism*, p. 115). Those that are saved are not saved by their character. Virtue has no virtue to save your soul (*Ibid.*, p. 114).

9. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—We ought at all times humbly to acknowledge our sins before God. We have done the things we ought not to have done. There is no health in us.

Parker.—According to the popular theology, sin does not consist in sinning, but in being born of Adam after the fall (*Theism*, p. 107). To take a step toward heaven, man must deny his nature. He is born totally depraved (*Discourse on Religion*, p. 425). You are born of the first sinner, and got as much hurt by the fall as he (*Theism*, p. 111).

10. *Carlyle and Stanley.*—Fulfil now, O Lord, the desires and petitions of Thy servants, as may be most expedient for them, granting us in this world knowledge of Thy truth, and in the world to come life everlasting.

Parker.—Down with reason, cries the popular theology ; down with human nature (*Theism*, p. 110).

Enough. If Westminster Abbey listens longer to this serene anthem and to these dissonant accusations, the dead here will rise. Pardon me, gentlemen ; but Westminster Abbey is the world in our century. The names and voices contrasted here I use only as symbols of the great classes they represent in the conflicts of thought in the ages. Do the accusations need any other answers in the Abbey than those of the historic worship and the associations of the place? None at all. Still less do these accusations need answer in the historic temple of the world and the ages.

Indirectly I contrast here Theodore Parker's father with Theodore Parker's mother. You have accused me of forgetting the better traits in Parker. It was his mother who was singing this anthem, and in Parker there were moods in which he sang it. But when he uttered these accusations, which are caricatures needing no answer, the spirit of the drum-major of Lexington stood up under his waistcoat, and he was addressing opponents. In much of Parker's severest speech he is not thinking, he is fretting and chafing. These accusations are the

language of intellectual irritation. You say I have contrasted Dean Stanley and Carlyle with Parker, and London with Boston. So I did; but I contrasted them in order that I might say emphatically at the last, that the mother of Theodore Parker would have sung that anthem with Carlyle and with Stanley; but the father in Theodore Parker, standing up to do a giant's work against slavery, had fallen into irritation of such a kind, that these ghastly statements of his undoubtedly seemed to him true, although you and I know that they are so false as to need no reply.

Total depravity, what is it? That clock yonder is made on a plan; so is my soul. The clock may be out of order; so may my soul. When that clock is in order, it keeps time; when my soul is in order, it obeys conscience. If the clock is so out of order as not to keep time, it is good for nothing as a clock; if my soul is so out of order as not to obey conscience, if I answer "I will not," when the Divine Voice says "I ought," I am not keeping time. Every choice is wrong when I reply by the negative to the infinite affirmative; and as the moral character of all action comes from choice, and as my choice is wrong, I violate the plan of my being: I no longer keep time; I am good for nothing as a clock. But when I say that clock will not keep time, do I mean to say that the wheels in it cannot be put in order? No. Perhaps the wheels are of gold and silver. Disarrangedness in the clock implies its arrangeability. Disarrangedness in the soul implies its arrangeability. That clock will not keep time, however, and so I say it is totally depraved as a clock. Does that mean that the wheels are all slime, and the face of it a concrete mass of leprosy, or that there is nothing useful in it? Let us be clear on this topic once for all; for Boston loves clear thought, and supposes that there can be none on this subject. *Make a distinction between total depravity and total corruption.* That is a distinction as old as St. Augustine, and ought to be tolerably well understood here, where the doctrine of total depravity has so long been attacked mercilessly. If that clock were a concrete mass of unspeakable slime, I should say it is totally corrupt; when it is so out of order that it will not keep time, I say it is totally depraved. If there were nothing in a man capable of arrangement; if, when the soul is out of order, it could not, by following conscience and by God's good grace, be put again into order, I should say it is totally corrupt. But the wheels yonder may be of pearl, the pivots may be of diamonds, and yet the clock not keep time at all. It is not totally corrupt; it is totally depraved. So the human faculties may be wheels of far-flashing silver and gold and pearl; the pivots may roll on diamonds, and yet the man not keep time. He says "I will not" when the still small voice says "I ought;" and you know it is a deliverance of self-evident truth, that, when a man says this, he has a sense of ill-desert, and feels that the nature of things is against him. You cannot convince him that he is right with the universe. He is out of order with the universe whenever he does not keep time to the divine "I ought." But is that man incapable of being arranged? Not at all. Total depravity means the moral disarrangedness of man and the evil character of his choices; it implies

man's arrangeability. It does not mean total corruption, that has no arrangeability.

Now, as to inherited vice and original sin, what amazing superficiality we have heard on that theme! You cut through knot after knot on this topic, if you will take a strong phrase of our American evangelist, and expand it into scientific shape. Indeed, it needs very little expanding. It was meant to be seen at a distance, as the figures of the prophets in the dome of St. Peter's are meant to be looked on at a distance. The pen of Isaiah in that dome is seven feet long; and his eyes, when you are close upon them, are really only bits of stone, rather rough mosaic; but, looked on as they were meant to be, he is the sublime prophet, and awes you as he gazes down from the height. Just so, many of our American evangelist's expressions, when taken by piecemeal, and looked on with the eye of a fly critic, are understood about as well as the buzzing insect in that dome of St. Peter's understands the prophet Isaiah. They were meant to be seen at a distance; and this phrase I for one am willing to adopt, if you will understand it: "Man is born with his back toward God." That is original sin. Will your Shakspeare bear you out in your assertion that a man is born with his face toward God, and ready to say "I will" when the Divine Voice says "I ought"? Will your Milton and Richter, and your Carlyle, carry you through, if you undertake to maintain that man is born with his face toward God?

Accredited New England theology does not assert that inherited evil disposition is sin; for it teaches always that responsibility cannot exist without freedom of the will, and that sin consists in evil choice. Sin is sinning, as Theodore Parker says that New England affirms it is not. There have been schools of theology using the word "sin" in a peculiar sense; but, if you will notice how they define the word, they mean at the last analysis only what our evangelist means when he says that a man is born with his face turned away from that Being who says "I ought," and to whom we say "I will not." But this moral condition is not total corruption; it is disarrangedness, it is not unarrangeability. Man is noble; the wheels in him are of gold, of silver, and of pearl, of an unmeasured preciousness. They are so disarranged, however, as not to keep time; and that condition we call total depravity. If they were concrete slime, as they are not, we should call that condition total corruption. But for want of making that simple distinction,—one of the commonplaces of religious science, so familiar that I am almost ashamed to take up time with it here, even when we stand face to face with Theodore Parker's rough caricatures,—men fall into the most ghastly misconceptions of religious truth at this point, as if it were an impeachment of God's own work, or as if there were in it the spirit of some ghoulish depredator at the tomb of all that is noble in man.

Your Shakspeare asserts total depravity as much as New England theology, and I think rather more. There is not on the globe a deep writer of the merely secular sort, who does not affirm that man is inclined at birth, by hereditary descent, to say "I will not," when the Divine Voice says "I ought." All ethical science asserts, that until

you come into a preaominant mood, in which you love what the Divine Voice that says "I ought" commands, you do not keep time; you are worth nothing as a clock. Nevertheless you can be arranged so as to follow the unchanging plan of your soul. That clock out of order needs a hand from outside of it to put it in order. Man can obey his conscience; I believe man can do all that God requires of him: nevertheless, when a man is put in order, after having been so disarranged as not to keep time, he incontrovertibly has to thank the original plan of the mechanism, and he did not invent that. He has to thank Divine Providence for bringing truth to bear upon him in such a way as to seize his reason and emotion, and woo him at last freely to do what he ought. While God rules in him by the plan of the clock, man also, by his own free choice, acts within himself; and, since very evidently both powers are conjoined in arranging the clock, we do well to work out our own orderliness with fear and trembling.

Theodore Parker's chief error was a confusion of popular and scholarly theology. This series of caricatures illustrates that confusion, and so does a series of self-contradictions which must now be outlined.

The deepest desire of man is for final satisfaction, intellectual and moral, concerning religious truth and his personal relations to it. Tossed about, however, wearily, and without a place where to lay the head, no past age has made, and no future age will make, a pillow of self-contradiction. There never will come a time when transcendentalism will meet with successful opposition to its assertion that a thing cannot be and be at the same time and in the same sense. If there is a self-evident truth, that is one, transcending, if you please, not only the experience of the individual, but also that of the race. Only very slowly can I get forward here with the immense theme of the intuitional philosophy; but I am not forgetting that some of you think that these royal intuitive beliefs in self-evident truths are the result of inherited experience of both the individual and the race. I know that in Orion a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, and that the same is true in the North Star. But I never had any experience in the North Star; the race never had any experience in Orion. Our conviction, however, is perfect that the whole must be greater than a part in the Pleiades, or in the Swan, or where Sagittarius draws his bow in the south. We have never flown through the zenith with the Swan; mankind never drew bow with Sagittarius in the southern heavens. Axiomatic certainties have a range immeasurably transcending all possible experience of the individual or of the race. They are certainties everywhere and always. Therefore, according to all just philosophy, self-contradiction is a competent condemnation of any proposition, not only for this world, but for all worlds; not only for time, but for eternity.

In Theodore Parker's collected writings, self-contradictions are far more easily noticed than in any of his volumes taken singly. It is significant that there never has been an American edition of his works; that is, of his collected writings. Of course, individual volumes of his have been several times republished; but there is in this country no

edition of his collected works. There is such an edition in England; but when I asked one of his publishers here if the English edition had prevented the appearance of the collected works in this country, he replied, "Not at all. The books will not sell."

What are some of the more important self-contradictions in Theodore Parker's productions taken as a whole?

There is in Parker's scheme of thought a multiplex self-contradiction as to the intuitions of conscience.

1. The intuitions of conscience declare man's ill-desert when he says "I will not" to the Divine "I ought."

2. The ill-desert of man is therefore a self-evident fact.

3. The intuitions were Parker's authority.

4. The life and correspondence and public words of Theodore Parker yield almost no proof that he was accustomed to confess sin to the Supreme Being. The nearest he comes to confession is in a prayer offered in Music Hall the day after the unveiling of Beethoven's statue: "May we chastise ourselves for every mean and wicked thing" (WEISS, *Life*, vol. i. p. 411).

5. To James Freeman Clark he writes from his dying chamber that there is in man no condition of enmity against God (*Life*, vol. i. p. 151). "No sin," he said, "can make an indeliable mark on what I call the soul" (*Ibid.*, p. 149).

6. Self-evident truth does, and Theodore Parker did not, carefully distinguish human infirmity from human iniquity. He held, that, at the last analysis, sin is a defect of judgment, or a necessary incident in our moral development, and that therefore "every fall is a fail upward." That phrase, I find, has been often cited by scholars as typical of Parker's thought. It is a clause out of a whole page to which I printed a reference the other day (*Sermons on Theism*, p. 408); and, when I put a reference into a published report, I mean, of course, to invite all gentlemen to look at the original (see also pp. 417, 299, of the same book). When a man painstakingly gives a reference, he must be accused of pedantry, if he has not a desire to have people make use of the reference. I cannot say everything here in an hour; but I give the references to bear myself out; and it is an essential part of the reading of any man's argument to examine the authorities to which he refers. There is in Parker nothing more fundamental than the doctrine implied by assertions like these: "To the wickedest, life is no absolute failure;" "Optimism is the piety of science;" "Sin is the provocation to virtue" (FROTHINGHAM, *Life*, p. 353). "Every fall is a fall upward;" "Sure of my immortality, and sure of God, I fear nothing." Expressions like these are scattered all through his writings; and these are perfectly consistent with the theory which he held, that, by many a long and winding slope, Iscariot comes out right at last, and that it is safe to die a kidnapper or a murderer. (See last page of *Sermons on Theism.*)

There were shrewd men fleeced in Boston the other day by a swindler who fled to Europe. New York was fleeced lately by a conscienceless cormorant, who opened his beak wide enough to

swallow the Hudson, and was afterward found back of the Palisades and at Vigo. At Meudon, in the French Revolution, gloves were made of human skins. What, now, if you were to say to the fleeced taxpayers, and to the relatives of the flayed Frenchmen, Why, have you not heard that sin is a necessary step in the development of virtue? Do you not know that liberal thought asserts that every fall is a fall upward? Do you not understand that these acts of which you complain are merely the efforts of the human soul to get possession of its faculties? The Winslows and the Tweeds will come out right. God cares as much for them as he does for the Lawrences and Peabodys; if He does not, He is a malignant being. By many a long and winding slope every thief, and leper, and perjurer, and murderer will come up at last to a height as lofty as he could have reached if he had gone up without sin. Iago falls; but he falls upward. He is getting possession of his faculties.

We understand moral truth best in a common-place example. Socrates preferred facts from the street to illustrate the curve of the moral law. On the gray mall on Boston Common yonder, under the elms beneath which Adams and Washington walked with Lafayette, you may see a seller of candies, an aged woman, in the biting wind, in the tatters of her poverty and in the trembling of her unsupported declining strength. (See *Bib. Sac.*, vol. xxvi. p. 296.) With gladness she shows you a large bill, and says, "A very finely dressed gentleman, with great kindness to me, took more of my stock than I have sold in a week before. He took, indeed, all I had; and, when I could not change his bill, he took my little collection of coppers, and filled his pocket with them, and gave me this large bill. Am I not blessed to-day?"—"Madam, that is a counterfeit bill."—"What, what! the wretch!"—"Yes. But, madam, have you not heard that the great Theodore Parker says that every fall is a fall upward? Philosophy teaches that all evil is evanescent. By many a long and winding slope every man shall attain at last supreme felicity. This man has perhaps heard, as you have not, that sin is needful to our development; he is getting command of his faculties."

Will you conduct law and business and politics on the principles of a lax, unscientific, lawless liberalism? Not while men are men. Do not ask me, then, to adopt fundamental principles in religious theory and practice which you will not adopt in any secular theory or practice. The scientific method asserts the unity and the universality of law. Dissonances with the nature of things are the mothers of whirlwinds.

Next I find in Theodore Parker *a self-contradiction concerning the penalties of sin.*

In his early manhood he said, "Punishment may be eternal" (WEISS, *Life*, vol. i. p. 66). And all through his life he held the intuitional philosophy, which proves that there may be free, final permanence in moral character; therefore all his life he held principles which would undermine his certainty as to optimism being the piety of science. While he was consistent with his philosophy, he

could not deny that a man *may* fall into free, final permanence of character; therefore he never had authorization from the scientific method to assert that, to the wickedest, life is no absolute failure, or that Judas Iscariot, Cain, and the kidnapper may die in their crimes, and yet be sure of final felicity.

Gentlemen, I beg you to fasten searching attention on the last door through which, I will not say evasive, but insufficiently clear and serious thought retreats, when brought face to face with the scientific method on the topic of eternal permanence of character. Will you tell me whether this height of bliss to which God is to lift man through suffering is finite or infinite? Finite, of course you would say. Finite beings are capable of being lifted only to a finite degree of happiness. Very well, then; suppose that all punishment, here and hereafter, produces increased bliss at last; when the highest ascending slope has been reached, that bliss will yet be a finite quantity, will it not? Let us here be straightforward as sunbeams. A finite being can have only a finite bliss; therefore, even God can lift a finite being only to a more finite degree of bliss. The highest bliss, then, which you will attain by your method of managing the universe will be a finite degree of bliss. Now, could not Omnipotence have lifted finite beings to a finite degree of bliss without any suffering on their part as a penalty of sin, or without their sinning, and thus incurring punishment? Yes; you know it could. Omnipotence can do anything that is an object of power; that is, anything not involving a self-contradiction. There is no self-contradiction in supposing that God could lift finite beings to the highest bliss of which they are capable, and yet not use as His instrumentality the suffering induced by sin. Assuredly He could do this. Why has He not done it? You say that all suffering of punishment for sin is intended to make men more happy at the last. But it will not; for it cannot make them more happy than God might have made them without it. To the highest bliss of which they are capable, God could lift men up without their suffering any of the pains induced by sin. *Why does He not do this?* Penal pain and innocent pain are to be distinguished from each other as remedial agents. Suffering which is the result of sin, and suffering which is not the result of sin, are two very different things. It is not denied here that the latter form of suffering may be necessary to the highest good of the universe, but only that suffering as the result of sin is thus necessary. Are sin and the suffering it induces necessary to the highest good of the universe, as your theory implies? If so, then the sin is necessary. *Who, then, is responsible for sin?* That is the inexorable question which comes at last before every man who cares for clear thought, and faces the fact that sin and its penalties, with self-propagating powers, now exist; and when you have gazed long enough into that quarter of the heavens, you will be apt to make up your minds that yours is the theory, and not mine, that calls in question the Divine benevolence.

As Dean Mansel, and Whately, and many others have said, "God is an infinite God now; God is an infinitely powerful God now; God

is infinitely good now; God has been infinitely powerful and good for the last six thousand years: but now sin exists; now the earth groans under what ought not to be; and for six thousand years sin and its suffering have been in progress." Yes; but you explain all that by saying that everything is coming out by-and-by—into what? Into a finite degree of bliss. God could have reached that without the existence of the suffering caused by sin. Why did He not? If you please, the universe is more serious than is dreamed by men who solace sin by affirming that it can never be too late to mend, and that character does not tend to a free, final permanence, bad as well as good. That sentiment is a web woven in the looms of luxury, and gilded there, but one that will not bear the weight of absolute seriousness, conducting research by the scientific method. Whatever outrages science will be found to solace sin.

In Theodore Parker's writings, as in nearly all productions of a like school in thought, there are abundant *self-contradictions as to the character of our Lord and the authority of the New Testament literature.*

1. At twenty-four years of age Parker believed that Christ was miraculously born. "Christ was the Son of God born in a miraculous manner" (i. 66).

2. At twenty-six he wrote a sonnet in praise of the Son of man as perfect.

3. At thirty-four he thought that possibly Jesus may have taught errors.

4. At thirty-six he thinks there may one day be a greater man than Christ. "God has yet greater men in store, I doubt not" (i. 429).

5. At forty-two he thinks Christ certainly made mistakes in His teaching.

6. At forty-nine he says the negro washerwoman who keeps the wolf from her unfathered babes, all fugitives from slavery, is not less glorious than Jesus of Nazareth on the mountain uttering His Beatitudes.

Now thus far there is no self-contradiction, only change of opinion. Do not suppose I mistake mere change of opinion for self-contradiction, although vacillation is a trait of crudeness of thought. What was Parker's final thought?

7. In his latest years he says that "our Lord's theology contained a considerable admixture of error."

8. *But* the Christianity of Christ, he thinks, was a perfect religion. "To me the name of Christianity," he says, "is most exceeding dear."

Goethe would have reproved Parker; for Goethe used to say, "Tear out of the New Testament faith in the veracity of Christ as to the fact of the supernatural, and there is not enough left to build faith on in regard to any other particular." Parker did the former, and then attempted to eulogize the trustworthiness of one who, as Parker affirmed, was yet to be surpassed, and had taught many errors. Thus Theodore Parker plays fast and loose with the historic evidence of the supernatural in Christianity, and then calls in as aid to his

scheme of thought a mass of historic refuse, good for nothing, according to his own testimony, as evidence. This self-contradiction has so often been pointed out in the arguments of outgrown sceptics, that Strauss was consistent enough in his lonely, last years, as some of Parker's followers now are, to drop the name Christian.

No one, even among Theodore Parker's friends, has built heavily on his foundations; and how can you expect me to build on them? Where is the man that is constructing a temple to-day with Theodore Parker's characteristic propositions as corner-stones? He is not in Boston; he is not in New York. Mr. Frothingham says that Theodore Parker will have no immortality as a religious philosopher. Let us grant him immortality as a crowned hero and martyr in the conflict with slavery; let us say that he was too busy, as he faced the foe, to think out a system in philosophy on this yet crude shore. America is young in all that pertains to deep metaphysical research. My main motive in criticising this antislavery hero is to show that Boston, as yet, has not hewn out any stone in philosophy that is fit to be put down as a corner of a temple of religious science. You have cut out from the mountains of research many a strong piece of marble for other structures; and some of you think that Theodore Parker hewed out what must lie at the corner of a philosophical religion. Julius Müller, and not Theodore Parker, is the best teacher of the Absolute Religion. Our transcendentalism in New England has not uttered a final word. We are not as far advanced in philosophy as we suppose. Germany thinks so little of New England in this particular, that you can find all she says of our philosophy in five or ten pages of any history on the course of metaphysical thought in these last decades. We overrate ourselves. Frothingham, who is nearest to being Parker's successor, will not bear his own weight on that stone which Theodore Parker hewed out. There is not a church of the liberal sort that to-day bears its weight on that stone, considered merely as the basis of philosophy. Can you expect me to build on it, when Plymouth Rock lies here to be the corner-stone of philosophy, of politics, of society, of church, of factory, of school, and to be blessed in the future as it has been in the past?

V.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

THE FIVE PARTS OF PRAYER.

It is recorded by Tacitus, with some surprise, that in the marshes of the Rhine there lived a tribe of Finns, who were so degraded as not to believe in the efficacy of prayer. An obscure infidel sheet in Boston has lately said, "The whole teaching of Free Religion concerning prayer is concentrated in this short maxim, Never pray, if you can help it." In a straightforward course of thought it is necessary to admit that sometimes we cannot help praying. From the point of view of science this conceded fact means more than much. "At their wits' ends all men pray," Shakspeare says. But what all men do, and cannot help doing, is instinctive. The existence of an organic or constitutional instinct is adequate scientific proof of the existence of its correlate. Wherever we find a fin, there has been provided water to match it; a wing, air to match it; an eye, light to match it; a migrating instinct, a climate to match it. The instinct of petition is no exception to the rule that God creates no hunger to mock it. Hegel and Emerson call prayer the highest act of the human spirit. The proof of the efficacy of prayer is its naturalness.

Nothing subdues will like already subdued will. Decision for one's self is the best teacher of decision to others. All prayer is vain repetition unless it include the petition, Thy will be done in me as in heaven. It means, among other things, a subdued will; and so, when a Christian worthy of the name offers prayer with one who is not yet religiously resolute, great natural laws show their force. The contagion of a religiously subdued and rejoicing will is brought to bear upon a will as yet unsubdued. Boston, Eastern Massachusetts, New England, are witnessing at this moment in many lives, that mystery which for eighteen centuries has been called the new birth. It is not heresy nor novelty to teach that God converts the soul according to the natural laws of the soul. What are some of the spiritual laws which are now in such subtle operation close around us, and undoubtedly are at all times capable of doing what we see them effecting now?

Prayer, it has commonly been taught, has four elements,—adoration, confession, thanksgiving, petition. I hold that we must always add a fifth part, namely, total self-surrender. The four parts without the fifth are what the Scriptures call vain repetition, and not prayer. Whoever offers prayer in all its five parts may be assured, in the name of natural law, that he will obtain religious aid of a kind that he can receive from no other source. Men who revere the scientific method will admit that experiment is the crucial test of truth. *Who dares try the experiment of prayer in the sense of total and affectionate self-surrender to God?* A Boston scholar has lately told the public that a somewhat rough man of affairs in this city, in the presence of the American evangelist, thought he would be manly enough to try the experiment of offering prayer. "But," said the latter, "you must be sincere."—"I know very little of this thing," the man replied; "but I am willing to be sincere in one prayer

at least."—"Very well," said the evangelist, "let us kneel down, here and now, together; and do you say from the depths of your heart, 'God be merciful to me a sinner.'" The merchant did that; and I suppose, from what followed, that he did it in a genuine way. Certain it is that there struck across that man's countenance a beam of light from the sun behind the sun, a peace and an illumination unknown to him before. He rose up, saying, "This is a singular experience. My partner, do you do as I have done, and perhaps there will be similar results." The partner was a sceptic; but he knelt and offered the prayer, "God be merciful to me a sinner;" and he, too, rose up, smitten across the forehead with the light that falls out of those ancestral spaces from which all souls come, and into which all men haste. Facts like these are the chief news of this serious day. Boston loves clear ideas. You say, "All this is mystery." It is fact, however, as age after age can witness. But analyze this greatly suggestive scene a little.

What is implied in the words, God be merciful to me a sinner?

1. That there is a God.
2. That there is a moral law.
3. That the moral law represents the will of a person.
4. That the law and the person have unconditional authority.
5. That I ought to obey that authority.
6. That I could have done what I ought.
7. That my will is free.
8. That I freely refused to do what I ought.
9. That the ill-desert of this refusal is wholly mine.
10. That I cannot remove this ill-desert from myself.
11. That there is obligation existing on my part to satisfy the violated majesty of the law.
12. That my own future good works cannot meet this obligation.
13. That God's mercy must meet it for me, if it is to be met at all.
14. That I implore God's mercy so to meet it.
15. That I trust myself implicitly to His mercy.
16. That I do so with entire freedom from the spirit of self-righteousness.
17. That I do so in the spirit of rejoicing loyalty to a personal Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier; one God, who was, and is, and is to come.
18. That in all these beliefs I hold propositions which, in my business and my family, in public and in secret, I mean to transmute into action.

This prayer, "God be merciful to me a sinner," is the articulate voice of an organic instinct. But it contains these eighteen and more propositions, which are thus not slightly emphasized by the structure of human nature. Transmute these beliefs into deeds, saturate society with these propositions, and have they any force? Is it any mystery that men who offer this prayer sincerely are smitten through and through by a redemptive illumination? These rays are javelins out of the light of the Great White Throne. Let them permeate business, politics, education, the newspaper press, literature, and all private life. The mystery of conversion!—if there were not conversion when a man seriously and gladly submits himself to the practical application of all these propositions, that would be a mystery. I am not denying at all that there is supernatural action in every case of conversion; but I defy any form of clear thought to show that these propositions are not all in the prayer, "God be merciful to me a sinner." I defy any man to justify in the name of science the Finns of Flanders or of Boston for not offering that prayer.

Two hundred churches in New England are uniting with Boston in special services. Your newspaper press affirms that thirty thousand people were at the Tabernacle yesterday. Business-men's prayer-meetings crowd their places

of assembly. The hush of God's work, through natural and supernatural laws, is in Boston.

Some simpleton in clerical garb said lately to that theologian of Andover who has done more for religious science in this country than any other man since Jonathan Edwards, "Is it not singular that Providence should effect so much through inferior labours? It must be admitted that the Lord has done much in Boston through weak instruments."—"I wish," said Professor Park in reply, "to be reverent in speaking of the work of the Lord; but Mr. Moody is a great man."

A great man! "There are no great men," Professor Park would, with Massillon, have said in another mood; "God only is great." A smaller Frenchman than Massillon—Renan—wrote not long ago, "We never shall keep the world in order until science has learned how to explode the globe. Then we shall say to the Philistinish masses, Peace under penalty! The power of natural law is behind us." But there are natural laws which, instead of exploding the globe, will explode all its icebergs,

> "Unlock the zone, the ice-fields clothe with wheat,
> And make God's pathway round the world complete."

It is scientifically certain that Christianity is in possession of the theory of those laws; and if she were only in the practice of them!

Take your rough bit of glass, and hew it here and there, and you have not made a prism; but, as soon as you have produced a prism, that instant the light striking through it is unravelled, and you have by natural laws a revelation, not to be imagined before you see the colours. Let a man surrender to God; let him hew himself into a religious prism which has reason, conscience, and self-surrender to God, as revealed in His word and works, for its three sides,—and the instant that posture of total, affectionate, irreversible self-surrender is reached, God will flash through the human faculties; the seven colours will fall on your face, on your families, on public life, on all the greed and fraud of American civilization, and give you as a people that coat of many colours which shall prove you to be the beloved son of the Father as a nation.

THE ATONEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH.

> "Quid refert igitur, quantis jumenta fatiget
> Porticibus? quantâ nemorum vectetur in umbrâ?
> Jugera quot vicina foro, quas emerit aedes?
> Nemo malus felix."
>
> JUVENAL: *Sat.* iv. 5.

"Non sumus nostri, sed pretio empti, et quali pretio? Sanguine Dei."—TERTULLIAN: *Ad Uxor.*, ii. 3.

When a man has wilfully violated the radiant moral law, it is instinctive, if the eyes are kept open to its light, to feel that something ought to be done to bring about satisfactory relations between the rebellious spirit and the Author of that insufferably resplendent moral enactment. What ought to be done? The soul should acquire similarity of feeling with God. Without that, its peace is scientifically

known to be a natural impossibility. But is that enough? Face to face with self-evident truths, can an unfettered human spirit which has behind it a record of disloyalty find intelligent and wholly tremorless peace, even after it is delivered from the love of what ought not to be? When an evil man has reformed, does he have a scientifically justifiable right to feel that his own excellence, taken wholly alone, *ought* to secure his entire harmony with the nature of things? What do the organic and ineradicable human instincts, scientifically interpreted, say on this point?

Lady Macbeth, Shakspeare tells us, could not wash her hands white, although she had learned to hate her crime so as to be made insane by the memory of it.

Doctor.—Look how she rubs her hands!

Gentleman.—It is an accustomed action with her to seem thus washing her hands. I have known her to continue in this a quarter of an hour.

Lady Macbeth.—Yet here's the spot.

Doctor.—Hark! she speaks. I will set down what comes from her.

Lady Macbeth.—Out, damned spot! out, I say! . . . Here's the smell of the blood still. All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand.

Doctor.—More needs she the divine than the physician. God, God, forgive us all!

Macbeth, act v. sc. 1.

Is your Shakspeare a partisan, when, describing in Macbeth the laws of human nature, he makes him say,—

"Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No: this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green—one red."

"Methought I heard a voice cry, 'Sleep no more!
Macbeth does murder sleep,'—the innocent sleep,
Sleep that knits up the ravelled sleeve of care,
The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
Chief nourisher in life's feast.
Still it cried, 'Sleep no more!' to all the house:
'Glamis hath murdered sleep; and therefore Cawdor
Shall sleep no more, Macbeth shall sleep no more.'"

"I could not say 'Amen'
When they did say 'God bless us.'"

Lady Macbeth.—Consider it not so deeply.
Macbeth.—But wherefore could I not pronounce "Amen"?
I had most need of blessing, and "Amen"
Stuck in my throat.
Lady Macbeth.—These deeds must not be thought
After these ways: so, it will make us mad.

Ibid., act ii. sc. 2

These deeds must be thought of after these ways; so it will make us wise.

Not Plato, not Aristotle, not Voltaire, not Strauss, not Renan, not Parker, can wash Lady Macbeth's red right hand.

Shakspeare describes the laws of your sleep and mine.

Instead of great literature, do you prefer actual life, to illustrate the laws of human nature? A schoolmate of mine lately committed murder. He was a foremost man in a church. He was nearly fifty years of age. Through thirty years he had suffered from an unhappy marriage. God knows what his trials had been. But the man was sane. He was in health. Not a whisper has been raised in his defence, although he is to be tried for his life in a few weeks. Coming home from an evening gathering, his wife and he passed into their house together, apparently at peace with each other. Half an hour later, when she was asleep, the monster with an axe took his wife's life.

Do not avert your gaze, my friends, from this lurid point of light. The narrative is of a piece with much else that has actually happened in the nights and days of our softly-rolling globe; and yet you say it is not philosophy. I affirm that events like these are facts, and that philosophy must face facts of every description, or once for all cease to call itself scientific. This piercing gleam out of experience is blue fire indeed; but not a little radiance of that sort has crept before now through the volcanic crevices of the world. When by this ominous but actual lamp you gaze intently upon the glitter of this axe, and upon the flashing of the afterward dripping blood, you will find that many problems as to the peace of the soul are here exposed to view, under a flame intense enough to permit their scientific examination.

Both these persons were my schoolmates. I knew each of them well, and think I have some reason to say that I understand what, probably, the whole interior sky was in this man. One of the things that proved his guilt, aside from his confession, which he made at the end of a week, was a remark which he curiously enough repeated to his neighbours months before his crime: "Can I not repent, even if I do a great wrong, and so repent as to go to heaven? Is it not taught that a man may repent and be saved, although he does something very bad?" The man was not well educated. He had in his mind the query, whether one might not commit some atrocity, and yet repent, and by the good grace of Almighty God, who is of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, be saved through the Atonement. Perhaps he thought heaven was a place rather than a state.

Confucius said on the Yellow Sea, "Heaven means principle." What if a man permanently loses principle? must he or must he not lose heaven? Under the law of judicial blindness, is it possible for a man to lose principle permanently?

This man, befogged but not insane, took up the theory—this was proved before the jury—that he might commit murder, and yet afterward repent, and go to heaven. And he committed murder; and I think his chief temptation, aside from vexatious married life, was that lie whispered to him out of the very bowels of Gehenna, that the Atonement is enough to save a man who makes a bargain of it, and tries to cheat God. That man did on a large scale what it is possible you and I have been trying to do on a small scale. We do not commit murder; but we would, if we had our own way, very gladly

cheat God of half our life at least, because we remember that we can repent at last, and all will come out well. Some men think, that, if they repent after they go out of this life, all will be well; that is rather a large application of this principle.

Pardon me, gentlemen; but you must be shocked into due attention to the monstrous caricatures of religious truth which often exist in half-educated minds, and which underlie a large part of the infidel attack on Christianity in this latest age, as they have underlaid every attack in every past age.

In this kind of analysis of the actual and typical experiences of men, I find more philosophy than I can put into an hour's declamation. Here is a gleam right out of human nature, and from our day; and I wish you to look at it while we ask how far self-evident truth can teach us what the Atonement can do. I affirm that the Atonement must be something that does not bargain with God for a piece of life or the whole of it. It must not undermine principle. We are assured by self-evident truth, that the Atonement, if it is to be effectual, must in some way provide for similarity of feeling with God. Conscience, with all its great operations, exists in us, and is going on into the Unseen Holy with us; and we must be at peace with all its multiplex lines of activity.

This man committed murder deliberately. Perhaps he now has had grace given him to loathe his crime. In his cell he sings hymns, it is said; is glad to receive religious solace; hopes that his execution may be the gateway to heaven; and his reliance is all in the Atonement. He really has come to hate, let us suppose, all that God hates, and to love all that God loves. He has, let us grant, what is called the new birth. *Does that erase or cover the record of the murderer?* Let us be mercilessly straightforward in our answer to this question, for it touches your case and mine. I am approaching a fundamental self-contradiction of the lawless and sharply mischievous dreaming of many, as to the nature and sequences of our refusal to say "I will," when the Divine Voice says "I ought." This man has learned to loathe the murder; but the record of his crime is behind him. Do you think that he is, or ought to be, at peace, simply because he really loathes everything that leads to murder? Here is a question which I put before you in the name of the scientific method, begging you to look on it with a love of clear ideas, and wholly apart from any conclusions in religious science. Do you think that human nature, with the great operations of conscience in it, and especially with that prophetic office which anticipates the continuance of the approval and disapproval which we know inevitably follow our acts, good and bad; that sense that this approval or disapproval is not only from ourselves, but from a Somewhat and Some One who is in us, but not of us, is likely to allow this man, in the name of his own excellence alone, to be wholly at peace about this record of murder, even after he has reformed? Let us fasten our thoughts on this one phase of human experience typical of range after range of human crime, and let us, if possible, attain clearness on the subject, whatever theory stands or falls. "*Was klar ist, wahr ist,*" the Germans

say,—"What is clear is true." There is a whole range of liberal thinking which asserts, that, when a man reforms, he has done enough; and that style of thought I wish to test—by what? By the street; by the axioms of self-evident truth applied by the scientific method. My schoolmate who has murdered his wife has repented, let us say, and he is at the edge of death itself. It may be that the first spirit he will meet in the Unseen Holy will be that which he sent thither before its time. No, not the first spirit: he will meet God there. He meets God now. In conscience, the still small voice is God's voice. He listens to that; he remembers the past; he knows he has learned to loathe his crime; but is that enough? Was it enough for Macbeth? Was it enough for Lady Macbeth?

When a great question concerning the organization of human nature comes up, the best way to decide it is to notice not only the deepest literatures of the world, but a long range of experience in history, and see how man has acted age after age. Have the nations acted as if they thought reform was enough to give peace after a great crime has been committed? We know that the heathen religions of the world have given large space to penance and sacrifice. I do not wish to exaggerate the amazing record; but there is enough to show that more than much has been done age after age, in history, by this desire to be at peace with conscience and with what is to be met behind the veil. These heathen religions have indicated in unspeakable ways that peace is not attained even after reformation. The devotees of those religions have desired to be calm before God; and many deep teachers have taught, with more or less distinctness, the necessity of loving what God loves, and hating what God hates. But how has the human heart acted? The whole history of the race, I claim, has proved that men in general have not felt ready to go before God in their own righteousness even after they have reformed. My schoolmate here has learned to hate his murder; and now he must go before God. He has the righteousness, let us hope, of loving and hating what God loves and hates; but there is that past behind him. *Conscience is in him; and now, when the operations of conscience have their free course, is that man, as he steps into the Unseen Holy, ready to depend on nothing but his own righteousness?*

Gentlemen, the greatest question in religious science is before you, and, I hope, in such a concrete form as to be intelligible. Keeping now your unpartisan and fathomless Shakspeare open, and not removing your thoughts from this concrete case of to-day, will you allow me to recite analytically a few self-evident truths concerning the Atonement?

1. It is self-evident that a thing cannot be and be at the same time and in the same sense.

If transcendentalism has a corner-stone of adamant, it is this axiom,—that a thing cannot be and be at the same instant and in the same signification. When will a philosophy arise that will undermine a certainty without which philosophy itself cannot exist?

2. It is, therefore, self-evident that we cannot be at once at peace and at variance with conscience;

3. That we cannot be at once at peace and at variance with the record of our past;

4. That we cannot be at once at peace and at variance with God.

The supremely terrific and supremely alluring cans and cannots of the nature of things are all implied in the words, "God cannot deny Himself." Here we put our feet upon adamant which Thor's hammer cannot pulverize, without, at the same time, reducing itself to powder. The nature of things has in it no fate at all, but is the total outcome of God's free choice; and His free choice is the total outcome of His infinite perfection. He cannot deny Himself; and so for ever and for ever it will be true that the axioms of the nature of things are adamant, not only for this world, but also for the next.

5. It is self-evident, that, while we continue to exist as personalities of the same plan we now exhibit in our natures, conscience will be something we cannot escape from.

> "The mind in its own place and in itself
> Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven."

6. It is self-evident that our past is irreversible.

Do you say that when I assert in the name of the nature of conscience, and of the irreversibleness of the past, that there will be regret in the universe for ever and for ever on account of the losses sin has occasioned, and when I affirm that some part of that shadow will fall on the sea of glass, and will not be invisible from the Great White Throne, I come near uttering blasphemy? Does the Bible utter blasphemy when it says there is a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world? My proposition is only that biblical proposition in scientific shape. No doubt all the losses sin has caused were foreseen; and no doubt the plan for the rescue of men existed in the councils of Omnipotence from eternity. No doubt there was, therefore, as the unsearchable depth of that metaphor asserts, a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. He whom we dare not name had sympathy from the first for the distress He foresaw would result from the abuse of that gift of freewill, without which there can be no virtue. For ever and for ever the losses caused by what ought not to have been will continue. The Scriptures therefore speak of a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, or of a shadow that is not invisible, and never has been invisible, and never will be invisible, from the Great White Throne. Before you accuse scientific speech of blasphemy instead of biblical depth of metaphor on this theme, remember that the Atonement is not an afterthought. The plan of redemption is no insertion into the universe to correct mistakes. It is a part of the perfect purpose of Him who was, and is, and is to come, who, in all eternities past and in all eternities future, will be faithful to the plan which was, and is, and is to come.

7. It is self-evident that we cannot escape from our record;

8. That we cannot escape from God;

9. *That harmonization with our environment is the indispensable condition of peace of soul.*

10. *That our environment in this world and the next consists unalterably of God, conscience, and our record;*

11. That we must be free from the love of what ought not to be before we can be at peace with the moral law which requires what ought to be.

"Si vis fugere a Deo; fuge ad Deum," says the Latin proverb. "If you wish to flee from God, flee to God;" for the only way to flee from Him is to flee to Him.

12. It is scientifically incontrovertible that conscience produces in us a sense of ill-desert whenever we say "I will not" to the Divine "I ought;"

13. That conscience produces in us this sense of ill-desert whenever we accurately remember the record of our intelligent refusal to say "I will" to the Divine "I ought;"

14. That no lapse of time lessens this sense of ill-desert, if the memory of such refusal is vivid and thoughtful.

Forty-eight hours ago we were passing through the anniversary of the assassination of President Lincoln. Some years have elapsed since that atrocity; but have our opinions changed as to the blameworthiness of the principal actor in it? If the assassination in 1865 ought not to have been, it will be true for ever that it ought not to have been. It is a long time since the world had fixed opinions about Nero and Caligula; but we do not think of changing our opinions simply because of the passage of time. Do we not disapprove all that ought to be disapproved, and do so once for all? It is a terrible certainty that Judas Iscariot, if he ever blamed himself once justly, must continue to blame himself for ever and for ever. There is a noose that a man may put about his own neck and tie, but which he cannot untie. There is irreversibility in the past; and the action which ought not to have been will always be regarded as such when we vividly and faithfully remember its character. It will be impossible for us not to disapprove such an action; for conscience is a part of our nature, and its natural operation is to disapprove all that ought not to be. *Murder ought not to have been; and Macbeth will never think that it ought to have been, or make it not to have been.* You were born in Boston; can Omnipotence make it true you were not born in Boston? You have done what ought not to have been; can Omnipotence make it true that what ought not to have been ought to have been? Conscience is so fearfully and wonderfully made, that you must for ever and for ever disapprove what ought not to have been. When a man has had an arm amputated, it cannot be put back; it is gone once for all.

How evident it is, that, under natural law, a man may drift on in careless æsthetic ways till he loses the perception of the beautiful! He learns to love that which æsthetically ought not to be; and he blunts his æsthetic sense until you say he could, by a long process of culture, be brought back, perhaps, but never will be. You say his probation is over æsthetically. On every conceivable side, except the moral and religious, character is subject to probations, and attains permanence; but on these sides a whim of the luxurious ages forbids

you to hear the truth which all great and strenuous ages have asserted, namely, that probations of course exist there as they do elsewhere. Undeniably there are æsthetical probations, physical probations, and intellectual probations. But now you affirm, you who assert the unity of law, that there are no moral probations. Do you perceive any self-contradiction in that intellectual proceeding?

14. It is a scientifically verifiable fact of experience, that conscience, when we keep our eyes open to light, produces in us, besides the sense of ill-desert, a feeling that something ought to be done to satisfy the rightly resplendent majesty and the plainly unconditional and eternal authority of the violated law which says "I ought."

If we have agreed up to this proposition, we shall not part here. Will you remember who committed the murder? What were you thinking a few minutes ago, when I outlined before you a typical human atrocity? The man has learned to loathe his crime. Were you ready to say that he had done enough? Something ought to be done besides his learning to be sorry that he had murdered his wife. You were very sure of this face to face with the concrete case. You say that this piece of current history is a fact, but that I am now leading you into vapour. Well, go back to that scrap of red-hot iron out of the pit, and touch it. It is not a fog. It burns up fog. It is, although blue flame, destructive of all vapour. And you, face to face with the concrete example, are not likely, in that man's case, to believe that the perfumes of Arabia will sweeten the hand that has driven the axe through the skull of the nearest and dearest. That man is not authorized to be at peace, even after he has reformed, if he depends only on his own excellence. That alone cannot give him peace of soul; and the question is, whether anything else can. One of the sceptical late schools of thought asserts that science knows nothing of Atonement for sin. All causes that are once put in action produce effects which become causes, and which must take their course. If we bring into existence evil causes, they will produce their natural effects; and we cannot erase or cover the past. The idea of a man being relieved from the natural results of his sin is in conflict with clear thought. These are propositions which just now are receiving indorsement from infidelity itself. Your old style of doubt is slowly undermined by the newer, I had almost said by that more Christian style, which is prepared to be amazed if it can be shown clearly that any great arrangement can deliver us from the terrors of the past. "Plato, Plato," said Socrates, "perhaps God can forgive deliberate sin; but I do not see how."

15. It is scientifically clear from the facts of personal and general experience, that, in the absence of satisfaction, conscience forebodes punishment;

16. It forebodes this with such pertinacity and force, that the prophetic action of conscience, or presentiment of penalty, according to the confession of all great literature and philosophy, makes cowards of us all;

17. That it forebodes punishment, not only in this life, but in time to come beyond death.

To and fro behind the veil, conscience, in anticipation, paces up and down, oftener than over any path in this life. It would not thus by organic instinct pace up and down behind the veil, if there were nothing there. Did we anticipate nothing behind the veil, conscience could not make cowards of us all; for death would be release.

18. This foreboding has done as much work in the history of religion among men as any other instinct, and thus has proved its strength.

19. The foreboding does not cease when we become free from the love of sin.

Remember Lady Macbeth's fruitless use of water; look back to my schoolmate.

When the hoofs of the horses of his pursuers were rattling after him on the old Roman pavements, Nero caused himself to be put to death; he passed out of the world by virtual suicide; and history says that his look was not a look, but a glare. He had not been misled by a Christian education. A distinguished infidel had troubles of conscience; but he attributed them to a nervous shock he received in his youth. Nero did not receive any nervous shock in his youth; Caligula did not. Boston may probably have men in it who never had a nervous shock in youth, but who have illustrated all the great laws of conscience, and who have been made afraid before a Somewhat or a Some One in whom it has been said there is nothing to fear. "Since I was seven years old," Parker affirmed, "I have had no fear of God."

20. It is a scientifically verifiable fact of experience, therefore, that the absence of the love of sin in the present does not bring us to peace when we vividly and thoughtfully recall our record of sin in the past, and allow our native instincts free course.

21. It is self-evident that personal ill-desert cannot be removed from person to person.

What!—sin not taken off us, and put upon our Lord? our guilt not borne by our Saviour? No; not in the sense in which you understand guilt. Blameworthiness is not transferred from us to Him, and cannot be. We know that our Lord had no sin, and that there can be no removing of personal ill-desert from one personality, and putting it upon another. That word "guilt" is a fog, unless you remember that behind it lie two meanings.

22. Guilt signifies, first, personal blameworthiness; second, liableness to suffer in order to preserve the honour of a violated law.

In the former sense guilt cannot be transferred from person to person; in the latter it can be. Our Lord is no murderer, no perjurer. There is no divergence of theological opinion from self-evident truth when self-evident truth declares that personal demerit is not transferable from personality to personality. Ghastliest of all misconceptions ever put before this city or any other is the assertion that the doctrine of the Atonement implies, first, that an innocent being is made guilty in the sense of being personally blameworthy; and, secondly, that that innocent being is punished in the sense of suffering pain for personal ill-desert. Both these propositions all clear thought

discards, all religious science condemns. We have no doctrine of the Atonement which declares that personal demerit is laid upon our Lord, or that, in the strict sense of the word, He suffered punishment; that is, pain inflicted for personal blameworthiness. He had no personal blameworthiness: He was an innocent being, as He always will be, and never did, can, or will suffer punishment in the strict sense of the word.

23. Guilt in the second sense, or liability to suffering in order to preserve the honour of a violated law, may be removed when the author of the law substitutes his own voluntary sacrificial chastisement for our punishment.

24. When such a substitution is made, the highest possible motives to loyalty to that Ruler are brought to bear upon the rebellious subject.

25. If any great arrangement on this principle has been made by the Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of the universe, that arrangement meets with exactness the deepest wants of man. It is the highest possible dissuasive from the love of sin; it is the only possible deliverance from the guilt of sin, in the sense, not of personal blameworthiness, but of liability to suffering in order to preserve the honour of the violated law, which says "I ought."

26. *Such a great arrangement may, therefore, with scientific exactness, be known to be needed, and so needed as to be called properly the desire of all nations.*

27. The Atonement which reason can prove is needed, Revelation declares has been made.

On the slope of Beacon Hill, a New England author, who ought always to be named side by side with Pestalozzi, once made it a rule, in a school full of subtle thought, that, if a pupil violated its regulations, the master should substitute his own voluntary sacrificial chastisement for that pupil's punishment. Bronson Alcott will allow me to say here and now, in his presence, that he has told me that this one regulation almost Christianized his school. The pupils were quite young, and for that reason the measure was effective among them. He was no dreamer. He would never have adopted this measure except with the sensitive. Nevertheless, the operation of these untutored, hardly unfolded, and therefore spontaneously natural hearts, indicates what man is. "One day," says Bronson Alcott, "I called up before me a pupil eight or ten years of age, who had violated an important regulation of the school. All the pupils were looking on, and they knew what the rule of the school was. I put the ruler into the hand of that offending pupil; I extended my hand; I told him to strike. The instant the boy saw my extended hand, and heard my command to strike, I saw a struggle begin in his face. A new light sprang up in his countenance. A new set of shuttles seemed to be weaving a new nature within him. I kept my hand extended, and the school was in tears. The boy struck once, and he himself burst into tears; and I constantly watched his face, and he seemed in a bath of fire, which was giving him a new nature. He had a different mood toward the school and toward the violated law. The boy seemed

transformed by the idea that I should take chastisement in place of his punishment. He went back to his seat, and ever after was one of the most docile of all the pupils in that school, although he had been at first one of the rudest." My friends, you know that I believe that law is a unit throughout the whole extent of time and space, and that, if you can measure a little arc of the moral law as exhibited in this school of the Concord philosopher, you will obtain some glimpse of the principle on which the Atonement operates.

28. The definition of the Atonement is, the substitution of the voluntary sacrificial chastisement of Christ for man's punishment.

Why do I make a distinction between chastisement and punishment? Because facts require me to do so. In this example was Bronson Alcott punished? Not at all. Was Bronson Alcott guilty? Not at all. Was the personal demerit of that pupil transferred to Bronson Alcott? Not at all. Such transference of personal demerit is an impossibility in the nature of things. Nevertheless, we have in Boston a school of theology and preaching, and a wide range of popular sentiment, which regards Christianity as teaching, in the doctrine of the Atonement, a self-contradiction, an absurdity; namely, the idea that personal demerit is transferred from one individual to another.

James Martineau says that the idea of a vicarious Atonement is abhorrent to him, because it includes the idea that Christ, an innocent being, was punished. I wish to admit that Orthodoxy has been careless in her phrases again and again. I do not know how many have been thrown into the lawless license of liberalism by that misconception of the Atonement which asserts that in it an innocent being was punished, and personal demerit was transferred. But law is one through the universe; and I have a perfect right to stand on this example of Alcott's school. I affirm that you know perfectly well that Bronson Alcott, in the strict sense, did not suffer punishment. He was innocent. What did happen? Bronson Alcott voluntarily accepted chastisement, not punishment. What is the definition of punishment? Pain inflicted for personal blameworthiness. What is chastisement? Pain suffered for the improvement of the one who suffers it, or for the benefit of those who witness it. Does the latter imply guilt? Not at all. A mother has a vicious son, and she has done her duty by him, let us suppose. She has no remorse; for I assume she is free from all guilt for her son's bad habits; but she suffers terribly. Is that pain punishment? No, chastisement. We must make this distinction, in Boston at least, where so long the caricature has been placarded on the highest walls, asserting that, in the Atonement, punishment is inflicted on an innocent being, and personal demerit transferred. I never was taught that Christ suffered punishment. I had to learn out of books that any one made it an objection to Christianity that an innocent being was punished. If religious science will begin the fashion, and never use a term of importance without defining it, I for one will try to keep step with that fashion as one of the most blessed of all modern improvements, and one I should like, by the contagion of general acceptance, to force upon all who differ from Christian views. In defining saving faith we must distinguish chastisement from punish-

ment ; the chastisement of our offences was laid upon our Lord. It is nowhere presumed in the Scriptures that personal demerit can be transferred from individuality to individuality.

What happened further in the school? Suppose that boy had been called up and punished a second time, after the master had been chastised, would that have been right? Would the school have said that was right? The master has accepted chastisement voluntarily ; and now you cannot call that boy up, and punish him a second time. The school would say that is wrong. It is against all human nature to do that. Why? Because justice is satisfied? No ; but because it has been sufficiently honoured. Distributive justice is waived, while general justice is satisfied. What has the master done? He has so substituted his own chastisement for the pupil's punishment as to remove the liableness of the pupil to suffer in order to preserve the honour of the law of the school. But the master is not to blame? No. The master has not been punished? No. Assuredly this case, on the human side, looks intelligible ; I think I can understand that side. But do you mean to say that in the arc of that little example are involved principles that sweep the whole curve of the Atonement, or show in part how God's chastisement was substituted for our punishment? Yes, by more than a glimpse ; for law is the same everywhere.

The master paid the debt of that boy, you say. He did not pay it in the sense of removing the pupil's ill-desert, but only in that of removing his liableness to suffer to preserve the honour of the law of the school. The illustration is, of course, imperfect on many points ; but on a few it is serviceable, and I present it only to throw light on these. It is perfectly clear that the pupil by his own act made himself liable to suffer in order to preserve the honour of the law he violated. If that liableness was to be removed, it was necessary something should be done ; and the school would have gone to ruin if nothing had been done to preserve the honour of its law. I understand perfectly, too, that when this boy goes back, a motive has been brought to bear on him that will transform him, if anything can. Nothing can take hold of human nature like such condescension, justice, and love.

Would the boy have acted so if he had been a Greek boy? Any sensitive free being, man or angel, would have been affected as that boy was by the command to substitute the chastisement of the master for his own punishment. A new set of shuttles would have sprung into action in an Esquimaux or a Greek boy in a similar case. I have seen a Greek boy whirl his top among the ruins of the Parthenon, and the Roman boy his top upon the old pavements that the chariot-wheels of Cæsar had scarred ; and I think that any boy from any quarter of the globe would have felt, in the case supposed, that the master had not lowered the dignity of the law of the school at all ; that the law which had been violated had not been treated lightly ; and that, if this boy wanted motives for loyalty, what he would need to do would be to remember vividly the chastisement of his master in place of his own punishment.

In the case of that scholar, guilt meant two things : first, his own personal blameworthiness ; second, his liability to suffer to preserve

the honour and vindicate the authority of the law of the school. Now, guilt in the first sense never is removed (HODGE'S *Theology, passim*). It is not the doctrine of the Atonement that personal demerit is taken off a man by saving faith. It was always true of that scholar that he violated the law. His personal demerit had not been transferred to Bronson Alcott at all. The record of rebellion is always behind that boy. Only his liableness to suffering for the preservation of the honour of the law of the school has been removed. That latter sense of guilt is the meaning of the word when we say the Atonement removes man's guilt. *It is scientifically certain that, in the sense of removing this liableness, Bronson Alcott had power to pay the debt which that boy owed, and that he paid it by substituting his own chastisement for that boy's punishment.* That is a straightforward, plain case, and you can teach any honest man to see that distinction. Hereafter, when scepticism with its long-eared hallelujahs comes to you, and says that the Atonement is a doctrine outgrown by all clear thought, because it teaches that an innocent being was punished, and that personal demerit was transferred from one individual to another, and that therefore advanced thought must abandon the central idea of Christian culture as plainly barbaric, the result of some Platonic interfusion of thought in the early centuries, or some heathenis hinheritance from Judaism—in short, that this scheme is self-contradictory, or at war with axiomatic truth—please ask that singer of empty anthems to be clear himself; to state what he would say in a human case such as I have supposed; and then whether he dare affirm, in the name of the unity of law, which he proclaims as the first truth of science, that, if there has been any such Atonement made in the universe, it is not what we infinitely need.

My friends, exact and cool science knows with precision that we want just this more than unspeakably, if anything like this has been done for us. We want it, first, to pay our debt to the school of the universe, in the sense of removing liableness to suffering to preserve the honour of violated law; and, next, to give us immeasurable motives to loyalty. There is surely nothing that really changes the heart so quickly as a sight of this substitution of chastisement for punishment, whether it be in the human case of a school, or in the revealed case of the school of the universe. Lift this feeling of the poor boy into all the dignity it naturally assumes when you take it as a type of the moral law, a unit throughout the universe; lift that law until the arc we can measure has become the segment of a circle large enough to reach from here to the galaxies; and then let all the constellations shine on the circle as you carry its line far past the spot over which Boötes is driving his hunting-dogs in the leash of sidereal fire; carry on that arc until stars fade out, and galaxies, and all the infinities and eternities of time past and time to come are embraced within it, and then what have you? One little point of light—the whole of it is no more—to hold up before the noon of Christ's chastisement substituted for man's punishment.

You wish to be born anew? Look on the Cross. You wish to take God gladly as your Lord? Look on Him as your Saviour. You wish to drop all the heart-burdens of slavishness, and you desire to

come into the obedience of delight? Look on the Cross. You want gladly to render allegiance to God as King? Look on the Cross. There is nothing that frees us from the love of sin like looking on Him who has delivered us from the guilt of it.

Speaking philosophically, addressing you in the mood of cool precision, I affirm that if the great things man wants are riddance from the love of sin, and deliverance from the guilt of it, we can obtain the first best, and the latter only, by looking on the Cross. Those old words have unfathomable depth; and he who is to be born anew must sit beside that pupil in Bronson Alcott's school, must imagine the benches to be the galaxies, and his human companions the angels and archangels who bow down on the golden floor, and on the shore of the sea of glass, and in presence of the Great White Throne, and cry out, "Holy, holy, holy Lord God Almighty; Thou art worthy, for Thou didst so love the world that Thou gavest Thine only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

May I summarize the scientific truths contained in this discussion by asserting, in the name of the axioms of the nature of things, that it is clear—

1. That the master of that school was not guilty.

2. That he suffered, in the strict sense, not punishment, but chastisement.

3. That he had power to remove from the pupil the liability to suffer to preserve the honour of the law of the school.

4. That the pupil's peace before the law of the school is the result, not of his own work, but of the master's work; and not of the master's moral influence and general character merely, but of his substitution of chastisement for punishment.

5. That, nevertheless, the pupil must be loyal to the master, and thus, though not saved by works cannot be saved without works.

6. That it is not simply the moral influence, or character and general example, of the master which transforms the boy into the mood of loyalty.

7. But that this substitution of voluntary sacrificial chastisement for punishment is the force which throws the shuttles that weave a new character in the soul thus delivered from punishment; and that although the record of disobedience cannot be changed, and must be remembered with regret, such memory, when loyalty is once made so perfect in love and trust as to cast out fear, will be but a spur to adoration of the condescension shown to the released soul; and, in the multitudinous anthem of its gratitude, this shadow on the sea of glass will, for that spirit only, be by contrast an enhancement of the glory of the light on the sea of glass.

On a summer evening, it has often been to me, on both sides of the Atlantic, a solemn joy to lie down alone at a grove's edge by the side of the ocean, and look into the infinite azure until the stars appear. In the rustle of the grove, one may hear thus all the forests of all the zones of the thrifty, jubilant, wheeling world; the soul may touch all shores with the howling, salt, uneasy sea. As the stars

come out, I love to lift above my thoughts Richter's apologue, which represents an angel as once catching a man up into the infinite of space, and moving with him from galaxy to galaxy, until the human heart fainted, and called out, "End is there none of the universe of God?" And the constellations answered, "End is there none that ever yet we heard of." Again the angel flew on with the man past immeasurable architraves, and immensity after immensity, sown with rushing worlds; and the human heart fainted again, and cried out, "End is there none of the universe of God: lo! also, there is no beginning." But if, while I, thus entranced, look into the sky, you bring above my gaze the page of the gospel recording the fact of the Atonement, all other revelations of the Divine glory appear in contrast but chaff and dust.

VI.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

MODERATE DRINKING AND DISREPUTABLE THEATRES

SUPPOSE that I have here in one hand a goblet filled with alcohol, and in the other a spoon containing the white of an egg, and that I turn the egg out into the alcohol. What has science to say about moderate drinking? Precisely what this experiment proves. The albuminous substance in the white of the egg is hardened by the action of the liquid, and so hardened, that, if I could have put the egg in round, it would have been fixed in that shape, with such a degree of firmness as to permit me to roll it across this platform. All glue-like or colloid substances, as your books say, are hardened by alcohol, because they contain a large percentage of water; and we know that alcohol is as thirsty for water as ever an inebriate is for alcohol. But the brain and the nerves contain a great amount of this same colloidal or glue-like substance. Drench the blood with alcohol, and you harden the brain, as I have hardened this egg in the goblet. The very latest investigation begins to speak in tones of great emphasis against moderate drinking, and this in the name of the natural effect of alcohol in hardening all the glue-like substances of the body.

We say that the heart beats faster when we indulge moderately in the use of intoxicating beverages, and that a cheerful flush comes to the face. But perpetual health is a perpetual intoxication. I had rather have the flush that our Anglo-Saxon ancestry gave us, and that we should keep if we loved the open sky as they did, or even open windows, as Charles Kingsley or Victor Hugo advise us to do, than any flush which comes, as alcohol brings it, by relaxing the nerve-fibres in the circulatory vessels. The quickening of the circulation of the blood by alcoholic stimulants was never quite understood until within the last twenty years, and perhaps not fully until within ten years. What makes the heart beat faster after moderate drinking? Is this hastened action a good effect or a bad? Is it disease, or is it the invigoration of the normal activity of the system? Suppose that I have here a steam-engine with india-rubber pipes. Around the pipes are delicate fibres constricting them, but liable to melt whenever the temperature of the room rises above a certain point. It is very evident, that, if I were to raise the temperature of the room to such a degree as to melt all these little constricting fibres from the india-rubber pipes of this steam-engine, the moment they were melted, or relaxed, the engine, without any more fire in its furnaces, would begin to move faster. Why? Because, by the melting of the delicate fibres around the india-rubber pipes, the latter have themselves become relaxed, and so there is evidently less friction for the rushing steam to meet; and therefore, without any increased force of fire, you would have a quickening of the action of the engine. Would that result be an improvement of the normal conditions of the machinery? Not at all. It would be an indication of a disarrangement. Just so in the human system. We have now learned that even moderate drinking, in ninety cases out of a hundred, temporarily paralyzes the nerves that govern the

minute muscles that hold the arteries and the veins in proper tensions. This injury of the finest nerves allows the circulatory system to become relaxed, and so the heart beats faster; but there is no more force in the heart. The whole effect is like the acceleration produced in the motions of a watch when you take the pallets off the machinery. Dr. Richardson, Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, has lately told us in his "Cantor Lectures on Alcohol," a work introduced to America by Dr. Willard Parker, that "alcohol paralyzes the minute blood-vessels, and allows them to become dilated. The dilatation follows on the reduction of nervous control, which reduction has been induced by alcohol" (*Lecture* iii.). Therefore there is a flush in the face; and not only there, but the flush pervades the entire system, and especially the brain, for which everybody knows that alcohol has a peculiar local affinity.

Go to the Hunterian Museum in London, and men will show you skeletons of two lions, both poisoned, and with the same kind of poison. There is a mark on these skeletons at the point where that poison expended its chief force. All physicians know that poisons have a local action within the system, and that sometimes a rifle-ball has no more definite point of impingement upon whatever it is aimed at than a poison has in relation to the object against the welfare of which it is directed. We must remember that the special local affinity of alcohol is for the brain; that the relaxing of the fibres which allows the heart to beat faster is not a sign of health, but of disease; and that the moderate drinker, in ninety cases out of a hundred, is thus honeycombed through and through by this relaxation. Its effects are seen first in a lack of moral feeling. But, when fever strikes him down, when cholera attacks him, when sun's heat and life's struggle come together, he breaks more easily than he otherwise would. In your remaining ten cases, perhaps, there may be apparent immunity for a while; but in old age a man is more brittle than he would be otherwise; and in the next generation what do you get? Why, when there is a confirmed and inveterate habit of wine-drinking, or other habitual and prolonged although moderate alcoholic stimulation, the succession of generations differs in character usually not very far from what it was in Webster's family,—colossal strength in the father of Webster, colossal strength in Webster, erratic strength in the son, lack of control in the grandson,—a boy who made of his grandfather's amusements his whole occupation; and what the next generation would have been, the law of hereditary descent will tell you. Inexhaustible strength, eccentricity, moral weakness, and then the condition which your "Atlantic Monthly," choice about its language, describes by the adjective "spooney." Even giants may deteriorate to this stage in four generations.

Mr. Gough, who used to be paid nine dollars for three lectures, has lately made us all his debtors by a plea, in Christ's name, against moderate drinking. The Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world is shining now more intensely than in any previous century on the physical deteriorations that come from coarse bodily habits. On all the physical vices God is throwing the progress of the sciences, as we throw spadefuls of earth on a coffin. "Apples of Sodom," "Circe's Enchantment," was the ancient language about all the physical vices; but the microscope and the scalpel are revealing to us, in characters of fire, the depth of those old metaphors. Physical vices are overrated, and, if exact science had her way, would be outgrown by all but the dissipated, who are always the dizzy-pated.

Christianity so values the body, that a Holy Sepulchre, where once an angel sat at the head, and another angel at the feet, not of a body, but of a place where a body had lain, drew to it all Europe in crusade after crusade, making the Italian cities rich, founding the Hanse towns, wrenching liberty for the

municipal classes out of the gripe of nobles, and so, in ultimate result, writing Magna Charta and the American Constitution. It is historically true to say that the crusades put the ballot in the poor man's hand, or began liberty ; and they were in great measure the outcome of the reverence of Christianity for the incontrovertible fact that a physical frame had been the supreme human temple of the Holy Ghost.

In a similar spirit she, and she only, has for ages effectively taught what science at last proclaims, that, if any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy ; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are. It is a small sneer of scepticism that Christianity cares nothing for the flesh. Only she glorifies it. Only Christianity makes the home possible. Mr. Seward came back from a tour around the world ; and the shrewdest thing he said about Asia was, "In all the East there is not a home."

In Athens, one night, walking to the south-east corner of the Acropolis, I looked down upon the great Dionysic Theatre, uncovered in 1862 by Hofbaurath Strack's German shovels. Some of the marble chairs, a few of the statues, half the seats, a multitude of the inscriptions, are still in their places. On one of the white thrones there is a lion's foot, with the tip of the claw yet savagely sharp, sculptured, perhaps, in Hadrian's time. Socrates once ironically commended Agathon, a poet, for having exhibited his wisdom in this theatre, or, at least, at this place, before thirty thousand spectators. Fully twenty thousand or thirty thousand people were accustomed to assemble at dawn here, in a semicircle cut in the slope of the Acropolis, and to listen to tragedies, the voice of which even now, as we read them, is to the ear of thought a majestic philosophical or theological anthem. Æschylus and Sophocles and Euripides so taught ethics and religion, that the stage in the ancient Athenian democracy must be compared to the pulpit in modern times. Never was it the frivolous and sometimes filthy thing which is to-day called a theatre. Beneath the shadow of the Parthenon, and of Minerva herself, the free people sat down, as Æschylus says, "under the wings of gods." Along the beach at Phalerum, where Demosthenes declaimed to the waves, and beneath the sharp hills of Ægina and Salamis, the blue sea palpitated before the spectators. The chief part of the Ilissus plain, Mount Hymettus, the ancient Agora and Pnyx, and numberless temples, were in view ; above the unroofed amphitheatre hung the infinite depth of the mysteriously soft and bright sky of Greece. Subtle allusions to this outlook, abounding in Euripedes, Æschylus, and Sophocles, prove curiously in detail, that here Greek poetry, in the early spring mornings, found earth, sea, sky, and historic monuments a most organizing inspiration, and fit to match an audience composed of all that was then the most brilliant in the world.

Such was the theatre in ancient Athens. Would Euripedes think it better than this in the modern Athens? Does the classic drama flourish here, or in New York, or in Chicago? Is not the low always the slow æsthetically? But is the low always the slow financially? The abler portion of your secular press thinks it time to speak incisively of swindling theatrical amusements, as Æschylus would do were he here. When I find the less reputable local press keeping up full descriptions of what you want no sister or brother of yours to see, I am reminded that sometimes in a great palace in the city, if you keep open the bottom of a marble wash-bowl, there is in the untrapped lead-pipe a connection with the gutter, and diphtheria may assail you in the midst of luxury. Is it quite profitable for us to keep open the gilded pipe from the marble basin to the gutter? You remember the French proverb, as true in practice as in theory : "Where virtue ends, there vice begins." The slave-hound is not to be more detested than the actress of a loathsome play. A

loaferish woman can amuse only loaferish men. A scandal which woman meets with just indignation deserves abhorrence everywhere. We men are to blame, we men are to take excoriation, if, not imitating ancient Athens, we make a portion of the theatre such a scene, that had it been exhibited in the classic age of Greece, on that slope of the Acropolis where Æschylus, Euripedes, and Sophocles taught, it would have been met there with loathing and all denunciation of it with Athenian acclaim.

THE HARMONIZATION OF THE SOUL WITH ITS ENVIRONMENT.

"Inter bonos viros ac Deum amicitia est, conciliante virtute: amicitiam dico? immo etiam necessitudo et similitudo.—SENECA: *De Provid.*, 1.

"Et metus ille foras præceps Acheruntis agendus,
Funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,
Omnia suffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam
Esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit."
LUCRETIUS: lib. iii. 37.

Mr. Gladstone is living now under a rapidly westering sun; and with the reverence of an empire, whose morning drum-beat encircles the world, attending on every serious word he utters, he lately proclaimed that the centre of all preaching must be the Cross. At a conference held at the City Temple, Holborn Viaduct, March 22, after speeches by Englishmen and Americans, there were loud cries for Mr. Gladstone; and, among other memorable words, this adviser of that queen who governs one-sixth of the population of the world used these expressions, to which his whole career adds emphasis:—

"We are here with a great and mighty function, belonging from the first especially, almost exclusively, to revealed religion,—a function, the efficacy of which must undoubtedly depend, in the main, upon the matter which is preached. We are here as Christians; and *it is the preaching of Christ our Lord, which is the secret, and substance, and centre, and heart of all preaching, not merely of facts about Him and notions about Him, but of His person, His work, His character, His simple yet unfathomable sayings: here lies the secret*" (*London Times*, March 23, 1877).

The two ablest Englishmen of our day are Scotchmen. When Thomas Carlyle and William Gladstone—under the light of a west almost cloudless, but not measureless in the visible stretch of azure yet to be rolled through by the chariots of their lives,—lean backward as they look forward, and from between the wheels that bear them on, and which never pause, speak to us out of the sunset, is it quite scientific, is it quite manly, is it quite womanly, for us whose chariots are yet at the zenith, or ascending the eastern slope of the azure, to forget that the sun moves towards the west as fast at noon as in the last moment before that in which he fires the western pines? Gladstone and Carlyle, and our century, are westering and gazing on us with the solemnity of the hour into which all men haste. In the radiance which streams out of the morning, noon, and evening watch of the

wheeling skies in which we rise and set but once, let us be willing to open any theme of religious science, and take all the results clear ideas require us to hold, whatever doctrine stands, or whatever doctrine falls. God looks through the morning unstained radiance of life, those dewy, upstretching, far-penetrating, star-lit auroras, which reveal the intuitions, and primal, untutored human instincts. As once He looked through the pillar of fire in the morning watch, so yet, gazing through those auroras, He troubles the hosts of unscientific, irreligious thought. He looks also through the evening cloud, and troubles the hosts of Iscariotism, and takes off their chariot wheels. Thor's hammer is engaged in that business.

In the light of previous discussions of the Atonement, you must allow me to say that the following propositions—which are almost omnipresent in James Martineau's references to this topic, and in many discussions conducted by honoured men here in New England, whom I need not name—are only a multiplex rustle of misconceptions. I do not call these statements misrepresentations ; but they are misapprehensions which have done, and are yet doing, immortal mischief.

1. That Christ, although innocent, was punished.
2. That God punishes by substitution.
3. That, if a penalty for the violation of moral law be inflicted so as to maintain the honour of that law, God is indifferent on whom that punishment falls.
4. That God was at first disposed to show mercy, and was made placable by the death of Christ.
5. That the Atonement involves a transfer of moral qualities from person to person.
6. That pardon, and not merely the conditional offer of it, precedes the soul's self-surrender to God.
7. That the Atonement involves the injustice of liberating the guilty.
8. That it saves, irrespective of character, whoever has faith.
9. That it is inconsistent with the immutability of the Divine attributes.
10. That it represents the law of the nature of things as supreme over the Divine Will itself.
11. That, as the Atonement is provided for all, it secures the salvation of all.
12. That, if pardon can be obtained on the condition of faith merely, morality is unimportant.

These propositions evangelical scholarship not only does not teach, but abhors. Gentlemen, what you say here goes very much further than anything I can present. Beware of approving statements of mine, for your indorsement makes language important. You have said, however, that all these propositions are caricatures ; and yet, if you are right, there is hardly a professor's chair in any school of unevangelical theology in New England that is not wrong in its fundamental representations of evangelical thought.

Opening only by glimpses the greatest theme which human unassisted reason can touch, I must proceed analytically, and with what scholars, to whom I am not speaking, may perhaps think is unneces-

sary slowness. I desire to accompany you, this morning, in your ascent along one of the most modern pathways of thought to a mountain summit from which I hope the outlook will cause us to fall on our knees, and send us away with strength for many days. I am discussing the Atonement in the light of self-evident truth; and, if I am not using proof-texts, it is not because I undervalue them. On other occasions it is my duty to expound the Scriptures; but here the object is to show the connection between religious and other science. Andover Seminary yonder has just asked for funds to found a professorship with this title, "On the Connections between Theology and the other Sciences." May she obtain money in abundance for a purpose so timely and sublime, and may something better than wealth come to America out of such a foundation! In the field of the relations between religion and science, this Lectureship has for its object simply the discussion of the clear, the true, the new, the strategic. The best posture of mind is that which seeks first, not orthodoxy, but clearness. Of course, truth is immeasurably the highest object of consideration; but, when we say we must seek truth first, such is the subtle action of prejudice, that truth is commonly understood to mean *my* truth, not *your* truth. Therefore let us first seek clearness, and not your truth or my truth. Clearness will not mislead us if we set it up as a goal; but our prejudgments as to what truth is may easily do so. Let us be true to the scientific method, and truth will take care of itself. Let us seek primarily to be distinct and straightforward, and only secondarily to be orthodox or heterodox. Let us not confuse ourselves with the slightest partisan prejudice. Let us keep all creeds out of our minds as much as possible, and seek first, midst, last, all that Intuition, Instinct, Experiment, and Syllogism can teach us, or perfect loyalty to the scientific method.

1. God wills man's perfection.
2. Man cannot be perfect without a perfect religion.
3. God, therefore, will give man a perfect religion.

In democratic ages, small philosophers, whose rule of procedure is to guess at the half, and multiply by two, are great characters; but lost babes are greater,—those who think it the supreme philosophical glory never to come to a conclusion, and, on the whole, are of the opinion that the best thing we can do in the forest of human investigation is to lie down, after the ancient and not honourable example narrated in childhood's primers, and let the robins cover us with leaves. Unmanly, despairing bewilderment, and unconfessed, desponding, intellectual unrest thrive in more educated minds than we think, and this simply because we have masses of highly cultured people who have never looked into religious thought as a science. Nearly all investigation of theology as a system of exact research has, little by little, been crowded into the distinctively theological schools. Almost nothing is taught on this theme in our colleges at present, because so much more matter is forced into their courses now than was there eighty or one hundred years ago. It is not because Harvard undervalues ethics or the Christian evidences, that she gives little time to them. Yale gives almost as little time. For my examination in ethics

in Harvard University, I prepared in two days; and the examination ran through twenty-seven minutes. How much could I learn in that time on topics that have convulsed all highly cultured thought on both sides of the Atlantic? If I had gone out from the University, and entered immediately upon the professional studies, and afterward, in regular course, upon the duties of a lawyer, how much time should I have had to have looked into religious science elaborately? It is said that no successful lawyer, in the full tide of the work of his profession, ever reads a book through. He examines, perhaps, as Carlyle does, or as Macaulay did, a dozen books a day, year after year; but he gets through them swiftly, as Macaulay did, by skipping. If I had taken the profession of medicine, it is probable I should have become absorbed, as I ought in duty to do, in that; and so religious truth as a science might never have come before me. Cultivated minds, with wide gaps in their culture, are characteristic of an age of specialists; and ours is such an age. College-courses are intended to sharpen sickles, and not to reap the harvest. But the prepared reaping-hooks are, in nine cases out of ten, cast heedfully into ripe, rustling grain only on the field of thought a man's profession or business compels him to enter. Even for the humble but indispensable purpose of sharpening dull sickles, four years are too few; and yet no more work can profitably be crowded into those years. The time occupied by the studies pursued at Harvard and Yale is already packed as full as an egg is with meat, and so full, that sometimes the egg will not hatch. One of the intellectual dangers of our time is the almost necessary existence of a wide circle of cultured minds well educated only on one side. In that class you find most of those who lie down in the tropical forests of modern thought, and say, "We cannot find the way home." I affirm that if there is a God, and if He is not a malevolent Being, He not only has made a best way to live, but has made it sure that it is best to live the best way. He wills our perfection; and, if He is a benevolent Being, He will not only give us a religion that will carry us to perfection, but He will make it so plain, that he who runs may read, if he will. Wherever in the forest a man wishes you to drop down in despair, there recall and recite the great *Credo*. That God wills man's perfection; that man cannot be perfect without a perfect religion; and that, therefore, God will give man a perfect religion, so clear that it will be the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. While I hold to a belief in God's goodness, I must believe, although I cannot know the map of all the forest, that there is a way home, and that I can find the path back to my Father's house!

Our surprising friends who believe that the universe is without a path home are the worst of the class of lost babes; but for five centuries to come probably theirs will be one of the most misleading of the temporary influences in the circles of merely professional or special culture. If this is the condition of many who have been liberally educated, what shall be said of the masses of average men of strong minds and inextensive studies, whose heads are buried in their ledgers and newspapers, and who have not time to look at religious truth as a science, until clearness is reached concerning it, and do not

know by their own investigation what to think, and in a democratic and scientific age are little likely to take anything for granted or on authority? Democratic ages can never be taught *ex cathedra*. All men must think for themselves; and so all men must be taught how to think. It is therefore worth while for public educated discussion to put in the foreground axioms, self-evident truths, intuitions, instincts, or the nature of things, and to let men see that, after all, the great truths we cannot help believing are the things of most importance to us. We know we are dependent beings. We know we did not create ourselves. We are here; and once we were not here. Our coming into existence was a change. Every change must have an adequate cause. There is a Power above us. If we are dependent beings, there must be an independent Being. Just as there cannot be a here without a there, an upper without an under, so there cannot be a dependent being without an independent, that is, a self-existent Being. If we can induce men to attend to the scientific certainty, that, without similarity of feeling with that Being, their peace is a natural impossibility; if we can cause them to feel that their consciences are the touch of God within them, or of a Somewhat and Some One in, but not of us, we shall slowly bring them to believe that these axioms, these constitutional instincts, these ineradicable moral beliefs, are, and were meant to be, a clue to the path that leads into the King's Highway, and brings men into the land on which the sun never sets. Whoever will read with reverence, clearness, and fulness the Oldest Testament, or the Nature of Things, will have such convictions as he reads the Old Testament, and the New and the Newest, that he will find his cheeks growing pale if he is disloyal to the truth he meets; or, if he is loyal, his forehead becoming white, and his eyes like stars.

4. A perfect religion will secure for all who accept it blessedness.

5. But there can be no blessedness without holiness.

6. For a free moral agent who has sinned, there can be no blessedness without holiness *and pardon*.

7. A perfect religion, therefore, will secure for all who accept it holiness *and pardon*.

8. A perfect religion will harmonize us with our environment.

9. But our environment here and hereafter convicts unalterably of God, conscience, and our record of sin.

10. *A perfect God who wills man's perfection will teach man the methods of harmonizing himself with his environment.*

11. *In the nature of things we cannot be harmonized with that environment unless religion provides for us both holiness and pardon.*

Why, if we are loyal to the scientific method, we ought to sleep on propositions like these; for they will not fall into tremor until the pillars of the universe fall. It is affirmed, I am told, that I never have had any conflict with doctrinal unrest; but it was my fortune to quit for three years a college-course at its central part, that I might find time to give myself information on certain majestic topics, the investigation of which I longed for more than vexed Sahara, with its deadly thunderous simooms and dervish dance of sand pillars, ever longed for

the dew or rain. It is of little consequence to you, but it is of consequence to me, that a certain desert Carlyle speaks of has been under my feet. You know he says we must not sit down in that howling waste, but keep on ; and that beyond it we shall find the green fields, and the waters that quench all thirst. All those springs burst out of axioms ; that is, out of ranges of living rock, whose roots take hold of the core of the world.

12. After six thousand years of experience, man's philosophical and moral restlessness proves, that, without violence to self-evident truth, he has found no way of harmonizing himself by his own excellence, or solely by his own good works, with his entire environment, including conscience, God, and a record of deliberate sin in an irreversible past.

Some men ask how, if the past is irreversible, we can be happy, even in heaven? Was the past of the prodigal who returned to his father's house not irreversible? For ever and for ever it could not be changed. But was he happy after his return? Assuredly. *Is the house not made with hands so very different from the present dwelling-place of men, that we cannot reason from the experience of a prodigal here to experience there? Moral as well as physical law has unity and universality.* In some respects a prodigal's record enhances his bliss on his return ; in other respects it diminishes bliss, as it must always be remembered with regret. Is the balance so much in favour of bliss, that we may conclude, in the name of science, that we shall add to our happiness by living a while in the strange country, under famine and with the swine? No serious man asks this question ; but, to my amazement, I have been seriously asked by unscientific liberalism to deny that the past is irreversible. Alas that the soft whims of luxury and superficiality are in conflict with Eternal enactments! Is all science asleep, that we do not see that the nature of things is—He whom we dare not name? If I deny that the past is irreversible, I must deny a very large number of truths guaranteed to us by the same evidence ; that is, by self-evident truth. I must deny that the whole is greater than a part, or that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that every change must have a cause. It is just as evident that what has once been cannot be made not to have been, as that every change must have a cause. If you play fast and loose with axioms, you have a task larger than that of Sisyphus on your hands to prove that you know anything. You know that you know that nothing can be known. How do you know that you know? The time has come when we must teach the outlines of the philosophy of axioms, or self-evident truths, to John and James, and Patrick and Michael, and the Monthly Rocket and the Daily Blunderbuss. A little philosophy is in all men's minds, and it is a dangerous thing. The Castalian spring must be made to run through democratic ages in streams large enough to quench the thirst of multitudes, otherwise there will be trouble.

I affirm that, by experience, the proposition is guaranteed to us as fully as any other inference from history, that man has not invented a religion wholly out of reason, that would harmonize his nature with his whole environment. Where is that invented scheme of thought? How many attempts have been made to harmonize man with his entire

environment, and to use in the attempt only reason! and how, age after age, the law of the survival of the fittest has forced to the wall human inventions on that theme! If there were a great philosophy that could provide for man's harmonization with his entire environment, we should know its name; we should be following it. Plato's philosophy! —well, it is twenty-two hundred years old; but, if some of its fundamental propositions were carried out, you and I to-day would be living in barracks, and could not tell who our brothers are, or our sisters, or who our parents were. I know how glorious portions of Plato's teaching are; but the truth is that the central ideas in his system are not able to satisfy man. They have not been adopted as the rule of life; they have had fair hearing. You know what is governing the world to-day. After twenty-two hundred years of conflict, it is not philosophy that governs social life. Some reverence is to be had for a cause that has seen battle, age after age, but never yet defeat. "God is on the side of the heaviest battalions," Napoleon used to say; and it looks as if Christianity were not a very weak battalion. The test of scholarship is that it should contend with scholarship, not once or twice, but century after century, and come out crowned.

13. Man's need of an Atonement not made by himself, and assuring him of pardon, has therefore been proved by human experience.

14. *This need is also an incontrovertible inference from the natural operations of conscience and the unchangeableness of the past.*

Of that central proposition I have offered here detailed proof; and so, without expanding this discussion, I put now our previous conclusion into its natural connections of thoughts. It is held here that whoever will be loyal to the scientific method, or to axiomatic truth in its relation to the conscience and an irreversible past, will come out with the scientific certainty, that such arrangements as may harmonize us with our entire environment, man's own excellence of character cannot make. *We have concluded once for all here, in the name of self-evident truth, that Lady Macbeth's use of water will be fruitless for ever.* But she must have her hand made white, or the record in her past covered; for, in the nature of things, she cannot be at peace with her entire environment until her foreboding is taken away.

15. So far forth as any religion provides for man's holiness and pardon, it has the marks of being a perfect religion.

16. *Alone among all religions yet known to men, Christianity, without coming into conflict with self-evident truth, provides both for man's holiness and his pardon.*

17. Alone among all religions known to men, Christianity, therefore, has the marks of being a perfect religion; for it, and it only, provides for both man's holiness and his pardon.

18 It does the latter by the revealed truths of the Incarnation and the Atonement.

19. *So far forth as Christianity could not, in the nature of things, provide for man's blessedness and perfection, or his holiness and pardon, without the Incarnation and the Atonement, so far forth the Incarnation and Atonement had an eternal and abiding necessity in the wise and free love of God, since this love wills the perfection of man, who*

cannot be perfect without a perfect religion, and cannot attain blessedness without both holiness and pardon.

20. *So far forth as this necessity inheres in the nature of things, the Divine idea relative to the completion of the world first arrives at perfection, or at relization, through the Incarnation and the Atonement.*

21. *The religion of Christ, including the truths of the Incarnation and the Atonement, is the only religion that, without violence to self-evident truth, brings man to peace with his entire environment.*

22. It is, therefore, scientifically known to be a perfect or absolute religion.

Gentlemen, we are drawing nigh one of the highest summits of the loftiest range of ethical thought. I open the best book on the Deity of our Lord which has been produced in the last century, Dorner's "History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ;" and although you cannot find these propositions analytically stated anywhere in the volume, you may find them everywhere implied in it, and scattered through the freshest portions of the world's best ethical and theological scientific research on this theme. You want a twig off the German tree, and I give you one in order that you may judge whether the sap in it is not of precisely the same quality with that of the circulating fluid of thought in these analytical propositions. Off this stalwart tree, which I chose as a confessedly crowned specimen of the growths of modern thought on this theme, I will pluck this spray of foliage, assured that, if you hold it up in the wind of self-evident truth, it will have a harp-like tone. What anthem, then, might you not hear, if you were to walk into a whole forest of such growths?

"The world of humanity and spirits constitutes a real unity solely in virtue of the circumstance that over its essence, which consists in free susceptibility to God, there stands the personal and universal Divine principle; and that this principle, whilst standing over, is also turned towards, nay more, belongs to it, so far as it is the true *kosmos;* so that without it the world cannot at all be conceived as a completed and filled unity.

"The idea of the world as it stands eternally before God is not terminated and completed with susceptibility to God, but, according to His unfathomable gracious will, includes also that this susceptibility be absolutely filled in itself; and at the point where the central fulfilment corresponding to this central susceptibility takes place, the world, too,—which, as merely susceptible to God, or even sinful, was outside of God,—entered into the circle of the Divine Life, into the life of the triune God himself, even as the immanent Divine Life explicated itself here.

"The Son is not the world, but its Divine principle, which brought a world to pass, not by a necessity of nature, but according to the inner law of love, which is at the same time the law of freedom. He is also not the ideal world, nor the image of the world in God, but primarily its principle. Still we are compelled to say that the world, both according to its idea, and according to the idea of the will of the Logos—in other words, the Divine idea relative to the completion of the world—first arrives at perfection, at realization, through the Incarnation.

"This leads to a further point, which is of decisive importance both in itself and in a systematical respect,—a point by which the *historical* in Christ is raised to absolute significance, and is removed from the sphere of contingency. This is the truth, that the incarnation of God in Christ had not its sole ground in sin, but, besides sin, had a deeper, to wit, an eternal and abiding necessity in the wise and free love of God, so far as this love willed, in general, the existence of a world which should be the scene of its *perfect* revelation, and so far as, consequently, the world is marked by susceptibility to, and need of, this revelation." (DORNER, PROFESSOR I. A., *on the Person of Christ,* div. ii., vol. iii., pp. 235, 236.)

This is the successor of Schleiermacher in the University at Berlin, speaking in the best university of the world, and at the end of age after age of the acutest scholarly discussion of this theme. I might put before you volumes of such discussion ; but they would point only to the sublime creed, that God wills man's perfection ; that he cannot be perfect without a perfect religion ; that He will give man, therefore, a perfect religion ; and that Christianity is the only religion that has the two marks of perfection,—ability to harmonize man with his entire environment by providing for both his holiness and his pardon.

23. But there cannot be two perfect or absolute religions, or one with Christ, and one without Christ.

24. The religion of Christ, including the truths of the Incarnation and the Atonement, is, therefore, the only absolute religion.

25. A body of thought, of which an outline has now been given, is taught implicitly in New England, England, and Scotland to-day, and in Germany is explicitly adopted by theologians such as Dorner, Niztsch, Martensen, Ebrard, Schmid, Petersen, Kling, Nagelsbach, Schoberlein, Ehrenfeuchter, Chalybæus, Fischer, Liebner, Lange, and Rothe. (See DORNER, *Person of Christ*, div. ii., vol. iii., p. 237.)

Theodore Parker's Absolute Religion was a religion without the Incarnation, a religion without the Atonement, a religion, therefore, adequately discredited by scientific thought and human experience, as unable on the one hand to provide for man's pardon without violating self-evident truth, and therefore unable on the other to give him that transfiguration of his entire nature, that deliverance from the last ache of Pharisaic pride, that eternal cessation of the unrest of forced deistic repose, that similarity of feeling with a Saviour who is gladly taken as Lord, that peace unsearchable and eternal, which springs up only in the light of the Cross.

Revelation is a king unmarried ; science is a queen unmarried ; but from eternity and for eternity these two have changed eyes.

> "He is the half part of a blessed man,
> Left to be finished by such as she ;
> And she a fair divided excellence
> Whose fulness of perfection lies in him."
>
> *King John*, act ii

VII.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

THE POSSIBLE USES OF CONVERSATION MEETINGS.

WASHINGTON IRVING was once invited to Boston by the historian Prescott to spend a week of leisure, but refused to do so on the ground that hard work was a greater delight than rest. Only those who have had experience in the deepest secrets of life understand that our best blisses come from the performance of our most odious duties. "It would give me the greatest pleasure to enjoy companionship with a few choice spirits like yourself," Irving wrote to Prescott; "but I dread the vortex of gay society. Habits of literary occupation have almost unfitted me for idle, gentlemanly life. Relaxation and repose begin to be insupportable to me. I feel a disposition to relapse into hard writing" (TICKNOR'S *Prescott*, illus. ed., pp. 422, 423). We think that conversation with the religiously irresolute is a very difficult duty; and yet those who perform it know that it is the source of one of the highest blisses of this life, and find such reward, that their hallowed endeavour will be prolonged from the love of it. They will relapse, as Washington Irving did, into hard work at what may have been, in its earlier stages, not a little distasteful. Those are the happiest persons in Boston to-day, who have done most face to face with the religiously irresolute during the past three months. Those will remember the winter with the greatest delight who have plunged themselves into this cold sea of personal conversation with the religiously indifferent, and have beaten back all its surges, instead of sinking; and, when they have beaten them, have found the waters buoying them up, until now stalwart swimming is a bliss. Christians do not know their privileges until they learn to like these most difficult parts of a Christian's duty.

Not far from fifty years ago in this city, Lyman Beecher called one morning on a respectable family, and asked if the children of the household could not be sent to a Bible school. Dr. Chalmers had done something in such schools in Scotland; and it was the purpose of Lyman Beecher to introduce Chalmers' scheme of effort here. "My own children are going," said he to the head of the household, "can you not send yours? Let us have that nucleus to begin with." In Boston, the Sabbath school as an instrumentality for the education of society was hardly more than a germ fifty years ago. It was a hope; it was an impulse; it had no assured position. To-day, in the International Sabbath-school Lessons, that style of instruction encircles the globe. In this last yet unrolling chapter of the Acts of the Apostles there is, I believe, not a Divine inspiration, such as fills our Scriptures, but a Divine illumination from the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

Now, there is one other religious instrumentality, almost in the germ yet, but which might have a field as wide as that which the Sabbath school has entered, and become even more fruitful, would Christians but learn Washington Irving's secret, that hard work at an odious duty transmutes into bliss. This is a large hope, I know; but I refer to the conversation-meeting, which has had such power in this city in the last three months, and ought to continue to have the same power in the four hundred churches which are now uniting their

services with those of Boston. If there could be in these four hundred churches the right use of what is called in England an "after-meeting," or what we call a "conversation-meeting," or what is called in older phraseology an "inquiry-meeting," and if there could be a full and prolonged development of that religious instrumentality, how soon might we not find the Church gladly doing all the while what it now does in its lucid intervals only! The Church now is sometimes zealous, and sometimes cold. It is amphibious in the sense in which those timbers on the mud-flat in the harbour yonder are: when the tide is in, they are up and floating; when the tide is out, they are on the earth. Amphibious in the style of driftwood! What if we were trained to be amphibious in the style of those to whom God has given power to meet difficulty? In the seasons when no great effort is required face to face with the religiously irresolute, the Christian has the right to cultivate his own inner life, to solace himself with the St. Augustines, and the Fenélons, and the Jeremy Taylors, and the Pascals. But when the trumpet calls, when the fallen, and perishing, and degraded are to be met face to face; when there is effort going on by which the courses of hundreds of lives may be determined; and when, if every one will mend one, all will be amended, then your Christian is to be amphibious in the better sense; he should be ready for the sternest duty, and love it even better than the soft swathing of himself in the luxuries of spiritual repose. He knows that stalwart action on the field of battle is rather braver than any military movement practised on the drill-field. Let him stand face to face with the enemy, if he would become a soldier, and not merely face to face with painted or printed enemies.

How shall a meeting be managed so as to make the rule of courtesy that of Christian endeavour in conversation between the religiously resolute and the religiously irresolute? Go to these four hundred churches,—it is my fortune to pass up and down New England,—and you will find them disagreed sometimes as to just what to do. But there is coming to be a very well-established custom as to conversation meetings. Not long ago we had a hundred and fifty meetings in the Established Church inside the city of London, all of them closed on each night with a conversation-meeting. In that effort, archbishops and bishops led; and men from some of the highest ranks in culture made it too late to say that this conversation is not fashionable. People who will not touch a pearl until somebody has handled it with lavender gloves may know very well, if they will study the history of what the English Church calls "missions,"—only another name for "revivals,"—that the conversation-meeting has been sprinkled with holy water, and therefore, perhaps, deserves christening here. In London and in many other places the common habit has been to make a request that any who are willing to enter into religious conversation will remain at the close of the meeting. All who do not care to enter into such an exercise go out while a hymn is sung: those who remain, by doing so, say that they are willing to converse on religion; and so there is no discourtesy in your speaking to them under such circumstances. Now, let it be the rule among the churches of New England in the winter season, when large gatherings can be held in the evenings, for every devotional meeting to be closed by a request that any religiously irresolute person who is present, and who wishes to remain for a quarter or half an hour for religious conversation, should do so. *Let that be the custom, as much observed as holding devotional meetings, or as the gathering of Sabbath schools;* and very soon, instead of a church that is a mere hook in place of an amputated hand, I will show you a church that has fingers, that can reach into the wants of society, and can make supply match demand.

In no other way, so well as by bringing the unconverted face to face with

the converted, can you nurture an inefficient church-member into a Christian of the stalwart type. For lack of this work, we are feeble; for lack of this work, some of us are asleep; for lack of just this style of effort, or its equivalent, some of us are portly, indeed, but placid and flaccid.

Let us begin, during the illumined time which is now passing over our heads, a large reform on this theme. Let us make it a rule, under the voluntary system in the free churches of America, which state churches of Europe watch closely, that a conversation-meeting shall follow every large devotional gathering in the central seasons of the year. We need many styles of meetings; the reform gathering once a month, at least, to attend to temperance, and perhaps oftener in many places. To-day I wish to emphasize one point only; and that is, that if, in the next fifty years, you will develop the conversation-meeting as you have developed the Sabbath school in the last fifty, you will find more blessed results from the conversation-meeting than you have from the Sabbath school. This I believe solemnly, in the name of the influence of such conversations not only upon the unconverted, but upon the converted. I know personally one church to which it was my fortune to minister, in days which, like those I am now passing through, were unfit to be used to teach anybody; but that church was led into conversation with the religiously irresolute as a standard measure. It was a church where those invited to do this work could be trusted to do right in such conversations. General public instruction for such labour had been given. A pastor may feel that he cannot trust everybody in his church to converse with everybody; but he can give such public instruction, that the influence of injudicious advice given in conversation will soon be counteracted. Let there be right instruction from the pulpit, and you can trust church-members, with proper oversight, to converse with those who remain. This church, of which I have positive knowledge, employed that measure of conversation for three months, and then was without a pastor for many months; but the conversations and conversions went on. Men learned to love that style of effort. Instead of Sabbath clubs listening to sermons and music, and going away talking about the oratory and the fashions, the scent of the minister's handkerchief, and the divine aroma of wardrobes, white or black, let us have churches such as those which conquered the Cæsars. Let us be sure that the most difficult duties are the most blissful; let all the churches be filled with this certainty, and the hard work will soon be so done as to be deadly.

TRUE AND FALSE OPTIMISM.

"Dic, Epicure, Quæ res faciat beatum? Responde, Voluptus corporis. Dic, Stoice: Virtus animi. Dic, Christiane: Donum Dei."

> "Arrisit infans, nec moratus retulit:
> Est quidquid illud, quod ferunt homines Deum,
> Unum esse opportet, et quod uni est unicum.
> Cum Christus hoc sit, Christus est verus Deus.
> Genera deorum multa nec pueri putant."
>
> PERISTEPH: *Hymn.*

One of the kings who were prominent in the crusades was taken prisoner, and confined for many months in a castle standing in that territory which Turkey and Russia may soon deluge in blood. A musician, who had been a member of the household of this prince,

sought long to find the spot in which his lord was immured, but could obtain no entrance behind any castle's bars. In place after place he wearily gave up the search, because he could procure no sight of his lord. At last it occurred to him, that in his childhood, and when the king was young, a delicious strain of music had been greatly admired by them both; and therefore this wanderer, whenever he appeared before a prison, would produce on his flute that strain of music, in the hope that possibly his lord might hear it, and know that the musician with whom he had been acquainted was beneath his window. One day this searching singer, having been refused entrance to the wards of a castle, sat down under its windows, and hour by hour lifted up that entrancing melody which the king he sought had known in his youth; and at last a token was thrown to him out of a tower, indicating that his lord was there. I go up and down in search of scientific theology. I am a poor musician, looking for my Lord. I am not admitted to the inner vaults of all castles. I know not where He may be confined among the mysteries of the universe. Science knows, however, that somewhere He remembers a delicious strain of music, which both Revelation and Science heard in their youth. Religion and Science both have the nature of things as their earliest memory. Self-evident truth is the delicious strain of music which I will lift up under the barred windows of castle after castle, until from some tower I have a token indicating to me that my Lord is there. I know He heard that melody of self-evident truth when He was young; for the Old Testament was preceded by the Oldest, and it is only self-evident truth. Among the perplexities of the universe I will lift up the melody of axioms, self-evident propositions, intuitive truths, until out of the bars of mystery shall be thrown down a token of my Lord, and He and I are together once more.

Theodore Parker held that the Divine Perfection is the first of all theological truths; and so did David when he struck his harp at the edge of Siloa's Brook; so did Æschylus when he smote his under the shadow of the Acropolis; so have all lofty and clear souls taught that God is the fulness of all excellence; and every just inference we can draw from that fact is scientific. Contrast, however, a false with a true optimism, or Parker's inferences from the fact of God's perfection with Christian inferences from the same fact.

The perfection of the moral law, inhering in the nature of things, proves the perfection of the Divine Nature.

The perfection of the moral law is a self-evident, axiomatic, intuitive truth. It is an axiom of conscience, that the voice which says "I ought" utters a mandate absolutely perfect; therefore the law revealed by that mandate is perfect. There cannot be a here without a there, or a before without an after, or a thought without a thinker, or a law without a lawgiver, or a perfect law without a perfect lawgiver. (See, for detailed discussion of these propositions, Lecture I.

Say what you will about the origin of evil, talk as blandly or as complainingly, as blindly or as searchingly, as you please concerning the problem, not of error merely and of infirmity, but of deliberate sin and of absolute iniquity in the world, it yet remains true scientifically,

that all objection to the belief that God is perfect is shattered on the axiomatic certainty of the perfection of the moral law. *Who will dare to say that the nature of things is not perfect? But it is He!*

If, now, I am to recite my own personal creed, so far as I can gain one from a philosophical point of view, it consists of these two propositions :—

1. God will do what He can for us.

2. What God cannot do for us, He has given us power to do for ourselves.

That is my optimism ; but it is optimism with an if.

1. God will do what He can for us.

2. What He can do for us is measured in part by our susceptibility.

You admit, do you, that God will do what He can for us? You think God is perfect? You are all agreed on that, are you? Very well. Do not be frightened if I ask you to be consistent with yourselves. He will do what He can for us? Yes.

3. God's creation of our free susceptibility is a promise from Him that He will fill it, if He can do so without destroying our freedom.

4. Man has a susceptibility of oneness with God in conscience.

5. He is, therefore, susceptible of sinlessness.

6. Unless man's free susceptibility of sinlessness is somewhere filled in the history of the race, God's ideal as to man as a type fails of realization.

7. But God's ideal and promise never fail.

8. Therefore the most perfect possible type of man will be brought into existence ; that is, somewhere in history a sinless character will appear.

9. Christ, a sinless character, has appeared in history.

If we are to take as a test Christian conviction, victorious through ages, this last proposition will stand, and I had almost said, if we are to take infidel criticism as a test ; for it is not the tendency of any form of modern research to cast supreme doubt on the sinlessness of Christ. Scepticism finds itself more and more exclaiming with Rousseau : "Socrates died like a man ; the founder of Christianity, like a God." Carlyle says of Voltaire, that his central fault is, that "he meddles with religion, without being in any profound sense religious." But modern scepticism is far more reverent than Voltaire was, and often has insight enough not to deny the sinlessness of the Author of Christianity. It denies the soundness of His judgment in many particulars, talks in a light way about mistakes greater or less ; but, when it comes to character, it is very nearly dumb before the challenge of Christianity to show any evil there. It is not necessary for my present purpose, however, speaking of scientific optimism, to show that this point is conceded by infidelity. It has been a general consent of many ages, that a Being who had oneness with conscience, and with God in conscience, has appeared in the world. All I need to emphasize is the certainty that, unless the sinless character appears in history, man's susceptibility is not filled ; the Divine ideal for the species has not been realized, and God has not done what He can for us. How much can God do for us? As much as we are susceptible

of. How much are we susceptible of? Obedience to conscience, uninterrupted oneness with the moral law. If our Lord was a sinless character, He was the first perfect man. He was what every man should have been from the beginning. He was the first creature exhibiting the full susceptibility of the human kind. God will do what He can for us? Yes; but, if He does that, He will bring into existence somewhere a sinless character. That is to be expected. Such is in the susceptibility of man as a race; and such, therefore, is within the power of God without destroying our free will.

"*It is not an arbitrary procedure*," writes Dorner ("Person of Christ," div. ii., vol. iii., p. 224), "*but simply the necessity of the case, to see in Christ, so far as sinlessness is attributed to Him, a Divine revelation of God, which, by realizing, discloses the archetype of holiness; which revelation could only be brought to pass through the medium of an unique distinctive being of God in Him, by which the image of God attained to actual representation in the world.*"

10. The possibilities of human nature are exhibited in the human nature of our Lord.

11. Any religion that is without such a sinless character is defective in its exhibition of the capabilities of man, and cannot, therefore, be a perfect religion.

12. Every religion, except Christianity, is defective in this supreme part.

Plainly we reach high issues here. But assuredly all this is in your belief that God will do what He can for us. Propositions like these underlie the very latest schools in German thought. We have book after book on the sinlessness of our Lord. The philosophical significance of the numerous attempts to write the life of the Christ lies in the fact of His sinlessness. It is often said among German cultivators of religious science, that the character of God is the Alpha and Omega; but that the imperfection of human nature, or the effect of sin, is the Beta and Upsilon of philosophy. One is the A and the Z, and the other is the B and the Y. When we listen to only these four letters of the alphabet, we are convinced that God will do what He can for us; that what He can do is measured in part by our own free susceptibility; that we have a free susceptibility of oneness with conscience; and that somewhere in the history of the race a sinless character is to be expected. We cannot fix dates for God's work. We do not know when He will do this; but a perfect religion will look forward to such a character: otherwise it does not believe in God's optimism; it does not believe that He will fill the susceptibilities He has created. Science must hold that the creation of a free susceptibility in man is the promise of God to fill it, if He can do so without our loss of freedom. There cannot be a great instinct without its correlate; and every great susceptibility of man is a Divine promise that it will be filled, if we yield to Him. One test of perfection in a religion, therefore, is its power to bring out man into sinlessness; and its power to do that must be tested by what it has done. We must look on every scheme of religious thought from the point of veiw of man's susceptibility; and if any system of ideas limits God's activities, will

not allow that He in six thousand years has ever produced a sinless character, denies that He has filled the susceptibility He created, and which was His promise,—in that narrowness of its horizon we find something very repulsive to the breadth of view which Christ and Christian philosophy cultivate.

1. God will do what He can for us.
2. What He can do for us is measured in part by our need.
3. We need holiness and pardon.
4. It has been shown that we can obtain holiness best, and pardon only, through an Atonement not our own. (See Lecture V.)

There is always in modern communities a great difficulty laid upon public discussion, when the attempt is made to prove that we really need some other assurance than that derived from general views of God's goodness, if we are to know that we have had pardon. New England is filled with Christianity. We have all heard unspeakable revealed truths, until our philosophical thought is saturated with Christian ideas of God's goodness and condescension, more perfectly than morning twilight ever was by the coming sun. If a man stands up here to say that he needs some other assurance than a general view of God's goodness, in order to know he is pardoned, the reply sometimes is, that God's goodness is enough. The Prodigal Son came back; and in his case there was no Atonement. Yes; but He who taught the parable of the Prodigal Son taught also that "He came to give His life a ransom for many." "This is My blood shed for many for the remission of sins," was the teaching of the same lips which taught that parable of the Prodigal Son, in which, of course, all the other teaching of the same Author is presupposed. We are not to shut up the Bible except at one opening, or sew a portion of its leaves together, and take an isolated page of it, and read the fragment as if it were the whole. The parable of the Prodigal Son a complete statement? Why, the Sermon on the Mount is not! We are to study the view north, south, east, and west, in the scriptural landscape, if we are to be liberal at all. But, even in the parable of the Prodigal Son, it is God's mercy, it is God's condescension, it is His merit, and not ours, that takes us back in peace. Everywhere it is presupposed in the New Testament that the Atonement is a fact. To leave that out is to take the sun from the noon, and then to judge the sky by a patch of the twilight. We must be fair with the record, and interpret it at least as honestly as we would a friend's written will or a legal document, by looking at all there is in it. Coleridge was accustomed to say—I beg pardon for quoting the remark in Boston—that if men were to interpret wills and legal documents, as some who deny the fact of the vicarious atonement and the Deity of our Lord are forced to interpret the New Testament, lawyers would stand aghast. "I have not fallen into these ways of interpretation," said Coleridge (*Table Talk*, p. 327), "for I went much beyond those who hold them: I went so far west, that I came into east." You doubt whether the New Testament teaches the Deity of our Lord? What do these words mean? "Ye shall see the Son of man ascend up to where He was before." "In the beginning the Word was with God, and was God." "Before Abraham was,

I am." Is man's pre-existence taught in the New Testament? The pre-existence of our Lord is taught there.

The truth is, that if you will take up the best discussions from either side of the Atlantic, and look at the present condition of exegetical contests, you will find that, more and more, objection to the Deity of our Lord is put upon philosophical grounds, and not on exegetical. Some of the old pieces of unfairness are being given up on both sides; for no doubt Orthodoxy has strained many a text; but the general trend of scholarship both sides of the North Sea, as you may learn well enough by reading either side in the discussion, is to carry the debate over to the philosophical field, because it is tacitly understood that the Bible does teach the fact of the vicariousness of the Atonement and the Deity of our Lord. To-day, when the field is widened to philosophical considerations, these thoughts that I am now presenting are among the most blazing of philosophical themes. I open here Dorner, and I find him willing, face to face with Germany, to stand on propositions like these: "We cannot conceive that God, in willing a world, should not also have willed it for perfection; nor will it be necessary to consult a necessity for the Incarnation on the side of man, in the fact of sin, because we find its necessity also in the need of perfection; or because *we affirm it to have been a necessity for God in so far as, if He willed a perfect world, He could not omit to will the God-man, who is its honour and crown.*" (*Person of Christ*, div. ii., vol. iii., pp. 238, 239.)

America has not fought enough on this philosophical ground to know its importance; but Germany has. You have been accustomed to use proof-texts to establish all this; and you have been logically victorious, as Germany has been, in that contest. For one student, I think that you have driven into chaos, horse, foot, and dragoons, all exegetical opponents, and that Moses Stuart, Dorner, and Liddon have done this. I asserted on this platform weeks ago, that Moses Stuart's proof-texts never have been answered; and the curious and the only reply that has been offered is, that I make no reference to proof-texts. But this philosophical outline of scientific optimism is in place in Boston, if it is in place in Berlin and in Edinburgh, and assuredly it has had a place in the best discussions of Germany for fifty years.

Any religion that comes to me with a demand that I surrender to it my life, and does not give me assurance as to my pardon before God, or exhibit to me the way of peace with my whole environment, is marked by a lack of intellectual seriousness. The central thought with me is, that no scheme of religious science can give a man peace before his demand for pardon, unless it have in it the idea of an atonement not our own, and revealing God's mercy, condescension, and justice in the biblical way. I wish peace for myself as well as for others, and, in the search for it, must demand that self-evident truth be not ignored. When I, in company with my conscience, go hence, or when I, with untutored but fully awakened moral instincts, stand now face to face with the insufferably resplendent moral law, I desire harmonization with my environment. This I do not, this my conviction is I cannot,

obtain from any scheme of thought not Christian. Christianity itself has difficulty enough in washing Lady Macbeth's red right hand; but it is scientifically known that diluted Christianity never can do that business. Gentlemen, that business must be done. Philosophy every day is growing more serious. The literature of the world is deepening in its earnestness. Woman is coming into modern literature; and it is therefore being purified, and with its purification we have a great increase of literary sensitiveness concerning moral ideas. Philosophy partakes in this increase of keenness of moral insight; and the time is coming when it will be asked in the name of exact research, how Lady Macbeth's hand can be washed, and when it will be ascertained in the name of self-evident truth that a diluted form of Christianity cannot wash Lady Macbeth's hand! A lack of intellectual—yes, a lack of moral—seriousness belongs to every philosophy, and even more to every religion, that plays fast and loose with self-evident truth, when the problem is to give peace to man face to face with his entire environment.

Show me a philosophy that can wash Lady Macbeth's red right hand, and I will show you undiluted Christianity in other terms.

So far as what God will do for us is measured by our need, we are not true to Christian optimism if we do not believe that God will provide for our peace, if our wills permit. But is it not known that He can, by a great arrangement, which we call the Atonement, make possible our harmony with our environment, even after we have sinned? Germany says that incontrovertibly the Incarnation and Atonement are so far necessary as they are indispensable to man's pardon and holiness. Not only can we not reach perfection without them, but, after having once fallen into disloyalty to the moral law, we cannot have pardon without them. If God will do what He can for us, He will secure for us blessedness by securing both holiness and pardon, if we will accept them.

5. If the Incarnation and Atonement are facts, they satisfy man's highest needs.

This has been proved philosophically in the last fifty years, with a fulness of detail beyond a reply.

6. If we admit, therefore, that God will do what He can for us, we must say that it is antecedently probable that a great arrangement will be made by which pardon will be possible, without violation of self-evident truth.

This is only Michael Angelo again, old man in the Vatican, and blind, feeling along that Torso, in many places fragmentary, and estimating what the plan of the whole must be. This is only the French astronomer, Leverrier, asking where the unknown planet is that produced the perturbations of an orb that has been observed for years. This is only moral science, in the name of the unity of the moral as well as the physical law, walking out into the infinities and the eternities with as much courage as to the moral side of God's nature as physical science does concerning that side of His will which produces physical arrangements. As we know there is a unity in the physical law of the universe, we know there is in the moral; and therefore, as we go out

from here to Orion, knowing that gravitation is one thing here, and one thing there, we go out on the moral law from here to the Great White Throne itself, and bend a curve around the infinities till we feel sure that God's heart beats in response to man's wants of holiness and pardon, and beats in such a way that because He is God, He will do what He can for us, from an eternal necessity of love.

1. God will do what He can for us.
2. What He can do for us is measured in part by His own perfections.
3. He cannot deny Himself.
4. He therefore cannot give pardon previous to repentance.

What! A limit of God's power? He loves us; and He is as a Father in this world, who will not pardon a child until the child has repented. A deliberate lie has been told you by a child of yours, and brazen impudence stands upon the boy's face. With entire intelligence as to the character of his act, he denies that he has told a lie, and exhibits no sorrow for it. "Come now," it is said to you, "be liberal; pardon that child before he has repented."—"Of course I cannot," you reply. "I love the child. If I pardon him before he repents, I injure him. He is old enough to know what he is about; he understands the evil of falsehood; he knows perfectly that he has done a thing that should not have been done, and knows that I know this; and now, if I pardon him before he repents at all, I injure him."—"Well, but be advanced in your thought; have enlightened views of the universe; do look a little into the difference between new equipments and the old blunt weapons of warfare; do not employ bows and arrows any more; use columbiads."—"Why, it is a columbiad in my own soul, that I will not pardon that boy until he repents; for I shall injure him if I do. I love him." The columbiad is directed at your bosom! "Advanced thought! I am advanced enough to take care of my child; and I cannot in love pardon him until I can do so without injuring him." A very fathomless *cannot*, that is! This unwavering curve of the moral law, I believe, sweeps around all the constellations of the inner sky; and although God will do what He can for us, He cannot, without denying Himself, pardon us until we repent.

5. God cannot, without denying Himself, give blessedness where there is no holiness.

Self-evident truth does not always sing Elysian melodies. It sings very stern battle-anthems; but when you have fought the battle, then it sings trumpet-tones of bliss indeed.

The central lie of an unscientific optimism is the song of the sirens: "Let us do what we will; we shall by-and-by will to do what we ought."

6. With God is no liberty to do what is not fitting.
7. It is not fitting that sin be forgiven without an Atonement.

This was Anselm's position (*Cur Deus Homo?*) and for eight hundred years that thought has been tossed about in the seas of debate, and swims to-day probably at the very top of all philosophical discussion on this theme. God has no liberty to do what is not fit.

Julius Müller faces this thought, and calls pause to all thinkers of our day before one idea. God has no liberty to do what is not fitting.

It is not fitting that sin be forgiven without an Atonement. Your Dorner bows there ; your Nitzsch and Rothe bow there ; your New England, your Scottish, and your English theologians bow there ; and infidelity itself, when asked to face that proposition, evades it, and has done so for eight hundred years. I do not know where there is a fair philosophical discussion from the point of view of scepticism on self-evident truth as applied to the Atonement. What am I doing here? I am discussing transcendentalism in its relations to religious science. What is it to do that? It is to apply self-evident truth to the innermost holiest of Christianity itself. It is to lift up before the bars of mystery, and under the window of our Lord, the anthem which He heard in His youth, and which He gave us the capacity to sing, and which He will recognize by coming forth as Conqueror.

1. God will do what He can for us.
2. What He can do for us is to be measured by what He has done for us.
3. He has not destroyed the freedom of the will.
4. He has not prevented evil.
5. *What He has not done cannot be done wisely.*
6. The Incarnation and Atonement may be proved by historical evidence to be facts of history.
7. If they are such, they reveal what God has done.
8. What God has done is well done.
9. What He cannot do for us, He will give us power to do for ourselves.
10. The origin of evil in the universe is in the failure of free agents to do the best they can for themselves.

Gentlemen, I am not bound in partisan wraps and withes. If I know myself, I have no desire other than to be clear and straightforward. But I know that a little while ago I was not in the world, and that a little while hence I shall be here no longer. I know that I cannot escape from myself, God, and my record. I know that I wish to go hence in peace with myself and God and that irreversible past. I look about in this dim stir of existence for a scheme of thought that will harmonize me with any whole environment. I want it. I am not ashamed of self-love, though I am of selfishness. What is the difference between self-love and selfishness? Selfishness is a disproportionate love of self ; self-love is a proportionate love of self. We have a right to self-love, and it is not without a proper place if it urges us to intellectual seriousness. Selfishness is always wrong ; for it is the disproportionate love of self. I have a right to love myself as well as anybody else whose being is of the same worth ; but I must love God in proportion to His being ; that is, infinitely, and my neighbour as myself, because he has as much being as I. Self-love leads me to ask how I can be harmonized with my past, and my conscience, and my God. I assure you solemnly that I cannot place anything except full Christianity under my head, and be at peace. I have been in the jaws of death. I hope I have seen enough of life to be a little above caring what men say for or against any position I may take up, for I am not to be here long at the longest. You are not to be here long. We are

to be gathered home, as our fathers were, and we wish to go hence in peace. In the name of cool precision, in the name of the philosophy that dares not believe a lie, or call anything that is obscure clear, it must be declared that Christianity, and it alone, can harmonize us with an irreversible record of deliberate sin, with a God who is a thousand consciences, and with a conscience that is a thousand swords.

VIII.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS OF ORTHODOXY.

THE River Ilissus in Athens is a delicious crystalline stream, full of white and brown pebbles, which no doubt the feet of Phocion, and Socrates, and Demosthenes, and Plato, and Aristotle, have touched. Its ripples, therefore, are more musical than Apollo's lute ; and you will not blame me for stating that I brought home from Athens a broad, fair pebble out of that stream, and from that portion of its bed, which, scholars say, was once crossed by the gardens and walks and marble colonnades of Aristotle's Lyceum. I keep this white stone now as a paper-weight on a heap of excerpts and newspaper cuttings intended to represent current misconceptions of Christian truth. Quite a number of slips have been accumulating in that heap of late, some of them from Music Hall ; and, since I am as proud of the specimens I gather into my cabinet as ever a collector of crystals was of his captured gems, I wish to make you sharers of my bliss, according to Shakspeare's maxim :—

> "When thou haply seest
> Some rare noteworthy object in thy travel,
> Make me partaker of thy happiness."
>
> *Two Gentlemen of Verona.*

1. From this cabinet of misconception—notice, I do not say of misrepresentation—I must choose at least one specimen concerning the measureless theme of free final permanence of character, or the natural wages of habitual evil choice. I hold in my hand a book written by a man whom we all honour for his candour and learning, and whose vigorous honesty in the political affairs of this Commonwealth has more than once been a pillar of fire in a dark place. I mean Mr. Clarke, who lately has presented to the public an almost semi-official answer to the question "What is a Christian?" I read in this volume, which is also almost semi-official, and, in my opinion, the best book ever published in Boston by unevangelical Christianity, the following very amazing words : "The Orthodox doctrine of future punishment is exceedingly simple. . . . The purest and best of men, who does not believe the precise Orthodox theory concerning the Trinity, sits in hell side by side with Zingis Khan, who murdered in cold blood hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, marking his bloody route by pyramids of skulls" (CLARKE, *Orthodoxy*, p. 357).

Gentlemen, that is a very interesting specimen in this cabinet. It is almost flawless. I hardly know how it could be better. That misconception is fundamental, colossal, ghastly, inexcusable.

2. But take another flaming favourite gem of mine from the same cabinet, and broken off the same ledge of crystalline Boston rock :—

"The unbaptized child, who goes to hell because of the original sin derived from Adam, is exposed to God's wrath no less than Pope Alexander VI., who outraged every law of God and man, and who, says Machiavelli, 'was followed

to the tomb by the heavy feet of his three dear companions,—Luxury, Simony, and Cruelty.' This is the doctrine which every denomination and sect in Christendom, except the Unitarians and Universalists, maintain as essential to Orthodoxy" (pp. 357, 358).

Gentlemen, is that a correct statement? This serious assertion is just about as correct as it would be to say that Charles River flows into the Mississippi. It is quite as correct as to affirm that Massachusetts is a province of China.

3. You will allow me, therefore, to say that I was not greatly surprised, when, a few weeks ago, I obtained a third specimen off this same fruitful ledge of crystals; or, the assertion that my view of the Trinity, or the view of the New-England theology as understood by this Lectureship, is "one which any Unitarian can accept" (Mr. CLARKE, *Daily Advertiser*, March 26). That statement was made, however, before a full discussion had been presented here, although warning had been given not to judge the house while the scaffolding was up; and I believe the statement is not reiterated at present.

4. In an account of semi-official discussions at Music Hall, I read that Mr. Cook has given up the doctrine of substitution. The language of the report is, that Mr. Cook comes forward, belonging to the same school of thought with a certain evangelist, and tells us "that we must accept the Orthodox doctrine on this subject;" and he says that "no Orthodox man of any sense or any knowledge believes to-day in substitution" (Report of Mr. CLARKE'S *Sermon*, "Daily Advertiser," April 30). Another authority says that Mr. Cook "defends the doctrine of substitution by giving it up" (*Unitarian Tract*, by Mr. KIMBALL).

Now, what are the facts? New-England theology makes a distinction between chastisement and punishment. Even the Universalist theology insists that there is a difference between suffering and punishment. I know careless phrases have been used by orthodox scholars; but when I open a series of articles published in "The Bibliotheca Sacra," by writers of all denominations, within the last fifteen years, and constituting the best statement of the new Orthodoxy that New England has yet made,—fifteen or eighteen elaborate communications prepared by Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Congregationalists of the first rank in scholarship,—I find such a representative writer, for instance, as the revered Dr. Whedon, editor of "The Methodist Quarterly Review," a man probably not given to Calvinism, saying this,—

"The imputation of the sin of man, or his punishment, to Christ, is but a popular conception, justifiable if understood as only conceptual; just as we might say that the crime of Pythias was imputed to Damon in order that we also might be able to say that Damon was *punished* instead of Pythias. In strictness of language and thought, neither crime, guilt, nor punishment is personally transferable" (WHEDON, Rev. D.D., *Bib. Sac.*, April 1862, pp. 260, 261).

Why, it is amazing to me that gentlemen will quote phrases from Mr. Spurgeon, saying that our Lord was punished, and then come forward in Boston, and affirm that Orthodoxy holds that our Lord was not innocent, and meet us with the charge of self-contradiction when we exhibit the truths of the Atonement in detail. Ask Mr. Spurgeon, or any other man who uses that word "punished," whether our Lord was a murderer, a perjurer, a leper, or a thief. Ask whether he does not believe, as the Church has always believed, whatever its language may have been, that our Lord was innocent. We are now more careful in our phraseology than we once were; but the Church has always had the idea of Christ's innocence, and never has asserted that He was punished, in the sense of suffering pain for personal blameworthiness; for He never had any personal blameworthiness. Let us distinguish ideas from voca-

bularies. I admit that the latter have been careless ; and it is one part of the joy of my life to contribute a little toward more caution in the expression of truths which we cannot touch properly, unless in that spirit which Uzzah did *not* have when he touched the ark, and for lack of reverence was struck dead !

Andrew Fuller, the Baptist scholar, who has been called the Benjamin Franklin of theology, was very careful of his language on this supreme point ; and as long ago as 1800 drew in substance the distinction between chastisement and punishment. "Real and proper punishment," he wrote, "is not only the infliction of natural evil for the commission of moral evil, but the infliction of the one upon the person who committed the other, and in displeasure against him ; it not only supposes criminality, but that the party punished was literally the criminal" (FULLER, ANDREW, *Works*, chap. x., p. 34, quoted with approval by Professor PARK, *Bib. Sac.*, January 1865, p. 174).

Modern theological science is substantially a unit on this topic, not in its vocabularies, but in its ideas. I dislike to take time on a point which needs to be elaborated nowhere out of Boston ; but, if you will allow me to cite a school on which you may probably have looked with considerable arrogance, —the East Windsor Theological Institution, where the old school in New-England theology is represented,—you will find Professor Lawrence there, in his official article in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," saying of that school of theology, "The old school theology speaks freely of Christ as 'suffering the penalty of the law,' and as 'paying our debts.' *But it never implies that He was a sinner, suffering demerits.* 'Our guilt and punishment being, *as it were*, transferred to Him,' says Calvin. Edwards says, 'He suffered *as though* guilty.'" (LAWRENCE, Reverend Professor, of East Windsor Theol. Inst., on "The Old School in N. E. Theol.," *Bib. Sac.*, April 1863, p. 333. See also pp. 338, 339.)

The distinction between chastisement and punishment is very familiar in the instruction given at Andover in religious science.

If now, for using phraseology which recognizes this distinction between chastisement and punishment, I may be accused of giving up the doctrine of substitution, then all New-England theology is to be thus accused ; then all schools, old and new, are to be supposed to have changed their ideas, because they have become more cautious in their language. The doctrine of the Atonement is such to me, that, without it, philosophy would lead by self-evident truth only to the conclusion that we of all men are most miserable, since we have sinned, and do not know a way of escape. There is to me such clearness in the demonstration of our need of an Atonement, that, if you say no Atonement ever has been made, philosophy to me is not glad tidings ; for it is clear tidings of a necessity not met ; therefore, to philosophy itself, the denial of the doctrine of substitution makes a desert of life.

5. But it is said that I have put forward Dean Stanley as a representative of Orthodoxy, and that he is a Unitarian (Mr. CLARKE, *Daily Advertirse*, April 30).

Not many months ago, Lady Augusta Stanley lay in her coffin in Westminster Abbey, and there at her side sat Thomas Carlyle. Who had been her chaplain? The American evangelist who has but just left this city. On whose invitation? On her own. By whose consent? By her husband's. Who told you that? The American evangelist himself. What did he do? He conducted devotional exercises in Lady Stanley's sick-chamber. You talk about the breadth of Dean Stanley's Broad Church views! You must look at the upper part of the breadth as well as the lower. By the way, speaking of Carlyle, let me say that Mr. Ruskin has lately affirmed that Carlyle's opinion of Darwin, which I stated to you some months since, "will probably be remembered as long as anything else that Carlyle ever said."

That is reported, I beg you notice I say, as coming from Ruskin. According to written assurances sent to me by a literary gentleman of high rank, who knows the person who heard Carlyle express his opinion of Darwin, there is every reason to trust that extract as Carlyle's own. Professor Tholuck of Halle in Germany told me that once he was invited to spend the winter in the south of Italy with Thomas Carlyle, and doubted at first whether he had better accept the invitation, for fear there would be social dissonance on account of divergences of views. "I sought information," said Professor Tholuck; "and from England, on the highest authority, I was told there would be no dissonance; for Carlyle is a good Christian man." Have I not read what Carlyle says about the Thirty-nine Articles? Yes; and rejoice in it. Have I not read what he says about threshing mere straw in formulas of belief without soul behind them? Yes; and thank God for every syllable the Prophet of Chelsea has written on that theme. I have heard also from the lips of your own Emerson, that Carlyle likes to quote his own father's expressions at family worship in old Scotland. I do not forget what Carlyle thought of Sterling, or what he said of the death of Edward Irving. "To Frederic, as to all of us," says Carlyle, "it was flatly inconceivable that intellect, moral emotion, could have been put into him by an Entity that had none of its own" (*Life of Frederic the Great*, last chapter). This language asserts the Personality of the Supreme Being, and proves, therefore, that Carlyle is no pantheist. There is even more between than in the lines of hundreds of pages that he has given to the world. I remember that Essay on Voltaire in which he writes explicitly:—

"We understand ourselves to be risking no new assertion, but simply reporting what is already the conviction of the greatest in our age, when we say, that cheerfully recognizing, gratefully appropriating, whatever Voltaire has proved, or any other man has proved, or shall prove, the Christian religion, once here, cannot again pass away; that, in one or the other form, it will endure through all time; that as in Scripture, so also in the heart of man, is written, 'The gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' Were the memory of this faith never so obscured, as, indeed, in all times, the coarse passions and perceptions of the world do all but obliterate it in the hearts of most, yet in every pure soul, in every poet and wise man, it finds a new missionary, a new martyr, till the great volume of universal history is finally closed, and man's destinies are fulfilled in this earth. 'It is a height to which the human species were fated and enabled to attain; and from which, having once attained it, they can never retrograde.'"

Distinguish between ideas and vocabularies, and you will find that Carlyle deserved what he received the other day from Dean Stanley, a certificate that "he never disdained the traditions of the Scottish Church and nation." When I put in his lips the Litany, I took what all are obliged to subscribe who are in the renowned English Church. The prayer-book, as well as the articles, is subscribed, is it not? Of course I had a right to quote the flower as well as the root; out of the latter grows the former. I wished to indicate what popular theology is; and it was evidently necessary for me to take that which is most before the people,—the hallelujahs and the praises, the indication of the popular mind in worship. I took the most overt public part of the Church of England service to indicate what the popular theology is. Some scribblers have complained because I put the words of the Litany into the mouths of Carlyle and Stanley, and have thought the language of the Thirty-nine Articles could not have been used with the same effect. The words I cited from your Boston critic would have sounded weak and wicked, had I quoted them alone in Westminster Abbey, in presence only of God.

But now, as to Dean Stanley, three things are to be noticed:—

First, we must make a distinction between his breadth as an ecclesiastical politician and his breadth as a theologian. He is a representative of a national church such as we know nothing of in America. Any gentleman here, directly or indirectly connected with that church, will allow me to say that the High Church and Low Church and Broad Church are quite as sharply antagonistic to each other as any of our Protestant denominations outside of the English Establishment. Dean Stanley is the representative of this national church, which must hold all kinds of culture together; and his great principle is a political one. He wishes to keep these warring elements from seceding until their real merits can be distinguished by time. His supreme principle is one of comprehension and trial. Let these conflicting ideas be kept inside the Church, says Dean Stanley; allow every man to hold any fairly reasonable opinion; let every such opinion have a place until its value is tested by time.

This is a breadth of ecclesiastical policy rather than of theology. Dean Stanley as a theologian is far less broad than Dean Stanley as an ecclesiastical politician. I am not discussing whether or not he is to be justified in taking that attitude as to a national church. Many of Dean Stanley's best friends declare that he ought to be more severe in excluding from the English Church some sections of sentiment, perhaps so broad that they hardly come within the range even of general tolerant Christianity. They say he ought to think more of the Christian Church than of the national church, and that he does not. But into that question I need not enter.

In the next place, it is to be remembered that Dean Stanley is by no means careless in his statements as to the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Atonement. He holds such views as Charles Kingsley did; and what Kingsley's views of the Trinity were, I showed to you in detail the other morning. No doubt Charles Kingsley held erratic views on one or two points; but he was substantially sound on what the Church of England regards as the essentials of Christian truth, and so surely Stanley is, or he would not be where he is. Dean Stanley said not long ago in the chapel at Rugby,—I have his language before me,—"Thomas Arnold's words constantly come back to me as expressing better than anything else my hopes and fears for this life and for the life to come." Everybody knows Stanley is the biographer of Thomas Arnold, and that Thomas Arnold was a man of a large, generous, illumined nature, and of great symmetry of character, but by no means what one would call a loose dreamer as to the highest of all truths. No doubt he was in the best sense of the word a liberal believer; but that word "liberal" I use as infrequently as possible, it has such an amazing resemblance to caoutchouc. Toward the bottom of the elastic scale of liberalism you may often find those who are ready to answer, if you ask what is a Christian, "He is man who is always learning, but never able to come to a knowledge of the truth;" and that comes pretty near to being the definition given in Music Hall the other evening. And if you ask what does a Christian believe, "Why, anything that means nothing in particular;" and that comes so fearfully near to being the definition given in Music Hall, that I do not dare to talk about the lower ranges of liberalism, lest I seem to slander the upper.

Now, Thomas Arnold believed something in particular; and Dean Stanley is a pupil, and professes himself to be theologically an enlarged copy, of Thomas Arnold. He is to be ranked with Kingsley and Robertson and Milman as a follower of Hooker, and an opponent of the influences of Laud. It is perfectly amazing to find the Broad Church party spoken of as carrying England over to that style of unscientific liberalism which I have just ridiculed. Why, only yesterday I opened a periodical not given to the theological discussion, and found the statement, that when Emerson came first to England,

many years ago, and Carlyle sounded his glories to such an extent that almost every circle in the country was anxious to obtain a glimpse of the Boston poet and philosopher, the current feeling was one of sorrow, that so brilliant a man as Emerson, so lovable, and so talented, should nevertheless be afflicted with a repugnant something, spoken of in whispers, like the small-pox, or the practice of cannibalism; this was his Unitarianism, Transcendentalism, Theodore-Parkerism. "But then he cannot be altogether sane," was the frequent comment. It is true that many English people of position are Unitarians. There is a brilliant man who is on the point of making an effort to get a seat in Parliament now, who has long been a disciple of Theodore Parker. "I feel bound to add," my English authority says, "that all with whom I have conversed say that his religious sentiments are the only drawbacks to his success; but the repugnance toward them felt by the majority of voters will prevent his getting the seat." The objection most offered in England to such views is the demoralizing effect they are considered to have on the average mass of society. Much of the political sentiment here described I abhor. But, when it is assumed that all England is turning over to Parker's views, it is important to notice straws like this, which show which way the wind blows.

But, in the third place, Dean Stanley is regarded in England and by scholars generally as a church historian rather than a theologian. He is the Macaulay of church historians. But, as to his ability as a theologian or philosopher, the *London Times* hints well a general opinion in its criticism on Dean Stanley's recent address at St. Andrew's University. It finds reason in that production for saying, that, if Dean Stanley's hopes are fulfilled, Christendom will have unity by-and-by,—"the unity of a landscape covered with mist" (*London Times*, March 17). The growing power of the scientific method does not prophesy for that style of unity a victorious future. But the *London Times* has usually failed, as many other authorities have done, to distinguish between Stanley's breadth as a church politician and his breadth as a theologian.

6. There is one more glittering specimen in my cabinet of misconceptions to be noticed; and then I must hasten to the conclusion of this exhibition of curiosities, many of them fossils, I hope. A man of letters, a philanthropist, a citizen whom we all honour for his own deeds and for those of his fathers, said last night in Music Hall: "They tell you that God the Father entered into council with God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, and that in their infinite wisdom they devised a plan by which God the Son might meet the justice of God the Father, and that by this means the race of men should be saved, not from their sins, but from the punishment which their sins have justly deserved. Mr. Cook says I must not say that this is the substitution of an innocent Christ for guilty men. Mr. Boyd says I must; and Dr. Chalmers says I must." [Whatever his language, Dr. Chalmers does not mean that our Lord was personally blameworthy.] "But I do not care for the words. I never use any of them unless I am forced to, and that is not often. *The point I would impress on you is, that all this middle-age theology turns on the assumption that Jesus Christ saves men from their punishment simply.* But all the simpler theologies, all liberal theology, turn on the truth that God, because He is God, chooses to save His people from all sins" (*Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 7).

So speaks Mr. Hale. But what definition of salvation has been given from time immemorial in idea, and what definition has been given here especially? "Salvation is permanent deliverance from both the love and the guilt of sin." Without deliverance from both these, peace with our whole environment is a natural impossibility. To assume that what is called evangelical theology is

not careful to deliver men from sin, as well as from the guilt of it, is as accurate as to say that Plymouth Rock will float, or that Bunker-hill Monument is the North Pole. I am patriotically pained by these astounding stretches of vapour in Boston. If these are the clear heights of the landscape which contains the population opposed to evangelical truth, what are the lower portions? If these are the sunlit peaks, what are the marshes? I have heard of a miraculous London fog so dense that you could not see a street-lamp when standing under it, though I never saw such a fog. I have seen one, however, in which you could not see one street-lamp from another; and I have heard of one which could be cut into slices with any delicate edge of steel. But I need all these styles of fogs to give me a perfect symbol for that style of vapour which must brood over the lower lands, if these amazing statements are the vapour brooding over the sunlit peaks. To be perfectly frank, and to speak kindly, evangelical scholars do regard these representations as astounding; and we think, if people believe them,—which we hope they do not,—those people who do believe them are a heavily befogged population.

7. But, my friends, all the peaks in this landscape in which I have been showing you a few heights are not thus wreathed in vapour. Go to Harvard University, which has had reason to think on this subject as no other college in the land has done. I turn to the words of the present preacher to the university, and I find him saying that he "remembers in his boyhood a type of Calvinism as cold as it was bitter, in which spirit was wholly congealed into dogma." I should not admit quite that Jonathan Edwards, who spoke of "the soul of a true Christian as such a little white flower as we see in the spring of the year, low and humble on the ground, opening its bosom to receive the pleasant beams of the sun's glory, rejoicing, as it were, in a calm rapture, diffusing around a sweet fragrance, standing peacefully and lovingly in the midst of other flowers round about, all in like manner opening their bosoms to drink in the light of the sun" (President EDWARDS'S works, vol. i., pp. 61, 62),—I should hardly concede that this Edwards, who might have been the first poet of his nation, if he had not chosen to be its first theologian, and who, if a man ever was a saint, was one, had wholly congealed his religion into a dogma. There is a law of development somewhere in religious history; so we heard yesterday from Professor Peirce himself. If there is a better Orthodoxy, it has been developed out of something behind it. It was the old school Orthodoxy that took Charles I. by the throat, and broke his neck. It was the old school Orthodoxy that fled from England in times of the icy breath of persecution, and that planted the common-school system in the rocky soil of New England. We had stern work to do; and it is perhaps natural that some stern things were said in stern days. But this very preacher of the renowned University yonder goes on to say,—and here we rise out of the vapour; here, thank God! is a sunlit peak:—

"What now terms itself Calvinism is a free, generous, earnest, philanthropic development of the religious life, with which I for one feel the most hearty and loving sympathy; nor do I believe that, under its auspices, New-England Congregationalism would have been rent in twain, as it was early in the present century."

Remember that these are not my words, but those of the Plummer Professor of Morals, and Preacher to Harvard University:—

"Lowest of all in the scale, yet the very thing we need most to shun, is the dogmatism of mere negations. As a Trinitarian, I should, as I desire to do now, worship the Father, love the Son, and pray for the Holy Spirit. But mere anti-Trinitarianism cannot by any possibility make me reverent or devout; and a

ministry of negations, even though the negatives be all justifiable, is utterly fruitless, nay, worse, harmful, demoralizing, contemptible. A church which lays intense emphasis on what it does not believe, and whose members know not how to express any article of faith without a negative particle, is a nursery of scepticism and infidelity, and nothing better. At the same time there is no intolerance so bitter and scornful as that of the so-called churches whose faith consists in not believing."

So bravely spoke symmetry, strength, and devoutness of soul, in Professor Peabody, and so bravely were these words published (*Unitarian Review*, January 1877, pp. 72—74).

8. Not far from Bunker Hill there is another sunlit peak; and, now that I am on this theme, I must point out how noticeable that summit yonder is crowned with light.

"Professor Park," writes the Rev. Dr. George E. Ellis, in his Half-Century of Unitarian Controversy, "tried the whole resources of his amazingly acute and skilful mind upon these problems. We trust all our readers have perused that Conventional Discourse of the Andover professor, to which we have more than once referred. We regard it, on the score of what it boldly affirms, and of what it so significantly implies, when taken in connection with its wonderful beauty of style, and its marvellous subtlety of analysis, as the most noteworthy contribution which Orthodoxy has made to the literature of New England for the last half-century. That single discourse would win fame for any preacher" (pp. 385, 386).

"It may be, that something will be offered to us as Orthodoxy which we shall pronounce to be better far than Unitarianism,—something which we can receive with the same sympathy of soul and cordiality of heart with which we read the writings of those who are constructing the new theology from the ruins of the old.

"We look with sincere and unprejudiced interest to the speculative and scholarly labours of the advanced minds in orthodox communions. May God's blessing be on their labours, to keep them loyal to Him, to Christ, and to the everlasting gospel of grace and redemption. If the new theology shall prove to be so much truer and better than 'Unitarianism' as to obliterate the sect whose visible increase it does withstand, we are ready to welcome it" (pp. 391, 402).

Gentlemen, that is sunlight; and these fogs lie far below this sky-kissed peak.

9. Open history as it stands recorded in the latest book written on the first century of our republic,—a set of essays by such men as Presidents Woolsey and Barnard, Francis A. Walker, Professor T. Sterry Hunt, Professor Sumner, E. P. Whipple, and others; and turn to Mr. Whipple's Essay on American Literature, and you will read,—this is not written for a partisan purpose,—"The theological protest against Unitarianism was made by some of the most powerful minds and learned scholars in the country,—by Stuart, Park, Edwards, Barnes, Robinson, Lyman Beecher, and the Alexanders, not to mention fifty others. The thought of these men still controls the theological opinion of the country; and their works are much more extensively circulated, and exert a greater practical influence, than the writings of such men as Channing, Norton, Dewey, Emerson, and Parker" (*The First Century of the Republic*, p. 372).

What is the summary of all this?

1. That there is manhood left, and clear thought, on both sides, and that, when the great peaks are seen, they do not scold each other, or the azure above them, but are reverently looking into each other's faces, asking how brotherhood under one sky can be brought about in consistency with clearness of thought.

2. That the vapours of misconception, the dense fogs which have made so many of us shy of each other, are unworthy of scholarship of the first rank.

3. That if such presentations of religious truth as are now regarded, and as in substance always have been regarded, as evangelical, had been in explicit as well as implicit use fifty or eighty years ago, God's house would not have been divided in Eastern Massachusetts.

4. That, if there was no reason for the division of the house on the ground of such presentations as are now called evangelical, there is no longer any ground, in view of such presentations, for the house continuing to be divided against itself.

A CONSIDERATION OF MR. CLARKE'S AND MR. HALE'S CRITICISMS.

"Qualis gemma micat, fulvum quæ dividit aurum
Aut collo decus, aut capiti; vel quale per artem
Inclusam buxo, aut Oricia terebintho
Lucet ebur."
VIRGIL: *Æn.* x. 134.

"Es ist Nichts schrecklicher als eine thätige Unwissenheit."
GOETHE: *Maxims*, iii. 191.

It is a famous story concerning the Greek general Brasidas, that he looked out one morning upon the host that was attacking the city he was set to defend, and said, "Victory is ours; for I see that the spears in the files of the enemy are not in line. The ranks yonder are so illy trained, that their weapons will become sources of suicide before the sun shall set." Fasten your attention, gentlemen, on the quivering spears of the host who attack self-evident truth in its relations to that central Christian doctrine which we call the Atonement. My purpose is not controversial, but practical. I speak in the name of axioms only, and I have laboured up to our present point of view with the hope of convincing you that the converging admissions of all who are good ethical scholars prove the necessity of a great arrangement, not made by man, to secure his harmonization with his entire environment.

It was an occasion on which history will look back with interest in this city, when James Freeman Clarke stood on the platform of Theodore Parker, in the absence of the latter in Italy, and criticised the system of Parker, as Dorner the great German theologian does, for underrating the significance of the fact of sin. James Freeman Clarke took up his position on the ground of self-evident truth. He planted himself upon axioms. Like a scholar, he made his first appeal to self-evident propositions. Now, I am this morning to put under the lenses of ethical science a few of the admissions of Mr. Clarke, which are not very unlike the propositions I have been defending here in the name of axioms, and show you just whither these self-evident propositions lead. In order that I may not be accused of misrepresenting Mr. Clarke, you will allow me to read an extract here of the length of a page,—

"We think that if we analyze the feeling which the conscience gives us concerning the consequences of wrong-doing, it is this: first, conscience demands

reparation to the injured party; second, it demands punishment as a satisfaction to be made to the law of right, and this suffering to be accepted as just by the guilty party; and, thirdly, it declares that guilt should produce an alienation or separation between the guilty party and those who are not guilty. A man hitherto respected and trusted by society commits some great breach of trust, and robs the community. Conscience requires that he should make atonement to those he has injured, by restitution; to the law of right which he has offended, by suffering some punishment; and to honourable men, by keeping out of their way.

"This, which the conscience teaches of an injury done to man, it also teaches of an injury done to God. The offence against man is *a crime;* the offence against God is *a sin.* For a crime the conscience requires restitution, punishment with confession, and alienation from the good, which is shame; for a sin the conscience requires, in like manner, restitution, punishment, and alienation. It merely transfers to God's justice the ideas of atonement which human justice has given to it. . . .

"There is, however, a difficulty in *believing* that we can be forgiven. This difficulty is in the conscience; and—

"(*a.*) To say *there is no difficulty* will not remove it.

"(*b.*) To say *that repentance and good works are enough* will not remove it.

"(*c.*) To say that *God is merciful* will not remove it; for *the difficulty lies in the conscience,* which declares that every sin is—

"1. An injury done to God.

"2. An injury to the moral universe; inasmuch as it is an example of evil, and a defiance of right.

"3. An injury to ourselves, by putting us away from God, the source of life, and alienating us from Him.

"The *inward voice of conscience is always saying that God ought not to forgive us without some reparation made for the injury done to Himself, to the universe, and to ourselves.*" (CLARKE, *Orthodoxy*, pp. 246—248.)

This is not an evangelical author. Here is straightforward adherence, thus far, to the plain inferences from the great natural operations of conscience. Up to this point, there is no parting company in linked scholarship all through the world; and Mr. Clarke knows there is not.

"Conscience is always saying that God ought not to forgive us." God always does what He ought to do. Conscience does not tell Munchausen tales. These laws, by which we know how to harmonize ourselves with our environment, so far forth it is merely human, are one and the same with the moral laws which sweep through the universe, and reveal to us, therefore, how we are to obtain harmonization with that wider environment.

But now, having gone thus far, how does Mr. Clarke escape from the conclusion which follows very naturally from these propositions of ethical science? Why, by denying the unity of the moral law! This is his language: "God's justice is not like man's." Now, there is a sense in which that is true; but when you interrogate conscience, and find it always proclaiming that something ought to be, that is an exhibition, not of man's justice, but of God's justice. I put this to any scholar,—to Mr. Clarke himself,—whether Bishop Butler, the best student of conscience in modern times, would justify him in saying that what the inward voice of conscience "always" says has not in it a revelation of God. Why, it is one of Mr. Clarke's teachings, that conscience has in it a something in us, but not of us,—something really Divine. It is held by the acutest scholarship that the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world is one with the Holy Ghost, shed forth from our ascended Lord. Go to your Dorner,

and Martensen, and Rothe, and all the best students of religious science, from the side of ethics and evangelical truth, and you will find them rejoicing to illustrate in all detail, and with the full radiance of philosophy as well as of evangelical learning, the truth that the Holy Spirit is the present Christ; and they identify it with the innermost holiest of conscience. Now, I affirm that the moral law is a part of the natural law, and that law is a unit throughout the universe; and that therefore we cannot escape from the consequences of such an admission as this; that the inward voice of conscience always says that God "ought not" to forgive us, except on a threefold condition, by simply saying, "God's justice is not like man's." The ideas of the Atonement drawn from our human experience, Mr. Clarke says, "are essentially false" (p. 247). But, if the ideas that come to us from the moral natural law are essentially false, how is it that we do not fall into scepticism about the physical natural laws? We know that law is a unit; and that therefore this earth, although an atom in immensity, is immensity itself in the revelation of truth. We believe in the unity of law. The law of gravitation is the same here, and in Orion, and the Seven Stars. Tell me what the moral law is here, and I will tell you what it is in the Unseen Holy. It is disloyalty of the most extreme sort to the scientific method, to endeavour to escape from any proposition by denying the unity of the moral law; for the unity and universality of law are among the most haughty and irrefutable teachings of all science.

It is admitted, then, by Mr. Clarke—

1. That conscience demands reparation to the injured party.
2. That it demands punishment as a satisfaction to the law of right.
3. That this suffering is to be accepted as just by the guilty party.
4. That guilt should produce a separation between the guilty and those who are not guilty.
5. That what the conscience teaches of an injury done to man, it also teaches of an injury done to God.
6. That offence against man is a crime, and that against God is a sin.
7. That conscience transfers to God's justice the ideas of Atonement which human justice has given to it.
8. That, without other light than that of conscience, there is a difficulty in believing that we can be forgiven.
9. That to say there is no difficulty will not remove it.
10. That to say repentance and good works are enough will not remove it.
11. That to say that God is merciful will not remove it.
12. That the difficulty is in the conscience, and that the inward voice is *always* saying that God *ought* not to forgive us without some reparation made for the injury done to Himself, to the universe, and to ourselves.
13. Theodore Parker admitted this supreme fact as to the natural operations of conscience (*Theism*, last discourse).
14. All established ethical science asserts this fact as an inevitable

inference from intuition, instinctive belief, and the experience of man age after age.

With the emphasis of his hand upon his heart, a scholar whom I suppose to be the best representative of the learning of unevangelical Christianity in this country, a professor who lives not a hundred miles from Boston, said to me in the Athenæum Library lately, without any cross-questioning from me, "There is a difficulty in conscience as to our peace, when we once have sinned; and that difficulty in the structure of human nature has sustained the doctrine of the vicarious Atonement, before the attacks of philosophy, century after century." He seemed to think that he was pointing to a proof-text of not much consequence; but to me this human nature, the serious volume he thus put aside in order to read some more authoritative proof-text out of the Scriptures, was itself the oldest scripture; was that scripture in harmony with which all other scripture must be interpreted; was, in short, the supreme although not all-sufficing revelation of God by being a revelation of the unity of the moral law,—the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

15. All these admissions point to the necessity of an Atonement.

16. But Clarke and Parker, and the schools of thought they represent, deny this necessity.

17. They do this, and they can do this, only by denying explicitly or implicitly the universality of law.

18. *The affirmation is made, that the ideas we draw from what conscience is saying constantly are essentially false.*

We must give all the intuitions supreme authority in our religious science. The intuitions of conscience, which prove the philosophical accuracy of distinctively biblical evangelical ideas must have no authority in our religious science!

Here is the supreme self-contradiction in Theodore Parker's system and in every similar scheme of thought. Such systems evade the challenge which Julius Müller and Dorner accept, to follow up this inner voice of conscience, and receive the testimony of all intuition, instinctive belief, and experiment, whithersoever they lead. It is admitted that conscience affirms that God ought not to harmonize us with our entire environment without a great arrangement which exhibits at once His love and His justice. What ought to be will be. By-and-by it will be seen that we ought not to deny the unity of the moral law, and so we shall not. The philosophy is coming that will be true to all self-evident truth, north, south, east, and west, and will be liberal enough to look into the thirty-two points of the azure before it decides on any proposition, great or small. When that day comes, this inner voice will be left to its proper authority; and the necessity of the Atonement will be an inference from exact ethical science. Mr. Clarke says implicitly that the ideas we draw from what conscience is always saying to us ought to be, are essentially false. I affirm that this denial of the authority of conscience in its innermost voice is unscientific on Mr. Clarke's part, and on the part of all that school of theology which will not harmonize itself with the the supreme fact of the Atonement. I maintain that to say that the ideas we draw from

the inmost holiest of conscience mislead us in religious research is to deny the unity and the universality of law, and to shut the eyes to a part of the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, and so is at once unscientific and irreligious. Here Orthodoxy and the Scripture part company with loose thought, and keep company with conscience and science.

IX.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

USE AND ABUSE OF CHURCH-MEMBERSHIP.

EMERSON says that the poorest poem is better than the best criticism upon it; and so we may say that the poorest really conscientious life is incalculably better than the acutest worldly sneer concerning it. Men outside the Church, when asked to unite with it, sometimes complain that there are many stunted, fruitless growths in the Church. Poor native spiritual endowments in Christians are the result of poor soil in which they grow; and the world that sneers is itself the soil. It will be noticed, that, as I am not in charge of any church, I have not the slightest personal interest at stake in anything I may say of the value of church-membership. But if, in a free church in a free state, I utter a single word on that now timely and always suggestive theme, I shall of course be met in some enlightened quarters with the profound remark, that all the effort that has been made in Boston this winter has been incited by a desire to pay church debts. Well, that is a good object. "Owe no man anything," is a divine maxim. An obscure infidel paper in this city shrewdly judges that the entire effort has been intended to fill up the membership of the evangelical churches. The *Springfield Republican* said the other day that the *Boston Index* would find something mean and atrocious in the proposition that two and two make four, if that statement were a part of the Apostles' Creed.

Every true church is a contract, not between two parties only, but three. It is not only an agreement of men with men, but of men with God. In disbanding a church, men alone cannot annul the contract. This is the scholarly idea of the bond of Christians in fellowship with each other and with an invisible Head. Thus the Christians of the world are really and confessedly members of a theocracy. You think Cromwell's and Milton's dream of a theocracy failed. Many an archangel pities you; and all the deep students of science among men smile, if you say this seriously. God governs; and His kingship is no pretence. Our best hope for America is, that like every other part of the universe, it is a theocracy. A true church is the outward form among men of God's kingdom in human history; and it illustrates His kingdom in all worlds.

We must look on every true church as really a divine institution; for it is a contract with the unseen Power that is filling the world, just as the magnetic currents of the globe fill all the needles on it. Our Lord was, and is, and is to come; and in all true believers He is as much present as the magnetic currents of the globe are in the balancing needles that point out the north pole rightly, if they are true to the currents that are in them, but not of them. The Church is our Lord's body; the Church is our Lord's temple; the Church brings every true believer into contact with the deepest inmost of our Lord's present life in the world; and this is the supreme reason for uniting with it. *It is painfully evident here, I hope, that I am speaking of a true church, and not of a Sunday club.*

Experience has shown that most men who do not unite with the Church drop away from their early religious life. The two great reasons for uniting with a true Church are, that you are likely to grow more inside the Church than out of it, and that you can probably do more good in it than out of it.

To which church do I ask you to join yourselves? I wish you could find out. Am I making a party plea? I wish you would ascertain on which side it is made. I know, perhaps, five hundred young men who are members of churches; but I do not know of twenty of them to which evangelical church they belong, nor do I care. It is not a partisan plea I am making in asking you to become a member of the visible church; and, if you are a member of the true invisible church, you will assuredly wish to aid in making some part of the visible church a true church.

But you say that creeds are long. They are quite short in some places, although they are deep. Not a few newspapers have lately cited a portion of the Andover creed, which the professors there sign. That is in form a very different creed from the one that belongs to the Andover Chapel Church. The public does not seem to know that the detailed statement or confession which the professors may very well be called on to subscribe is a different thing from that statement of essentials which Andover puts into a church creed. The Andover Chapel Church creed is hardly longer than my hand is broad; but it is as deep as any rift in the granite that goes to the core of the world. The best church creeds include great essentials, and no more. I think now especially of the short creed in the Yale College Church, written by President Dwight, not very wide, but fathomlessly deep. These are simply the creeds which you wish to make the basis of your action, and therefore may well make the basis of your profession.

I hold in my hand the creed which the American evangelist, who will soon lead our devotions, subscribed twenty-one years ago in Boston. That confession of faith has by the Divine blessing amounted to something in the world. As a ray of keen light for others, our evangelist will allow me in his presence to read, what perhaps he never has seen, the record on the church books, of his examination in that house of God yonder in which he first resolved to do his duty:—

"No. 1079. Dwight L. Moody. Boards 43 Court Street. Has been baptized. First awakened on the 16th of May. Became anxious about himself. Saw himself a sinner; and sin now seems hateful, and holiness desirable. Thinks he has repented. Has purposed to give up sin. Feels dependent upon Christ for forgiveness. Loves the Scriptures. Prays. Desires to be useful. Religiously educated. Been in the city a year. From Northfield, this State. Is not ashamed to be known as a Christian. Eighteen years old.

"No. 1121. March 12, 1856. Thinks he has made some progress since he was here before,—at least in knowledge. Has maintained his habits of prayer and reading the Bible. Believes God will hear his prayers. Is fully determined to adhere to the cause of Christ always. Feels that it would be very bad if he should join the church, and then turn. Must repent of sin, and ask forgiveness for Christ's sake. Will never give up his hope, or love Christ less, whether admitted to the church or not. His prevailing intention is to give up his will to God.

"Admitted May 4, 1856."

That is a most moving record. Gentlemen, I hold that this is an examination that no church need feel ashamed of; and the results of it are of the same character.

The Christian ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper you do not approach closely unless you come into the Church. In close contact with illumined

souls there is a power which will come to you nowhere outside of God's house. Why is it that there is such a strange influence exerted upon itself by a great assembly all of one mind? Go to the little gatherings where some men of the class that neglect God's house spend their Sundays,—fire-engine rooms and the secret clubs for drinking,—and all the sentiment runs one way there. Such men are like eels in pools of the muddy sort, and often come to think that their pool is the whole ocean. You are easily transfused with the spirit of any company that moves all one way. Put yourselves into the crystalline springs and streams. Somewhere in the Church you will find crystalline waters. There is a church inside the Church. *Move in that; live enswathed in that.* Let that be the transfusing bath of your inmost life; and very soon you will find in the power of that interfusion of soul with soul that assuredly God is yet in His holy temple.

Yes; but there are hypocrites in the Church. I know it. Let Tennyson describe one:—

> "With all his conscience and one eye askew,
> So false, he partly took himself for true;
> Whose pious talk, when most his heart was dry,
> Made wet the crafty crow's-foot round his eye;
> Who never naming God except for gain,
> So never took that useful name in vain;
> Made Him his cat's-paw, and the Cross his tool,
> And Christ the bait to trap his dupe and fool;
> Nor deeds of gift, but gifts of grace, he forged,
> And, snake-like, slimed his victim ere he gorged;
> And oft at Bible-meetings, o'er the rest
> Arising, did his holy, oily best."
>
> *Tennyson's Sea-Dreams.*

The black angels look through pillars of blue fire of that sort. Do you want the Church better? Unite with it, and turn out such men; or, rather, unite with it, and keep such men from getting in.

Perhaps some of our churches are too ambitious to be large in numbers. Let us be reasonably shy of that church ambition which cares more for quantity than quality. Our evangelist has said that he once in Chicago was ambitious to have a big church. He obtained one. Then he became ambitious to get a small one. A recognition of the necessity of spiritual church-membership is the crowning glory of the churches of America of all denominations; and it is almost a distinctively American idea.

Think of the host in the air behind me, as I invite you to become members of God's house! Here is a visible audience which might be enlarged to fill the city, or the nation, or the continent, or the world; but even then the audience before me would be as a ripple compared with the sea, in contrast with this audience in the air behind me,—all the sainted of our New-England shore, all who have gone hence from foreign lands, and are now in the Unseen Holy! The Church is one on earth and in heaven. Think of the martyrs of the Reformation, those who, on the Continent of Europe, prepared the way for this modern rising of the sun, and of all those who in the eighteen Christian centuries have laboured, and into whose labours we have entered. The goodly company of the martyrs and apostles and prophets is before you. With all that company I urge you to join hands, when I ask you to pass your brief career in this world in organized aggressive companionship with those who have a zeal for good works.

SCEPTICISM IN NEW ENGLAND.

"NESCIRE autem, quid antea, quam natus sis, acciderit, id est semper esse puerum."—CICERO: *Or.* 34.

"Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint."

GOETHE: *Faust.*

New-England scepticism of the last fifty years is the upheaved, foaming, temporary crest of two interfused waves, slowly rising from the historic deep, moving toward each other, meeting with loud shock, and throwing themselves aloft,—one American, and one German. Theodore Parker and much else floated in Boston at the summit of this glittering, uncertain crest, when each wave was at its height, and when in New England each increased the height of the other. In Germany the watery swell of rationalism is going down. (See Dorner, Schwartz, Kahnis, Christlieb, Hagenbach, Tholuck, and other writers, on the decline of rationalism in the German univerities. On that topic see an article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1875). In New England the vexed billow which upheaved Theodore Parker is going down also. Both waves have already broken into foam, passed their climax, and are slowly sinking now into the thoughtful, abiding level of the sea.

Under what compulsion of winds and tides did these waves rise? Answer me that question, or do not attempt to explain to me Boston and New England. Make some fairly adequate response to that inquiry, or do not try to tell me how Theodore Parker's errors, and those of the school of thought he represents, arose. In order to understand the sources of his mistakes, it is necessary for me to cast what I hope will not be a wholly useless glance over the causes of New-England scepticism at large. Long enough has this city had the name, long enough has Harvard University yonder had the reputation, it does not now deserve, of leading erratic thought in regard to the highest of all possible themes. A very curious past is behind us.

When Timothy Dwight, soldier, poet, and theologian *magnum atque venerabile nomen*, began his presidency at Yale College in 1795, the students there were accustomed to name each other after the French atheists. Jefferson, suspected of French principles in both religion and politics, was soon to become the chief magistrate of the nation. The enthusiasm for Lafayette and for Gallican liberty had inclined the heart of our whole people toward France. The atrociously shallow and unclean, but brilliant and audacious, Parisian infidelity of the period looked attractive, even to the most talented and scholarly undergraduates. "That was the day," Lyman Beecher writes in his "Autobiography" (vol. i. p. 43), "when boys that dressed flax in the barn read Tom Paine, and believed him. The college church was almost extinct. Most of the students were sceptical, and rowdies were plenty. Wines and liquors were kept in many rooms. Intemperance, profanity, gambling, and licentiousness were common." Lyman Beecher was in Yale College as a student in his third year, when Timothy Dwight came there as president; and now these two men lie not

far from each other in the unspeakably precious dust of the New Haven cemetery, at rest until the heavens are no more. At the first communion season after President Dwight's installation, only a single student from the whole membership of the college remained to participate in the service of the eucharist. In all the history of the American Church there has hardly been an hour of greater disaster. The senior class brought before the president a list of questions for discussion, one of them on the inspiration of the Scriptures (DWIGHT'S *Theology*, Memoir, vol. i. See also SPARKS'S *Life of Dwight*). He chose that theme for a written debate, asked the young men to be as thorough as possible on the infidel side, treated them courteously, answered them fairly, delivered for six months from the college pulpit massive courses of thought against infidelity; and from that day it ran into hiding-holes in Yale College.

If Harvard University had had a President Dwight, I say not what might have been its subsequent history and that of portions of Cambridge and Boston; but it would have been different. Among the eloquent memorials of the fathers, Mr. Emerson, in the Old South Church, lately told us that Providence has granted to Boston thus far the guidance of the intellectual destiny of this continent. Boston is a sea-blown city of amusingly self-blown trumpets. It is safe to affirm, that, in the geography of American culture, Boston is as yet, in the opinion of many, and especially in her own, the highest summit. But Harvard University is Boston's summit. Religious diseases, originated chiefly by contagion from France in her revolutionary period, and by many years of war on our own soil, filled the veins of Harvard, as well as those of Yale, at the opening of our national life. At the close of the last century, Harvard, as well as Yale, was in a vicious state, induced chiefly by the very same causes which had produced demoralization at Yale. Under the elms yonder, as well as under those at New Haven, sceptical students called each other in honour by infidel names,—Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert. In that Parisian period, unreportable vices were as common at Harvard as at Yale. We have just had a pleasant book written, describing student life in Harvard as it unrolls itself at present, and as many of you and as I remember it; but a volume describing life there ninety years ago, and as frankly written as this new description, we should not care to have generally circulated. In several works of historic fiction the average undergraduate of that time is represented as a low character. You know what pictures the world received from Hogarth; but some of the scenes he has put on immortal canvas to illustrate "The Rake's Progress" might be matched out of the fairly representative life of Yale and Harvard in that French period. The average undergraduate of the last years of the last century, at both Yale and Harvard, was far less of a gentleman, and immensely less of a Christian, than he is to-day. Why, at Harvard at this moment a great body of the students are members of churches, and, other things being equal, are not thought the less of on that account. I hold in my hand here elaborate statistics as to recent classes in Harvard University. Take one of the very last, and in it there were, of men about to graduate, of Unitarians,

39; Episcopalians, 35; Congregationalists, 23; Baptists, 11; Presbyterians, 6; Liberals, 4; Methodists, 2; Roman Catholics, 2. According to that table, there is really more reason for calling Harvard an orthodox college than a heterodox. The college is not denominational in any sense. It would not like to be called Unitarian, or Congregational, or Episcopal. Among the students there are well-organized and vigorous religious societies, and the conditions of admission to them are more severe than to most churches. I find reason, therefore, for contrasting the present with the past of Harvard favourably. But this change has come about within the last fifty years. At Yale, in my class, we had more than two-thirds on entrance, members of Christian churches. I know that we hear of scandalous things in these large companies of students at Yale and Harvard. You cannot bring together a thousand young men, without finding a few among them of the shallow and riotous sort; but they do not give the tone to the whole college. Perhaps they do to a few secret societies,—breathing-holes of frivolity, and often of what is far worse. The mass of students are honourable men, and come from honourable families, although at the present day it can be said that a few are what the most were in the last twenty years of the last century, at Yale and Harvard. Certain it is that these diseases of a greatly tempted time existed in Cambridge with as much intensity as they did at New Haven. Certain it is that at Harvard there was no President Dwight to drive them out, as there was at Yale. The atmosphere of Harvard as well as of Yale at the opening of our national life was heavily infected with Parisian infidelity, but no adequate corrective was applied at Harvard; and, although the evil results are now largely outgrown, they have been very noteworthy to those who have minutely studied how the sick forehead of a certain kind of culture in Boston, laid in the palm of God to rest, has tossed there with doubt, as in Channing's and Parker's case, whether the hand was ever pierced for human sins; and now lately with doubt, as with some of the Free-Religionists, whether there be any personal hand at all, or not.

Boston is asked to give an account of herself. She had excellent fathers; but she has of late had the name of being the apologist for much looseness of thought. We are willing to give an account of ourselves. We have had a trial such as no other Commonwealth on this continent ever had. We have had a State Church. How did this arise? Yale and Harvard were founded by men of Christian zeal; and how did it come about, that, in so short a time, these institutions lapsed into a condition that gave joy to the shallow infidel clubs of Paris? All Frenchmen were not like Lafayette. These results arose from adequate causes, which ought not to be forgotten. If you wish to understand Boston doctrinal unrest, you must go back first to the period when Paris ruled us. You must recall the time when Lafayette and Jefferson had our heart, and we were not a little in awe or admiration of that very brittle sceptre,—Parisian thought about religion,—a style of intellectual allegiance that no man is proud of now. The infidelity which flourished in 1795 in Yale and Harvard among young men, no scholar to-day cares to answer for: it is an unclean and

degraded thing. We have grown far beyond all that. How did we sink so low as to follow that pillar of ashes and blood which rose on the Seine, and led the nations not altogether celestially for a while—a little electricity in it, no doubt ; some white fire mingled with the blue in the whirlwind ; but Saharas of dust also, and hosts of hissing, flying scraps of white-hot volcanic stone?

Our fathers did not believe that a man might be a minister, although unconverted ; but when George Whitefield was in this city, it was necessary for him to insist that a man should not be a minister unless converted. (See WHITEFIELD'S *New England Journal, passim.*) On Boston Common, with twenty thousand people in his audience, George Whitefield defended the proposition that a man does not become a saint in his sleep ; that conversion is an ascertainable change, or will show itself by its effects ; and that if the results which will naturally follow from such a state of life are not visible, their absence is proof that a man should not be a member of God's house. Why did he need to oppose in New England ideas which did not cross the Atlantic in the Mayflower? How did New England wander so far away from Plymouth Rock, and find herself in this low marsh, where many of the State churches of Europe are struggling to-day? Why, she fell into that marsh by having herself a State Church. The marshes of the State Churches of Europe,—you understand them very well. We had the oozy acres of a State Church to walk over in Massachusetts for more than fifty years ; and the smutch is not off our feet yet that we received in those bogs.

In 1631 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay passed an order that "for time to come none shall be admitted to the freedom of the body politic but church-members." What is the effect of making a rule that nobody can vote unless he is a church-member? Why, everybody will want to be a church-member, and there will be large churches, and you will admit men into the church whom it will be very hard to get out. Now, it was a public law of this Commonwealth, passed early, with all due form, that only church-members could vote. That was eleven years after the landing on Plymouth Rock. Remember, however, that the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, rather than the Pilgrims of Plymouth Bay, are responsible for the secularization of the holiest portion of New-England life. Where did that law come from? It was a thrifty scion from the far-spreading European bough. Our fathers had seen children baptized and confirmed in State Churches ; and it was thought that, in some sense, all baptized persons were members of the Church. That was, and is, the predominating opinion of Europe. This idea the Puritans of England—who were not separatists, as the Pilgrims were—did not leave behind them when they crossed the sea. So we had here in my denomination—the most aristocratic on this continent, if you please, and the most split, and in some particulars the most harmful—a State Church.

The Puritans who landed in Boston brought to America the theory that every child should be made, as far as possible, a member of the Church : and therefore it was a part of their anxiety in founding a new civilization to have all children baptized. Those of our fathers

who were not separatists had State Church ideas concerning the baptism of children. The secularization of Orthodoxy in New England arose primarily from the desire of the Puritans to secure the religious culture of the whole population. The law of 1631 was passed with the best of intentions, but it had the most mischievous effects.

What happened next? In 1635 we turned Roger Williams away from the Massachusetts colony, chiefly for political reasons, as the highest authority on this vexed theme, the learned editor of "The Boston Congregationalist," says and proves, in spite of the dissent of Rhode Island and of Brown University. (See DEXTER, Rev. Dr. H. M., *As to Roger Williams*, p. 79.) The reasons why Roger Williams was sent away were no doubt fundamentally political; nevertheless, one source of irritation with him was that he objected to the baptizing of infants. Why did he do that? Among many other reasons, because he saw that to regard all baptized persons as, in an important sense, members of the Church, led to the secularization of church-membership. I remember where I am speaking; I know what prejudices I am crossing; but I know that in this assembly, assuredly, nobody will have objection to my advocacy, even at a little expense of consistency with my own supposed principles, of the necessity of a spiritual church-membership. If I say that a certain denomination, represented by that man who was driven from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, has, in spite of all we hear of criticism about one of its beliefs, been of foremost service in bringing into the world, among all Protestant denominations, an adequate idea of the importance of a spiritual church-membership, I know that no generous heart or searching intellect will object to that statement.

In 1653 no less a man than Henry Dunster, president of Harvard University, announced himself as an opponent to the doctrine that infants should be baptized. He refused to allow an infant of his own family to be baptized, and delivered several sermons against the baptism of infants. Baptist authorities assert that Henry Dunster became a Baptist. (See an address delivered in Philadelphia, before the American Baptist Historical Society at its eleventh anniversary, by Rev. Daniel C. Eddy. Philadelphia: Historical Society Press, 1864.) But he continued to be president of Harvard University. His pastor, the Rev. Jonathan Mitchell, in 1657, on account of collisions of debate of the kindest sort between himself and this revered man, who had been his teacher, caused a synod to be called, in which action was taken of which we feel the mischief yet. Questions raised as to the baptism of children had "come to some figure first in the colony of Connecticut." (MATHER'S *Magnalia*, vol. ii. p. 238. Hartford ed.). A comparison of all the authorities, however, shows that both Mitchell of Cambridge, and Stone of Hartford, were leading forces among the influences which brought together the Massachusetts Council of 1657. (See MCKENZIE, Rev. Dr. A., *History of the Shepard Church*, Cambridge.) This Jonathan Mitchell would have been quite a figure in that sky of culture which some think too soft, too transcendental, for anything in the stern days of our fathers to have risen into. The recent structure of the Shepard Church in Cambridge stands yonder under

the Washington Elm,—it is my fortune to be a member of it,- Mr. McKenzie's ; and of that church, successor to Shepard, this Jonathan Mitchell was pastor. Cotton Mather says of him,—

"His *Sermons* . . . were admirably *Well-Studied.* . . . He ordinarily medled with no Point, but what he managed with such an extraordinary *Invention*, Curious *Disposition*, and Copious *Application*, as if he would leave no material Thing to be said of it, by any that should come after him. And when he came to Utter what he had Prepared, his Utterance had such a becoming *Tuneableness*, and *Vivacity*, to set it off, as was indeed *Inimitable.* . . . Tho' he were all along in his Preaching, *as a very lovely Song of one that hath a pleasant Voice*, yet as he drew near to the Close of his Exercises, his Comely *Fervency* would rise to a marvellous Measure of *Energy ;* He would speak with such a Transcendent *Majesty* and *Liveliness*, that the People (more *Thunderstruck* than they that heard *Cicero's* Oration for *Ligarius*) would often *Shake* under his Dispensations, as if they had Heard the *Sound* of the *Trumpets* from the *Burning Mountain*, and yet they would *Mourn* to think, that they were going presently to be dismissed from such a *Heaven upon Earth.*" (See SIBLEY, JOHN LANGDON, librarian of Harvard University, *Lives of Harvard Graduates*, pp. 148-150.) Richard Baxter said that "if there could be convened a Council of the whole Christian World, that man would be worthy to be the moderator of it."

Now that man came very near opposing himself to infant baptism. On the twenty-fourth day of December, 1653, with arguments elaborately prepared, he went to the study of Henry Dunster to convince the president of Harvard University that opposition to infant baptism was wrong ; but Jonathan Mitchell came away almost converted to Henry Dunster's views. He found, that, in his secret thoughts, it was injected into his mind now and then, that infant baptism had certain mischievous tendencies in the State. But these suggestions came oftenest on Saturday, when he was very busy writing his address for the next day ; and he thought, therefore, that they were from the evil spirits. It could not be good angels that sent these suggestions ; for no good spirit would interrupt the writing of a sermon. Besides, although "these thoughts were darted in with some impression, and left a strange confusion and sickliness on his spirits," they were "injected, hurrying suggestions, rather than deliberate thoughts." On these grounds chiefly, Jonathan Mitchell, in the days of Salem witchcraft, concluded that all arguments against infant baptism must be put aside. The question was settled in his own mind ; but the importance of these interruptions turned out to be really considerable to New England to this hour. He insisted on debating the matter in public over and over ; and his influence, says Cotton Mather, was something of which the centre was at Cambridge, and the circumference outside New England.

Largely by the effort of this eloquent man, Mitchell, there was brought together at Boston, in 1657, by invitation of the General Court, an assembly of the principal ministers of Massachusetts ; and by that body of grave men it was ordained that the half-way covenant be adopted. By that covenant those parents who were baptized in infancy were, if living respectable lives, allowed to have their children baptized. Church-members became eligible to civil offices. (See MATHER'S *Magnalia*, vol. ii. pp. 238-270. Hartford ed.)

Notice how the political strain was on Massachusetts all the way through. That decision gave great umbrage to the churches. President Chauncy of Harvard opposed it; and in 1662 another synod was called, and it was affirmed again that the half-way covenant should be the rule of the land. That changed one or two thousand things.

It is an inadequate account of the origin of secularization of New-England orthodoxy, to attribute the half-way covenant exclusively to religious causes. If we look beneath the surface of this deterioration in its middle stages, we shall find political causes at work. Palfrey well says (*History of New England*, vol. ii. p. 492) that "the degree of irritation that prevailed" concerning the half-way covenant "is scarcely to be explained by a consideration of only the ostensible grounds of dispute. 'From the fire of the altar,' says Mather (*Magnalia*, Book iii. 117) 'there issued thunderings and lightnings and earthquakes.' The truth is, that political regards brought their explosive fuel to the flame."

The fashion had been set, that only church-members could be eligible to public office. I know that in 1688, on the accession of William and Mary, the law that required church-membership as a condition to citizenship was repealed; but you cannot raise a great wave like this, and stop it by changing rulers in England. We had had it from 1631 to 1688. It was the rule that only church-members should be eligible to office, and partly, as a result of that, we had had a half-way covenant. Long after 1688, that rule of fashion and the half-way covenant kept on in spite of the changes of laws under William and Mary.

It is, therefore, not surprising that in 1704 we find men like Stoddard of Northampton maintaining that unregenerate persons might come to the Lord's Supper. Whitefield wrote in 1740, "Mr. Stoddard is much to be blamed for endeavouring to prove that unconverted men might be admitted into the ministry."

To close this astounding story of the secularization of New-England Congregationalism, we find at last Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield making objection seriously to the prolonged abuses of the church-membership. When Jonathan Edwards at Northampton, finding out that some moral evils greatly needing criticism were appearing in the younger lives he was set to guide, taught that unconverted persons should not be members of God's house, opposed his predecessor's evil plea that church ordinances are or may be saving, and insisted that a man should experience the new birth before coming to the communion service, his hearers rose, and drove him into the wilderness for ascetic heresy. I know where in Massachusetts I can put my hand on little irregular scraps of brown paper, stitched together as note-books, and closely covered all over with Jonathan Edwards's handwriting. Why did he use such coarse material in his studies? Why was he within sight of starvation? Because he had opposed the secularization of the Church. Why did that man need to accept from Scotland funds with which to maintain his family? Because he insisted upon a spiritual church-membership. Why did his wife and

daughters make fans, and sell them to buy bread? Because he opposed the spirit of the half-way covenant. Because he defended with vigour, as Whitefield did, the idea that a man should not be a minister unless converted, nor a church-member unless converted, and so set himself against the whole trend of this huge, turbid, hungry, haughty wave of secularization that had been rising ever since 1631. Of course he was abandoned by the fashionable. Of course his life was in some sense a martyrdom. His note-books were made from the refuse of brown paper left from the fans. There is nothing Massachusetts so little likes to be fanned with as those fans Jonathan Edwards's wife and daughters made, and sold for bread. Yes, you starved him; but Scotland fed him, thank God! When Edwards was dismissed, it was proposed that there be a council of ten pastors; and he of course claimed the right of choosing five; but he was obliged to go beyond the broad bounds of old Hampshire County in order to find five who agreed with him. He went to Mount Holyoke, a marked spot then, apparently, as it is now, in the spiritual history of New England, and obtained Woodbridge of South Hadley as one of the council, because Woodbridge agreed with him in opposition to this secularization of the Church.

Political pressure and social arrogance led to the half-way covenant. That led to an unconverted church-membership. That allowed the existence of an unconverted ministry. That ministry filled the land with the hue and cry against Whitefield and Edwards.

I hold in my hand a copy of a record made as late as 1728 on the official books of a church in Westfield; and it is a specimen of the records you may find all over Eastern Massachusetts. I go up and down from the Merrimack to the Connecticut as a flying scout, and every now and then I chance to meet a talkative document like this:—

"At a church-meeting holden in Westfield, Feb. 25, 1728, *Voted*, that those who enter full communion may have liberty to give an account of a work of saving conversion, *or not. It shall be regarded by the church as a matter of indifference.*"

Gentlemen, out of the fashion of the English State Church, the care of our fathers for their children, and the political pressure which preceded the accession of William and Mary, came the half-way covenant. Out of the half-way covenant came the secularization of the church-membership of the Congregational body in New England. Out of our connection with the State came marshes of stagnant church-life here, similar to the marshes of much of State Church life in Europe to-day. There is hardly a breeze that sweeps over Boston that does not come from those marshes, not yet dry, and that never had any salt in them to keep them sweet. You know that I am speaking here more frankly than I could have spoken fifty years ago; for it has not been the fashion, in my portion of New England, denominationally to admit the evil of this half-way covenant as fully as I have now done, until within twenty-five or thirty years; but these are the facts.

A law by which only church-members could vote was in operation

in Massachusetts from 1631 to 1688, in form, and much longer in spirit.

The political and social pressure arising from that law led to the adoption of the half-way covenant, by which persons not professing to have entered on a new life at all were allowed to enter the Church.

Out of that pressure arose Stoddard's evil plea, that unconverted persons should be brought to the communion service.

Out of all these causes came an unconverted church-membership.

Out of that came gradually an unconverted ministry.

Out of that came a broad departure from many points of the lofty and scientifically severe ideals of Plymouth Rock.

Out of that departure arose, in experience, a wide and deep secularization of the more fashionable of the churches of Eastern Massachusetts.

Out of this secularization of the churches of Eastern Massachusetts came their chief weakness in their resistance to the irreligious influences arising from the French war and the Revolution, and to the accession of the French infidelity at the moment when Lafayette and French liberty had bent the national soul toward France.

What does Joseph Tracy say in his "History of the Great Awakening"? I open that most cautious book on the whole topic; and I read, "Every Congregational Church in New England, probably, has either adopted Edwards's and Whitefield's doctrine concerning church-membership, or become Unitarian." (See pp. 411—413, 418.)

Americans have all sorts of sense, except historic sense. We have had a State Church; we have had a secularized church-membership in one of our denominations, the ruling one; and little by little that secularization so lowered our standards, that it is not amazing at all, and it is a thing we ought to have expected, that out of the combination of causes included in the older Arminianism, the half-way covenant, the disturbances of the French war and the Revolution, French infidelity, the popular misconceptions of scholarly Orthodox doctrine, and some crude and rash statements in Orthodoxy itself, came Unitarianism.

Out of Unitarianism, and the brilliancy of its early literary and secular successes, came Harvard University in its largely unevangelical attitude, an attitude now greatly changed.

Out of Harvard University, in its unevangelical attitude, came the occasionally sceptical or doctrinally indifferent literary circles of Eastern Massachusetts.

Out of the sceptical literary circles of Eastern Massachusetts came one part of the influences that set a portion, though only a portion, of the Boston fashions of thought.

Here we are face to face with an age when anti-slavery was taken up by your eloquent Parker and the Church lagged behind. This was its own fault. Time has criticised that slowness on the part of Orthodoxy to follow Providence, that tardiness which left between the Church and God a chasm which is filled up, in great part, with the corpses of my own generation. You will allow me, as a member of a decimated generation, to be frank concerning the slowness of Ortho-

doxy to follow God, until he whom we dare not name plainly became abolitionist. Parker followed him, and obtained a following. This is the outcome of a single historical glance; but if I could have gone into detail, if I could have shown you how link has followed link, you would be amazed to find Boston to-day not wreathed round and round with misconceptions of the highest truth; and that religion here, which has allowed itself to be corrupted so much in the past, is to-day so little corrupted. Omitting fractions, the statistics show, that, in 1816, there was one unevangelical church in Boston to every three thousand of the population. Now there is only one to every six thousand. In 1816 there was only one evangelical church in Boston to every four thousand inhabitants. Now there is one to every two thousand. In the experience of half a century, a period long enough to constitute a very fair test of the tendencies of thought, and exhibiting the results of no mere temporary swirl of opinion, evangelical churches in Boston have risen from the proportion of one to four thousand to that of one to two thousand, and the unevangelical of all kinds have fallen off from the proportion of one to three thousand to that of one to six thousand. Very significant on the dial of Boston, with this past behind us, is the declining shadow of that philosophy, which, in a dim morning of religious experience, sees Olympus and Parnassus, and mistakes them for Sinai and Calvary.

Orthodoxy has not always followed God; but only so far as it follows Him will it ultimately have any following. *Deum sequi*, to follow God, was Seneca's supreme rule for politcial action. Our painful past summarizes its eager counsels by writing these Roman words over all doors of church and school, social life, literature, and reform.

X.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS:

GREECE SINCE HER LIBERATION FROM TURKEY.

WILL it not be well for the fertile lands on the Danube to escape from under the light of the Crescent? In four hundred years, beneath that peculiar radiance, have they grown fatter, or leaner? Where are the great fruits of Turkish finance, politics, literature, law, philosophy, religion, and social life? It was well for Servia, it was advantageous for Egypt, it was fortunate for Greece, to break or loosen the Turkish yoke. Our stern world, up to this miraculous hour, is governed by the law of the survival of the fittest. There are renowned Mussulman proverbs, which assert that the Turkish hoof always leaves behind it barrenness. These ancient sayings are not contradicted by the Turkish bankruptcy of to-day. Which ought we to fear the more for the Danube,—the tread of the blighting Turkish hoof, or that of the relentless icy paw of the Russian bear? Each of these feet deserves a tether. On which side ought American sympathies to lie in the Eastern war? British sympathies are divided; but American sympathies ought to be cooler at this distance than the British can be. Nevertheless, since American missionaries, whom Lord Shaftesbury calls the most remarkable men in the East, have planted the Cross on the Bosphorus, we have an interest, as Christian citizens of the world, in the question whether Russia, or Turkey, or the Great Powers of Europe, shall rule these fair borders of the Black Sea.

What has polygamy done for Turkish society? I looked once five days through Constantinople, to find among polygamists a single fresh face over forty years of age, and looked in vain. The unreportable vices of the East not infrequently have to be guarded against in Roberts College. The son of an English physician who followed Lord Byron to Greece, and who became one of the foremost medical advisers of the court at Constantinople, told me, that his father would never let him go to the public baths alone. You would drive me out at that door, if I were to tell you what more he said. Which is the worse,—Russian absolutism, or Mohammedan polygamy and its attendant vices? What Carlyle calls the unspeakable Turk is not seen in Constantinople as well as he can be in the interior of Turkey or Syria.

I remember how like a Corliss engine Russian absolutism is, and what Russia did in 1846 in driving all missionaries from her borders. I know, also, that 1846 is not 1876; and that, even if Russia should have right of way through the Bosphorus, it is not altogether certain that our missions are to be put down there. One of the leading statesmen who helped settle the treaty of peace after the Crimean war told one of the most honoured merchants of this city, in the gallery of the House of Commons, that, in the conference preceding the making of that treaty, Russia explicitly and uniformly, and with great detail, promised to give all the guaranties that the Christian powers of the West should desire, if only she could have the right of way through the Bosphorus. We have exaggerated, I fear, the danger to missionaries, in case Russia

should drive the Turks out of Europe. Right of way through the Bosphorus is not possession of Constantinople. Entire control of that city, Russia will not obtain as easily as she burned Moscow.

It is affirmed that Turkey is now making reforms which she cannot carry through without violating the Koran. The subtlest thing said in favour of sympathy with Turkey is, "Let Islam be allowed to commit suicide. Let Turkey stand, that Islam may fall." Her reforms in the past have been chiefly on paper. Her promises of reform are worth nothing among bankers or statesmen. But what if she be driven back to her deserts? What if she lose Constantinople, as she has practically lost Cairo? Will this not be a more effective lessening of the powers and prestige of Mohammedanism in the world than could come from her reforms, which may never come? But, even if Turkey could glorify herself on the Danube politically and industrially, would she not aid Mohammedanism far more by her commercial importance and political weight than she will injure it by violating a few tenets of her creed in her political changes?

It is my purpose, however, to insist simply on the fact of experience, that it has been well for some portion of the glowing East to escape from under the Turkish yoke; and that therefore, if we are to be guided by the light of experience, we must hope that Providence means to limit more and more the power of Mohammedanism, and, indeed, so to limit it, that by and by it shall itself see its own natural tendencies to decay, and in its deserts and its wildernesses be healed of its sickness by a rebound from its own leprosies. God grant that this may be the result of driving Islam back to her fastnesses!

What has happened in Greece since she was liberated from Turkey?

Forty years ago, not a book could be bought at Athens. To-day one in eighteen of the whole population of Greece is in school. Fifty years of independence, and the Hellenic spirit has doubled the population of Greece, increased her revenues five hundred per cent, extended telegraphic communication over the kingdom, enlarged the fleet from four hundred and forty to five thousand vessels, opened eight ports, founded eleven new cities, restored forty ruined towns, changed Athens from a hamlet of hovels to a city of sixty thousand inhabitants, and planted there a royal palace, a legislative chamber, six type-foundries, forty printing establishments, twenty newspapers, an astronomical observatory, and a university with fifty professors and twelve hundred students. King Otho's German court, when he came from Nauplia to Athens, in 1835, lived at first in a shed that kept out neither the rain nor the north wind. On Constitution Place in Athens, in 1843, the Hellenic spirit, without violence, and by the display of force for but a few hours, substituted for personal power in Greece a constitutional government as free as that of England. George Finlay, the historian of the Greek Revolution, and who fought in it, affirms, that even before that event, degraded as the people were politically, a larger proportion could read and write than among any other Christian race in Europe. Undoubtedly long bondage, acting on the native adroitness of the race, taught the Greeks disingenuousness. The old blood produced an Alcibiades as well as a Socrates, a Cleon as well as a Phocion. There was in it, as in American veins to-day, a tendency to social, commercial, and political sharp-dealing. But, after fifty years of independence, the Hellenic spirit devotes a larger percentage of public revenue to purposes of instruction than France, Italy, England, Germany, or even the United States. Modern Greece, fifty years ago a slave and a beggar, to-day, by the confession of the most merciless statisticians, its enemies, stands at the head of the list of self-educated nations.

Railways, as even the less sanguine at Athens now hope, must, at no very

distant period, cut the Isthmus of Corinth, and the green, fat Bœotian Plain. They will bring the Western Patras and the Northern Larissa into communication with Athens. Possibly the Piræus, or Cape Sunium, and not Brindisi, may one day become the point of departure from Europe, of mails to the East from London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. Greece desires to connect a Larissa railway with a Turkish railway, soon to pierce the iron gates of the Danube.

If there is to be a reconstruction of the Turkish territory, shall not Greece recover her Macedonian provinces? Ten thousand people assembled lately in the Pnyx at Athens, before the Bema of Demosthenes, to consider that question. (See GLADSTONE, "The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Question," *Contemporary Review*, December, 1876.)

William Pitt said, in 1792, that the true doctrine of the balance of power in the east of Europe was, that the influence of Russia should not be allowed to increase, nor that of Turkey to decline. Wellington called the confirmation of Greek independence by the victory of Navarino an untoward event. Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, however, whose deaths were as sincerely mourned in Greece as in America, hailed that battle as the triumph of a sister-people in a struggle which the United States were the first among nations to encourage officially.

George Canning hoped, and Athens has not ceased to dream, that a regenerated Greece might, from Athens and Constantinople, regenerate all the now subject Greek races on both shores of the Ægean. Of the fifteen millions of the population of European Turkey, less than four millions are Ottomans. The rest—Slavonians, Greeks, Wallachians. Albanians—profess the Greek religion, or speak the Greek dialect. Demosthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, it may be presumed, would adopt the Hellenic idea, were they now in Greece. But, as a late American ambassador at Athens affirms, these men are remembered by the modern Greek as if they were yesterday on the Acropolis. In polyglot Turkey there are peoples, but no people. To-day it is calculated, that, counting by individuals, the Greeks in European Turkey are to the Turks as six to one; but, estimating them by their wealth, they are as thirty to one. In view of these facts, and with the clash of Russian arms on the Danube, shall we not renew our enthusiasm for Greece?

THEODORE PARKER AS AN ANTISLAVERY REFORMER.

"WINDES Rauschen, Gottes Flügel,
Tief in kühler Waldesnacht,
Wie der Held in Rosses Bügel,
Schwingt sich des Gedankens Macht.
Wie die alten Tannen sausen,
Hört man Geistes Wogen brausen." SCHLEGEL.

"WHEN a deed is done for freedom, through the broad earth's aching breast
Runs a thrill of joy prophetic, trembling on from east to west;
And the slave, where'er he cowers, feels the soul within him climb
To the awful verge of manhood, as the energy sublime
Of a century bursts, full-blossomed, on the thorny stem of Time." LOWELL.

In the first century of its existence our nation has twice been washed in blood; and to-day we draw nigh to that anniversary on which, through an extent of territory broader than Cæsar ever ruled over you

will decorate uncounted graves, a great proportion of which are filled by men of my generation. Look on the marbles which, before this month closes, you will cover with spring flowers, and you will find that a very large part of those who laid down their lives in the civil war were men between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age. My generation in America is and always will be a remnant. Such of us as are left must be excused if we remember that it is not long, at the longest, from now to the roll-call after the battle; and that very soon we shall see those who have already laid down their lives that the dolorous and accursed ages might a little change their course. Assembled at the very tombstones we are about to decorate, will you not allow me to say, that, if the Church had done its whole duty in the fifty years preceding the time in which our land was bathed in blood, my generation might not have been a fragment? for that moral apathy in the North which allowed the South to hope for a divided North would not have existed; and, had the South not had that hope, who knows that she would have dared to have assailed the Union in arms? Had every pulpit in the land done what a few pulpits did,—and what all would have done, had they not lost the Master's whip of small cords, twice knotted up in the temple of old, but almost forgotten in a luxurious age,—there might have been no need at last for Almighty Providence to seize the North by the nape of the neck, and throw it across a chasm filled with corpses to the firm land of justice.

It was Almighty God who abolished slavery. The Church to-day, at the edge of these martyrs' graves, must beware of two things,—pride in what God has accomplished, and a tendency to self-excuse for not having used her Master's whip of small cords. That whip will be needed yet in America. It must not go out of fashion on this continent. There is a long, crowded, seething future before us in this land. Having twice been washed in blood against our anticipation, is it fit for us, now that we are at peace again, and now that the subtle sorcery of luxury has come to us once more out of the death of our martyrs, to forget them, and to forget God, and make unfashionable even yet our Lord's example of purging the temple? Why, you could excuse me better for being too severe to-day than for being an apologist for public immorality. We want as our leader, not some soft person brought up in king's palaces, and afraid of the shaking of a reed. We want Him who twice, with indignation upon which men dared not look, purged the temple, saying,—as He said lately to America, in accents with which the awe-struck air ought to be made permanently alive, and as He will have occasion to say again and again before another thousand years shall have wheeled and burned above our good and evil,—"Take these things hence!" On the side of that Eternal Power not ourselves, which makes for righteousness, America was not a unit; and therefore she fell for a while beneath those high and flaming chariot-wheels which move evermore in universal history whithersoever Justice wills. There is a prospect that America may not be a unit in time to come in loving what that Power loves, and in hating what it hates; and therefore there is reason for remembering our past, and sowing in the fat, ploughed field of our bitter days, and

in all the great and yet smoking furrows of our chastisement, abundant seed of conscience. This is a good time to speak a solemn word, that may take root, and bring forth fruit in politics, in trade, and in every man's secret moral sense.

What could the Church have done against slavery that it did not do?

1. It could have made slaveholding a bar to church-membership.

One great denomination did that—great in quality, not in quantity—the Quakers. It was their good fortune to have established a right precedent as to slavery before the Cave of Æolus was opened, and the winds of all division began to blow upon us from unoccupied territory coveted by the slave power.

Eli Whitney, in 1794, invented the cotton-gin. The British fleet, in 1803, hovered off the mouth of the Mississippi, and Napoleon Bonaparte sold to us Louisiana. With that purchase the Cave of Æolus, who imprisons tempests within his bellowing mountains, was opened. When the winds had blown out of it until it was substantially vacant, unexpectedly in the depths of the cave opened another Æolus Cave,—Texas. After the winds blowing out of that had tossed our whole ocean into yeasting, yellow foam, suddenly, in the rear of that Æolus Cave, opened another,—California and the Mexican war. Then came a yet more huge enlargement of the cave, in the repeal of the Missouri compromise, and the Kansas and Nebraska struggle. We saw the gleaming of the western sea through the last opening of the cavern. God be thanked that the bowels of the mountains were exhausted at last, and that we had no more unoccupied territory! To this fully opened colossal prison-house of winds we found no door that could be bolted, except one made of corpses. We had to block it up at last, the whole mouth of our unmeasured Æolus Cavern, by the dead bodies of the North and South. It is blocked to this day by that immovable and costly mound.

Now before this Æolus Cave was opened, before the cotton-gin had lifted the value of a slave-hand to a thousand dollars, and of a black infant at birth to one hundred dollars, we find the Quaker sect putting itself right by assuming that a man cannot be a church-member of the genuine kind, if he owns slaves. George Fox visited the Barbadoes in 1671, and thereafter bore earnest testimony against slavery. In 1776 the Philadelphia meeting of Quakers took a decisive step by directing—this was their language—"that the owners of slaves who refuse to execute the proper instruments for giving them their freedom be disowned," that is, disfellowshipped in the Church. In 1783 it was officially ascertained that no slaves were owned by Quakers inside the domain of the Philadelphia Assembly. But the New York and Rhode Island and Virginia Yearly Meetings of the Friends attained slowly the same results. In 1800, before we purchased Louisiana, slavery and Quakerism were fully divided. What cut them asunder? Simply the righteous rule of a spiritual church-membership,—the rule to which we have been drifting, I hope, more and more in America, in all our sad experience since 1631.

Wordsworth, in spite of the intensity of his early sympathy with

republicanism, was accustomed to say that America never can have a class pure enough and weighty enough to keep up a high standard of manners and morals; for here we have no aristocracy. Stuart Mill thought it our great fault that we have no leisured and propertied class. God forbid that we should have a law of primogeniture, giving all the lands in a family to the eldest-born! God forbid that we should have an aristocracy built on hereditary descent merely, or on artificial rather than a natural rank! But unless there is in this land a spiritual church-membership, or an aristocracy appointed of Almighty God, who knows but that Wordsworth was right in saying that our standard of morals and manners may become of the earth, earthy, and lead to the pit? "Men never so much need to be theocratic," said De Tocqueville, "as when they are the most democratic." I hold that it is more important to maintain a spiritual church-membership than to maintain the written constitution. The unwritten constitution of America is more important than its written; and the first article in the unwritten ought to be one that makes a distinction between a true church and its opposite. What is the average type of a counterfeit church? A hammock, attached on one side to the Cross, and on the other held and swung to and fro by the forefingers of Mammon, its freight of nominal Christians elegantly moaning meanwhile over the evils of the times, and not at ease unless fanned by eloquence and music, and sprinkled by social adulations into perfumed, unheroic slumber.

There is a distinction between a church and a Sunday club,—the distinction which Whitefield and Edwards drew on the mind of New England, and which the remissness of many churches, and the faithfulness of others, in our civil war, ought to engrave yet deeper on the slowly solidifying rock of American social custom. Let that distinction stand as the first article of your unwritten constitution, if you would make sure that a day will not come when an average population of two hundred to the square mile may take your written constitution, and chop it in pieces in the name of greed and fraud, and of great cities. You do not in any case anticipate that? Your trouble is that you are Anglo-Saxon, and always think there is no danger, until you are burned to the bone. We said there was no danger in the war-cloud of slavery; but really it amounted to more than a shower.

The Quaker sect put itself right by honouring the first article of the unwritten American Constitution. They executed it. They made a distinction between church-membership that held slaves, and church-membership that did not If you ask me what the Church at large could have done, I affirm that it could, little by little, have done everywhere what it did in several places. Toward the close of the last century, England, under distinctively Christian leadership, determined unalterably her position as to slavery. It was the supreme misfortune of America, that she did not keep step with Wilberforce and Clarkson and the father of Macaulay. When the Quakers established their suggestive precedent, we might have done the same, had not many of our fathers been asleep. Why they were off their guard, you will understand by a glance at what the demoralizations of war and of

French infidelity were doing for us in 1795. The cotton-gin came when we were weak from Parisian poison. The Æolus Cave of coveted territory was opened when we were feeble from a long course of unfortunate experiences, beginning in 1631. But, even after temptation grew fierce, who, with the history of subsequent American heroism before him, can say that we could not have taken up our cross, instead of trampling upon it? We could have stood on the proposition that church-membership is inconsistent with man-stealing; and, indeed, there is where the Presbyterian Assembly stood in 1793.

2. We could have acted on the fixed plan, not of adapting Christianity to slavery, but of adapting slavery to Christianity.

Say that the rule adopted by the Friends was too radical a measure; say that we could not have strained up the North to this point: one hardly knows what prolonged, multiplex, conscientious discussion can do in a free nation. My feeling is, that the Quaker ideal was not too high for most of us to have reached by effort in 1800. It is farther back to 1850 than it is to 1800 in the history of slavery. Even in the era of compromises, we could at least have settled on the principle, that, when Christianity comes into collision with wrong, evil, and not Christianity, is to compromise. There will be a time in America when the expedients of our fathers in regard to slavery will not look well. It will not be remembered with pleasure that the Presbyterian General Assembly, although in 1794 it denounced slaveholding as man-stealing, erased that denunciation in the General Assembly of 1816. I know that Methodist discipline could with great difficulty be reconciled with slavery, and that it was never made clear to any Methodist scholar that bishops could be permitted to hold slaves. Macaulay said that John Wesley's genius for government was not inferior to that of Richelieu. But, in spite of the excellence of the Methodist organization, slavery produced the secession of the Methodist Church South,—a great evil, and yet an honour to the North. But the Church South was part of the Church; and when I speak of the delinquency of the Church, of course I have an outlook extending to the Gulf. I am not here to-day to blame the Northern Church exclusively. The Southern Church was a part of God's house; and its action before and during the war has helped to make sceptics. It is a cruel and terrible thing to force educated young men to raise the question, whether the manliness inside of the Church is of a purer quality than that outside. There are forms of scepticism concerning the First and Second Epistles of Clement, and the Letter by Diognetus to the Pamphylians. I do not care greatly about this kind of mental unrest. But when the question arises, whether manliness is to be found inside or outside of God's house, remember that the first duty of the Church is to be despised by no man. And if we so acted, that many a young man, full of that enthusiasm which afterwards led him to the front at Gettysburg and Richmond, did not know by any light on our countenances whether we were more manly than our critics or not; if we so acted that some were sickened, and turned aside,—it was because we compromised.

It was my fortune but a few days ago to hear the poet Whittier say,

in that sea-blown city of Newburyport yonder, where the roof yet stands under which William Lloyd Garrison was born, that Mr. Garrison himself, in his earlier career, was a friend of ministers, and, indeed, might have been called, perhaps, a Calvinist of the strict type. He believed too much in ministers; he made them idols; and when his sympathies were penetratingly enlisted in one of the greatest of modern reforms, and he found that many ministers were not on his side, the instant and surprised recoil was of that intense sort which comes when we fall into anger with those we love. Again and again a similar amazement was the source of the vigour and the breadth of the recoil from accredited Christianity in many of the antislavery men. Henry C. Wright was a Congregational minister. There were subsidiary men; and some of them, I think, were deformers as well as reformers,—Parker Pillsbury, and S. S. Foster, and others. Within the circle of a hundred miles' radius from Boston you can find hundreds of influential citizens, and at least a score of divided or weakened churches, whose difficulties with the ministers began, as Garrison's did, by the operation of that principle which Coleridge describes in his "Christabel":—

> "Alas! they had been friends in youth;
> But whispering tongues can poison truth,
> And constancy lives in realms above;
> And life is thorny, and youth is vain;
> And to be wroth with one we love
> Doth work like madness on the brain."

3. In the South the Church could have refused to justify, and in the North to apologize for, slavery.

4. In the South it could have refused to uphold secession and the attempt to found an empire on human chattelhood.

5. In the North, by discussion and united action, it could have prevented that moral and political apathy which encouraged the South to hope for a divided North in the event of war.

6. It could have taken away power from deformers by putting itself on the side of reformers.

So much, my friends, must we not and do we not all admit, when we say that the Northern Church, as well as the Southern Church, or the American Church at large, did not do its whole duty in the conflict with slavery?

Are there any excuses for the crime of the North? I will make none for that of the South; and I am not at ease in mentioning any for the North. These are no excuses; they are hardly explanations:

1. Daniel Webster was the archbishop of the Northern Church.

2. Among anti-slavery men, deformers were sadly mingled with reformers. About 1839 Mr. Garrison, for a considerable period, united anti-Church and anti-Sabbath with his anti-slavery discussions. Some of the more radical abolitionists were avowedly secessionists: but it was political abolition which triumphed.

3. Political abolition the North had no right to apply to slavery in the States, except as an extreme measure. Almost unanimously the Northern Church resisted the extension of slavery into the Territories.

4. A conflict of political and commercial interests and duties on the one hand, with religious interests and duties on the other, strained the voluntary system of the American churches across its weakest part.

Evil exceedingly, my friends, is that day in any nation when political and religious interests run in opposite channels. These opposing currents make the whirlpool that impales faith on the tusks of the sea. When Chevalier Bunsen lay dying, he said, "God be thanked that Italy is free. Now thirty millions of people can believe that God governs the world." The average German peasant, twenty years ago, regarded his minister as merely an agent of the government, and spoke contemptuously of police Christianity, because the State Church in the fatherland was, until within a few years, very frequently an ally of absolutism. In the United States, while the compromise measures were under debate, political ideas ran in one direction, and religious duties in another. The immense interests of commerce often held the pulpit, as well as the press, in bondage. The payment of Southern debts—have you ever heard that theme discussed in whispers? Webster had his eyes constantly on Wall Street. Wendell Phillips would stand here in Boston, with his eyes on the conscience of the nation, a very different barometer; and he would say, "There is a storm singing already in all the winds. We shall escape from slavery only by civil war." Webster would reply, looking at the citations in Wall Street, "There has not yet been any large fluctuation in prices. Gentlemen are not serious when they talk of secession. Let us repress agitation, and tide through the crisis without war." Both the moral and the financial barometer must be kept in view by any eyes that would read the signs of modern times. In the rising price of slave property we had a thermometer of threatening aspect, on which the North cast a too careless gaze. A hundred dollars for a black infant, ten dollars a pound for a black boy, a thousand or fifteen hundred dollars for a good field-hand,—and still this thermometer and the wailing breeze rose, and the winds out of the Æolus Cave resounded more and more loudly; the murky threat of coming war hung above all business and bosoms; and yet so were we filled with Anglo-Saxon pride, so little foresight did we have, that Wall Street was hardly troubled up to the very hour when we could no longer doubt that there was to be a deluge of blood.

Webster hoped we should pass through the crisis without civil war, and could hardly have made more gigantic efforts to have averted the contest, had he foreseen what was to come, as probably he did, far better than some have thought. I know with what silence I should sit in this assembly, were any one of five hundred scholars here the speaker; I should be quiet in this presence. But it is my good or ill fortune here to be responsible to nobody, as no one is to me; and therefore let me say, that my personal feeling is, that Webster, from first to last, was honest, and that he ventured much, because he had great foresight. I believe that man anticipated, with a fulness we can but poorly understand from any of his public expressions, the terrors of our civil war. Judge Nesmyth, on the Merrimack yonder, at Franklin, who conversed over and over with Webster in his last years,

on his Speech of March 7, and who is often quoted in Curtis's Life of Webster, as final authority, said to me the other day, "Once at Elms Farm I was returning home in the sunset with Webster; and he turned upon me suddenly, and, in his deepest supernatural voice, said, 'You may regard me as extravagant; but I have had some experience with both Northern and Southern men. I probably shall not live to see the Potomac run red with blood; but I think you will.'" That was within six months of the time when, on the shore of the sea at Marshfield yonder, that man went hence. No doubt he was ambitious; but he was too great a man to be supremely ambitious. In secret, as well as in public, he prayed, that, when his eyes should be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, they might not see him shining on the broken and dishonoured fragments of a once glorious Union,—on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent. He foresaw what this land would look like, drenched in Gettysburgs and Richmonds. But he was taken hence before he had time to right himself in the public estimation. No doubt he went to extremes. He was a statesman. He probably had not a sufficiently active perception of the moral issues in the whole discussion of his time. Who was it that wrote to Andover to ask Moses Stuart to publish a pamphlet to befog the conscience of the North? Daniel Webster. (See STUART, *Conscience and the Constitution*, p. 18.) Did Moses Stuart do this? He did it so far as to defend vigorously the Speech of March 7. He wrote some other things, however, which we hope will counteract the ill effect of this pamphlet. To whom else did Webster afford an opportunity to befog the conscience of the North? To that other professor who to-day is perhaps the first theologian visible in America when scholars in Europe look toward us from the other side of the Atlantic. Did he agree to do what Webster asked? He refused with foresight. Professor Park had opportunity to do what Moses Stuart did, and at that time was ready to defy the archbishop of the Northern Church. That fact never has been made public until this hour; but it lies here before me in writing, not from any professor, but from a man whose authority is equal on that point to any professor's (*Letter from* Rev. Dr. C. CUSHING of Boston). Professor Edwards at Andover had opportunity to do what Moses Stuart did, and refused.

But how did Boston stand in that hour? Why, in Music Hall yonder was the tallest anti-slavery pulpit this side of Brooklyn. What made that pulpit tall,—anti-Christianity or anti-slavery? Let Charles Sumner answer. Here is a short, strategic correspondence which throws light upon the inmost history of Boston. In 1854, Theodore Parker was arrested for resisting the Fugitive-slave Law, and came near being thrown into jail, as did Wendell Phillips. Charles Sumner wrote to Mr. Parker, Dec. 12, 1854: "Upon the whole, I regard your indictment as a call to a new parish, with B. R. Curtis and B. F. Hallet as deacons, and a pulpit higher than the Strasburg steeple." Theodore Parker replied, Dec. 15: "In 1845 my friends passed a resolution that Theodore Parker should have a chance to be heard in Boston. The two brothers-*in-law*, Benjamin C. and Benjamin H.,

now second the resolution,—a chance to be heard!" (WEISS, *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 144.)

You say I have not given Theodore Parker all the credit he deserves as a religious reformer? You think I have underrated him as a philosopher? If you please, I give you his own estimate of himself. "Last year," he wrote in 1851, "I laid out much; but how little of it I did! The wicked Fugitive-slave Law came, and hindered all my work. It may be so again. Suppose I could have given all the attention to theology that I have been forced to pay to politics and slavery, how much I might have done! I was meant for a philosopher; but the times call for a stump orator" (WEISS, *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 115).

What made that pulpit busy,—anti-slavery, or anti-Christianity? In the year 1851 a publishing firm to whom Theodore Parker had offered two volumes of speeches asked him if they would contain any discussions relating to slavery. He replied, "By all means: they are the principal things. I wish to go down to posterity, as far as I shall go at all, with the anti-slavery sermons and speeches in my right hand" (Ibid., p. 115). Boston sends Theodore Parker to posterity with his anti-slavery speeches in his right hand, and no hurricane of criticism shall ever blow them out of his manly grasp: but in his left hand anti-Christianity was clutched loosely; and already the winds have torn these leaves away, and the hand is nearly empty, and will yet be emptier.

This biography says that Mr. Parker thought, in the early stage of his discussions of religious science, that he could complete in ten years a projected book on that theme. Compared with average German work in the same field, the outlines of this volume (Ibid., pp. 49-67) are fragmentary and careless, and are plainly what Parker called them, only a "provisional scheme." Did he ever fill up these outlines? Mr. Weiss admits that he was too preoccupied to do so. "Time," says this candid biographer, "diminished rapidly; *and all literary and scientific pursuits were rudely thrust aside by the domination of slavery in the thoughts and affairs of the nation*" (Ibid., p. 67). It needs to be frequently stated, that Theodore Parker's Absolute Religion was a system of thought which he arranged before he came to Boston. It was a West Roxbury creed. Boston need not be so proud of it. It was not built here. If it had been, no doubt it would have lasted.

What was happening when Theodore Parker came to Boston, and in the twelve years he passed here? Why, he reached this city in 1846; and what year was that? The year after Texas had been acquired, and the winds were howling for the Mexican war. We remember these great events so poorly, that it is necessary to call your attention to the fact, that, in 1845, Henry Clay was defeated; and his competitor, Mr. Polk—whose name I had almost forgotten: I have it written here, but I could not see it well, it is so small—began to defend Texas against Mexico. In 1846 came the Mexican war. How could a man think of anything but public affairs? In 1846 Fremont captured California. In 1848, the treaty of Guadalupe,

Hidalgo gave New Mexico and California to the United States. In 1850 came the compromise measures, including the law for the rendition of fugitive slaves. In 1852 Mrs. Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin appears in March; and the Duchess of Sutherland in November sends to the women of America an address signed by 576,000 English women. In 1854 Anthony Burns is kidnapped in Boston. In 1855 election riots are occurring in Kansas. In 1856, on the 2nd of May, Charles Sumner is smitten down in the Senate of the nation for speaking against slavery. In 1856 Fremont is nominated, and Buchanan elected. In 1857 we are listening to the Dred Scott decision. In 1858 John Brown is plotting the deeds which brought him to the scaffold in Virginia.

During all these years the grandson of that soldier who captured the first British gun at Lexington stood in a pulpit which anti-slavery, rather than anti-Christianity, had made higher than the Strasburg steeple. Who agreed with him? Except a few harsh expressions, almost everybody that had conscience, so far as his anti-slavery opinions were concerned. Did every one who agreed with Theodore Parker in his anti-slavery career agree with him in his anti-Christian discussions? Here is an answer in a letter to Mr. Parker from him who afterwards was our great chief justice,—Salmon P. Chase. "Shall I not say to you frankly how much I regret, that, on the great question of the Divine origin of the Bible and the Divine nature of Christ, your views are so little in harmony with the views of *almost all* who labour with you in the great cause of human enfranchisement and progress; and that I could not help wishing, that, in this sermon on the Nebraska question, your distinctive opinions had not been brought forward?" (WEISS, *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. p. 517.) This is very interesting and unimpeachable historic testimony.

What made this anti-slavery pulpit high? The lowness of other pulpits. Why were not other pulpits high in Boston? Some of them faced the South. Let me not be unjust to any man; but I suppose the undistorted truth to be, that Orthodoxy lacked anti-slavery leaders. Its ranks and files, at least so far as the ministry was concerned, were substantially right in their feeling toward slavery. Do you doubt that? I have been at great pains to examine facts and contemporary evidence; and I find it incontrovertible, though I cannot here go into detail, that, in the year 1837, nearly one half of the evangelical ministers in Massachusetts were members of anti-slavery societies. Of the Orthodox Congregational ministry of Massachusetts, more than one-third were members of anti-slavery societies in 1837. It was true in this year that only one in eight of the unevangelical ministers in Massachusetts were in such societies. Such was the elaborate calculation made and published at the time by Amos A. Phelps, whom, as the foremost Christian abolitionist of that vexed day, Massachusetts does well to honour. (See PHELPS, Rev. A. A., *The True History of the late Division in the anti-Slavery Societies.* Compare the careful statistics given by Dr. CUSHING in the *Congregational Quarterly*, October, 1876, pp. 550, 554.) I do not forget that the crowned martyrs, Lovejoy and Torrey, the latter of whom was buried from this Temple, were Congregational ministers. Under

Nathaniel Colver the Baptist, whose church met in this hall, slaveholding was made a bar to church-membership. But during the larger part of that period, when, in the pulpits of Eastern Massachusetts, Channing and Parker, and one or two other very able men, represented prominently the anti-slavery thought of the time, there was here no evangelical anti-slavery pulpit of equal prominence.

Nevertheless, I do not admit, that, even with Daniel Webster and Moses Stuart for our archbishops, the mass of the Orthodox ministry went astray further than others; for in 1837 nearly one half of them were members of anti-slavery societies.

What, then, was the trouble? Simply the weak spot in our voluntary system. You cannot feed a man, unless he is popular with the people to whom he preaches. Families must be supported. Opportunity of usefulness must not be thrown away. Many lost their places. "I began between 1830 and 1840," says the poet Whittier, "the business of interviewing. I went to minister after minister, and was disappointed in case after case; but the general feeling," he affirms, "was right. It was only a regard for families, and a desire not to produce schism in the Church, that held back many a good man." That sound heart in Amesbury yonder, in sight of the sea, that soul which often led us in our dark days as a pillar of Hebrew fire, that entranced poet and reformer, never broke with the Church, because he was in a part of it that had adopted God's rule of excluding from church-membership those who held slaves. His testimony to-day is other than sour. It has in it no sub-acidity in any sense. He says calmly, "The trouble was usually, that men feared they would lose their places." Who brought that fear upon public teachers? I am a layman; and my feeling is, that laymen had some responsibility in this matter. Our reluctance to allow free discussion arose from commercial causes. More than one merchant here in Boston may have heard something about Southern debts that might never be paid, and of churches which laymen would surely rend asunder, if slavery were discussed from the pulpit too much. As to slavery, what prevented the full education of the average public heart? The average public heart itself. Some ministers here may have looked from their pulpits, and remembered what merchants were in the congregation, and been silent against their choice. It is possible that industrial, commercial, and social considerations were so powerfully discussed among our laymen as to gag the pulpit not a little. Were *we* one in three in anti-slavery societies? The pulpit behind the times! Where were the pews?

But, gentlemen, I believe that even that archbishop of the North, had he lived as long as Everett did, would have taken as easily as Everett took a new position as to slavery and the Union. Had Daniel Webster lived to hear the first gun fired against Fort Sumter, and its echoes rolling across belligerent commonwealths, and reverberated from the Alleghanies to the Rocky Mountains, he would have stamped his foot down in behalf of the Constitution with an emphasis that would have shaken both those ridges; and to have called forth millions of armed men in defence of the Union there would have been needed no other drum-beat.

XI.

PRELUDE ON CURRENT EVENTS.

LESSING'S TEST OF THE WORTH OF SECTS.

Go back to the time when Sir Henry Vane was governor of the Massachusetts colony, in 1636, and you will find that friend of John Milton advocating at once both toleration and agressiveness in religion. If his foresight could have been turned into fact, or if his ideas had been transmuted into custom, we might have had at that date just what Berlin saw not long ago, on the grounds where Voltaire and Frederick the Great cried out, "Ecrasez, l'infame!" On these historical terraces of San Souci an Evangelical Alliance came together from the Indus, the Rhine, the Tiber, the Hudson, and the Mississipi. So, too, we saw yonder, at the mouth of the Hudson, in 1873, a similar Alliance, gathered from the five zones, and filled with one enthusiasm. Who knows but that soon at Geneva, or at Rome, a like gathering will occur, representing the ideas of religious union and activity which were current in Boston, so far forth as its governor had influence, in 1636? The increasing concentration of the strength of the religious bodies of the world is a large, fair sign of hope for civilization. The great mass of evangelical scholarship and life is an unbroken chain extending from the Ural Mountains to our sunset seas, and from our Western shores, through the Pacific Islands, and many a gem of the ocean redeemed to Christianity, far on to the new light that is dawning on Japan and China and India.

When I was on the great pyramid, I looked toward the valley of the Nile, and saw many square brown fields of ripe wheat, many square green fields of growing wheat, many square black fields of ploughed land, many square white fields of blossoming pomegranates. But all the fenceless and hedgeless fields were a part of Egypt; the division between them went no deeper down than a furrow; underneath that, this rich soil was a unit. And so, when I look across the world from any commanding height of scholarship, I find that all these evangelical sects differ from each other only by the depth of a furrow. They are one Egypt, only different squares.

Undoubtedly, however, there is a distinction between the green fat river-bottom of the Nile and the rustling sand of Sahara that lies at its side. It is unsafe to overlook that distinction. Between belief and unbelief, between that style of thought which does, and that which does not, assert man's need of a physician not human, of a regeneration not arising wholly from his own sweet and crooked will, there must be a distinction made in philosophy, and so there must be in practice. But in Eygpt I found that all the distinction that I needed to notice was that between the bed of the Nile and the drifts of Sahara. I will not say where Sahara ends, nor where the Nile valley begins. It is often a puzzling problem to draw that line with justice. Now and then the valley encroaches on the desert; and now and then the desert on the valley. It is a ragged zigzag which separates green Egypt from brown Sahara, belief from unbelief. Nevertheless, you do not doubt that there is a distinc-

tion between Sahara and the river-bottom. All men of honesty and candour are glad to have that distinction pointed out. He whom we dare not name undertakes to point it out, and he does so only by the fruitlessness on the one side, and the fat harvest on the other. Let the map traced by his finger be ours. Lessing taught that the most useful religion will ultimately be considered the best.

I have been tracing the history of New England, and showing how many causes for fifty, a hundred, or two hundred years, have made it important for us to insist on the distinction between the river-bottom and the desert, and to draw the line with an engineer's precision. Is there not a danger, that our experience in this protracted period has fixed our thoughts too closely upon mere maps of Egypt; that is, upon merely doctrinal, rather than upon practical Orthodoxy?

It does not plough the Nile plain to map the line never so accurately between it and Sahara. Sand drifting in here, and the green running out there upon the sand! Who will make Egypt more fruitful by bending for ever over the map, and finding just where the sand lies to-day, and where it will not lie to-morrow; and where the green has conquered the sand this hour, and may, in the next, be covered with the drifting brown powder of Sahara? You know that there is this distinction, and that God will take care of it by putting fruit on the one side, and sand on the other. There are locusts in Egypt; and on the fat lands the locusts fall, rather than on Sahara. Your fields are to be judged by their fruits. They are one: there is no distinction between these fat squares. They are all one soil; but we must adopt Lessing's test as to our merit,—fruitfulness, and nothing short of that. We are to attend to the locusts. We are to attend to the smoking furrows of opportunity. We are to attend to the great tides of inundation. We believe in evangelical principles. We believe in Orthodoxy. But religion is more than a map. We are proud of the record of scholarship in the last fifty years, conquering unbelief in Germany, and having to-day more than a promise of conquering all unbelief around the whole globe. But we must plough, sow, and reap Egypt, as well as map it. Our test must be Lessing's. Ultimately, as he said in "Nathan the Wise," all religious societies and principles will be judged by their fruits. By-and-by, if the world can tell which denomination of religious believers can do the most, if it can ascertain which sets of ideas match best the deepest instincts of the human heart, and the wants of life and death, the world will know what to believe.

Let us fasten our attention on the inundations of the Nile plain. There do come great opportunities. There do come times when the loss of opportunity is disloyalty to that providence which yet brings forth a finger on the wall, and yet points out the way, almost miraculously at times, to our poor human sight. The rain does not fall every day; the snow does not descend every hour in the winter. There are times of special refreshing from the Almighty Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.

Where are we, my friends, that we think of remitting effort, when two thousand persons came forward lately to unite with the churches on a single Sabbath in this city and its vicinity? Where are those who have lately united with the churches, if our effort is to stop? They ought not to have entered the Church if they are to be idle; and, if they are not to be idle, this movement will not pause. Thousands of new souls, aflame with the first love of Him who is the fulness of all excellence, are coming before our communities; and they, too, will be judged by Lessing's rule. They, too, will be dissected by the scalpel and the microscope of their fruitfulness. If those who claim to have entered upon a new life are not fruitful, they have not yet found the new

life; for whatever has life has growth. If there be life and growth in all these scions, shall we not have other clusters here of peace, good-will to men, absence of all narrow scepticism, and a fulness of devout, thoughtful, aggressive, religious activity? Shall we not have a revival in business following a revival in religion?

Milton was not prodigal of his praises; but, of a governor of Massachusetts, he wrote:—

> "Vane, young in years, but in sage counsels old,
> Than whom a better senator ne'er held
> The helm of Rome, when gowns, not arms, repelled
> The fierce Epirot and the African bold.
> Both spiritual power and civil thou hast learned:
> Therefore on thy firm hand Religion leans
> In peace, and reckons thee her eldest son." *Sonnet* xvii.

Charles II. is a great power in history yet. There are successors of him in many a circle of thought, and in many a drifting, sleepy haughty portion of society. Charles II. took Harry Vane to the scaffold, and chopped off his head. On whose side are we,—that of Harry Vane, or that of Charles II.? I am looking on the whole trend of the current of our history since Henry Vane was here, and on the trend of English history, and on the trend of scholarship throughout the world. We know what brilliant letters there were to uphold Charles II. We know how Cromwell, when he dissolved the Long Parliament, said, "God preserve me from Sir Harry Vane." "Why should we fear death?" asked Vane, the day before his execution. "I find it rather shrinks from me than I from it." "The Lord will be a better father to you," he said to his children, as he stooped to embrace them. "Be not you troubled, for I am going home to my Father. Suffer anything from men, rather than sin against God. Ten thousand deaths, rather than defile the chastity of conscience!" From the windows and tops of houses, the people poured out prayers and sobs for him as he passed by to the scaffold; and they shouted aloud, "God go with you!" "Blessed be God," he exclaimed as he bared his neck for the axe, "I have kept a conscience void of offence to this day, and have not deserted the righteous cause for which I suffer!" That cause was civil and religious liberty. It has immeasurable interests yet at stake in the world. Let us take up the great enterprise of our fathers, which is now the hope of the whole planet,—the story of religion transmuted into politics, and not only that, but into literature and science. America is but half republican until she Christianizes not only politics and the schools, but literature and trade, greed and fraud, and even those twin Saharas,—an unscientific Liberalism and a dead Orthodoxy. America will not meet the wishes of its early martyrs until it is brought so close to God's bosom, that the beating of His pulses may be the marching song of all our ages.

THE SOURCES OF THEODORE PARKER'S ERRORS.

"Incidis in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim."
PHILIPPE GAULTIER.

"In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas."
MELANCTHON.

There are great changes occurring in New England in the direction of increased individualism in the sentiments of men of moderate education. But the mass of New-Englanders are persons of moderate education. The healthful audacity of democracy in giving every man a right to act wholly for himself in politics induces the feeling that one man is as good as another at the bar of philosophy, as well as before the courts. We are all equal in the high matters decided by suffrage: why should not all be equal in the high matters decided by scholarship? Man's rights are inalienable, are they not? And do not his rights extend to his intellectual as well as to his political interests? A gulf-current of democracy and individualism is beneath these latest ages; and it is from its tepid breast that many of the vapours arise which temporarily obscure the popular philosophic and religious sky.

A very subtly correct picture of America, and, in some sense, of the middle classes of the England and Scotland of to-day, Alexis de Tocqueville drew in these incisive sentences:—

"Individualism is of democratic origin, and threatens to spread in the same ratio as equality of condition. Aristocracy makes a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king: democracy breaks that chain, and severs every link of it. As social conditions become more equal, the number of persons increases, who, although they are neither rich nor powerful enough to exercise any great influence over their fellows, have, nevertheless, acquired or retained sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants. They owe nothing to any man; they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of considering themselves as standing alone. Democracy makes every man forget his ancestors, hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from him: it throws him back for ever upon himself. Individualism is a feeling which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellows, and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself." (DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America*, vol. ii., book ii., chap. ii.)

We have in New England the most intense democracy on the globe; and, even in our highly cultured circles, a tendency exists to an exaggerated and unscientific individualism. Our Emerson himself is not so much pantheistic as he is individualistic, uttering, now excellent Christian truth, and now matter of a pantheistic look. Everywhere he is true to individualism, not everywhere to pantheism. This tendency of democracy will not be a permanent one; but it will appear more and more in the democratic ages, and in the popular quarters of our civilization—until when? Until the day when popular education shall have been elevated high enough to know that man's intellectual rights, while belonging to all individuals, are, perhaps, best defended by a few who have time to attend to the strategy of fortification. In England the political rights of the many have been best

defended by the few. But America has learned, that, on the whole, it is best to let all men defend their own political rights. Nevertheless, even here, a few have done the most in that field. We must finally come, in the intellectual range of our lives, to the same rule that we adopt in the political field and in the practical arts; all men shall be free to discuss; all men shall be free to decide; but as, in the political field and in the practical arts, we do pay attention to the few who can examine matters thoroughly, and have had long experience, so in the intellectual field we will pay attention to a few, after deciding that they are leaders worthy of the name.

Lift the standard of the mass of men high enough to cause them to choose the right kind of leadership in things intellectual and moral, as they now often do in things political and mechanical, and I will show you a public sentiment which will be a Vesuvian lava-front, to tear away and to burn up, once and for ever, all that is evil in our civilization. We must elevate public opinion until the masses of men are ripe enough to discern and follow merit. You say I am making a plea for some party. I am making a plea only for scholarship. I am making a plea only against religious quacks. I am making a plea only against haughty sciolism. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing; and our heads are in newspapers and ledgers. The better specimens of our omnipresent newspapers are not as well patronized as the poorer. This will not always be so. When we shall have learned the difference between the better and the best, and refuse to be guided by third-rate authorities in the press, on the platform, or even in the pulpit, we may lift public sentiment at last to an overawing power which will give America her right position, and justify her democracy; and, until we do lift popular opinion thus high by popular education, we shall never justify ourselves before the bar of the nations, nor before the providence of Almighty God.

Theodore Parker appeared in New England at a time when we were all in the sophomore year. Large parts of new England are in their sophomore year and do not know the fact. Much of the rest of the country has not yet come to college. There never was on the globe as large a community of men as now exists in New England, all thinking for themselves, and pushed to a height of haughty sciolism by the law of individualism inhering in democracy. The sophomoric disease is mental unrest mingled with omniscience. We have not begun to learn the evils of such a state of things. We hardly know that it exists. If I were not a flying scout and outlook committee—this is all I am—for my learned brethren here, going up and down, and conversing with some wise men, I doubt whether I should feel, as I now do, that what threatens us, perhaps, more than anything else, is precisely what De Tocqueville pointed out in this pervasive individualism. Under democracy men think as they please. We may go to church or not; and, if we choose, we may found a church. Every man can stand alone, and so may, within certain very general bounds, walk as he will. Small circles of individualists know little of each other, and they need know little. Almost their only communication with each other's ideas and sympathies, it may be, is through poor

newspapers, published weekly, and very weakly it oftentimes is. Thus we find more and more individualism growing up; for it is yet the law, that to him that hath of American individualism shall be given more and more abundantly.

This mood of the sophomore year dawned on New England at about the time when that great wave of secularization, beginning in 1631, and on the first ripples of which Harry Vane looked with no little concern, had risen to its haughty, turbulent height. About that same time, too, there struck us another wave, narrow, and now largely decadent,—the rationalism of Germany. The two seething seas, in collision, shot aloft above this reef of New England individualism. The reef is there, although the two waves have gone down. There will be more foam over that reef yet.

How did Theodore Parker fall into his errors of speculation?

1. He was in his course of education at a time when a now outgrown and discredited school of rationalism—that of De Wette, Strauss, and Baur—was possessed of great power in Germany.

2. His real teachers were De Wette, whom he translated, and Baur, whom he echoed.

3. His place of education was among Unitarians, themselves much divided by the results of their characteristic negations.

4. The system of thought which afterwards became his absolute religion, he formed while he was yet in the Divinity School, and insufficiently equipped for independent metaphysical speculation.

5. When he was yet a young man, his theological opinions were vehemently attacked publicly; he was forced to defend them vehemently; and thus his early crudities became his creed.

6. Absorbed in political and social discussions after his advent to Boston, his distinctively theological and metaphysical scholarship was comparatively little advanced after that period.

7. His nature was impetuously independent by birth, and became more so by the struggles of his public life.

8. He was deficient in the insight of reverence.

9. He was deficient in æsthetic perception.

10. Sympathy came to him in his anti-slavery efforts only too slowly from the supporters of established creeds.

11. He rarely came into contact with the best representatives of Orthodox scholarship.

12. In a hundred points he misapprehended the nature of orthodox teaching. He did not adequately distinguish from each other the supernatural and the unnatural, inspiration and illumination, inspiration and dictation, chastisement and punishment, total depravity and total corruption, disarrangedness of soul and unarrangeability, certainty and necessity, belief and faith.

13. His philosophical system was so loose, that he admitted into the list of self-evident truths or intuitions the Divine Existence and the fact of immortality, and made no distinction between intuition and instinct.

14. He died while his philosophical and theological systems were, by his own confession, crude, fragmentary, and provisional.

15. His scheme of thought underrates the significance of the fact of sin to such a degree as to deny several of the intuitions of conscience, and so by not attending to the whole list of self-evident truths, but only to a part of them, violates the fundamental principle of the scientific method.

When Theodore Parker was in the Divinity School at Cambridge, he one day made reference to "Old Paul."—"Why," said Henry Ware, one of the noblest and acutest men who ever taught in that institution, "you must be more reverent."—"Well," said Parker, "hereafter I will refer to the gentleman from Tarsus." All through his life, this capacity to be rough and ready was with him, and was a great popular power at times; and yet it indicated a certain lack of insight; and that deficiency his different biographers recognize.

There was in him a noble perception of the glory of everything that had conscience behind it. Theodore Parker seems to me to have had in his nature a majestic chord out of the old Pilgrim harp. The iron strand of the Puritan lyre which Milton and Cromwell, and Hampden and Vane, first struck, lifted up its stern, inspired sound in our civil war in the John Brown Marching Song. That Presbyterian captain! Parker wrote about him from Rome, that he would die "like a saint," and that "from Stephen who was stoned at Jerusalem, to Mary Dyer who was hung on the great tree on Boston Common, there have been few spirits more pure or devoted than this martyr" (WEISS, vol. ii. p. 178). The thrum of that chord we heard side by side with the John Brown marching choral, and we found no dissonance in the tones. That one note in him we glorify, and desire to have it heard long and far. While the Presbyterian captain stands there in history on the Virginia scaffold against the winter sky, let Theodore Parker's approval of him, and co-partnership with him, be remembered.

But this man lacked the deeper insights of æsthetic perception, perhaps, as much as any one who has ever written as copiously as he in Boston. This lack, too, is recognized well by his biographers; but it is only Mr. Frothingham who has been candid enough to admit that it unfitted him, in some particulars, for biblical criticism. When Theodore Parker was in Rome in 1859, he wrote, "I take more interest in a cattle-show than in a picture-show." He then goes on to say, "I love beauty." But he had no sympathy with those who lamented the absence of art in America. "There is not a saw-mill in Rome." That was his principal trouble with the Eternal City. He did not care to read a second time the best poem ever written by Mrs. Browning, Shakspeare's daughter. Now, in some passages of the Scriptures, he found neither a cattle-show nor a saw-mill; and Mr. Frothingham says, "This absence from his mind of the one artistic quality accounts for the something like crudeness that mars occasionally his treatment of the poetical side of ancient religions [Christianity among them, of course], their creeds and their documents. And this even helps to explain certain inaccuracies which sprang from a defect in æsthetic perception oftener than from infidelity to literal facts" (FROTHINGHAM, *Life of Parker*, pp. 576-578). Dr. Bartol, whose literary perceptions are certainly very sensitive, and

often singularly revelatory of truth, wrote years ago of Theodore Parker, "Right or wrong, I could not recognize in him genius poetic" (FROTHINGHAM, *Life of Parker*, p. 579). Mr. Emerson stood up at the commemorative services held for Theodore Parker, and said, "We can hardly ascribe to his mind the poetic element. I found some harshness in his treatment both of Greek and Hebrew antiquity, and sympathized with the pain of many good people in his auditory, whilst I acquitted him, of course, of any wish to be flippant" (Ibid., p. 549). In Parker you meet sinewy English often, and phrases that are like drum-beats; but very frequently the ruggedness and haste degenerate into roughness and uncouthness. You can rarely read ten pages of his writings consecutively, without feeling that there is a lack of grace; that smoothness is absent; and that, on the whole, Lowell was right when he said about this man, that he had—

> "Sophroniscus's son's head o'er the features of Rabelais."
>
> *Fable for Critics*

Even in Theodore Parker's best analytical passages, there is often something of that combination,—forceful thought, but badly angular expression. On the topic of slavery we find rough, harsh words, which appear to be, at times, the result of the lack of æsthetic perception, rather than of moral. What fearful doctrine this is, for instance!—"A man held against his will as a slave has a natural right to *kill* every one who seeks to prevent his enjoyment of liberty. It is the natural duty of the slave to develop this natural right in a practical manner, and actually *kill* all who seek to prevent his enjoyment of liberty. The free man has a natural right to help the slaves recover that liberty, and, in that enterprise, to do for them all that they have a right to do for themselves" ("Letter from Rome," Nov. 24, 1859. WEISS, *Life*, vol. ii. p. 170). He was a stern iconoclast indeed; and sometimes in his propositions, when great principles were to be brought into the foreground in the analytical method, he cut such a rough wound, that it is hardly wonderful that his sword was hacked by opposition from his own camp, although drawn in a righteous cause. When he attacks Orthodoxy, his weakness is in his extravagance. Here he finds God eminently malignant. His standard accusations cannot be read over a tombstone of any believer, without seeming weak and wicked. In his best book, that on "Theism," he is so full of this irritated, fretted mood, that the only reply needed to his thinking is to point out the fact that it is not thinking, but fretting. On account of his lack of æsthetic perception, he hardly knew how ungraceful all fretting is in a philosopher. Nevertheless, on several sides of his nature, this iconoclast was a copy of his gentle mother; but the father in him predominated.

It is to be remembered, however, that Theodore Parker's chief difficulty, after all, came from his being brought into New England at a time when a culminating, secularized historic wave seized him, with all his native independence, and of course lifted him to the height of the negations which then were popular. What was happening in Boston when Theodore Parker was in Cambridge as a student? Who were

the great men in public life here? What had just come to pass in New England? Why, in 1834, we had the haughty mood of a local movement which regarded itself as embracing the world, because it embraced Beacon Hill and Bunker Hill. I beg everybody's pardon; but it is simply historic accuracy, to notice that some victories have ceased to be victories, for any large extent of territory out of sight of the dome of the State House. Nevertheless, that dome was the centre of much, and more than much, and in Parker's time was recognized as such. It had just been crowned as the centre of New England culture; and the drift of Unitarianism and Universalism was against not a little that deserved to be criticised in popular Orthodoxy, although against very little in scholarly discussions.

Scholarly Orthodoxy has not changed greatly in the last fifty years. Partisan critics, perhaps, think that I am not candid concerning Orthodoxy, simply because they forget the distinction between popular and scholarly Orthodoxy. I am not here to defend all the loose phrases that have been used in the pulpits of Eastern Massachusetts in the last hundred years. It is no part of my policy to stand up here for anything that is not, properly speaking, a portion of scholarly New England theology. The question whether I defend historical Orthodoxy, or accredited Orthodoxy, is a very minor matter compared with the inquiry whether I defend truth. What do I care what historical Orthodoxy is, or what accredited Orthodoxy is? We desire to know what the truth is. The latter question is here always put in the foreground. But I defy most indignantly, in the name of those scholars, who have by their presence done more a thousand times to carry any thought uttered here out on the wings of print than anything I have done,—I defy indignantly all who would assert that I am not in harmony with accredited Orthodoxy in New England. An authority, than which there is no higher in this city in my denomination, has lately published these words: "The Congregationalists have seven seminaries in this country. When Mr. Cook is charged with deranging Orthodoxy, if it is meant that his teachings are essentially different from those of the Congregational theological seminaries of the land, the charge only shows the ignorance of the one who makes it" (CUSHING, Rev. Dr. C., of Boston, editor of "Congregational Quarterly," *Letter* in "Boston Globe," May 16).

Where is there a man that can show dissonance on any point of importance between what has been taught here and what is to-day called accredited Orthodoxy, and was implicitly if not explicitly accredited Orthodoxy, fifty, eighty, or a hundred years ago? Various changes of phraseology have been made; but remember, if you will, that in religious science, as in every other, we need a new vocabulary every hundred years. Distinguish vocabularies from ideas, and you will find that the rock on which New England has stood since Henry Vane's time crops out yet, here in Boston; and that the emphases of scholarship are given now to substantially the same eternal truths which brought our fathers to this iron shore.

Besides the billows beating on us in their long roll from 1631, political influences were disaffecting some with Orthodoxy in 1834.

Channing and Garrison were leading thought here on anti-slavery topics when Theodore Parker was yonder in Cambridge as a student, sensitively absorbing such influences as his day could send him. Horace Mann was just beginning his great work for the education of the people. Pierpont, single handed, was fighting the battle against intemperance in the street, and for righteousness in the pulpit. "The brilliant genius of Emerson, rising in the winter nights," as Parker himself says, "hung over Boston, drawing the eyes of ingenuous youth and the masses of the people to look up to that great new star, a beauty and a mystery, which charmed for the moment, while it gave also perennial inspiration as it led them forward along new paths and toward new hopes" (WEISS, *Life of Parker*, vol. ii. pp. 458, 459). Spurzheim in 1832, and Coombe in 1838, gave lectures here; and we had phrenology on the brain. Brook Farms were in the air—and almost nowhere else! The writings of Wordsworth and Carlyle and Coleridge and Cousin were new. The German language began to be learned in Boston.

In 1835 what was happening in Germany? Strauss had just risen above the horizon,—a star that shook down terror on many scholarly circles, but which we have seen at last obscured before its setting. The last and the most important work of Strauss (see *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1874) was disowned by average German radicalism, as full of positions that cannot be defended. Did Theodore Parker lean on Strauss? Yes and no. He criticised Strauss. There were many things in that writer which Parker himself could not adopt when he began his career. But open here Parker's last account of himself; and he says, "Young Mr. Strauss, in whom genius for criticism was united with extraordinary learning, and rare facility of philosophic speech, wrote his 'Life of Jesus,' where he rigidly scrutinized the genuineness of the Gospels and the authenticity of their contents, and with scientific calmness brought every statement to his steady scales, weighing it, not always justly, as I think, but impartially always, with philosophical coolness and deliberation" (WEISS, *Life* vol. ii. p. 459). Strauss taught Parker to undervalue the historical evidences of Christianity, and delivered him to the now discredited school of De Wette and Baur, of whom he was a follower, even after Germany ceased to give them any commanding following. Every scholar knows, that, "as a sect in biblical criticism, the Tübingen school has perished, and that its history has been written in more than one tongue" (THAYER, PROFESSOR J. HENRY, *Criticism confirmatory of the Gospels*, *Boston lectures*, pp. 363, 364, 371). But, from about 1835 to 1845, that school had great influence; and Theodore Parker mistook it for the Gulf Current of scholarship, and committed himself to it most enthusiastically and most unfortunately.

The sadly tortured and divided fatherland—Germany is our fatherland, as England is our motherland—had been under the heel of Napoleonic wars. Scratch the Old World in the centre of Europe once, and you find the wars of the first Napoleon; twice, and you find the Thirty-years' war; thrice, and you find the middle ages. Napoleon said, Scratch a Russian, and you find beneath the surface

a Tartar." Scratch Central Germany in its peasant life three times, and you come upon the age that preceded Charlemagne. Although writing for a sceptical sheet ("The Commonwealth," May 26), an observer distinctly affirmed in Leipzig, lately, that "rationalism makes far less show"—that was the phrase—now in the universities than it did fifty or eighty years ago. That is what Dorner will tell you, and Tholuck and Kahnis, and Schwarz and Christlieb, and all the scholars on both sides in Germany. Little by little Germany has been shaking off Parisian influences. Rationalism speaks to painfully empty benches in the universities, while evangelical lecture-rooms at Leipzig, Halle, and Berlin, are comparatively crowded. Nevertheless, what I affirm now is what I have affirmed everywhere (see *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1875, p. 766), that many of the less religiously and intellectually cultivated parts of the German population feel yet the inherited influence of the rationalism outgrown by German specialists in religious science. The average German yonder on the Elbe or Oder when he leaves his fatherland is what he is when he lands here. The decline of rationalism, however, among theological experts in Germany, is a fact as significant as it is indisputable. You will be told triumphantly that the number of theological students is less now in Germany than it was fifty or eighty years ago. That is true. Is this a good sign, or a bad one? You may easily be confused on this point, unless you cast a sharp glance on Germany. What is Germany doing at this moment? She is swinging away from the State Church to the voluntary system in ecclesiastical affairs. What is the result of that? Why, Germany has no abundance of material fit to make deacons of now; and Luther said, in language which I have lying before me, that there was no material in Germany fit to make deacons of in his day. Why was there not? Because Germany had no voluntary church system, and had never educated the mass of her citizens to activity in church affairs. She is doing this slowly now. But superb supporters of churches are not made in an hour. Deacons are poor institutions, you say; but the ability to produce good deacons is a high test of civilization. By the way, some say that I was brought up a narrow Baptist, because my father—whom God bless!—is a Baptist and open communionist. He united with the church when he was forty years of age, and I when I was fourteen. Who put on the shell? If you please, I was brought up, if anything, a Universalist, but of the serious type, I hope. Some good seed, I trust, was sown; and, if any good fruit has been produced, it has been the result of the fact that I was let alone, and came into my present position by the natural law of devolopment and of the survival of the fittest.

Of course the stagnant marshes of German State Church life will not be drained in a day. The number of theological students has temporarily diminished; but the number of evangelical students of theology in Germany has relatively increased. Little by little, men who teach religious truth are being put under the conditions of a voluntary system, and obliged to obtain their support largely from the people. But even with rationalism among the peasants, even with rationalism

in the middle class, the average rule is, that the ministers who are best paid in Germany are those who preach an undiluted Christianity. The churches are changing from the State Church system to a more free system. They are not accustomed to collect funds. They know almost nothing, by experience, of our voluntary plan. For a while, ministers of the poorer classes will starve in Germany; and you must not be surprised if the number of students in theology diminishes. That is no proof that Germany is going over to scepticism. It is important to notice that Germany is in a period of transition in church affairs, and, of course, must walk staggeringly or weakly for a while, until she walks erect in the voluntary system. Ministers may be fewer for a time, because some of them may more easily than under the State Church become poor.

But this state of things is not likely to be permanent. Heidelberg is the only decidedly rationalistic university among the twenty renowned universities of Germany. It has almost no theological students. Scholarship in support of rationalism is not easily found in the theological faculties. Germany follows her universities much more closely than we do ours. Let Harvard and Yale take what position they please, will not the mechanic on the Merrimack think what he pleases? What are Harvard and Yale to him? But your skilled operative knows here, and he knows a great deal better in Germany, that the specialist who has honestly won his rank is the authority to which he ought to listen, after a fair weighing of evidence for himself; and, now that the specialists in religious science in the universities have changed posture in Germany, we shall ultimately find all German thought changing posture.

That change will affect this shore also. Where the old wave of German rationalism, smiting on the strand of individualism in American democracy, lifted up Parker and much else, we shall have an intuitional and physiological and biblical philosophy smiting the shore here, as well as in Germany. Parker looked far less deeply than Dorner and Müller have done into the axioms of the nature of things. Ultimately, when popular education has been lifted high enough, it is to be hoped that, in the name of self-evident truth, we shall forget many negations, and take the great organizing religious propositions, scientifically established concerning the natural laws of conscience, into that inestimably precious body of scholarship, which age after age has considered sound; and so we shall found our philosophy and our religion on those reefs of axiomatic self-evident truths, which say to all attacking surges, "Aha! thus far, and no farther."

As we use axioms in mathematical science and in physical, so we must employ axioms in religious science. The axioms of religious science are no more in danger of going out of date than those of mathematical science. It is axiomatic theology which this Lectureship has taught. It is a theology of axioms, it is a religious science based on the nature of things, it is self-evident truth, upon which I have endeavoured to plant my small fortune. It is in the name of self-evident truth that I for one, on this reef of American individualism, and this stormy coast of Boston, sleep well. But I do not always

sleep. The moon is in the sky; and it heralds the coming sun. In the starry concave of axioms, the conscience, which has in it deep presentiments of the necessity, not only of a new birth, but of the Atonement, and which never yet has been adequately investigated by evangelical, and never outlined—I had almost said—by merely rationalistic thought, is the moon in the firmament of reason. When I gaze upon the orb of scientific, ethical knowledge, which in our age is no longer a crescent, I remember, not infrequently, that the eagles in the tropics, so bright is the moon at the full, sometimes in the midnight ruffle their pinions, and make ready to move aloft, as they do occasionally from Ætna's and Vesuvius' top, thinking that the day has come! Self-evident truths, axioms—they will not go out of date in mathematics; they will not go out of date in theology. We must teach all men to believe in religious axioms, as we have taught some to believe in mathematical. We must gaze on the stars and the moon, if we do not wait for the sun, or a knowledge of man's whole nature, to rise. But he who waiteth for the sun will not be disappointed.

The Koran says, that when Abraham set out on his travels, he was insufficiently acquainted with religious truth. He saw the star of evening, and said to his followers, "This is my god." But the star went down, and Abraham exclaimed, "I care not for any gods which set." He waited until the constellations appeared, and then said, "These are my gods." But the galaxies were carried beneath the west; and he cried aloud, "I care not for gods which set." When the moon uprose, he said, "This is my god." But the moon, too, went down. When the sun uprose, he saluted it as divine; but the wheeling sky carried the king of day behind the flaming pines of the west. And Abraham in the holy twilight, turning his face toward the assenting azure, said to his people, "I give myself to Him who was, and is, and is to come, Father of the stars and moon and sun, and who never sets, because He is the Eternal Noon."

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